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Since the emergence of the Christian Right as an identified political and social 
movement in the late 1970s, commentators have sought to explain it. I Love to Tell the 
Stor(ies) posits that Christian Right rhetoric can be defined and understood by its appeals 
to two narratives about the universe and the nation. The Cosmic Narrative suggests that 
the cosmos is a battlefield between the Christian God and Satan, hinged on the 
incarnation of Jesus Christ and culminating in the End Times. In the American Narrative, 
the nation was founded by Protestant Christians to fulfill God’s purposes, but has fallen 
into moral decline and must return to Christianity so that it can again be blessed by God. 
I Love to Tell the Stor(ies) reconstructs these narratives from texts by prominent 
Christian Right rhetors. The narratives resonate with one another in the parameters they 
set out for how the universe is held together and for epistemology within that universe, 
forming the foundation of the Christian Right’s rhetorical edifice. A challenge emerges 
for Christian Right rhetors in some of the particulars, though, as the narratives present 
dissonant hermeneutics for space and time, for the identity of the movement’s adherents, 
and for the relationship to other politically-conservative religious worldviews. This 
project concludes that while these dissonances threaten to undermine the Christian 
Right’s worldview, they can also be strategically used to bolster that worldview. Rhetors 
 
can use these dissonances to transpose methods of reasoning from one narrative to 
another, creating a context in which adherents’ actions have eternal consequences, the 
symbols of civil religion are reinterpreted as special revelation from God to those with 
the means to understand them, and the humanist enemy is not merely a threat to God’s 
purposes for the American nation but an occupying army in league with the forces of 
Satan in the great cosmic war. In the hands of skilled rhetors, the worldview structure 
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In chapter 12 of the New Testament book of Hebrews, the writer exhorts readers 
to take heed of the “great cloud of witnesses” that have come before and, following their 
example, to “run with perseverance the race marked out for us.” I beg the reader’s 
indulgence (and hardly for the last time) in adapting those words from their original 
context into this one, to give credit and thanks to the “cloud of witnesses” who have 
provided encouragement, guidance, and wisdom as I near the end of the first major leg of 
this project. 
The Department of Communication at the University of Maryland has been 
incredibly supportive and indulgent of a student with an ambitious project on an atypical 
career path. Even as I took full-time work in the private sector, relegating this dissertation 
to the night and weekend shift, and even after I moved some three hundred miles away 
from College Park, they remained supportive, responsive, and flexible. The length of this 
project spanned the tenure of multiple department chairs (Elizabeth Toth and Shawn J. 
Parry-Giles) and multiple graduate directors (Shawn J. Parry-Giles, Kristjana Maddux, 
Linda Aldoory, and Xiaoli Nan), all of whom have been very supportive of my work. I 
could not have finished this leg of the project without the critique, fellowship, support, 
and tolerance of my colleagues and friends in the graduate program, especially Alyssa 
Samek, Tim Barney, Elizabeth Gardner, Terri Donofrio, and Ben Krueger, all of whom 
have gone on to bigger and better things. 
This project would not be what it is without my advisor and dissertation 
committee chair, Trevor Parry-Giles, who was extremely patient with a project that 
seemed to proceed at fits and starts, occasionally with months between updates. His 
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editing contributions, critiques, encouragement, and support were essential to this project, 
and it would not be the same without him. My dissertation committee—Kristjana 
Maddux, Shawn J. Parry-Giles, Michelle Murray Yang, Stephen Freund, and James 
Klumpp—provided keen insight, direction, and guidance for this project, and their critical 
questions have been invaluable in shaping it.  
I have also been incredibly fortunate in the support I have received from my other 
academic connections, both from previous graduate programs and from others I have met 
along the way. We are all the product of our experiences, and mine have been filled with 
excellent mentors and teachers even before I first arrived in College Park. Throughout 
this project, I drew on the resources of my previous theological studies at Fuller 
Theological Seminary; while I was working on the preliminary research for chapter 1 of 
this project, Marguerite Shuster at Fuller provided me with invaluable guidance into 
some of the finer points of heilsgeschichte. At Bowling Green State University, where I 
received my first MA in theatre, there was a visiting professor in theatre history, Stephen 
Berwind, whom I found myself loathing for brutal take-home exams—that is, until I 
moved on to the next semester and realized how invaluable a skill it was to be able to 
quickly lay down large amounts of quality academic prose, without making the perfect 
the enemy of the good. At Calvin College, I learned from mentors like Debra Freeberg, 
David Leugs, Randall Bytwerk, and Stephanie Sandberg to never give up, never stop 
asking questions, and never be afraid to lop off a huge chunk of a scale model or a 
dissertation if it just wasn’t working. While I was working on this project, my wife’s 
colleagues and faculty at Virginia Theological Seminary were happy to provide me with 
encouragement, particularly Lisa Kimble, Katherine Grieb, and visiting professor 
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William H. Sachs, whose class on fundamentalism was extremely helpful in shaping my 
thinking about this project (and also gave me the opportunity to meet Martin E. Marty, 
one of my academic heroes). 
In a time when right-wing politicians try to score political points by attacking 
public schools and the educators who dedicate their lives to their profession, I would also 
be remiss if I did not point out that to the extent that I have been successful in college and 
graduate school, it is only because I was so well-prepared by thirteen years of public 
education, from kindergarten through high school. The men and women who shaped my 
ability to reason, to read clearly and express my thoughts in writing, to think critically 
about the world around me, were career public educators and teachers’ union members in 
Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, and Michigan. I am living evidence that public schools work.  
My supervisor and friend at Dewey Square Group, Timothy Chambers, has been 
incredibly supportive and flexible as I have burned the candle at both ends with my 
Dewey work and this dissertation, as have my other colleagues at Dewey Digital, 
particularly Eli Center, whose encouragement and friendship has been invaluable. 
Most importantly, this project would not have been possible without my family. 
My parents raised me to value hard work, intellectual rigor, critical thinking, and personal 
integrity, and they have remained supportive and loving even when those very values led 
me to political and religious positions that were a bit further afield from what they may 
have expected. They have embodied and modeled the very things I value as the best parts 
of evangelical Christianity—deep community and relationships, a commitment to 
character, integrity, and honesty, and an unwavering desire to show God’s love to others.  
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In 2012, about midway through this project, I met a woman named Cortney Dale 
who was on the path to becoming an Episcopal priest. She agreed to marry me despite my 
being an incredibly frustrating person to live with at times, and supported me in this 
project long after it was clear that I had bitten off well more than I could chew. She 
sacrificed countless weekend afternoons with me at the seminary library when she could 
have been doing much more enjoyable things, and continually encouraged me when I was 
tempted to give up hope. 
Finally, I must acknowledge my feline research assistants: Buster, Lucille, and the 
dearly-departed Simon. They were always happy to settle on my lap as I read, perch on 
my shoulder as I wrote, or provide me with a needed distraction during my writing 
breaks, even as I could tell they secretly thought I should be devising new ways to 
provide them with tuna instead of writing a doctoral dissertation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The dust from the World Trade Center still hung in the air over New York City on 
September 13, 2001. The nation awoke that morning still largely unsure of what had 
happened two days earlier, when hijacked airplanes had crashed into the Twin Towers 
and the Pentagon, completely destroying the former and leaving a massive scar in the 
latter. Thousands were still missing as people went from hospital to hospital, clutching 
pictures of loved ones and asking emergency room receptionists to look for wives, 
husbands, partners, children, mothers, fathers. 
That morning, the FBI confirmed what many had suspected: that behind the 
attacks had been Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist 
group. President George W. Bush promised action to keep the nation safe, but many 
Americans, still mourning the lost, were unsure of when the next shoe was going to drop. 
Among other responses, Americans looked to religious authority figures as well as 
political ones to help them make sense of the events of the previous days. Church 
attendance boomed in the wake of the attacks as people sought to understand what was 
happening in a religious context or simply to be comforted by community or rituals that 
reminded them of childhood. 
Pat Robertson, founder of the Christian Coalition and 1988 Republican 
presidential primary candidate, whose religious news/commentary show The 700 Club 
aired every morning on the ABC Family Network, also sought to provide understanding 
to his audience. Robertson appeared frequently on his show, generally providing 
commentaries interpreting the news from his own political and religious perspective. Like 
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virtually all other news shows during that week, the entire broadcast of The 700 Club on 
Thursday, September 13, was devoted to the events of September 11. 
Toward the end of the September 13 show, Robertson welcomed Jerry Falwell—
fundamentalist Baptist, founder of Liberty University and the Moral Majority, and 
frequent guest on The 700 Club—to a satellite interview to provide answers to the “grief, 
fear, and unanswered questions” of Robertson’s audience. During the course of the 
interview, Falwell and Robertson had an exchange that made headlines: 
JERRY FALWELL: The ACLU's got to take a lot of blame for this.  
PAT ROBERTSON: Well, yes.  
FALWELL: And, I know that I'll hear from them for this. But, throwing 
God out successfully with the help of the federal court system, throwing 
God out of the public square, out of the schools. The abortionists have got 
to bear some burden for this because God will not be mocked. And when 
we destroy 40 million little innocent babies, we make God mad. I really 
believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the 
gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative 
lifestyle, the ACLU, People For the American Way, all of them who have 
tried to secularize America. I point the finger in their face and say 'you 
helped this happen.’1 
These comments represented a symbolic breach in political commentators’ rhetorical 
construction of the nation’s attitude in the 48 hours that had transpired since the attacks. 
In those two days, the story went, even those who had historically viewed one another 
with suspicion or opposition were coming together. Newspapers in nations that had been 
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critical of American policies throughout the 1990s and early 2000s were proclaiming 
solidarity with Americans’ victimization, liberal and conservative politicians were 
standing side-by-side, and people who had only a week before viewed New York City as 
a den of iniquity were proclaiming themselves New Yorkers in spirit. Now, Falwell and 
Robertson had ruptured that peace by blaming their political opponents for inciting God’s 
wrath and thus removing God’s protection from the nation, allowing the attacks to 
happen. 
The criticism heaped on the remarks—not only from the media and 
commentators, but also from Falwell and Robertson’s allies and friends—was eventually 
too much for the duo.2 Several days later, Falwell issued a clarification of the remarks 
that apologized for any offense he had caused, and after that was deemed insufficient by 
many commentators, issued a second apology that was much more repentant; Robertson 
suggested in a press release that because of the satellite feed he had not understood the 
remarks Falwell was making, despite stating his full agreement with them on camera.  
Because of the controversy resulting from that brief exchange, the bulk of the 
attention from scholars and media has been on that brief portion of the interview. The 
entire interview segment is laced with similar associations that reveal a larger narrative 
structure and framework at play; the reason that particular portion was so controversial 
was that it made the worldview of Falwell, Robertson, and the Christian Right as a whole 
explicit rather than implicit, providing media critics and scholars something to latch on to 
and point to as an obvious marker of the Christian Right mindset.  
Throughout the interview, Falwell alternated between literal and symbolic 
interpretations of the attacks, between putting them into a contemporary political context 
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and a Biblically-driven theological narrative context, between seeing them as a call to 
greater devotion to God and seeing them as a call for America to become a stronger, 
more traditionally moral nation. In jumping back and forth between these interpretations, 
Falwell conflated the general sense of loss and unity experienced by many in the nation 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks with what he saw as a nation’s need and desire for 
spiritual revival; while the rest of the world sees a nation that is coming together to make 
sense of the attacks is, Falwell sees a nation “on its knees” and “calling upon God.”3 To 
Falwell, the attacks are thus both the beginning of a righteous war—on a par with World 
War II and the War of 1812 as wars of unambiguous good and evil—and “God’s call to 
revival.”4 
Falwell relied on the metaphor of the United States as a new Israel—and 
strategically left his characterization of Israel somewhat ambiguous, in order to identify 
the US with both the contemporary state of Israel (when Falwell suggested that “now 
America knows in a horrible way what Israel's been facing for 53 years”5) and with the 
Biblical state of Israel (as Falwell cited 2 Chronicles 7:14, which Christian audiences 
would understand as a call to Israel to return to God in order to see their land healed).6 
Similarly, Falwell interpreted a quintessentially civil-religious act—Congress singing 
“God Bless America” on the Capitol steps—as their acceptance not only of a 
conservative Christian religious outlook, describing it as their having “called out on to 
God in prayer,” but of the political and social agenda of the Christian Right, as he also 
interpreted their singing as saying “let the ACLU be hanged.”7 
As the nation did “the only normal and natural and spiritual thing to do” and 
returned to God, Falwell suggested, it would also engage in violent retribution toward 
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enemies that it had allowed to continue for too long—not only “the Husseins, the Bin 
Ladens, the Arafats,” but also “the ACLU, the pagans, and the abortionists, and the 
feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an 
alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People For the American Way, all of them who have 
tried to secularize America.”8 
Falwell thus integrated two major narratives about the history, present, and future 
of his audience. In one, he invited his audience to see themselves as part of the story of 
Americans in the War of 1812 or World War II or contemporary Israelis, who, under 
attack from an intractable enemy, engaged in a righteous war to protect the nation and rid 
the world of a dangerous geopolitical actor. In the other narrative, he invited his audience 
to see themselves as the vanguard of a spiritual revival for the nation, as those who were 
called to help lead the nation back to God and, as part of this effort, to rid the nation of 
immoral elements like social liberals, in order to return God’s blessing and protection to 
the nation.  
Implicit in these narratives are larger stories about the origin and trajectory of the 
nation and of the universe as a whole; Falwell’s allusion to just part of the narratives 
created symbolic room for his audience, familiar with these narratives, to fill in the rest of 
the story themselves. It is the integration of these two narratives and typologies—the 
secular and the spiritual, a narrative about America and a narrative about God’s plans for 
the universe—that forms the foundation of the Christian Right’s worldview and 
distinguishes it as a movement from other factions of conservative politics or 
conservative religiosity. 
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A Rhetorical Definition for the Christian Right: Two Narratives 
What is the Christian Right? Who are the members of the movement? What does 
it mean when we refer to the Christian Right? Is membership in the Christian Right 
adherence to a certain set of policy positions or starting points—that the nuclear family 
should be normative, or that abortion should be illegal, or that homosexuality, 
bisexuality, and alternative gender identities should be discriminated against, 
discouraged, or punished by law? This would explain some of the movement’s voting 
activities, but it does not explain the movement’s continual expression through an 
electoral process: putting more conservative Republicans in office who have thus far not 
only failed to enact their agenda, but have in fact allowed it to be pushed even further 
back. Further, the Christian Right's policy positions on family, abortion, and LGBT 
liberation are not uniquely Christian; the Christian Right shares those policy prescriptions 
with conservative Muslims worldwide, but nobody would suggest that the Christian Right 
and conservative Muslims are political allies in the United States. 
Is membership in the Christian Right identification with one or more of the many 
organizations or institutions associated with the movement—like the now-defunct Moral 
Majority, Christian Voice, Religious Roundtable, or Christian Coalition, or any of the 
still-extant Christian Right-identified political/social organizations like the American 
Family Association, Concerned Women for America, Family Research Council, Alliance 
Defense Fund, or Eagle Forum? Is it attendance of a Christian Right-identified college or 
graduate school like Liberty University, Regents University, Bob Jones University, Oral 
Roberts University, Wheaton College, or the Bible Institute of Los Angeles, or 
membership in a church or denomination that strongly identifies with the Christian Right, 
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like the Southern Baptist Convention or the Presbyterian Church of America? This has 
been the traditional view of many political scientists, who see the political sphere in light 
of the influence of various institutions. But this definition does not explain every 
Christian Right voter, many of whom will never send a check to a group like the Family 
Research Council or attend a Christian Right college like Liberty University. Nor does 
this definition explain politicians like one of the Christian Right’s most revered political 
figures, Ronald Reagan, who never joined any specifically Christian Right-linked 
organization and was, by all accounts, not even a regular churchgoer. 
Is membership in the Christian Right a natural political expression of a religious 
affiliation with evangelical or conservative Christianity? This is the suggestion of many 
media commentators, who imply a direct correlation between evangelical Christians or 
conservative Catholics and the Christian Right, with the implicit suggestion that holding 
evangelical or conservative religious views necessarily means that one will favor the 
Christian Right's policy prescriptions and generally conservative politics. However, this 
definition does not account for both specifically apolitical conservative Christians, such 
as the fundamentalists and evangelicals who believe that seeking political power is either 
not compatible with Christianity or not a good use of Christians’ resources and witness in 
the world. Nor does this definition account for evangelical Christians like Jimmy Carter, 
Jim Wallis, or Shane Claiborne who hold evangelical religious views but work for liberal 
or even radical political causes. 
Is membership in the Christian Right merely a matter of identifying as a member 
of the Christian Right? When Reagan stood before a convention of evangelical ministers 
and told them that “you can’t endorse me, but I endorse you,” and proclaimed his 
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identification with the Christian Right, was he really part of the Christian Right?9 When 
George H.W. Bush proclaimed that he did not believe that atheists could be citizens or 
patriots, was he identifying with the Christian Right?10 What, then, do we make of the 
unwillingness of those two politicians in particular, who held the presidency for twelve 
straight years between them, to put substantial amounts of political capital behind any of 
the Christian Right’s major policy priorities? 
I argue here that attempting to identify people with the Christian Right movement 
is necessarily misguided, in that it will run up against political considerations and 
organizational and institutional nuances that make the process of definition difficult. 
Additionally, identifying policies with the Christian Right ignores those who clearly are 
not Christian Right members who hold similar policy viewpoints, and identifying 
organizations with the Christian Right, while certainly useful for understanding the 
movement’s leadership, major figures, and structural composition, has the opposite 
problem in that it leaves out many who would otherwise identify with the movement. 
I argue that the Christian Right should be defined rhetorically—as a descriptor not 
of people, organizations, or policies, but rather of a rhetorical form that fulfills certain 
functions for those who accept its validity. In other words, I suggest that we should 
identify a politician like Reagan, an organization like the Christian Coalition, or a policy 
position like opposition to abortion with the Christian Right insofar as they or the rhetors 




This rhetorical worldview is based on two narratives—myths about the universe 
and the nation—whose interaction and intersection function to shape the space and time 
in which adherents exist; create a political, social, and religious identity; and combine 
religious and political symbology to create alternative visions of civil religion that holds 
out a vision for the nation as a Christian republic with a universalizing mission. 
The first narrative is the Cosmic Narrative, which describes God’s master plan 
from creation to end times and tells the story of a grand Manichaean struggle between 
good and evil. The Cosmic Narrative is an interpretation of the Biblical narrative through 
the lens of a vast war between the forces of good (led by God) and the forces of evil (led 
by Satan) encompassing the entire history of the universe. The Cosmic Narrative begins 
with Adam and Eve being created and succumbing to temptation in the Garden of Eden, 
and its chief pivot point is the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ and the 
inauguration of the church. The Cosmic Narrative draws its audience’s eyes to a (near) 
future end of the world, in which Jesus will return to inaugurate the heavenly kingdom, 
reward His followers, and punish those who rejected Him. This narrative is the 
foundation of the Christian Right's rhetorical vision, setting the stage on which the stories 
of individuals, nations, and the human race as a whole are played out. 
The second narrative of the Christian Right, the American Narrative, is nested 
inside the Cosmic Narrative like a Russian Matryoshka doll. In the American Narrative, 
Europeans came to North America with the explicit purpose of founding a Christian 
nation—a purpose that was held in common by Americans, more or less, through the 
founding of the country and the nineteenth century. However, throughout the 20th 
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century, the nation was stolen from Christians by secular humanists, who took over 
national institutions, grew government into an oppressive monster, and rewrote history to 
paint the founders of the country as secularists. Unlike in the Cosmic Narrative, where a 
triumphant future is certain, the American Narrative's ending is left open-ended; either 
Christians will retake the nation and return it to God’s values, or the nation will continue 
along its moral decline until it collapses or the world ends. 
I will trace the ways in which these narratives, and the interplay between them, 
resonate, circulate, and function to motivate action among the various members—from 
local activists to national politicians—who identify with the Christian Right. These two 
narratives form the foundation of the entire logic of the Christian Right’s positions. If one 
accepts these narratives as true and valid, one will be logically led to the Christian 
Right’s policy positions, and indeed see them as the only logical choice; if one rejects one 
or both of these narratives, the logical system breaks down.  
It is the interactions and spaces between the two narratives—the ways in which 
the narratives contradict one another, reinforce and amplify one another, and create 
multiple identities for individuals who adhere to them—that makes the Christian Right a 
rhetorically unique movement. The resonances and dissonances between these narratives 
account for much of the appeal of Christian Right rhetoric, even as political and social 
commentators have, time and time again over the past thirty years, prematurely read the 
movement’s obituary. I identify three main functions of the narratives and their 
interaction, suggesting that they create and shape identity, that they motivate and invite 
action, and that they create discourses that weave together religious and political 
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symbology to create a form of civil religion that is both a political and religious 
argument. 
Narrative Functions 
The first function of these narratives is to form identity for those who adhere to 
them; members of the audience for these narratives are invited to see themselves and their 
own lives and struggles in light of their position in these grand dramas. In the Cosmic 
Narrative, adherents take the role of the members of the Church, engaging in spiritual 
warfare against the forces of darkness, living holy lives dedicated to their relationship 
with Jesus, evangelizing the lost and “saving souls,” and waiting expectantly for the 
Second Coming. In the American Narrative, adherents are the true heirs of the legacy of 
the nation’s founders, who are called to act locally and nationally to return Christianity 
and Christian practices to a position of legal and cultural normativity and to continue to 
work for spiritual revival throughout the culture. The nesting of the American Narrative 
inside the Cosmic Narrative creates a system of dual significance for the adherent’s 
identity; there are both harmonies and tensions between the believer’s two roles as a 
spiritual warrior for Christ and as a political and social activist. 
It is important to note here that these narratives not only create roles for those 
who adhere to them, but also frame and shape the rest of the world as well. Political or 
cultural disputes over things like sex education, late-term abortion, “Merry Christmas,” or 
LGBT rights take on extra salience when they are seen not only as battles against the 
continual moral decline of America or against those who would supplant the true heirs to 
the country, but also as part of the vast spiritual war against Satan; similarly, religious 
practices like prayer, musical worship, or evangelism take on political characteristics and 
 12 
are seen as crucial parts of these cultural and political battles. Political opponents can be 
understood as willing or unwilling dupes of Satan; geopolitical or cultural developments 
like the continual threat of nuclear war in the 1980s or the spreading of equal marriage 
for same-sex couples throughout the 2000s are seen not only in terms of their impact on 
the vector of America’s decline, but also in terms of their correspondence with this 
narrative’s vision of the end times. The whole of the world can be explained by these 
dramas; not only the adherent’s own identity, but all the other things that form part of an 
adherent’s life—friends, family, neighbors, business, church, media, government, society 
as a whole—are seen through the lens of these myths.  
In other words, these myths form a worldview, defined by Aerts et al. as “a 
symbolic system of representation that allows us to integrate everything we know about 
the world and ourselves into a global picture, one that illuminates reality as it is presented 
to us within a certain culture.”11 The mythological and dramatistic characteristics of these 
overarching myths enables the myths to function as totalizing lenses for reality; the space 
between the myths, in which harmonies and dissonances form and resolve, adds to the 
strength of the system in explaining things that cannot be fully understood in light of one 
or the other myth, or in enabling actions that might be seen as futile or worse in terms of 
just one of the narratives. This worldview functions to shape virtually every other 
philosophical and ideological approach by its adherents. It functions epistemologically, 
creating categories by which statements or phenomena are deemed true or false—as seen 
in disputes over the teaching of creationism, for example. It functions teleologically, 
folding everything the adherent sees into a vast sweep and plan of purposed history. 
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For indeed, the narratives’ salience is not only that they function to provide an 
identity for the adherent and a lens by which he or she understands the phenomena and 
people that make up his or her world, but also that they invite the adherent to take action 
to fulfill God’s purposes in that world. If one sees oneself as a warrior for Christ, putting 
on the armor of God and taking up the Sword of the Spirit to engage in spiritual warfare, 
the obvious next step is to march into battle. If one sees oneself as the true heir to the 
nation's values and identity, whose inheritance has been stolen away by sinister political 
and social forces, the obvious next step is to take action to get it back. If one sees things 
like sex education or the teaching of evolution in schools as both part of the secularists’ 
agenda to remove the nation from its Christian roots and part of the Devil’s agenda to 
lead souls astray from the truth of Christianity, the obvious next step is to take action in 
the arenas—school boards, state legislatures, and eventually Congress, the Presidency, 
and particularly the judicial system—where these policies are shaped and determined. 
These narratives also are flexible in presenting the reasons for political action. 
One of the requirements for a rhetor to motivate an audience to take political or social 
action is that the rhetor convince them that their actions will be, at least in some sense, 
efficacious. The Cosmic Narrative, however, suggests that the ultimate fate of the world 
has already been determined and written by God, eliminating any case for the efficacy of 
political or social action. This is a particular dilemma for those who adhere to the 
premillennial version of the Cosmic Narrative, in which the world grows steadily more 
and more chaotic until the apocalypse occurs and Jesus Christ returns in glory to 
inaugurate the kingdom.  
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Jerry Falwell faced this dilemma during the 1970s and 1980s, as he had to find a 
way to persuade his fundamentalist colleagues, most of whom adhered to this 
premillennial vision of the future, to support political and cultural activism through the 
Moral Majority. One of his solutions, according to cultural anthropologist Susan Friend 
Harding, was to suggest that American political and military action abroad would create 
space for evangelistic action.12 He made the case for political involvement by suggesting 
to fundamentalists that while they may know (or at least suspect) that the USA’s 
expansionist foreign policy would not (as the civil-religious version of the American 
Narrative suggests) produce worldwide democracy, freedom, and prosperity because that 
is not how God’s story would end, it could succeed in opening up foreign countries to 
Christian missionary work, thus producing space in which more souls could be saved. 
Thus, even those who saw conflict between the American Narrative’s open-ended future 
and the inevitability of the Cosmic Narrative's conclusion could be given reasons for 
acting. 
Finally, these two narratives function to create spaces in which religious and 
political symbology are intertwined, in a way that creates an alternative and sectarian 
vision of civil religion that is neither completely Christian nor purely nationalistic. This 
differs from the ways in which religious and nationalistic symbologies have been 
intertwined in America’s past, in that this conflation displays a consciousness of its 
religiously-sectarian nature.  
Previous conflations of religious and nationalistic symbologies, like those in the 
Puritan, Revolutionary, and Civil War eras, sought to move from the perceived 
universality of the Christian religion (and specifically its understanding of Scriptural 
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authority) to a sectarian or activist political case. As evangelical historian Mark Noll 
would suggest about Civil War-era religious arguments between Union and Confederate 
advocates, not over whether Scripture was authoritative and binding on the culture (there 
was general agreement that it was), but rather over the proper interpretation of 
Scripture.13  
While clergy and politicians alike certainly used military, political, and social 
crises to spark attempts at religious revival—such as the numerous calls for fasting and 
prayer during times of war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—the context of 
these was that Americans (presumed to be Christian) should deepen their faith and 
commitment, not that a secular nation should return to Christianity. The cultural 
dominance in those contexts of Christianity as normative, and the relative absence of 
alternative religious viewpoints, necessarily led to a more or less universal call to revival; 
all citizens, the vast majority of whom were assumed to be at least nominally Christian, 
were to return to the faith and beseech God for aid and favor. 
The contemporary conflations of religious and political symbology in Christian 
Right discourse have a more decidedly sectarian and contentious flavor; because the 
narrative itself posits the existence of at least one powerful alternative worldview in 
American culture, that of secular humanism, the context is such that these intertwinings 
of religious and political symbols call their adherents not just to contend in the political 
or cultural realm, as antebellum sermons for or against slavery did, but to contend in the 
religious realm as well. Because they set themselves in a pluralist social context, they are 
a sectarian call; rather than assuming that to be truly American is to be Christian, as the 
antebellum or revolutionary rhetors did, they must contend it instead. In previous 
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situations in which these symbols were linked, the idea of the nation re-devoting itself at 
least to some form of Christian God was presented a relatively uncontroversial 
proposition in a normatively Protestant nation; in Christian Right discourse, religious and 
political revival are linked with one another because both are assumed to be 
controversial.  
This gives the religious end of the equation a bit more bite. Christian apologetics 
take on political significance; defending the faith against secularism is also defending the 
true America against a false vision. In this understanding of religion in civic culture, the 
act of calling the nation to prayer is not, as the old civil religious contract would suggest, 
calling on the people to commit themselves to a doctrinally-obscure notion of whatever 
God they hold in their heads. Rather, the call to prayer is the call to commit oneself to an 
evangelical (or quasi-evangelical) sectarian vision of God, in which not just a vague 
Christianity but a conservative and exclusive form of the religion is the norm. 
A Note on Terminology 
Before continuing, I would like to make a brief note about the terminology I use. 
Many of the terms I will be using throughout this project are ambiguously defined as they 
circulate throughout academia, the media, and popular culture. The word 
“fundamentalism” is a salient example. The “fundamentalist” label was originally self-
applied by conservative Christians in the first decades of the twentieth century who felt 
that their beliefs were threatened by theological modernism; they set out a specific set of 
doctrinal beliefs as the “fundamentals of the faith” for which Christians should “do battle 
royal.”14 Most prominent among these beliefs was the idea that one’s salvation from hell 
could only be found in a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, but the fundamentals of 
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the faith also included the literal interpretation and historical inerrancy of the Bible, six-
day creationism, and a certain vision of the end-times.15 
In the intervening century, however, the term “fundamentalist” has undergone a 
major expansion. After the Scopes trial of 1927, the term “fundamentalist” became a 
pejorative term in the dominant American discourse.16 Particularly over the last few 
decades as the Christian Right has become a prominent political movement, 
“fundamentalist” has been used as an umbrella term to describe conservative evangelical 
Protestants as a whole, with well-known evangelicals like Billy Graham or Rick Wallis 
described as “fundamentalist.” Perhaps more significantly, the term has branched beyond 
Christianity, most prominently being used to describe traditionalist Muslims in conflict 
with Western liberalism; scholars like Bruce Lawrence and Niels C. Nielsen, among 
many others, have underlined ideological connections between fundamentalist Christians, 
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus in suggesting that fundamentalism is a category of religion as 
a whole.17  
However, for the purposes of this project, references to “fundamentalism” will 
(unless otherwise noted) refer to the historical movement of fundamentalist Christianity 
from which have come many of the institutions and concepts used by the Christian Right, 
a doctrinal and cultural movement that traces its history back to the late nineteenth 
century and is defined by adherence to The Fundamentals.  
Along the same lines, “evangelical” is another term that has an ambiguous 
definition in contemporary culture. As historian Diarmaid MacCulloch notes, the term 
has been in circulation since at least the beginning of the Protestant Reformation, with 
early Protestants describing themselves as “evangelical” (referring to the Gospel as “good 
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news,” which in Latin is evangelium).18 The term has also been self-applied by Protestant 
Christians on the American continent since the very first migrations. Those who identify 
as evangelicals today are more directly descended from a group that originally called 
themselves “neo-evangelicals”: conservative Christians who broke from fundamentalism 
in the middle of the twentieth century, overlooking the minor doctrinal differences among 
themselves to form a coalition working together to “save souls.” When I refer to 
“evangelicals” in this project, unless otherwise indicated, I am referring to this latter-day 
movement—a movement that includes not only high-profile figures like Billy Graham 
and Rick Wallis, but also multitudes of lesser-known preachers and evangelists, and 
churches ranging in size from tens of thousands of members to only a dozen or two. 
However, even these definitions of fundamentalism and evangelicalism are 
somewhat fluid; Lundberg echoes Joel Carpenter in suggesting that rhetoricians have 
erred in seeing fundamentalism and evangelicalism as “substantially coherent bodies of 
belief” and as “unified and unproblematic identity categories” rather than as “strategic 
unities” built from disparate elements of doctrine, theology, and cultural commitment.19 
This is perhaps even more true as “fundamentalist” and, to a much lesser extent, 
“evangelical” have been used as pejorative labels in society. I agree with Lundberg and 
Carpenter that a hermeneutical approach that progresses from the labels “fundamentalist” 
and “evangelical” to a set of propositional and coherent doctrines is an error; hence my 
attempts to couch these terms not in a doctrinal definition, but in terms of self-identified 
fundamentalists or evangelicals seeing themselves as part of a narrative about their 
particular approach to the faith. 
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The final term I will discuss here is “Christian Right.” Culturally, this movement is 
known under several terms—the Religious Right (or New Religious Right) and the 
Christian Right (or New Christian Right). Randall Balmer is one of the few critics who 
has offered a serious analysis of the various terms used, defending his use of the term 
“Religious Right” by writing that “I don’t find much that I recognize as Christian in the 
actions and policies of the Religious Right.”20 Balmer seeks to differentiate the Religious 
Right from Christianity in order to reclaim the label of “Christian” within the culture.  
While I respect Dr. Balmer’s viewpoint and certainly sympathize with his frustration 
at the cultural and media portrayal of the Christian Right as emblematic of all Christians, 
I make the opposite choice, preferring the term “Christian Right” for three reasons. The 
first reason is accuracy: the movement is not generically “religious,” but specifically 
Christian. Though Christian Right rhetors describe their beliefs in terms of “Judeo-
Christian values,” suggesting an openness to Judaism, it is an indisputable fact that the 
dominant voices in the movement on every level are Christians—and, more specifically, 
theologically conservative (and mostly Protestant) Christians. The second reason is that 
the movement does not aspire to generically inter-religious alliances with those who 
agree with their positions, except on certain well-defined issues (such as the defense of 
the contemporary state of Israel). 
My third reason for using the term "Christian Right" is, in fact, related to Balmer's 
reasons for avoiding the term: Like him, I am a Christian, and like him my faith leads me 
to liberal or social-democratic positions on economic, social, and cultural issues. Also, 
like Balmer, I believe that the Christian tradition offers a solid ground for critique of the 
Christian Right's worldview, positions, and stances. Describing this rhetoric as “Christian 
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Right” thus opens up space for critique of Christian Right rhetoric on the basis of the 
Christian theological and rhetorical tradition; were I to use the term “Religious Right,” I 
believe I would be ceding the rhetorical space of “Christianity” and thus potentially 
confining my critique to more general theories about the relationship between religion, 
culture, and the state. 
Theoretical Backdrop 
This project is situated in a significant lacuna in rhetorical scholarship. Perhaps 
because religious terminology saturates the work of Kenneth Burke and perhaps because 
of his use of “perfection”—discussions in absolute terms—as a category for 
understanding the core of rhetoric, religious rhetorics have always been a ripe subject for 
analysis in the dramatistic mode. Dramatistic and narrative perspectives have certainly 
been used to illuminate individual texts associated with the rhetoric of the Christian 
Right—such as treatments of apocalyptic discourse by Brummett and O’Leary, abortion 
rhetoric by Lake, and young-earth creationism by McClure, to name but a very few.21 
However, while there have been numerous rhetorical treatments of individual texts22, 
rhetors,23 discursive genres,24 and issues25 that interact in smaller or greater ways with the 
Christian Right—many of which I discuss throughout this project as they become 
relevant to the topic at hand—there have been relatively few wider-scale treatments of 
Christian Right discourse as a whole, particularly from a dramatistic and narrative 
perspective, and perhaps the best example of such a study (by Susan Friend Harding) 
comes from outside the field of rhetoric. 
Sharon Crowley’s treatment of apocalyptic rhetoric and its impact on democracy 
parallels and informs this project in many ways. The structure of Christian Right 
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discourse, Crowley suggests, is built on what Linda Kintz describes as the “ideology of 
clarity”: a “densely articulated and hence highly resonant set of conjectures” that forms a 
“recursively spiraling logic” of mythological and propositional symbolic structures that 
create a “sense of seamless coherence” between personal, political, spiritual, and 
historical narratives.26 Crowley presents Christian apocalypticism as striving against 
secular liberalism for hegemony in American culture, drawing its strength from its 
attachment to key nodal points in American rhetoric, concepts like “family” and “God”; 
however, she contends, the ideology of apocalypticism is dangerous for democracy 
because, in denying any means by which an interlocutor could falsify the ideology, it 
“opens few spaces for [rhetorical] invention” and demands instead that the interlocutor 
completely convert to the apocalyptic ideology.27 
Crowley writes that despite the fact that the logical system of apocalypticism is 
built on some rather novel interpretations of the Bible by privileged figures, the adherent 
is asked to believe that the entire system is logically derived from the “common sense” 
principles that anyone should be able to find in a “literal” reading of the Bible. The 
interpretive leaps of the movement’s leaders, such as the premillennial dispensationalist 
narrative, are presented as quite literally absolute truth, functioning to lend the authority 
of “divine reason” and “divine reality” to their views on history, politics, and culture, 
while maintaining a healthy enough distance between “God’s time” (the elements of the 
eschatological narrative) and “historical time” that the eschatological claims cannot be 
empirically falsified.28 
Further, Crowley links the appeal and resonance of apocalyptic discourse to the 
emotional associations believers make with it, suggesting that adherents are asked to 
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judge new facts and ideas not based on their empirical veracity, but rather on their 
emotional resonance. This creates what Crowley terms as “a rightness that is deeply felt 
rather than rationalized” as a warrant for accepting or rejecting facts or reasons; thus, she 
argues, “apocalypticism is faith in belief itself, belief that the deeply resonant structure of 
the ideology of clarity is reality itself.”29 
I agree with much of what Crowley suggests about the Christian Right’s 
constitutive and ideological nature, and in many ways this project is another variation on 
the same basic tune. However, I do differ with her in a few areas. First, I agree with 
Christian Lundberg’s critique of what he terms her “rhetorical fundamentalism,” and 
particularly his disagreement with her claim that rhetoricians will be able to defuse the 
resonance of the rhetoric of the Christian Right by contextualizing their antagonism 
toward their opponents within a larger transcendent agon of contingency. Lundberg 
argues that fundamentalism of any kind represents “an investment in a doctrine of 
otherness,” a constitutive rhetoric that relies heavily on notions of opposition and polarity 
for its resonance.30 I agree that these antagonisms are necessary components of the 
narratives that constitute the Christian Right’s rhetorical identity. 
This dovetails with my second critique of Crowley, which is her privileging of the 
eschatological narrative over the whole of the narrative. While she does allude to the 
importance of creationism to ideology in several points in the book, I believe she places a 
disproportionate amount of emphasis on eschatology. The unity of past, present, and 
future within the narrative structures I identify in this project suggests that to isolate 
future antagonisms (the eschatological narrative) is to miss the bigger picture: the 
symbiotic relationship between future antagonisms with collectively-remembered past 
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and present agonistic scenarios in which the adherent understands him- or herself playing 
a role. 
Furthermore, Crowley's emphasis seems more to be on the fact of eschatology 
than anything specific to the narrative; premillennialism and postmillennialism, she 
suggests, have similar resonance in that both present a future as already written, despite 
the fact that (as Crowley acknowledges) they have markedly different views about the 
fate of the world and the efficacy of action. As O’Leary and McFarland point out in their 
discussion of fundamentalist criticism of Pat Robertson for his eschatological shifts in the 
1988 presidential campaign, the question of what the apocalypse looks like is very much 
a point of contention—and often doctrinal purity—among many fundamentalists and 
evangelicals.31 
Susan Biesecker-Mast suggests that the reason for the relative paucity of 
rhetorical scholarship about fundamentalism—and I would extend this to include the 
whole of the Christian Right—stems from the fact that “the discourse appears entirely 
unrhetorical,” in that it relies on Biblical inerrancy, a closed view of history as an 
already-written narrative, and a repetitive message that fits all observed phenomena into a 
fixed eschatological narrative with a fixed response from the audience. However, she 
suggests, the political activity of fundamentalists suggests that the discourse is in fact 
rhetorical—and thus worthy of further exploration by rhetorical scholars.32 
Starting with Falwell and Robertson’s comments on September 13, she sees this 
rhetoricity in the contradictions between premillennial dispensationalism and political 
action, suggesting that the narrative basis for the former—in which God is “the sole 
author of a closed history in which the world careens by its ever-increasing sinfulness 
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towards its imminent damnation,” an unchangeable and immutable narrative arc—makes 
the latter not only “nonsensical” but also “blasphemous.”33 As Biesecker-Mast suggests, 
motivating people to political involvement requires at least some sense of the efficacy of 
human action; if a rhetor cannot convince his or her audience that what they do will be at 
least in some way efficacious, the audience will not be motivated to act. However, the 
logic of the fundamentalism described by Biesecker-Mast suggests that the very notion of 
humans as efficacious creatures suggests that they are in some way the authors of 
history’s narrative and capable of turning the tide—which would contradict some of the 
most basic tenets of fundamentalism.  
I would suggest that this contradiction is resolved by the placement of the 
American Narrative within the Cosmic Narrative; if the audience accepts their dual 
identity as soldiers in God’s spiritual war against Satan and as Americans who are a part 
of the nation God has chosen as a beacon of light and a missionary to the world, they will 
be motivated to act if not out of a sense that national revival could spark a worldwide 
movement toward freedom and Christianity, then at least out of a desire for an 
evangelistic demonstration. If the Christian America is prosperous, free, and happy while 
the rest of the (secular) world falls into sin, war, poverty, and chaos, then at least some 
around the world would wonder what Americans had that they did not have, and convert 
to Christianity (and Americanism) in order to be a part of that. 
Perhaps the closest other study to this project is Susan Friend Harding’s 
dramatistic and narrative analysis of the discourse of Jerry Falwell and Southern 
fundamentalism during the transitional period of the 1980s. As a cultural anthropologist, 
Harding bases her analysis on extensive interviews and participant-observer experiences 
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within Falwell’s movement in particular throughout the 1980s. The whole of the project 
is an exemplary treatment of the ways in which the dramatistic perspective with an 
emphasis on the narrative component can illuminate the rhetorics associated with the 
Christian Right. 
Harding argues that Falwell used discourse “not only to mobilize fundamentalists 
politically, but to transform, rearrange, and reposition fundamentalism itself,” bringing it 
from the position it had held for the last six decades—in which fundamentalists perceived 
themselves as set apart from the world, and saw political action as unimportant in 
comparison to evangelism—into a new, broader outlook in which fundamentalists would 
see themselves as politically and socially engaged in the battle for the heart and soul of 
American culture.34 She suggests that this was accomplished through the manipulation of 
the fundamentalist perspective on history, which sees a basic continuity between the 
Biblical narrative, history between the Bible days and today, and their own personal 
narratives; through the manipulation of fundamentalist perspectives on time, in which 
time flows forward for humans (in our experiencing the world from the present into the 
future) but in a coherent unity, backward and forward, from the perspective of God (who 
has already written the narrative that we all enact); and through the manipulation of 
fundamentalist identity, in which emphasis was placed on the commonalities between 
traditional fundamentalists and the larger evangelical movement that contained 
Pentecostal and charismatic Christians, “neo-evangelicals” in the tradition of Billy 
Graham, and other conservative Christians of all stripes. 
Harding also discusses the circulation of these narratives, outlining the ways in 
which Falwell took advantage of his “empire of words”—a “veritable Bible-based 
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language industry” that included circulation of Falwell and his allies’ rhetoric on 
television, on the radio, in books and other publications, in Christian schools and Sunday 
school programs, in education, and in the news media—to reach audiences well outside 
most other southern Baptist pastors’ spheres of influence, arguing that his presence at the 
top of this empire made him “exceptionally well poised” to transform fundamentalism.35 
This web of discourses, she argues, were the “sites, or workshops, in which Falwell, his 
allies, and their communities recast and resituated themselves as a people in history.”36 
Dramatism and Narrative 
Harding touches on a set of scholarly discourses central to this study, those 
centered on Burke’s conception of dramatism and identification. Most significantly, 
Burke’s work on identification creates a specific space for totalizing narratives like the 
ones I will be discussing here in his differentiation between what he calls “dialectic” and 
“ultimate” language. Dialectic language, to Burke, is language that creates and describes 
the “realm of ideas,” but it is limited in that when ideas come into conflict, they remain in 
tension with one another—resulting in compromise or conflict—rather than resolving to a 
whole.37 Ultimate language resolves these conflicts between ideas by placing them within 
a larger order or progression, with “a ‘guiding idea’ or ‘unitary principle’ behind the 
diversity of voices.”38 Burke also suggests that “perhaps the ‘ultimate’ order comes most 
natural to narrative forms,” even if he does not make narrative a requirement for an 
ultimate order.39 Burke writes that in a “properly constructed” ultimate narrative, the 
succession from principle to principle will be “so implicit that we may not even discern 
it,” where each successive point of the plot builds on the previous ones to form an 
ultimate progression of forms.40 
 27 
Burke sets up a critical framework in which the critic examines the dramatic roles 
created within a text, for individuals to identify with communities and nations both 
diachronically and synchronically, and the dramatic stories in which we see those roles 
playing a part. The notion of identity as narrative-formed is an essential assumption of 
this study, in that I posit that the rhetorical participation in the dramatic narratives of the 
Christian Right is a definitional quality of the movement. In other words, I define the 
Christian Right as a rhetorical movement, a movement defined not by organizational or 
institutional allegiances but by appeals to these two narratives and, specifically, these 
narratives’ constitution of a subject-position for the receptive auditor which, as Charland 
would suggest, leads to further stances (whether implicit or explicit) on epistemology, 
teleology, political theory, and political action. 
Walter Fisher expanded and refined the notion of dramatism to posit what he 
called the “narrative paradigm,” a framework for understanding human communication 
that took as its basis MacIntyre’s assertion that human beings are first and foremost homo 
narrans—the storytelling animal. Fisher contrasted this with what he termed the “rational 
world paradigm,” which he suggested understood humans first as reasoning creatures 
who understand the world through the logical progression of propositional truths. Rather 
than using strict rationality, Fisher suggests a framework in which people make decisions 
based on good reasons—elements which, he suggests, “provide warrants for accepting or 
adhering to the advice” of a given text.41 Fisher also argues that opposing arguments in 
the public sphere are really competing narratives, and that people decide to accept a 
narrative based on two elements: its probability, or “what constitutes a coherent story,” 
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and its fidelity, which is “whether or not the stories they experience ring true with the 
stories they know to be true in their own lives.”42  
Fisher suggested the narrative paradigm not only as a descriptive lens for the 
critic to understand and interpret discourse; to him, it was a universal truth (hence his 
describing it as a paradigm) with prescriptive implications. He argued that the narrative 
paradigm applies not only to “public moral argument,” but to all forms of human 
communication—political campaigns and poems, advertisements and scientific journals 
alike—and that this is the way human beings understand the world around them, a mode 
of understanding that all people “culturally acquire […] through a universal faculty and 
experience.”43  
Barbara Warnick argued against the notion of the narrative paradigm as normative 
or prescriptive, arguing against Fisher’s claim that this “universal faculty” for 
understanding narrative results in their having a “natural tendency to prefer the true and 
the just,”44 and suggesting that Fisher contradicted himself in presenting something akin 
to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “universal audience” as an ideal auditor in his logic 
of good reasons while also suggesting that individual choices are always based in the 
particular and contextual. She suggested the acceptance in Weimar Germany of Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf as a counterexample; Mein Kampf presented an argument that was coherent 
in providing an explanation for what was happening in Germany at the time, and had a 
sufficient amount of “ambiguity and implicitness” in what it was claiming that it could 
account for even facts that seemed to contradict it.45 “A rhetorical narrative may ‘ring 
true’ in the lives of particular audience members, may resonate with their own experience 
and that of those whom they admire, and nevertheless be a bad story.”46 Fisher’s 
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paradigm, she suggested, cannot present within its own logic a reason for rejecting Mein 
Kampf. 
John Lucaites and Celeste Condit suggested that while the narrative paradigm was 
useful for understanding poetic and literary narratives, in which the author could create “a 
logically or aesthetically complete vision” of a closed world, the fact that rhetorical 
communication speaks to a world outside itself and into a specific context makes the 
criterion of narrative probability—that is, the coherence of the narrative structure—
inadequate for assessing a rhetorical narrative’s adequacy.47  Farrell made a similar 
argument, suggesting that the difference between literary narratives and rhetorical or 
conversational exchanges is that the literary narrative is closed and complete, with the 
author capable of controlling time, whereas rhetoric or conversation is incomplete and 
unpredictable—as rhetorical and conversational exchanges lack a transcendent and 
omniscient “author” guiding them toward an end. Because of this unpredictability, 
narrative is an underlying and unstated aspect of rhetorical conversation.48 Implicit in 
both of these arguments is the suggestion that while Fisher’s narrative view might be 
appropriate for some texts, his critical lens does not apply to all texts—or at least, not all 
in the same way. 
In an attempt to revive critical use of narrative and the narrative paradigm after 
their becoming “virtually dead subjects” in rhetorical scholarship, Kevin McClure offered 
an alternative interpretation of Fisher’s paradigm. He argued that while Fisher was 
correct in rooting the paradigm in Burke’s notion of identification, he erred in using the 
categories of fidelity and probability, as they “limit[ed] the range and descriptive utility 
of identification” in the paradigm to texts that were compatible with “good reasons”49; 
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this created not only the problems identified by critics above, but also brought the 
narrative paradigm out-of-step with poststructuralism’s critique of the text, subject, and 
audience. Poststructuralism reveals narratives to be “co-constructions of meanings 
created by texts and audiences,”50 a result of a particular audience’s encounter with a text 
and that text’s interaction with the other texts and textual fragments in the audience’s 
memory, language, and culture; McClure suggests that Fisher’s paradigm does not 
account for this. 
As an alternative, McClure proposes a return to the root of the theory—Burke’s 
concept of identification as the root of rhetoric—which McClure suggests “carries 
narrativity far beyond Fisher’s explicit normative limitations of probability and 
fidelity.”51 Accepting narrative identification as a critical framework enables the critic to 
recognize that “identification is the prime mechanism through which acceptance of an 
argument or story works or does not,”52 enabling him or her to more thoroughly 
interrogate the ways in which a given narrative interacts with other constitutive rhetorics, 
narratives, and linguistic constructions that a given audience might bring bring with them. 
McClure’s case study is Young-Earth Creationism, whose acceptance he suggests cannot 
be accounted for according to narrative fidelity and probability; when viewed through the 
wider lens of narrative identification, however, the critic’s understanding of Young-Earth 
Creationism and its acceptance in society is strengthened by “reference to its 
identifications with other Biblically based narratives and its religious and sociological 
interconnections,”53 such as the importance of Biblical inerrancy within fundamentalist 
theology and the supposition that the arc of history is playing out according to a divine 
plan rather than the randomness suggested by naturalistic evolutionary theories. 
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I find McClure’s vision of narrative identification useful in that it provides for a 
more fulfilling and flexible means for understanding the interactions between narratives, 
texts, and audiences than the categories of probability and fidelity. As McClure himself 
illustrates, the rational-world paradigm (and, by extension, Fisher’s categories for 
narrative interpretation) cannot account for Christian Right rhetoric in particular; the 
narratives of the Christian Right represent a problem in that they call their audiences to 
rationally-based actions like voting or campaigning while drawing on the “deeply 
irrational or non-rational resources” of religious narratives.54 McClure also demonstrates 
a much more robust way of bringing narratives into conversation with rhetorical 
scholarship on identity and subjectivity—particularly Charland’s theory of constitutive 
rhetoric, which is integral to this study. 
So how is such a view operationalized into a critical framework? The work of 
political scientist David Gutterman presents what I see as a useful way forward.55 
Gutterman suggests that critics attune themselves to narratives’ power to create and 
define identity, shape the horizons of temporal and spatial context in which a community 
is operating, and engage with and relate to other narratives. Narratives have power, he 
writes, to the extent that they resonate with the underlying “sacred stories” of a culture, 
functioning as a mediating force between “innovation” and “sedimentation,” terms he 
borrows from Ricoeur to refer to the idea that the narrative innovations of one generation 
become the sediment of tradition from which the next generation constructs their own 
narratives.56 In this way, Gutterman suggests, “‘sacred stories’ offer not just the stability 
of tradition but also the horizon within which meaningful and intelligible innovation can 
occur.”57 
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I suggest that these three elements set out by Gutterman—identity, setting, and 
relationship to other stories—give the critic the tools needed to operationalize McClure’s 
call for deeper analyses of narrative identification. The narratives I identify as 
foundational for Christian Right rhetoric operate as constitutive rhetorics which, as 
Charland would suggest, function to define the subject and identify him or her with other 
subjects in the context of a narrative past, present, and future. These narratives operate by 
configuring space and time, offering rhetors flexibility in enabling them to operate in two 
spatiotemporal frames: the frame of chronological history, in which space and time are 
measured and operate in a linear progression from past to future, and the frame of 
salvation history or heilsgeschichte, which sees time as a series of connected kairos 
moments in which God intervenes providentially to fulfill God’s purposes and plans. And 
their connection to other narratives about religion’s place in the nation can be understood 
through scholarly inquiries into civil religion, which have both descriptively and 
prescriptively theorized the complex relationship between religion in general and 
American identity. 
Identity and Constitutive Rhetorics 
Burke sets out identification as a key term for the function of rhetoric, a role 
expanded upon by McClure who sees it as the key to a more robust vision of narrative as 
a paradigm for understanding human communication. A critical exploration of 
identification first implicates the question of identity itself, and the ways in which 
rhetorics can form or shape identities; in this project I will be drawing on Maurice 
Charland’s conception of constitutive rhetoric as a critical tool for understanding the role 
of identity formation in the narratives of the Christian Right. 
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Charland draws on Michael Calvin McGee’s assertion that a “people,” rather than 
enjoying a separate existence, is a construct of rhetoric, called into existence by the rhetor 
and existent only to the extent that those addressed as a people accept the rhetor’s claims 
about them and their history, present, and future; as McGee puts it, “‘the people’ are the 
social and political myths they accept.”58 Charland starts with this basic assumption that 
peoples are socially constructed by rhetorical acts rather than preexistent, and discusses 
the ideological effects of the constitutive rhetorics that, in addressing (interpellating) their 
audience, seek to rhetorically construct them as part of a larger constituency in a grand 
narrative; constitutive rhetorics, he suggests, constitute “a collective subject”59 that is 
“transhistorical” (part of a continuity of past, present, and future), and create “the illusion 
of freedom,” so called because while rhetoric must appeal to an uncertain future in order 
to motivate action from the audience, their acceptance of the subject-positions 
constructed for them by the rhetorical act necessarily limits them to act in ways 
prescribed by the rhetor’s narrative arc.60  
Narrativity plays a crucial role in rhetoric’s constitutive function; the member of 
the audience is asked to see him- or herself as the subject of the text, one of the 
protagonists in the story weaved by the rhetor. This has implications not only for the 
subject’s present, but also creates a new way of understanding the past and future; as 
Charland writes, ”to be constituted as a subject in a narrative is to be constituted with a 
history, motives, and a telos.”61 Further, religious rhetorics in particular have the potential 
for strong constitutive functions, as Nathaniel Cordova makes plain in his discussion of 
the religious and political elements of the Puerto Rican Catecismo del Pueblo. Cordova 
roots the appeal of religiously-based constitutive rhetorics not just in their invocation of 
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the ultimate but also in their invocation of values shared with others, “the life of a 
community of believers.”62 A shared set of religious beliefs and practices can construct 
an identity for those who adhere to them; this identity can later form the building blocks 
of another set of subject-positions. 
Charland also suggests that successful constitutive rhetorics “resolve, or at least 
contain, experienced contradictions” in previous conceptions of identity; the new identity 
creates a category for conception of the self that transcends the dissonant elements. In his 
example, French-speaking Canadians experienced a contradiction between their subject 
positions as citizens of the federal republic of Canada, an “ultimately foreign” 
government, and as citizens of the province of Quebec represented in provincial 
government by other francophones.63 In a sense, if one views the example from a 
narrative perspective, French-speaking Canadians were asked to see themselves as part of 
two different, and somewhat contradictory narratives. In one, they were part of the story 
of Quebec, imbued with a unique culture based not only on the language they spoke but 
on hundreds of years of development of a culture unique even from other French-
speaking cultures. In the other, they were part of the story of Canada, the cultural 
“leftovers” of the 150-year period of French rule over the nation, a francophone minority 
among an anglophone minority who were expected to subordinate their unique culture to 
the nation as a whole for the good of Canada’s future. The narrative of the Québécois—a 
complete and independent nation with its own land and language—creates a new 
teleological vision for the subject. 
This function is heightened when the narrative being told takes on cosmic 
proportions, as the Cosmic Narrative does; seeing oneself as a member of a unique 
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people with a history and a future according to a quasi-naturalistic view of history is a 
potent vision, but seeing oneself as a member of a unique people who have been chosen 
by God to fulfill God’s plans for the entire human race, laid since the beginning of time 
itself, is a rather more grand one.  
James Jasinski’s offers a different, more methodologically-oriented perspective 
on constitutive rhetorics. He draws on Leff’s distinction between intentional and 
extensional aspects of the text—in which a critic views the text in terms of either the 
intentions of the rhetor (the intentional) or in terms of its “persuasive effect” 
(extensional)64—to suggest that critics look at both the “constitutive potential” that exists 
within the text itself, as well as the “circulation and discursive articulation” of its forms 
“in ways that enable and constrain subsequent practice.”65 He and Jennifer R. Merceica 
expand on this point in a 2010 piece, replacing “intentional” and “extensional” with 
“interior” and “exterior” (which enables them to avoid the problematic notions of 
intention and effect) and suggesting that while there has been a great deal of critical work 
looking at the interior aspects of constitutive rhetorics, there has been far less 
development in the exterior aspects.66 This, they write, gives us an incomplete view of 
the text; while texts do invite their audiences to understand themselves in certain ways or 
adopt certain narratives, a text’s circulation into other texts—including its reinterpretation 
outside its original “intentional” context—can “define, shape, and even transform the 
utterance’s initially inchoate constitutive potential.”67 
Jasinski also set out in his initial piece on constitutive rhetorics in historiography 
four categories for critical analysis of the intentional dimensions of constitutive rhetorics: 
their creation of subject-positions, their shaping of time and space, their setting out the 
 36 
norms of community culture, and their use of linguistic resources within a given 
culture.68 Jasinski and Merceica modify these categories slightly in 2009, suggesting that 
internal analyses focus on a text’s invitation to its audience to modify the “key terms” of 
their culture, to understand public time differently, to reconfigure space, and to “affirm as 
well as challenge established sources of cultural authority, bonds of affiliation, and 
institutional relationships.”69 However, they suggest, the categories for understanding 
exterior rhetorics are “much less fully realized at present.” I would suggest that a critic 
wishing to look at the exterior aspects of a constitutive text could use similar categories 
to those suggested by Jasinski and Merceica for interior analyses in analyzing the 
circulation of that text; this project will represent such an exploration, looking at the ways 
In which the two narratives I set out have circulated throughout the discourse of political 
and cultural actors who wish to affiliate themselves with the Christian Right’s rhetorical 
vision.  
Jasinski and Merceica’s notion of exterior analysis proves particularly salient 
when, as in this case, the text is constructed by the critic from what McGee would call 
“fragments” from other texts.70 There is no single source in which both narratives are set 
out in total—but, often, texts that set out one of these narratives assume the other, to the 
point where the two narratives begin to act upon one another. In other words, this single 
text, composed of the two narratives and the spaces and interactions between the 
narratives, which I will argue functions primarily constitutively, is only seen in “second-
degree” forms of circulation; it is from this circulation that I reconstruct the full text from 
its multiple sources, at which point I can then analyze its interior dynamics and the 
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invitations, tensions, and resolutions within the text itself according to Gutterman’s more 
general criteria. 
An alternative vision of constitutive rhetorics is found in Susan Friend Harding’s 
discussion of her own research into the changes in fundamentalism throughout the 1980s. 
An anthropologist by training, Harding nonetheless draws on the work of rhetoricians to 
discuss the ways in which the manipulation of narratives by fundamentalists like Jerry 
Falwell contributed to the rhetorical potency and flexibility of their movement, 
particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, which she suggests were a transitional period 
between an old vision of fundamentalism in which separation from “the world” and 
action to “save souls” was the center of the movement and a new vision, led by people 
like Falwell, which saw a larger place for engagement by fundamentalists in culture, the 
professional world, and politics. She argues that the narrative flexibility of fundamentalist 
rhetoric, and particularly its ability to create gaps and spaces for ambiguous 
interpretation, gave Falwell and his allies the tools they needed to subvert the old way of 
thinking in favor of the new. 
Harding’s reading of fundamentalism’s view of time problematizes Charland’s 
discussion of the “illusion of freedom” as an ideological effect of constitutive rhetorics. 
The fact that the end of the story has already been written—not as speculative or 
dependent on human action, as in the White Paper, but as something that is certain to the 
point where, from God’s point of view, it has already happened—denies that the 
individual actor has the freedom to ensure that the telos implied by his or her subject-
position is fulfilled. This gets at a division made by multiple critics in their discussion of 
the role of teleology in narrative rhetorical forms. Farrell’s and Lucaites and Condit’s 
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critiques of Fisher are echoed by Charland when he writes that “while classical narratives 
have an ending, constitutive rhetorics leave the task of narrative closure to their 
constituted subjects,”71 implying a difference between classical narratives and rhetorical 
visions like that of Quebec’s White Paper. Farrell puts it thus: “narrative in real-life ‘talk’ 
must be less an overt creation of any omniscient author and more a background postulate 
governing the expectations of communicants themselves.”72  
So how do rhetors using the Christian Right’s narratives create the “illusion of 
freedom”? I suggest three ways—one of which is through the manipulation of the Cosmic 
Narrative alone, and the other two of which occur within the interactions between the 
Cosmic Narrative and the American Narrative.  
First, in terms of the Cosmic Narrative, the chronology of the future is left 
intentionally vague. Religious historial Harold Bloom suggests that the Millerite 
movement, which formed around William Miller's specific prediction that the eschaton 
would occur in 1843 (leading to a subsequent “Great Disappointment” when the 
prediction turned out to be wrong), served as a warning to other millennarians, arguing 
that the “creedlessness” of American millennarianism since then has “learned to make 
gestures to the End, while taking care not to fall into the Millerite abyss.”73 In keeping 
not only with avoiding the mistakes of the Great Disappointment but also with Jesus’s 
assertion in the Gospel of Matthew that “nobody knows the day or the hour, not even the 
angels in heaven, nor the Son,”74 prominent promoters of the Cosmic Narrative do not 
make exact predictions about dates or years of future End Times events; while the 
ultimate outcome of the story is certain in the Cosmic Narrative, it occurs in a future that 
is functionally outside of chronological time. 
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Second, unlike the Cosmic Narrative, which places past, present, and future as 
part of God’s grand master plan, the American Narrative is left incomplete, leaving room 
for America to be revived by recommitting itself to God or destroyed by a wrathful God 
who leaves only a faithful remnant. This interaction creates an ambiguity and tension 
about the future that bleeds together the determinism of the completed book of literature 
and the uncertainty about the future that motivates action. Harding points to the 
modifications made by Christian Right rhetors in their discussions of eschatology 
throughout the 1980s, as they adapted it into a discourse that could accommodate social 
action.75 They could have denied the general teleological trajectory of premillennialism 
held by their fundamentalist forebears, or ignored the subject entirely; however, they 
instead chose to create a second, smaller eschaton, in which Christians would be judged 
prior to the final judgment, creating space in which there was the possibility that America 
could be saved. 
Third, the interaction between the narrative creates not one subject-position, but 
multiple subject-positions, each with their own teleological vector. Though God invites 
the audience to participate in the narrative as part of God’s righteous cause, the audience 
knows that the choices they make could just as easily cast them in other roles. The 
Parable of the Sower, found in Mark 4, illustrates the multiplicity of roles available in the 
narrative. In this parable, Jesus tells the story of a farmer who cast out seeds along the 
path, with some finding good soil and bearing fruit, and others for various reasons failing 
to do so, as a metaphor for people’s response to Jesus’s message (“the word”). Jesus is 
implicitly calling his audience to ask themselves which of the seeds they are: are they the 
seed that fell on rocky soil, “hearing the word and at once receiving it with joy” but 
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ultimately failing when “trouble or persecution” comes because their roots do not go deep 
enough? Are they the seed sown among thorns, where the word is choked out of them by 
the “weeds” of worry, wealth, and “desires for other things”? Or are they the seed that 
falls on good soil and produces a crop yielding even a hundred times what was sown?76 
The Cosmic and American Narratives create even more roles than this, enabling the 
audience to see themselves not only as God’s allies, but also potentially as those who fail 
under persecution, backslide into their old ways, betray the faith, or unwittingly aid the 
forces of evil. There is an implied risk here for those who accept these narratives; while 
they may see themselves as the heroes of the story at this moment, so too were King Saul, 
Benedict Arnold, Charles Darwin, and Lucifer himself once heroes—before they fell into 
evil and became villains. 
Thus, the “illusion of freedom” Charland refers to as the third ideological effect of 
constitutive rhetorics is molded by the dynamic interaction between the narratives into a 
tension between freedom and certainty.77 While on a “macro” level the end of the story is 
a certainty, in that God—the author and orchestrator of that narrative—has seen and 
molded the end from a position outside of time, the individual believer on a “micro” 
level, with his or her limited perspective, is left with the uncertainty of (a) the 
chronological non-definition of the eschatology, in which “nobody knows the day or the 
hour, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son,”78 (b) what the fate of the American 
nation will be in light of the two teleological alternatives created by the narrative, and (c) 
what his or her individual role will be in terms of the dramatis personae laid out in the 
two narratives. 
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Rhetorical Constructions of History 
The argumentative and constitutive work of the Christian Right’s narratives is 
also done by their view of history, which sets up the spatial and temporal boundaries in 
which the various players in the cosmic and national drama play out their parts. The 
construction of space and time within these narratives is connected with their identity-
forming constitutive function because, as Jasinski suggests, such rhetorics invite their 
audiences to see themselves as subjects not in a static, propositional state, but rather as 
part of a narrative. The narratives operate as “general experiential structures” that invite 
their audience to experience the figurative distance between various points in the past, 
present, and future in different ways.79 
E. Culpepper Clark and Raymie McKerrow suggest that contrary to modernist 
assumptions that positioned the historian as dispassionate narrator presenting history as 
something akin to “scientific fact,” any retelling of history is a construction of that 
history, “a rhetorical re-presentation of the self or a community.”80 In narrating history, a 
rhetor “re-creates” it and in doing so implicates his or her own ideological assumptions 
and arguments, even if he or she does not intend to do so. As Clark and McKerrow 
suggest, “the language of the historian is closer to that of the raconteur than the 
scientist.”81 This is particularly true for the narratives I identify here, which rely on 
history not only for their teleological vision but also in their use of typology, as I 
discussed above. 
Clark and McKerrow’s view of the historian’s work is complicated, however, by 
the doubt expressed by outside audiences not only in the Christian Right narratives’ 
interpretation of historical facts (as those disagreeing with the White Paper highlighted 
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by Charland might have done) but in their construction of the facts themselves. Clark and 
McKerrow suggest that history is “simultaneously a real and an invented account,” 
because historical events like the Holocaust or the atom bombs at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki are “undeniable” historical facts82; the questionable historicity of the events of 
the Bible throws a monkey wrench into that conception, as the “facts” are no longer 
undeniable.  
The teleological and epistemological claims of the Cosmic Narrative in particular 
rely on a view of the events of the Bible not as allegorical tales or even as events whose 
historicity is indeterminate, but as events that are just as historically true as the Holocaust 
or Lincoln’s presidency. As Harding points out, the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy 
presupposes the historicity of the events of the Bible; if there is any disagreement 
between the data and a literal interpretation of the Bible, then it is the data that must be 
wrong.83 This flattens the differentiation made by Clark and McKerrow between fiction 
and history, in which they suggest that while the historian must “strain for 
verisimilitude,” the fiction writer does not necessarily have to. Rhetors who appeal to 
Biblical stories—and particularly, stories about miracles, like the healing of the blind or 
walking on water—as history, however, break this distinction down. The very thing that 
makes a miracle distinctive is that it breaks the conventional rules of verisimilitude; its 
power depends on its being impossible according to the conventional rules of nature.  
The American Narrative also implicates rhetoricians’ discussions about history, 
based as it is on the constructs of civil religion in the United States. This is perhaps more 
similar to Clark and McKerrow’s discussion of history, where there is very little dispute 
over the broad outlines of the “data,” than the Cosmic Narrative which relies on broad 
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historical claims which are very much in dispute. The American Narrative uses much of 
the same “data” as secular American histories, but uses that data to tell a markedly 
different story.  
This discussion implicates apocalyptic literature as well, in terms of its 
construction of temporality as a whole; notable analyses of apocalyptic literature from a 
dramatistic perspective have been provided by Barry Brummett and Stephen O’Leary, 
each of whom emphasized at least one text explicitly linked to the Christian Right in their 
analysis. Brummett argued that rhetoricians need to take apocalyptic rhetoric seriously 
and treat it as a rhetorical genre, with its own markers in strategy, argumentation, and 
style.84 O’Leary’s suggestion was that apocalyptic rhetoric “functions as a symbolic 
theodicy”—a solution to the problem of evil—that accomplishes this explanation 
“through discursive construction of temporality,” by contextualizing present evils within 
a narrative of cosmic time-frames.85 
The narrative fuel for rhetorics of civil religion is collective memory, the shaping 
of the past for the purposes of justifying the order of the present. As Bruce Gronbeck puts 
it, collective memory’s purpose is to create “absolute identification—an interpretation of 
then and now where the hermeneutic circle spins in exceedingly small rotations,” a 
discourse that seeks to place the contemporary on par with a legendary past.86 Civil 
religious rhetorics, then, are not just a collection of symbols, a pantheon of saints, or a 
liturgy of national rituals, but an invitation to take part and see oneself as part of the 
narrative of the nation. The collective memorializing that occurs in civil religious 
rhetorics suggests that the great heroes of the nation’s past left present-day citizens a 
legacy, and calls contemporary audiences to identify not only with the narratives and 
 44 
rituals of the past but also to emulate their mindset or moral strength. Like saints, the 
nation’s heroes serve as exemplar and inspiration. 
However, there is a different historical lens that might shed more light on the 
Cosmic and American Narratives; although both narratives set the events they describe in 
the context of a chronological timeline, they also employ what German theologians called 
heilsgeschichte—salvation history. Oscar Cullman, who is described by John Reumann in 
the Encyclopedia of Christianity as having “brought Heilsgeschichte to its fullest 
expression and, with pupils and allies, its peak of influence in biblical and ecumenical 
theology,”87 described heilsgeschichte in terms of a linear timeline stretching from the 
creation to the end-times, punctuated by crucial events called kairoi, which Reumann 
summarizes as “significant moments in the revealing and executing of God’s plan of 
salvation”88—or, as feminist theologian Lucy Tatman puts it, “the whole of history is 
read as a progressive movement toward the realization of God’s ends.”89 In Cullman’s 
theology, the most significant of these kairotic moments is the death and resurrection of 
Christ, “a ‘midpoint’ in time [with] a unique, absolutely decisive character.”90   
In other words, the heilsgeschichte perspective on history implies (a) a massive, 
sweeping narrative in which each historical event has a place in the vast plan, (b) that the 
entire narrative centers around a single crucial kairotic “salvation” moment that creates a 
new nation or a new people, who then are chosen by God in the wake of that moment for 
God’s mission to the world, and (c) that there are a number of smaller kairotic moments 
that both lead up to the salvation moment and help the community created by that kairotic 
moment survive and make sense of the moment. This view of history understands God to 
be at work in the present and future, and uses evidence of God’s involvement in kairotic 
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moments in the past to suggest that there is a massive, divine plan for such moments to 
continue into the future until the final act. 
It is important to note that heilsgeschichte is as much about the future as it is 
about the past; its theological purpose is “assuring the chosen ones of God’s actions in 
the future, albeit at the end of the future.”91 The interpretation of the past in terms of 
God’s salvific acts at key kairotic moments serves an epistemological and teleological 
purpose, giving the believer an interpretive framework for understanding the present and 
assuring the believer that no matter how bleak the future looks, God is in control of it and 
all too willing to intervene when God’s interests are at stake. Further, as Tatman 
suggests, while heilsgeschichte originally arose in the context of 19th century bourgeois 
German theology (in which the “‘truth’ of historical progress […] was certainly 
beginning to be felt”92), the incorporation of the cataclysmic apocalyptic vision—which 
Tatman among others links to “the underdogs, the militarily and religiously oppressed 
and persecuted”—made the notion more rhetorically potent in that it “can accommodate, 
conceptually, both a smooth sort of man-made (but God-willed) sense of historical 
progress, and a more irruptive, even violent sort of ‘progress.’”93 Just as the familiar 
saying goes about statistics, it seems that heilsgeschichte could be used to prove 
anything; it can accommodate both setbacks and successes in pointing to its vision of the 
future. Harding suggests that the future looms so large in fundamentalist readings of 
history as to shape the past. 
The notion of kairotic moments is a shared one between theological and rhetorical 
scholarship; in both, it describes the sense of the possibilities inherent in a particular 
moment, a “quality of time” as differentiated from the quantity of measured time, 
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chronos.94 Kairos is understood in terms of the opportunity to engage in an act that can 
change the course of events; it “depend[s] more on the forces at work on and in a 
particular moment than their quantifiable length.”95 The kairotic moment is one of 
potentiality, a moment seen not in terms of its location on a fixed timeline but in terms of 
a convergence of forces, ideas, and actions, a moment that creates the opportunity for 
rhetoric to produce change. 
However, the theological and rhetorical understandings of kairos diverge in terms 
of their understanding of the spontaneity of time. Rhetorically, the kairotic moment is one 
of unpredictability and invention; as Hawhee suggests, a key aspect of kairos as 
understood in classical rhetoric is that, like the athletic acts to which Gorgias compared 
kairos, the results “cannot be known in advance, but rather depend on a particular 
encounter […] which demands a deployment of skills on the spot, in the heat of the 
moment, in the blink of an eye.”96 Kairos, to the classical rhetoricians, is a situation in 
which the rhetor can use the skills he or she has learned to affect the moment—but the 
moment’s potentiality for producing effects (the dunamis) has the potential to produce 
destructive as well as constructive events, to spiral out of the rhetor’s control.  
The theological understanding of kairos is a bit different because the agent is not 
the human rhetor who experiences the flow of time in the same way as his or her 
audience; rather, the actor in the kairotic moments of heilsgeschichte is God, whose 
omnipotence and omniscience enable God to see the moment as just one piece of a larger 
linear and planned narrative in which God is entirely in control at all times. While the 
results of the kairotic moment might be unpredictable to those experiencing it in real 
time, there is no chance that the event will spiral out of the control of God, who is both 
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the author of the drama and its key actor. Theologian Paul Tillich describes the kairos 
perspective as “the prophetic view of history,” in which the kairos represents “the 
fulfilled moment of time in which the present and the future, the holy that is given and 
the holy that is demanded meet, and from whose concrete tensions the new creation 
proceeds in which sacred import is realized in necessary form.”97 Tillich describes kairos 
here as a moment of potentiality in which divine action can occur in order to form “the 
new creation,” to fulfill God’s purposes in the world. 
The use of the German term geschichte as the root of heilsgeschichte is significant 
here; theologians in the mid-20th century suggested a divide between the term geschichte 
and the other German term for history, historie. Richard N. Soulen and R. Kendall Soulen 
define the difference between the two as the difference between “history as fact, external 
and verifiable [historie], and, on the other, history as significance, internal and 
nonverifiable [geschichte].”98 Since the middle of the century there has been what Soulen 
and Soulen describe as a “marked decrease in enthusiasm for the distinction”99 among 
theologians for the difference between the two, but that is less important for our use of 
the term heilsgeschichte than the notion that geschichte, the idea that certain historical 
moments have theological significance as they represent God’s action in the history of 
humanity, remains an essential part of this reading of history. 
Heilsgeschichte remains an essential characteristic of a theological reading of 
history even if the term for the significance or meaning of a moment is seen as 
harmonious with the modern chronological and empirical understanding of history; in 
fact, making no distinction between the terms strengthens the association between 
chronos and kairos. As Lesslie Newbigin writes: “From the point of view of a theologian 
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there is one question, perhaps a very simplistic one, which seems unavoidable. If God 
does not act in history, what meaning can there be in saying that God acts at all?”100 God 
acts at kairotic moments, but those moments do not stand apart from chronic history; 
rather, to this perspective, if you or I had a time machine and traveled back to a certain 
day in first-century Roman-occupied Palestine, we too would see Jesus healing a blind 
man, feeding the five thousand, or turning water into wine. The moments described in the 
Bible in which God acted for the salvation of God’s people are seen as no less 
empirically historical than the Peloponnesian War or the assassination of Julius Caesar, 
despite their theological significance as moments of God’s action in the world. 
It is important to note here that the term heilsgeschichte was developed by 
German liberal theologians in the nineteenth century—the very theologians against whom 
the fundamentalists were reacting in their defense of both traditional and modern 
conservative theological tenets—and that the further development of the notions of 
heilsgeschichte and kairos are also the work of liberal theologians, who used the terms to 
suggest that the Bible, while historically inaccurate, nevertheless told a story that was 
spiritually “true.” This theological direction was, of course, rejected by fundamentalists 
and many evangelicals, who believe that the Bible is literally as well as spiritually 
accurate in its historical narratives. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that the narrative structures upon which the Christian 
Right builds its logic rely on a lens of heilsgeschichte—even if they do not use that 
theological term—in their views of both the cosmic history of the universe and of the 
history of the American nation. Heilsgeschichte is a newer term for a view of history that 
has long been prevalent in Christian historiography; the term came about only as modern 
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historical visions that privileged chronos (historie) over kairos (geschichte) rose to 
prominence, thus requiring some differentiation. The notion of heilsgeschichte provides a 
useful rhetorical lens for understanding the narratives utilized by the Christian Right—in 
which the historical narrative is seen not only in the chronological sense as a “flat” line in 
which all moments have equal value, but also as a progression between kairotic moments, 
which operate in both directions temporally. 
Narrative Connection: Civil Religion 
Narratives do not operate in a vacuum; rather, society is full of narratives, 
sometimes competing with one another and sometimes harmonizing with one another. As 
already mentioned, Gutterman theorizes the development of these relationships by 
utilizing Ricoeur’s “dialectic of sedimentation and innovation,” in which new narratives 
use the “sediment” left from previous generations’ sacred and mundane stories as basis 
for their “innovations,” which then in turn, if they resonate and take hold within culture, 
become the sediments used by future generations to construct their narratives.101 As 
Gutterman writes, “innovation develops within and is, indeed, inspired by the necessary 
tension between the desire for stability and the need for, or inevitability of, change.”102 
As the stories of a culture are told, retold, and reshaped within every new generation, they 
draw on the elements of the sacred and mundane stories that already existed within a 
culture; part of the narrative critic’s role, then, is to rebuild the sacred stories that are 
being told and subtly altered as their fragments are reconfigured in new mundane stories. 
As McGee suggests, this is a constructive and inventive role for the critic, standing in 
opposition to previous conceptions of the critic as working with an existing and discrete 
text.103 
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The construction of the narrative then necessarily involves relating it to the 
fragments from previous narrative sentiments—making understanding the relationship 
between a given narrative and other narratives essential to a critical analysis of 
narrative’s rhetorical function. This can be related to Jasinski and Merceica’s suggestion 
that among the goals of the analysis of constitutive rhetorics should be to analyze “how 
texts invite listeners and readers to modify the meaning of a culture’s key terms” and 
“affirm as well as challenge established sources of cultural authority, bonds of affiliation, 
and institutional relationships104”—in other words, to explore the ways in which 
constitutive texts make use of the symbols and systems already in place in the culture and 
invite their audiences, by way of changing their understanding of who they are and where 
they fit in, to see those symbols and systems in a different light. I argue that some of the 
most significant fragments of narrative sediment used by the Christian Right are the 
symbols, narratives, institutions, and systems implicated in civil religion, the process by 
which the state legitimates itself through appeals to religious form; thus, a discussion of 
civil religion is the third component to the construction of a critical framework. 
It has been fifty years since Robert Bellah published the article in Daedalus 
reviving Rousseau’s idea of civil religion, which Bellah described as a set of symbols and 
rituals that, he argued, qualified as a separate religion from Christianity, positing a 
unitarian God who cares about law and order and who intervenes providentially on behalf 
of the American people. This religion is the religion of the state, Bellah argued, existing 
not to compete with or replace Christianity as the de facto American religion, but rather 
to augment it for the purposes of the state, to “build up […] powerful symbols of national 
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solidarity and to mobilize deep levels of personal motivation for the attainment of 
national goals.”105  
For Bellah, the function of civil religion is to legitimize the state through appeals 
to a transcendent purpose; as he writes, such a construction provides “a higher criterion” 
than the will of the people for right and wrong so that “it is possible that the people may 
be wrong,” as well as to provide “a transcendent goal for the political process.”106 This 
provides a crucial means of rhetorical escape for the promoter of American 
exceptionalism and American democracy when he or she faces something like slavery or 
Jim Crow, institutions that were very clearly oppressive and which are understood today 
to have been very clearly immoral, but which nevertheless at one time in American 
history enjoyed the support of the majority of the populace. 
Civil religion also draws from the symbolic storehouses of both nationalism and 
religion to create rituals and rhetorics that read the nation’s history, present, and future 
through the lens of religious archetypes like death and rebirth, providence, and sin and 
penance. Bellah suggests that despite civil religion being used to justify civil 
disobedience, its primary function seems to be priestly rather than prophetic, reinforcing 
rather than subverting the political and social system. The use of civil religion to create 
civic rituals like our celebrations of Memorial Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Independence 
Day chiefly upholds the institutions of the civis as well as the separation between the 
civil religion and explicitly sectarian religion. 
Another key aspect of Bellah’s vision of civil religion is that it is universal. To 
Bellah, civil religion draws not on a specifically Christian God but on a generic, unitarian 
version of God defined not by God’s character, God’s personality, or any other categories 
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that could take on sectarian qualities, but rather on God’s salvific acts for the American 
people. Thus, the function of civil religion has been to bring together people of disparate 
faiths in the narrative of the American nation—a function that has become more 
important as the nation has become more religiously pluralistic. Though this often is 
more functional in theory than in practice, particularly as atheists, agnostics, and 
humanists have become more insistent on their place in the nation’s religious landscape 
and thus attempted to push civil religion’s God-references out of government, civil 
religion is more reliant on a belief in America and in the idea of God blessing America 
than it is in any specific ontological vision of God. 
Roderick Hart’s critical examination of civil religion in The Political Pulpit 
remains a significant piece in rhetoricians’ discussion of the topic. Hart focused on 
presidential rhetoric, suggesting that rather than civil religion we have instead what he 
calls civic piety, a relationship between religion and state best expressed in the metaphor 
of a contract—in which both church and state have an unspoken agreement that though 
the line between them will continually be negotiated, the agents of neither will tread too 
heavily on the other’s territory for fear of their transgression resulting in their ostracism 
from their chosen (religious or political) arena. Hart’s understanding of civic piety is 
more pragmatic than Bellah’s transcendent notion; for Hart, the language of civic piety 
functions entirely in the priestly realm for civic actors, like Presidents, to justify their 
own power.  
In this contract, religion agrees to confine itself to the rhetorical (as opposed to 
the legal) sphere and support the policies of the state; the state agrees that its officials will 
“pay tacit homage to religion, [… or else] be branded un-American and declared non-
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electable.”107 This creates a role for civic piety characterized by four properties: 
expedient complexity, which creates an effectively “polytheistic” system in which piety 
can serve any number of political goals; non-existential content, in which it “revel[s] in a 
world of images rather than with practical policy”108; ritualistic presence, in which the 
discourse of civic piety is at its fullest in national rituals like inaugurations, 
commemorations, and the like; and prosaic animus, in which it is homocentric (rather 
than theocentric) and designed to “short-circuit national difficulties which could arise 
between church and state,” rather than exacerbate or confront them.109 
Hart’s conception of civic piety is free of any theological content short of that 
needed to unite the majority of the populace; pluralistic inclusion and pragmatic 
operation are its aims. Its function is fundamentally conservative; it seeks to preserve and 
define the nation and its traditions in the service of the system as it exists. As Hart puts it, 
“we find no truly prophetic God in America’s civil-religious pantheon.”110 When 
expressions of civic piety step over the line into opposition to governmental policy, Hart 
says, they are shut out of power, “labeled radical and denied an opportunity to offer the 
benediction at political gatherings.”111 To Hart’s vision of civic piety, then, the sacred is 
entirely in the service of the secular, operating as a legitimating and unifying force in a 
system-supportive role deployed by those who are already legitimated by the system. 
Furthermore, for Hart, civic piety still operates largely in terms of traditional religious 
categories—it is found in the reappropriation of symbols, icons, ideologies, and rituals 
that are traditionally the sphere of the religious. 
Since the publication of Hart’s book in 1977, numerous scholars have addressed 
its core claims.112 Most notably, in 2002, Martin J. Medhurst, while acknowledging that 
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The Political Pulpit was an accurate description of the landscape of the relationship 
between religion and government from 1925 to 1975, claimed that Hart’s model has since 
become woefully outdated; noting the existence of politically-active groups on the 
Christian Right, he claims that while civic piety remains largely the same, “a new, more 
personalized, more religion-specific language” is arising among political actors alongside 
it.113 In addition, Donald Lee claims that religious rhetoric in American politics is not as 
non-specific as Hart claims; there are real references to the sacred in some American 
civil-religious rhetoric, particularly in the past 25 years. He outlines four references to the 
sacred in American civil-religious discourse, claiming that they “are not just catch-
phrases – not merely salve for soothing the parties to the church-state contract – instead, 
they represent words that form a powerful American narrative about nation, God, justice, 
and community.”114 However, they both continue to see civil religion or civic piety 
largely in the same terms that Hart and Bellah see them—as sets of symbols or appeals to 
smaller stories, rather than in terms of constitutive narratives that shape subject-positions’ 
views of themselves, of the key terms of society, and of space and time. 
Robert Wuthnow’s 1989 critique of Bellah draws closer to a constitutive view. He 
proposes that civil religion’s legitimating and unifying function has been diminished due 
to the increasing divide between what he suggests are two separate civil religious views: 
a conservative view, in which America is an exceptional nation, Christian in origin, 
chosen by God to fulfill God’s mission on earth; and a liberal view, which draws on 
theological and religious ideologies not necessarily to legitimate American nationalism, 
but rather to uphold broader values that both transcend and challenge the national culture. 
He suggests that “secular mythologies” like freedom and material success “seem to be 
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gaining a more powerful position” in society than the mythologies of civil religion, 
because they are more widely accepted than civil religious values.115  
Wuthnow’s critique has much to speak for it, most notably its engagement with 
the Christian Right (which Bellah’s 1967 article predates) in light of their engagement 
with the symbol-system of civil religion/civic piety; other critics, like those in the 2002 
Journal of Communication and Religion, engaged the discourse of the Christian Right as 
something outside of the system of civic piety, because of Hart’s insistence on civic piety 
as a rhetorical form deployed by those who hold power within the system. The strength of 
Wuthnow’s engagement is his attention to the ways in which alternative visions of the 
relationship between religious symbols and the national imaginary function to shift the 
lines of demarcation that separate them; though the Christian Right operates outside the 
political system, I will demonstrate that appeals to their worldview appear in discourse 
within the system as well. Additionally, Wuthnow gets at the depth of the disconnect 
between conservative and liberal civil-religious viewpoints. If conservative and liberal 
civil religion see the world through the lens of different narratives—narratives that 
constitute the “American people” in different subject-positions, with different teleological 
trajectories and desired endpoints—then that could explain some of the breakdowns and 
fractures we have seen within our political system in recent years. 
Wuthnow also presents civil religious discourse in a frame that I find more 
accurate than that of Beasley, Bellah, and Hart; the latter three all seem to see civil 
religion as (in Beasley’s words) an “ideological consensus,”116 a series of propositional 
statements, rituals, and symbols that Neuhaus has suggested is not a “true religion” 
compared to the coherent theological and dogmatic systems of the traditional religions.117 
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This notion of civil religion—an adaptation of the same terms that traditional theology 
and religious studies construct for the more traditional religions, that of the philosophical 
or propositional core of the religion—does not get at the crucial narrative and teleological 
core that I maintain is at the center of civil religion as it is understood in America. In 
seeing the trees of the pantheon of patriotic heroes, the collection of iconic images, the 
ideologies of shared faith and belief, I suggest that they are missing the rhetorical forest 
of narrative that ties these elements together and gives American civil religious discourse 
its power—whether it is unified, as Bellah suggests, or fragmented, as Wuthnow 
maintains. 
Evangelical Christians would surely agree that merely assenting to propositional 
statements about Jesus Christ does not make one a Christian; among other passages from 
the Bible they would cite the book of James, in which the author writes that “even the 
demons believe [there is one God]—and shudder.”118 Similarly, participation in American 
civil religion is not simply assent to an “ideological consensus,” even one that constitutes 
the American subject. After the Allied armies liberated Paris from Nazi Germany in 1944, 
the Parisians who lined the streets, cheering and waving American flags at passing tanks 
and soldiers, might at that moment have assented to the American civil religion’s vision 
of Americans as the messianic liberators of the world—but that does not mean those 
Parisians were suddenly Americans. It is one’s sense of participation in this narrative, 
seeing oneself as the American defending freedom and democracy against all who would 
fight it, that constitutes the subject of American civil religion. Civil religious discourse, I 
suggest, functions as a constitutive rhetoric. 
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Harold Bloom presents an alternative vision of the relationship between religion 
and the American experience, suggesting that the pervasive religious value in America is 
not Christianity at all, but rather what he describes as the “American Religion”—which 
“masks itself as Protestant Christianity yet has ceased to be Christian.”119 He argues that 
this American Religion has become completely unmoored from the theological traditions 
of the Christian church as they have been understood for the last two millennia. Most of 
Bloom's thesis, positing the existence of this American Religion, is on a level with which 
this study is not concerned; whether or not the American Religion is in fact Protestant 
Christianity, or orthodox Christianity as it has historically been understood for the past 
two thousand years, is less important here than whether the American Religion identifies 
itself as such—and indeed it does. The fact that American Christians continue to insist 
that a religious continuum runs from the Apostle Paul through Erasmus, Martin Luther, 
and John Edwards to Franklin Graham and T.D. Jakes is reason enough for the 
rhetorician to see American Christianity in light of the Christian tradition as a whole. 
However, Bloom does identify several key aspects of American religiosity (and 
particularly conservative American Christianity) that bear discussion in this study. First 
and foremost, he identifies American Christianity as fundamentally concerned with the 
individual and, further, with the immortal core soul of the individual; in fact, he argues, 
what he describes as the Gnosticism of the American Religion “consistently leads to a 
denial of communal concern” and “continues to rejoice in its social inutility.”120 This, I 
think, is a crucial component of American Christianity; with the atomized individual, 
standing alone before God, as its heart, there comes a point for all evangelical 
Christianity at which the communal concern breaks down. At the end of the day (or the 
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End of Days), we all must stand by ourselves to be judged, with nobody else to help or 
hurt us. 
Bloom's interpretation of American religiosity as a form of Gnosticism also 
provides an interesting lens; the Christian Right's interpretation of the Scriptural narrative 
couches its Manichaean worldview as “Christ” versus “the World,” as “spirit” versus 
“flesh.” (Christianity has flirted with Gnosticism since its very beginnings as a religious 
movement; the most well-known apocryphal Gospel, the Gospel of Thomas, is a 
collection of purported saying of Jesus that make him into a Gnostic of his time.) The 
strict division of the world into “good” and “evil” called for by the Cosmic Narrative is 
certainly at least in some sense Gnostic, given its condemnation of the created world as 
essentially evil since the Fall, even if the narrative itself in many places resists Gnostic 
characterizations. Eden was the perfect version of the created world, and the primitive 
church the perfect form of Christianity; both of these would undermine a strictly Gnostic 
lens, as too would the narrative’s insistence on spiritual warfare against evil in the realm 
of the spirit. Nevertheless, despite these nuances, there is much to suggest that the 
contemporary Christian Right, at least in some respect, is Gnostic, particularly in its 
attitudes toward sexuality. 
But finally, and perhaps most importantly, Bloom identifies the uniqueness of 
American religion; even if one does not accept his thesis that his “American Religion” is, 
in some essential way, not really Christianity, it is hard to dispute that American 
Christianity is in many ways different, both historically and in the present, from 
expressions of Christianity elsewhere in the world. There is something unique about the 
ways in which American narratives and Christian narratives have been woven together, 
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not just in the discourses I identify as the “Christian Right” but throughout American 
religion, to produce a form of religious expression that is qualitatively unlike the 
historical Christian practices found in Europe and the Middle East, or the more direct 
extensions of those traditions in Latin America and Asia. 
These studies are all somewhat limited, though, by their conception of the 
“political.” I find a great deal of resonance in Jason C. Bivins’s summation of most of the 
landscape of religion and politics, which he suggests have tended to subsume the term of 
“politics” under that of the “church-state” relationship. He argues that the “church-state” 
frame “implies that, when we are talking about religion and politics, we are actually 
talking about two discrete institutions (‘church’ and ‘state’), and that what we mean by 
politics is government.”121 In its place, he argues, we need a more expansive view of 
politics that sees religion “in explicit relation to the broad spaces, conceptions, and 
practices of the political which have historically taken shape in the crucible of specific 
arguments and struggles—over race, gender, patriotism, public speech, and so forth”122—
in other words, we need a view of the political not as being subsumed as a function of the 
state or government, but rather as the process by which church, state, the people, and the 
political spaces in which they operate are defined and negotiated. 
This viewpoint—which Bivins characterizes as “political religion”—forms the 
basis of the lens through which I will explore the civil-religious constructs and the 
negotiations of those constructs, the history of which people like Bellah, Hart, and 
Wuthnow have sought to describe and understand. It offers a conception in which civil 
religion is seen as a process in which narratives meet, intersect, and intermingle, where 
boundaries between “American” and “foreign” are defined and negotiated; it enables us 
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to view the civil religious debate not as an orderly, stately process in which church and 
state sit down at a table and hash out a negotiated agreement, but rather as a fluid process 
in which religious narratives, rituals, and philosophies are in a constant state of flux. In 
short, this terminology enables us to understand and conceptualize relationships between 
the various interpretations of civil religion I have outlined above: Bellah and Hart’s 
conceptions of the nondescript and providential God of American civil religion, 
Wuthnow’s sociological appreciation of the split between conservative and liberal civil 
religion, and Bloom’s notion of American civic and political life creating a religion unto 
itself. 
Precís 
Chapter 2 will be broken into two parts. The first part will represent an effort to 
construct the whole of these two “sacred narratives” from various texts identified with 
Christian Right rhetors; I will present detailed accounts of the two narratives, appealing 
to multiple primary sources in their construction. The second part of the chapter will be 
what Jasinski and Merceica would characterize as an internal analysis of the space 
created by these two narratives,123 focusing on the ways in which these narratives invite 
their audiences to see themselves, the key symbols and terms of American culture, and 
time itself in particular ways. Of particular interest will be the epistemological functions 
of the interactions between the narratives, which I will suggest function to create a 
complete worldview. The logics created by the two narratives “cross-pollinate”—for 
example, the Cosmic Narrative takes as a fundamental tenet that the original manuscripts 
of the Bible as inerrant, which then “bleeds over” into the American Narrative’s 
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understanding of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence and their reading of 
those documents through their construction of the original intent of their authors. 
Chapters 3 through 5 will use the three components of narrative set out by 
Gutterman—identity, setting, and connection to other narratives—as touchstones for 
discussing aspects of the interactions between the narratives, looking for the ways in 
which the apparent contradictions between the two narratives actually serve as sources of 
flexibility for rhetors appealing to both texts.  
Chapter 3 will be a discussion of the ways in which the two narratives create 
flexibility for rhetors to manipulate the setting, with a particular emphasis on the ways in 
which the tension between the narratives’ views of eschatology enable the manipulation 
of the variable of time. The two narratives draw on different forms of temporal reasoning, 
moving in different directions. The American Narrative views time as chronos, and 
reasons from the basis of history; the past affects the present and provides rhetors with a 
means of interpreting and guiding actions as the nation moves into an unknown future 
through the rhetorical form of the jeremiad. The Cosmic Narrative, on the other hand, has 
a kairotic perspective, and reasons from the basis of typology, in which present and future 
actions fulfill and give meaning to the past; in this perspective, because the whole of the 
narrative has already been written by God, the past, present, and future can be read and 
interpreted as a form of literature, with dramatic parallels between past and present events 
indicating the certainty of future outcomes. 
However, the resonances and dissonances between the two narratives allow their 
perspectives on time to be applied between the narratives, which opens up space for acts 
of rhetorical creativity. In the American Narrative, the stories of the American founders, 
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of revolution and civil war, are read not just as history but as typology, placing the 
contemporary Christian Right auditor in a position where he or she can ultimately fulfill 
and give meaning to the sacrifices and trials of the generations that came before. The 
Cosmic Narrative, meanwhile, is reinterpreted as conditional, exploiting the narrative's 
ambiguity about the immediate future (specifically, the timing and nature of the eschaton) 
to suggest that while the ultimate end of the narrative is known, the path by which it will 
be reached will be determined by human actions in the present context. 
Chapter 4 is a discussion of the constitutive and identity-forming aspects of these 
narratives, and particularly the ways in which the two narratives create alternative loci 
and circumferences of identity. The Cosmic Narrative suggests that religious identity is 
individual, and that the true Christians are a persecuted minority in a world where 
temporal authorities will be suspicious, if not overtly hostile, toward the true faith. The 
American Narrative, on the other hand, suggests that communities and nations can also 
be imbued with religious identity, and positions the auditor as part of a “silent majority” 
of “pro-moral” Americans who are being shut out of the nation whose ideals they 
inherited by a shadowy secular humanist elite. 
The tensions between these two visions of identity are mitigated by two strategies. 
The first strategy is a strong definition of the antagonist of the narrative, which suggests 
that secular humanist elites are (wittingly or unwittingly) serving the agenda of Satan in 
the great cosmic war between good and evil. The second strategy is a reinterpretation and 
reconfiguration of the symbols of civil religion from unitarian universality to sectarian 
specificity; the God who blesses America is not Bellah's vague and theologically-non-
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specific providential deity, but specifically the Triune God as defined by the tenets of 
evangelical Protestantism.  
Both of these strategies appeal to the notion of dual meanings, defining those who 
are truly inside the circle of circumference as those who have the “ears to hear and eyes 
to see” what is truly going on. While the general public may see the nation beset by a 
series of unconnected enemies, those who are inside the circumference of identity 
understand the ways in which they are all connected under the satanic umbrella; while 
ordinary Americans may interpret the symbols of civil religion as universal to all 
Americans of good faith, those with “ears to hear and eyes to see” understand them as a 
sign that evangelical Protestants are the true heirs to the legacy of the nation's founders. 
Chapter 5 will look at the third aspect Gutterman sets out for narratives, that of its 
relationship to other narratives.  The dual-meaning strategies used by Christian Right 
rhetors to resolve the internal tensions between the Cosmic and American Narratives’ 
visions of identity function to create hierarchies in place of fixed circumferences, with 
evangelical Protestants at the center as the keepers of the true Christian faith and the true 
American identity. While those hierarchies resolve the tensions in identity formation 
between the Cosmic and American Narrative, they also function to create tensions within 
the larger movements of which the Christian Right is a part. Specifically, if evangelical 
Protestants are the keepers of true Christianity and true Americanism, where does that 
leave the other major religious allegiances within American conservatism: Roman 
Catholics and Latter-Day Saints (Mormons)? 
I will briefly review the history of theological and political tensions between each 
group and the Protestant Christian Right, and then utilize presidential campaigns as a lens 
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to examine how Christian Right rhetors and members of these other religious groups 
navigated and negotiated the relationships between their narrative worldviews. I will 
identify two strategies used by Protestant Christian Right rhetors in particular. First, they 
strategically differentiated between rhetorical acts intended for an internal audience 
(within evangelical Protestantism) and those intended for external audiences (other 
religious communities within conservatism and, ultimately, the general public). Second, 
they strengthened their appeals to the danger posed by cultural antagonists, suggesting 
that conservative Christians of all stripes should be consubstantial in defending their 
religious freedom from incursion by governmental and cultural forces. 
I will conclude with a brief reflection on the future of Christian Right rhetoric in 
the age of Donald Trump, who rose to the presidency by earning widespread support 
from white evangelical Protestants despite the many aspects of his personality and 
politics that they would previously have considered disqualifying: his multiple marriages 
and history of proud adulterous affairs, his ostentatious lifestyle, his alleged sexual 
assaults, his apparent lack of religiosity, and his ambiguity toward what many Christian 
Right rhetors have characterized in the past as non-negotiable issue positions. How does 
the thesis of this project address many evangelical Protestants’ consubstantial 
identification with someone like Trump, with whom they seemingly have very little (if 
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Chapter 2: Two Narratives 
On page 110 of the paperback version of Tim LaHaye’s 1994 book Faith of our 
Founding Fathers, there is a notable typographical error: 
That President George Washington was a devout believer in Jesus Christ 
and had accepted Him as His Lord and Savior is easily demonstrated by a 
reading of his personal prayer book (written in his own handwriting), 
which was discovered in 1891 among a collection of his papers.1 
The capitalization of pronouns describing God (and Jesus) is not uncommon among 
Christians from various backgrounds who believe that it is an appropriate way of 
showing reverence for God. However, this practice is generally not used for pronouns 
referring to George Washington. 
Obviously, this is a typographical error and represents no attempt on the part of 
LaHaye to equate Washington with Jesus—but it does serve as something of a 
representative anecdote (if an unintentional one) for the ways in which the mixture of the 
Cosmic Narrative and the American Narrative creates resonances that imbue elements of 
one narrative with themes and concepts from the other. Presenting Washington as a 
devoted Christian whose faith is described in the same way as an evangelical might 
describe his or her own relationship to Jesus Christ (“accepted [Jesus] as His [sic] Lord 
and Savior”), the Freudian slip only serves to emphasize the thesis of LaHaye’s book, 
inviting the reader to imagine Washington as a type of holy figure whose words and 
deeds exist in the same mythological, kairotic space as the words of Jesus Christ. 
As Michael Calvin McGee pointed out, all rhetoric is built from fragments of 
what has come before, fragments which implicate the whole of the culture in which a 
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given rhetorical act comes into being, so that “all of culture is implicated in every 
instance of discourse.”2 If the two narratives I identify are indeed significant if not 
definitional sources for those whose rhetoric we identify as the Christian Right, then they 
cannot stand in isolation from one another, either in the formation of rhetorical identity 
that proceeds from the texts or in the reverberations and reformulations that proceed as 
other rhetors within these narrative traditions respond and react to these texts.  
While the seeming contradictions between the two narratives themselves create 
ample space and energy for the formation of new texts, there are also ways in which they 
reinforce and harmonize with one another, amplifying certain aspects of the worldviews 
to which the narratives invite their audiences. This chapter will focus on those 
resonances. First, I will lay out in more detail my reconstruction of the Cosmic and 
American Narratives from a variety of source texts, focusing particularly on the 
American Narrative and the ways in which it “borrows” some aspects of the Cosmic 
Narrative’s overall historical hermeneutic to cast the history of the European-descended 
peoples in North America in a more theological and more presentist light. Second, I will 
discuss the ways in which the two narratives harmonize with one another particularly in 
their epistemological outlook—a harmony that sets the stage for the productive tensions 
in identity and time that I discuss later. 
The Two Narratives: Sources and Authors 
In reconstructing the Cosmic and American Narratives, I have chosen a variety of 
sources from across the spectrum of what would be described as the “Christian Right.” 
Some of these sources, like Schaeffer, Falwell, and LaHaye, were chosen for the 
influence of their work on other Christian Right advocates and political figures, or their 
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prominence in the media as figureheads of the Christian Right. Others, like Kennedy and 
Whitehead, are influential thinkers and writers in their own right, even as they are not 
nearly as heavily cited as the first group; these were chosen more because their works are 
representative of those whose work has been influenced by the major Christian Right 
thought leaders. One of the major challenges of a work of this kind is the sheer volume of 
rhetorical material produced by Christian Right figures of major and minor provenance; 
this represents an attempt to make that large volume of work manageable. 
In addition to these major sources, I also access a variety of minor sources from 
the past decade, to demonstrate the continuing resonance of these narratives in rhetoric 
associated with the Christian Right movement. Notably, in my research on this subject, I 
found no sources that directly contradicted the dual-narrative construct I have proposed 
here; some sources certainly emphasized one narrative over the other, and there exist 
subtle differences as to the extent to which the Cosmic Narrative in particular is viewed 
literally, but the broad thrusts of the two narratives are remarkably consistent throughout 
the rhetoric associated with the Christian Right movement. 
Mention the Christian Right to most Americans and one of the first names that 
inevitably emerges is Jerry Falwell (1933-2007). A Baptist pastor and founder of Thomas 
Road Baptist Church and Liberty University (both in Lynchburg, Virginia), Falwell was 
one of the first prominent figures to arise from the new Christian Right movement in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s via his leadership of the Moral Majority. Even after resigning 
from the Moral Majority’s leadership in 1987 (after the controversy over his assumption 
of leadership of Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker’s PTL Ministries3), he continued to be a 
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prominent media figure for the Christian Right, as well as carrying on his influence 
through Liberty University and its various associated organizations. 
The other name that inevitably arises in discussions about the Christian Right is 
Marion “Pat” Robertson (1930-), a Pentecostal Baptist media figure and founder of the 
Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). Robertson, the son of Virginia U.S. Senator A. 
Willis Robertson, rose to prominence along with CBN’s expansion throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, as host of its news program The 700 Club. After losing the 1988 Republican 
presidential nomination to George H.W. Bush, he founded the Christian Coalition, a 
national network of Christian Right organizations whose explicit aim was to be more 
politically-savvy than organizations like the Moral Majority or Christian Voice that 
preceded it.4 The Christian Coalition was arguably the most prominent of the Christian 
Right organizations throughout the 1990s.  
Timothy LaHaye (1926-2016) is best known in popular culture for the Left Behind 
series of novels, coauthored with novelist Jerry Jenkins, which topped bestseller lists and 
spawned several films. Those novels are based in large part on LaHaye’s theological 
works on eschatology, where he outlines a premillennial dispensationalist viewpoint in 
which the end of the present age will come with the rapture of believing Christians, 
terrible cataclysms leading to the rise of the Antichrist as a world dictator aided by Satan 
himself, and Jesus’s ultimate return at the head of a conquering army to defeat the forces 
of evil in a bloody battle and inaugurate a millennial reign of peace under his direct rule. 
In addition to his eschatological works, LaHaye, wrote a series of books, heavily 
influenced by evangelical scholar/critic Francis Schaeffer (who will be discussed 
shortly), purporting to show the dangers posed by “secular humanism” for the souls of 
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individuals, the family, and society as a whole. LaHaye has also been a prominent figure 
in the Christian Right organizationally, sitting on the Moral Majority’s board of directors, 
founding the Center for Traditional Values and organizing the conservative Center for 
National Policy.5 His wife and frequent coauthor, Beverly LaHaye, is the founder of 
Concerned Women for America, a conservative advocacy group.  
D. James Kennedy (1930-2007) was a Presbyterian pastor who rose to 
significance among evangelicals after the church he founded, Coral Ridge Presbyterian 
Church in Florida, sustained explosive growth by adopting a set of evangelism techniques 
he devised. In 1978, he turned his church’s success into a television ministry and became 
a prominent media and political figure among the Christian Right, authoring or 
coauthoring numerous books defending his Christian faith and arguing for political 
activism and involvement by conservative Christians. 
Francis Schaeffer (1912-1984) was one of the most significant influences on the 
thought history of the Christian Right; virtually every other rhetor I have selected here 
cites him directly at least once, and shows the influence of his work in many more places. 
Schaeffer studied under prominent fundamentalist Presbyterian Carl McIntyre and was 
the first clergyman ordained by the Bible Presbyterian Church, a new fundamentalist 
denomination that broke away from the already-fundamentalist Orthodox Presbyterian 
Church. After a decade in American ministry, Schaeffer and his family moved to 
Switzerland, where they founded the L’Abri community (French for “the shelter”) in the 
Swiss Alps. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Schaeffer became popular among American 
evangelicals for his intellectual apologetics asserting the superiority of Christianity over 
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humanism. Christianity, he claimed, was the only consistent and coherent worldview. His 
political thinking stemmed from his view of Reformation theology and its sola scriptura 
theological epistemology; only in a society with a “Christian base,” he claimed, could 
there be true “freedom without chaos,”6 and contemporary society’s abandonment of the 
Christian consensus in favor of humanism was the cause of the chaotic social unrest of 
the era. His political thought led him to be one of the few Protestants who sided with the 
Roman Catholics in opposing the Roe v. Wade decision when it came out in 1973; 
Schaeffer, who saw the legalization of abortion as another sign of humanism’s lack of 
value for human life, is credited by many scholars as one of the primary influences 
behind abortion becoming a major issue for the Christian Right.7 
John Whitehead (1946-) is a lawyer, constitutional scholar, and founder of the 
Rutherford Institute, a legal advocacy organization (one of the right-wing answers to the 
ACLU) that provides free legal aid in support of public monuments to Christianity, 
religion in public schools, and other similar causes. Whitehead’s work draws heavily on 
the work of Schaeffer as well as work by Reconstructionist theologian Rousas J. 
Rushdoony in making the case for basing all laws in Reformed Christian thought and for 
a return to the “Christian consensus.”8 
David Barton (1954-) is a self-trained historian from Texas whose historical 
works advance the claim that America’s founders intended for the United States to be a 
Christian nation, and did not intend the separation of church and state. Barton has served 
in official roles for the Texas Republican Party and the Republican National Committee, 
and has been cited by numerous Christian Right-associated politicians like Mike 
Huckabee and Michele Bachmann as an authority on American history. Barton is not 
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well-regarded among academic historians, though; many such historians, including 
prominent evangelical historians like Warren Throckmorton and George Marsden, have 
criticized Barton for using quotations from the nation’s founders out of context and, in 
some cases, possibly even fabricating them. 
Peter Marshall (1940-2010), a pastor, and David Manuel (1936-2013), a 
professional writer, were the co-authors of God’s Plan for America, a three-book series 
claiming that “that God had a definite and discoverable plan for America”9—to be 
revealed by Protestant Christians who would found a free and Christian nation to serve as 
a blessing to the world for centuries to come.10 Starting with Columbus’s “discovery” of 
the New World in 1492, they trace American history up to and through the Civil War, 
claiming that a serious study of that history reveals the influence of divine providence in 
sustaining America with the Puritans’ vision of a covenant between the nation and God. 
Social unrest in the present, they claim, is a result of contemporary Americans’ forgetting 
that history. 
In addition to the authors mentioned, I also will draw from several history 
textbooks intended for Christian schools or for conservative Christian homeschooling 
families; these textbooks are representative of the American Narrative as it is presented to 
children and youth who grow up in households where the Christian Right’s influence is 
prominent. The whole of the theological/political construct I present here is reinforced 
across multiple media spanning the evangelical Christian subculture in America; for 
example, Marshall and Manuel’s God’s Plan for America series has been adapted into a 
series of children’s books11 and a study guide for Sunday school teachers.12 
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The Cosmic Narrative 
The overarching narrative for the Christian Right, what I am characterizing as the 
Cosmic Narrative, is one of a vast battle between the forces of good (led by God) and the 
forces of evil (led by Satan). This narrative envelops, encompasses, and contextualizes 
the American Narrative; to the extent that the story of America appears at all in the 
Cosmic Narrative, it plays a minor role at best, serving as the site of further theological 
and spiritual revival in the age of the Reformation and as a base for missionary activity as 
the End Times approach. 
It is also important to note that parts of this narrative—such as the valorization of 
the early church, the corruption of Roman Catholicism, and premillennial 
dispensationalism—are not universal even among theologically-conservative Christians. 
Rather, those who espouse it tend to be theologically-conservative Protestants from the 
fundamentalist or evangelical traditions. Notably, conservative Roman Catholics, 
theologically-conservative mainline Protestants without ties to the fundamentalist 
movement (such as the Dutch Reformed traditions), and Latter-Day Saints break from or 
reject portions of this narrative. 
I also maintain that it would also be an error to overemphasize the differences 
among theologically- and politically-conservative Christians within the Christian Right. 
While the contemporary Christian Right is more religiously-diverse than its origins—
particularly in its acceptance of conservative Roman Catholics and Latter-Day Saints as 
partners—most of the major thinkers and theorists of the Christian Right have been 
conservative Protestants in the theological tradition of evangelicalism and/or 
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fundamentalism. Furthermore, those outside the evangelical or fundamentalist tradition 
emphasize some of the same themes in their own versions of the Cosmic Narrative. 
In this narrative, the Christian Bible is seen as the foundational text laying out the 
terms and characters; Christians see the current era as one chapter in a great cosmic story, 
whose beginning is the Creation and Fall of humanity and whose ending is the descent of 
the world into chaos followed by the great cosmic and cataclysmic battle of the 
Apocalypse, in which God finally triumphs over Satan and inaugurates the eternal 
heavenly Kingdom for all true Christians to inhabit. This long struggle, which extends 
literally from the beginning of time to its end, is seen in terms of ongoing “spiritual 
warfare” (a concept from Paul’s letter to the Ephesians)13 with God and God’s followers 
(including angels) on one side, and Satan and Satan’s followers (including demons) on 
the other. However, it is important to note that despite the frame of a “battle,” there is no 
point where the outcome is anything less than certain; God remains in control of the 
whole narrative, including deciding when God will win the final victory over Satan. 
The Beginning: A Vast Cosmic War 
The narrative starts with a tale that is commonly accepted among Christians 
despite the fact that it does not appear in its totality in canonical Scripture (there are 
allusions to it in the Bible, but most of the material comes from non-canonical works like 
the book of 2 Enoch14 and the Book of Adam and Eve, as well as in the early teachings 
and writings of Christianity) in which the archangel Lucifer (who according to the 
tradition was God’s lieutenant, considered the most beautiful angel or “morning star”), 
believing that he could usurp God, gathered followers among the angels and rebelled 
against God. After a battle in Heaven, Lucifer was defeated by God and banished from 
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God’s presence—at which point he and his followers became Satan and the demons, 
eternally contending against God and seeking to damage or destroy that which God 
created. 
At some point after that (to the extent that time had any meaning before the 
creation of the world) God created the world in six days not through a process of 
evolutionary change but by divine fiat, and created the first man, Adam. Adam was 
forbidden from eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, under penalty 
of death, but otherwise was given dominion over all of the earth and its creatures. Not 
liking that Adam was alone, God created out of Adam’s rib the woman, Eve, who was to 
be a “help meet”15 to Adam; Adam and Eve were placed in the Garden of Eden, to tend 
the Garden of Eden. As Adam and Eve did not know sin, they were designed to live 
forever in the garden, walking naked freely with God because they knew no shame.  
However, a serpent—understood as Satan even though the book of Genesis does 
not explicitly state this—tempted Eve by causing her to doubt God’s command and by 
telling her that God forbade their eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil 
because God was afraid of the humans’ power. Eve ate from the tree and gave some of its 
fruit to Adam, who also ate it; when God found out, God cursed Adam, Eve, and the 
serpent, and cast the humans out of the Garden. 
This story is generally known as the “fall,” by which sin entered into the world; 
prior to Adam and Eve’s eating of the fruit, the world was perfect and death was 
unknown, but after the Fall, death entered into the world. In Christian doctrine, the Fall 
creates the gulf between humans and God, because humans, knowing the difference 
between good and evil, now have sin in their nature. Human sinfulness, incompatible 
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with God’s holiness and perfection, creates the need for reconciliation between humans 
and God by blood sacrifice; if human sinfulness is not addressed, humans are unworthy 
of God’s kingdom, and they are thus condemned to hell in the end. 
The Patriarchs and Israel 
The narrative follows through the Patriarchs, the fathers of the Hebrew people; 
Abraham, the first Patriarch, made a covenant with God whereby Abraham promised to 
follow God and God, in return, granted the land of Israel to Abraham and his 
descendants. Abraham’s grandson Jacob and his sons settled in Egypt fleeing a famine, 
and four hundred years later (when the narrative rejoined them), they were enslaved to 
Pharaoh. God raised up Moses, who confronted Pharaoh; after the ten plagues, Pharaoh 
released the Hebrews, who then spent forty years wandering the Sinai Peninsula. During 
this time, the Hebrews received the Ten Commandments from Moses, who encountered 
God face-to-face on Mount Sinai, as well as the ceremonial and ritual law centered on 
blood sacrifice at a single central location where the nation’s spiritual leader would 
encounter God: the tabernacle (later replaced by the temple in Jerusalem). 
After Moses’s death in the wilderness, his successor Joshua led the Israelites into 
Canaan, the land God had promised to Abraham’s descendants, and the people gradually 
conquered the land, demanded and received a dynastic line of kings from God, and 
eventually were politically divided into a Northern Kingdom (whose capital was 
Samaria) and a Southern Kingdom (whose capital was Jerusalem). A recurring pattern 
developed where the Israelites would fall into idolatry and syncretism, abandoning God’s 
law for their neighbors’ worship of gods like Ba’al and Ashtoreth. God, growing tired of 
this idolatry, would allow Israel’s neighbors to attack, and the people, prompted by 
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prophets sent by God, would repent and return to God. This pattern culminated in the 
conquest of all of the Northern Kingdom by the Assyrians (after which point they faded 
from the narrative) and all of the Southern Kingdom by the Babylonians, who destroyed 
the Temple in Jerusalem and sent the Israelites into exile. During the exile, some of the 
people remained faithful to God’s law and—after the Persians had conquered Babylon—
were permitted to return to Jerusalem and, eventually, to rebuild the Temple. The Greeks 
then conquered Israel from the Persians, and then the Romans conquered it from the 
Greeks. 
A recurring theme throughout this period of the narrative is God’s special 
relationship with the people of biblical Israel; Israel is symbolically characterized as a 
wayward wife to God, pledged to remain faithful to God but continually straying to 
worship other fertility gods like Ba’al or Ashtoreth. However, God continues to love 
Israel and to honor God’s covenant with Abraham and his descendants; whenever God 
disciplines Israel for their unfaithfulness, God preserves a remnant of the faithful to 
remain and build a new generation who will follow God. Another key theme in this 
period is God’s use of other nations to punish Israel through war and conquest; the other 
nations are seen as instruments of God’s plan to draw Israel back to God. However, this 
period is also understood as setting up the main act in the drama: the birth, life, 
execution, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
The Incarnation 
The Jesus story is the pivot of the larger narrative; in this view of history, it is the 
single most consequential moment between the creation of the world and the end of time. 
Though the crux of the story is the death and resurrection of Jesus, the entirety of his 
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lifetime is considered to be of great significance within this narrative. The narrative of 
Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection is found in the four Bible books called the Gospels; 
tradition holds that two were written by the apostles Matthew and John, and the other two 
by early Christians named Mark and Luke.16 
The broad outlines of the Jesus story are relatively straightforward. Jesus was 
born to Mary, who was betrothed to Joseph but still a virgin,17 in a stable in Bethlehem 
amid a chorus of angels, a visit from shepherds,18 and gifts from sages who saw him as 
the fulfillment of an astrological prophecy.19 Once Jesus came of age, he was baptized by 
John the Baptist, a local itinerant prophet,20 and commenced his ministry, gathering 
disciples together and traveling the countryside, preaching, performing miracles, and 
enraging the religious authorities with his emphasis on loving God and one’s neighbor 
rather than strictly adhering to religious law. This culminated in his journey to Jerusalem, 
where Jewish religious leaders and Roman political leaders conspired against him, finally 
arresting him (with the aid of Jesus’s disciple Judas Iscariot, who betrayed Jesus21), and 
trying and sentencing him to death by crucifixion under Roman authority.22  
At the moment of Jesus’s death on the cross he cried out to God, the sky went 
dark, there was a great earthquake, and the curtain in the Temple which separated the 
people from the Holy of Holies which contained the seat of God was split in two.23 Jesus 
was buried by a wealthy patron before sundown on Friday (as Saturday was the Sabbath), 
and on Sunday morning, when several of Jesus’s followers went to visit the tomb, they 
discovered it empty.24 Jesus appeared to his disciples on several occasions, staying with 
them for another forty days before commissioning them to spread the Gospel over the 
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whole world, promising them that the Holy Spirit would come to help them and that he 
would return soon to initiate the end of the world, and then ascending into heaven.25 
It is significant for this study that the religious and political leaders are 
characterized as threatened by Jesus and Jesus’s message; the Bible’s promise that his 
followers would be persecuted for their faith and the Biblical narratives of the 
persecution of early Christians suggest to those who subscribe to this narrative that 
persecution is a sign of faithfulness.26 Another significant aspect to the narrative is the 
notion of Jesus’s sinlessness; the theology of substitutionary atonement requires that 
Jesus be the “spotless lamb” sacrificed for the sins of all, having never overtly sinned and 
having been born without original sin.27  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the miracles Jesus performs throughout the 
narrative—healings, mass feedings, casting out demons, and supernatural acts like 
walking on water—are significant in that they are seen as proof that Jesus is who he says 
he is. The historicity of the Gospels—in which they are seen as being just as historically 
and literally true as any other account of history, if not even more so due to their divine 
authorship and inerrancy—is an essential component of this narrative’s potency among 
the Christian Right; to them, everything laid out in the Gospels actually happened in 
Palestine during the first half of the first century of the common era, and these miracles 
are just as historically certain as any more mundane event from that era that is assumed to 
be historically true by the rest of the world (like Caesar’s assassination in 44 BCE). 
Among their many other functions, the Gospels are understood to be accurate historical 
records.28 
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The Church Age 
After Jesus’s ascension into heaven, the narrative continues to follow the stories 
of the disciples, who gathered in Jerusalem to figure out the next move. On the day of 
Pentecost (fifty days after Jesus’s crucifixion), the Holy Spirit came upon the disciples 
and they began preaching; devout Jews and God-fearers (those who believed in the 
Jewish God but were not themselves Jewish) from throughout the world, gathered in the 
city, heard the disciples speaking in their own languages. This kicked off a dramatic 
expansion of the Christian community in Jerusalem—one which led to the first wave of 
persecution against the nascent Christians. However, Christianity continued to thrive 
throughout the whole of the Middle East and the Roman Empire despite the persecutions 
as the disciples spread out, converting Jews to Christianity and starting communities of 
Christian believers wherever they went. 
One Pharisee who had been persecuting Christians, Saul, was traveling to 
Damascus when he had a dramatic conversion experience and began a series of 
missionary journeys that would result in his bringing the Gospel to the Gentiles 
(previously, the disciples had only been preaching to diasporic Jews) and planting 
churches throughout the whole of the Mediterranean region. Known as Paul (part of the 
Roman version of his name), he also wrote a series of epistles to the churches he planted, 
advising them on points of theology and practice; these letters would form much of what 
would later be collected as the New Testament. The biblical book of Acts relates 
numerous incidents in which Christians were persecuted; tradition holds that most of the 
apostles, and many other followers of Jesus in that early day, were martyred for their 
faith. 
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The Cosmic Narrative presents the early church era as a golden age of 
Christianity, with the implication that because the original disciples had actually known 
Jesus and had personally experienced the anointing of the Holy Spirit, their way of 
practicing Christianity was the ideal form of the religion. Harold Bloom suggests that the 
search for “primordial” Christianity is one of the hallmarks of American religion in 
general; as he points out, not only evangelicals but also Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) 
valorize the early church and suggest that their practices mirror most closely those of the 
earliest Christians (even as the Mormons suggest that their added revelation supersedes 
the early Christians’ practices).29 Some evangelical churches in the Campbellite 
Restorationist tradition take their emulation of the early church to the point of not using 
musical instruments in worship (since the early church did not have instrumental music), 
or by modeling their church structure after that presented in the epistles of Paul. 
According to the Cosmic Narrative, the golden age of the early church was 
followed by a steady decline, with the implication that the church’s increasing 
respectability in Roman culture (culminating in Constantine’s conversion in 313 CE and 
the subsequent adoption of Christianity as the official state religion of the Roman 
Empire) came at the cost of its purity and holiness. LaHaye writes, for example, that “as 
the Church became married to governmental authority and elevated to a place of 
acceptance, it declined in spiritual blessing and power.”30 The narrative suggests that this 
corruption expressed itself liturgically in the church’s adaptation of pagan Roman ritual 
into the practices of the Roman Catholic Church,31 philosophically in the church’s 
gradual acceptance of Greek and Roman thought and the valorization of human reason, 
and theologically in the emphasis on ritual and works rather than faith.  
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Another effect of this corruption, the Cosmic Narrative suggests, was a shift in 
Christian eschatology. Prior to Constantine, Christians were largely premillennial in their 
eschatology, seeing the imperial structure as irredeemable in its persecution of Christ’s 
chosen, ready to be wiped off the face of the earth with Christ’s sudden and unexpected 
second coming. However, when church and state united under Constantine, the idea of 
Rome as a hostile enemy of God obviously could not be maintained; thus, the Cosmic 
Narrative suggests, Christian eschatology shifted from a literal interpretation of 
Scripture’s End Times prophecies to an allegorical interpretation, culminating in 
Augustine's doctrine of amillennialism—that the millennium prophesied by the Bible was 
a symbol for the age of the church, rather than a literal millennium ushered in by 
supernatural events.32 
In the Cosmic Narrative, the church continued in this declined state, growing 
more corrupt and more mixed with worldly philosophies, for over one thousand years; 
though the narrative acknowledges the devotion of some individual Christians during this 
period, it suggests that their devotion was despite the church's influence, not because of 
it.33 This steady decline ended with the Reformation, which started with rebels like John 
Wycliffe and Jan Hus but took on full steam as Martin Luther broke from the Roman 
Catholic Church. Other heroes of the faith followed behind Luther: Ulrich Zwingli, John 
Calvin, and William Tyndale, to name but a few.  
The Reformation is seen as arresting the decline of the church in several 
important ways. First, there was the return to the notion of individual salvation—not only 
in Luther’s famous emphasis on salvation by faith alone (rather than by works), but also 
in highlighting the need for each individual to have his or her own relationship with God. 
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Parallel with the emphasis on individual salvation was an emphasis on an individual's 
relationship with the Bible, where the common person could now read the Bible in the 
vernacular language—as opposed to Scripture being restricted to the clergy reading in 
Latin. As Barton writes, “since the common man was not permitted to read the Scriptures 
for himself, his knowledge of rights and wrongs was limited to what his civil leaders told 
him.”34  
The increased emphasis on the Bible as the sole source of theological knowledge 
(rather than filtered through the traditions of the church) was famously described by 
Luther as sola scriptura; for Francis Schaeffer, even more important than flushing out the 
traditions of the church in theological reasoning, the Reformation's emphasis on the 
authority of the Bible was instrumental in recovering the concept of total depravity, over 
against the Roman Catholic Church's adoption of Thomist optimism about human reason, 
and “removing [...] the humanistic distortions which had entered the church.”35 
Some of the more eschatologically-minded rhetors in the Cosmic Narrative 
tradition—such as Tim LaHaye—also see the Reformation as the beginning of the 
recovery of premillennial eschatology. Though the first generations of Protestants (like 
Luther and Calvin) retained the amillennialism of Augustine, the emphasis on individual 
Bible reading and “the natural tendency of the ordinary individual to take the Bible 
literally”36 led to a renewed interest in premillennialism during the nineteenth century. 
The Cosmic Narrative also puts forth the notion that all Christians are engaged in 
spiritual warfare. Christians, equipped with the Holy Spirit and various spiritual 
disciplines and practices including prayer, Scripture, and righteousness, are to stand 
alongside God's armies of angels doing battle “against the powers of this dark world and 
 96 
against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms.”37 When spiritual warfare is 
coupled with premillennial eschatology (which suggests that the End Times are 
imminent), Satan becomes a very real presence, prowling “like a roaring lion looking for 
someone to devour”38 the souls of those who fall away, continually undermining 
Christianity and morality at a crucial kairotic moment in time. 
The Final Act: The End Times 
The End Times are the final act of this grand drama—and for many of the most 
significant proponents of the Christian Right’s vision, the End Times take the form of 
“premillennial dispensationalism,” a theological vision first developed by an English 
pastor named John Nelson Darby in the late 1800s. Premillennialism is defined by 
rupture rather than continuity; after God suddenly and unexpectedly raptures all true 
Christian believers into heaven, the world will descend into chaos and a single world 
government, led by the Antichrist and masterminded by Satan himself, will rise to 
oppress the world for seven years (killing much of humankind in the process). At the end 
of that seven-year period, Christ will return to make war against Satan and his forces; 
Christ will violently slaughter Satan's minions and bind Satan for a thousand years while 
Christ reigns over a peaceful millennial kingdom. At the end of that millennium, Satan 
will be unbound for the final climactic battle between good and evil, but Christ's forces 
will prevail again and God will create a “new heaven and new earth,”39 where all 
Christians will live eternally in God's glory. 
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The American Narrative 
The second narrative of the Christian Right, nested inside the first, is a historical 
narrative about the United States. In this narrative, Europeans who came to North 
America were guided there by God and charged with the founding of a Christian nation. 
The founders of the country, steeped in this ethos, were inspired by God on some level to 
write the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution based on Protestant 
Christian ideals and with the intention that the nation remain Christian in character. 
However, as the nation’s history progressed—and particularly in the latter half of the 
twentieth century—secular humanists, who sought to separate religion and morality from 
government, took over cultural institutions and indoctrinated Americans into abandoning 
Christian morality and government, leading to massive social chaos and decline. 
In the Cosmic Narrative, the outcome is certain; the world will grow worse and 
worse until Christ returns to finally triumph over evil and inaugurate the eternal kingdom. 
However, the American Narrative is left open-ended; either Christians will retake the 
nation, spark a national revival, and return America to God’s values and prosperity, or the 
nation will continue along its moral decline until it collapses (either naturally as a result 
of its sins, or supernaturally by God’s wrath) or the world ends. 
Columbus and the Puritans 
The American Narrative begins with the European discovery of the Americas—
which the narrative suggests was itself a product of divine providence, particularly in its 
timing: 
God had withheld knowledge of this place from Europeans for centuries. 
He had stocked it with an abundance of game and fertile soil, natural 
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resources and beauty—all that a people would ever need—as a fitting 
abode for the followers of His Son. And He had chosen Christopher 
[Columbus] to point the way.40 
Christopher Columbus, the first European to discover the New World, is presented in 
several ways. 41 In some Christian Right retellings of the American Narrative, Columbus 
is a hero who set out against all odds to spread the Christian faith to the New World, and 
historians who malign him are the agents of rampant political correctness. Barton, for 
example, presents a long passage from Columbus’s writings in which Columbus claims 
that the Holy Spirit convinced him that his journey would be successful,42 and Robertson 
claims that attacks against Columbus are “propaganda”43 that reflect the “hostility and 
divisiveness”44 of liberals. 
Others, like Marshall and Manuel, present a more ambiguous picture of Columbus 
as a hero of the faith gone wrong; while he initially was “the Christ-bearer”45 to the 
native peoples of the Americas, he was corrupted by his avarice into taking slaves and 
gold, a bad start to the European adventure in the New World. Columbus is also 
portrayed as corrupted by his Roman Catholicism, which was reason enough for God to 
providentially keep him away from North America, which God was setting aside for 
Protestants. Kennedy and Newcombe relate a story of Columbus being led by a cloud and 
a flock of birds to the West Indies instead of to the North American coast:  
And to think, if it had not been for the flight of some birds [leading 
Columbus to the West Indies], America would probably have the same 
culture and religion as that of South and Central America today. Were the 
cloud and those feathered creatures just a coincidence, or the hand of 
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God? I believe that just as God used a talking donkey to set Balaam 
straight (Num. 22:21-31), so He used a cloud and a flight of birds to 
change Columbus's destination.46 
If Columbus’s role in the story of America is left somewhat ambiguous, that of the 
Puritans is much less so. They are presented as the community that God truly intended to 
colonize the North American continent from the very beginning of history: 
I believe that God set our continent apart—separating it by two oceans—
not to be discovered until around the time of the Reformation. Here God 
established a certain sort of nation, a nation that was founded by the 
Pilgrims and the Puritans and others who came with evangelical 
Christianity. Here the Bible was believed and the gospel was preached. It 
was an evangelical nation. […] [I]f God, in His providence, ordained that 
this is what this nation should be, then all down through the ages, in fact 
from all eternity, God intended that it would be so. He guided our path and 
led us to this end.47 
The Puritans exemplify the ideal starting-point for the American Narrative; unlike the 
morally compromised (and Roman Catholic) Christopher Columbus, the Puritans 
represent not just Protestantism but Protestantism on a mission—the “city on a hill” of 
John Winthrop’s famous Arbella sermon, which Kennedy and Newcombe suggest 
“helped create the template for a uniquely free and Christian America.”48 The Puritans 
were not in the New World to mine gold or enslave the native population, but to serve as 
“a model of the Kingdom of Christ upon earth” and “living proof to the rest of the world 
that it was possible to live a life together that reflected the commandments of Christ”49—
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a community, Marshall and Manuel write, “who, more than any other, made possible 
America's foundation as a Christian nation.”50 
The Puritans explicitly saw themselves as a type of Israel, a people sent by God 
from their home into a new Promised Land—with the implication that God’s covenant 
with Israel in the Bible, including its conditional blessings and curses, applied to their 
communal life as well.51 This covenant is understood within the American Narrative not 
simply as a rhetorical device or as a way for the Puritans to understand and channel their 
religious devotion, but as being every bit as real as the Puritans supposed it to be. 
Marshall and Manuel suggest that Puritan history bears witness to the validity of their 
beliefs: 
Few Biblical principles are more compelling than this: that God blesses 
repentance. And, in the early days of our history, it was frequently proven 
that when people began to earnestly repent, what followed was the return 
of God's grace. That a drought could be broken or an Indian attack averted 
by corporate repentance is an idea that sounds alien to many Christians 
today. Yet it was central to the faith that built this country, and it is a 
prominent, recurring theme in the Bible.52 
In fact, they write, God’s blessing on the Puritans and their devotion to communal 
religious life was so great that its effects may be felt even to this day: “How much of the 
grace that continues to cover this country today and how many of the incredible blessings 
that have been poured out upon this land are a direct result of their obedience and 
willingness to die to self? Only God knows for certain.”53 
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The Puritans are also held up as an example of the necessity for religion and 
morality in civil government. While the American Narrative differs from the narrative 
offered up by explicit Christian Reconstructionists in suggesting that the Constitution's 
separation of explicit religious and civil authority is superior to the Puritan theocracy, the 
American Narrative nevertheless holds that the Puritans understood that civil government 
could not function in the absence of religion—and that a shared communal teleology was 
necessary to the health of the community. As Falwell writes (confusing the Puritans and 
Pilgrims), “time and again, our Puritan Pilgrim heritage was centered around advancing 
the Kingdom of God. Liberty was directly related to this end.”54  
The American Narrative particularly emphasizes the Puritans’ example of religion 
and civil government in the realm of education. The Puritans, aware of the abuses of the 
institutional church in England and on Continental Europe, believed that (as Barton 
writes) “the proper protection from civil abuses in America could be achieved by 
eliminating Biblical illiteracy. In this way, the citizens themselves (rather than just their 
leaders) could measure the acts of their civil government compared to the teachings of the 
Bible.”55 LaHaye also writes: 
One of the Pilgrims’ greatest passions next to religious freedom was the 
education of their young so they could read the Bible for themselves. [...] 
For that reason, school committed to teaching reading sprang up almost as 
fast as villages, and many of the first teachers were ministers. As long as 
the town had a minister, the people had a teacher for their young. No one 
suggested the Bible was not an appropriate textbook in the community or 
 102 
common school, and, of course, it was automatically found in the many 
church-sponsored schools.56 
The use of the Bible in the educational system was so widespread and systemic, Kennedy 
and Newcombe write, that America is “a nation that was born of the Bible”57—and 
particularly of the idea that the people should be equipped and encouraged to read the 
Bible for themselves. 
The Puritans’ religiosity and commitment is presented as an ideal for today's 
Christians to strive toward, not only because of the great personal risk they endured for 
the sake of their religious vision, but also because they understood religion not just as 
individual but also as communal. As Whitehead writes, “the church must learn to 
externalize the principles of its faith as practiced by Christians [...] in early America.”58 
Marshall and Manuel similarly lament the present condition as compared to the Puritans, 
writing that today, “privacy has become our religion, with the home as the foremost place 
of worship,”59 where the Puritans understood the necessity of a “Christ-centered and 
covenanted community”60 where neighbors feel responsible not only for the state of their 
own souls, but for the religious health of the whole community. 
Finally, the contemporary portrayal of the Puritans also serves another purpose in 
the American Narrative, as further evidence of American decline over the past century. 
Marshall and Manuel suggest that the Puritans were well-regarded by historians before 
the twentieth century, but fell victim to “sudden prejudice” from the secular humanist 
elites.61 The historical revisionism of the elites, they suggest, has roots in the secular and 
the spiritual. On the secular side, the “spirit of rebellion”62 has taken hold of Americans 
who no longer not want to live by “social customs that have been acceptable in this 
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country for more than three centuries,” including “work ethic, chastity before marriage, 
modesty in decorum and dress, traditional lifestyles, regulations against obscenity in the 
media, or legislation against immorality.”63 On the spiritual side, Satan himself is behind 
the “monstrous misrepresentation”64 of the Puritans because they stand for everything he 
stands against: “If there is one group of people in the history of the country whose 
example Satan hates more than any other it is the Puritans.”65 LaHaye is more explicit in 
attributing the vilification of Puritanism to the elites, writing that “today the humanists 
ridicule the Puritan work ethic, free enterprise, private ownership of land, and 
capitalism.”66 
The ideal society of the Puritans underwent spiritual decline after the enthusiastic 
first few generations overcame the difficulties of establishing a settlement, and left their 
children a stable, functioning, and largely self-sustaining society. The narrative suggests a 
direct link between comfort and spiritual malaise, further reinforcing the notion of 
persecution (either by the powers of this world or by demonic forces) as a sign and a 
cause of spiritual strength. The spiritual malaise experienced by the Puritans, combined 
with the continuing success and growth of the American colonies, led to gradual 
evolution from the Puritans’ vision of a complete unity between religious and spiritual 
authority to the more generalized “Christian consensus” lauded by writers like Schaeffer 
and Whitehead, in which an active Christian faith was no longer a prerequisite for 
enfranchisement. 
There is an ambiguity about the effects of this evolution in the American 
Narrative, even within individual retellings. Marshall and Manuel illustrate this 
ambiguity. On the one hand, they bemoan the Half-Way Covenant and the spiritual 
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malaise that led to it as a sign of the failure of Puritan parents to inculcate their children 
with their spiritual zeal—“a halfway covenant for halfway committed Christians.”67 On 
the other hand, they laud Connecticut founder Thomas Hooker for his vision of a civil 
covenant, in which religious faith was not a prerequisite for enfranchisement, suggesting 
that it was the “next step in the evolution of American civil government” given to him 
directly by God.68 
Embedded in the overall pattern of a decline in spiritual zeal during the colonial 
period before the Great Awakening is a smaller, cyclical pattern as well, as Marshall and 
Manuel write: 
For God was now warning them directly—with droughts, with plagues of 
locusts and caterpillars, with smallpox epidemics, and with all the myriad 
and seemingly unconnected things that start to go wrong when grace is 
lifted. […] Repeatedly His people would turn back to Him, and pray and 
call His name and humble themselves, and He would gladly relent and 
return blessings. But each time they turned away a little quicker, and each 
time their repentance was a little more perfunctory—going through the 
motions, with not everyone bothering to observe the fast days or attend the 
services. There may indeed have been repentance, but it did not reach 
deeply enough to affect an amending of lives, for their hearts were turning 
hard and dry like those of the people in Israel of old. And so the droughts 
did not lift so quickly, nor did the pests entirely disappear.69 
While Marshall and Manuel’s narrative makes brief reference to droughts and pests as 
signs of God’s displeasure with the Puritans’ spiritual malaise, they go into more explicit 
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detail in their retelling of King Philip’s War, the series of battles between the Puritan 
colonists and American Indians, presenting it as a direct response to the Half-Way 
Covenant. The American Indians in this narrative are Satan’s “obedient servants [doing] 
their savage best to make up for all the ground lost and the insults taken” by the Dark 
Lord, but allowed to act by God in order to call the people back to repentance and 
covenant.70 The spiritual dimension of King Philip’s War, Marshall and Manuel suggest, 
made spiritual revival a patriotic as well as a religious duty, until “there was scarcely a 
man or woman in all of New England who was not diligently searching his or her own 
soul for unconfessed or unrepented sin. In fact, it became unpatriotic not to do so—as if 
one were not doing one's part for the war effort.”71 
Marshall and Manuel also explicitly draw the parallel between the downward 
spiral of decline, adversity, and repentance among the Puritans and that of the people of 
Israel in the Old Testament narrative—part and parcel of their contention that America is 
a nation uniquely covenanted with God to a specific purpose, just as the Old Testament 
Israelites were. Similar to the parallel Israelite story, the downward-spiral narrative ends 
in the kairotic moment of truth, the fulcrum around which the rest of the narrative turns; 
however, unlike the story of the Israelites, in which they were finally defeated and exiled, 
and only returned to the land as a conquered foe, the protagonists of the American 
Narrative were prepared for the kairotic moment by a true spiritual rebirth and an era of 
prosperity. 
The Great Awakening and the Revolution 
That moment of spiritual rebirth and prosperity was the Great Awakening, a 
Christian revival that swept through the American colonies during the eighteenth century. 
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The American Narrative gives the Great Awakening a great deal of credit for sparking, 
fueling, and sustaining the American Revolution. Politically, the Great Awakening is 
credited with unifying the colonies and creating a sense of American identity independent 
from Great Britain,72 as well as with building up a foundation of moral leadership that 
placed great men into key roles leading up to the revolutionary period and with 
reawakening a sense of shared, communal spiritual responsibility. 73 As Marshall and 
Manuel write: 
Through the universal, simultaneous experience of the Great Awakening, 
Americans began to become aware of themselves as a nation. They began 
to see themselves as God saw them: as a people chosen by Him for a 
specific purpose—to be not only ‘a city upon a hill,’ but a veritable citadel 
of light in a darkened world […] Now, through the shared experience of 
coming together in large groups to hear the Gospel of Jesus Christ, 
Americans were rediscovering God's plan to join them together by His 
spirit in the common cause of advancing His Kingdom. Furthermore, they 
were returning to another aspect of his plan—they were not to operate as 
lone individualists but in covenanted groups.74 
Spiritually, the Great Awakening “provided the colonists with the mental and moral 
toughness to declare their independence from England and endure the rigors of the 
Revolutionary War,”75 as LaHaye puts it—a psychological effect that increased the 
colonists’ perseverance through the trials of independence and war.  
The narratives also imply, by connecting the Great Awakening to the malaise-
adversity-repentance cycle of the Puritans, that the revival of the Great Awakening, 
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national instead of regional in scope, created the spiritual conditions necessary for the 
American people to withstand the spiritual assault of the American Revolution. Marshall 
and Manuel describe the pattern of Puritan history as a demonstration that “when people 
began to earnestly repent, what followed was the return of God's grace”76; when this is 
extended as a pattern for the whole of American history (as Marshall and Manuel clearly 
intend), the implication is clear that the Great Awakening gave the American people not 
only the psychological wherewithal to maintain their faith through the trials of the 
Revolution, but also the spiritual wherewithal to continually repent and seek God’s favor, 
thus inviting God’s supernatural intervention in the cause.  
Incredible as it may seem today, the Congress acknowledged that the war 
against our powerful enemy could be won only through a continuing 
willingness to face up to and deal with sin, both personal and national. 
Hence, throughout the eight-year conflict they continually called for days 
of fasting, humiliation, and prayer (or thanksgiving, if events warranted)—
sixteen of them in all.77 
The American Revolution thus contextualizes and adds significance to King Philip’s 
War, which was described in detail as a spiritual war between the forces of God and the 
forces of Satan, the success of which was dependent on the colonists’ repentance and 
covenant renewal; read in light of the Revolution, King Philip’s War is seen as a 
typological forebear of the American Revolution. Like King Philip’s War, “there could 
be little doubt that the struggle against Britain [in the Revolution] was fundamentally a 
spiritual one.”78 
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George Washington looms large during this period in the American Narrative as 
the hero of the Revolution and of the early republic; Washington is “God's man, chosen 
for America's hour of greatest crisis,”79 preserved by God for the purpose of leading the 
revolutionary cause and guiding the new nation through its formative years. Numerous 
retellings of the narrative emphasize his “miraculous” survival through a particular battle 
in 1755, during the French and Indian War, in which Washington “had two horses shot 
out from under him and four musket balls pass through his coat”80; one of Barton’s short 
books is titled The Bulletproof George Washington in reference to this battle.81 In the 
American Narrative, Washington is not just an extraordinary man or even “the greatest 
man in the colonies”82; he is an anointed man, compared to biblical heroes like Gideon83 
and Moses84, chosen by God as the leader of his people. 
The American Narrative also portrays Washington as a deeply committed 
practicing Christian, drawing an explicit contrast to contemporary historians who suggest 
that while he was a member of the Anglican Church, he rarely attended services and his 
faith was (as a book by several prominent evangelical historians put it), “not particularly 
Christian.”85 The narrative presents him as well-read in the Bible, reading it for two hours 
daily,86 as well as prayerful in private.87 Washington is also portrayed as an intensely 
moral man, disciplining himself and demanding that his soldiers also engage in spiritual 
discipline in order to win God’s favor, as Marshall and Manuel relate in describing his 
general order requiring Continental Army soldiers to attend religious services and 
prohibiting swearing: 
Why did this matter so much to Washington? Partly because the vastly 
out-numbered, out-supplied, and out-generaled American armies could 
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never expect to defeat the armed might of Great Britain without divine 
intervention on their behalf. He knew that because God does not bless 
immorality, a superior morality was required of his soldiers.88 
All of these aspects are combined to make Washington into the ideal Christian soldier, not 
only for his time but for the present as well; LaHaye writes that if Washington were alive 
today, “he would freely identify with the Bible-believing branch of evangelical 
Christianity that is having such a positive influence on our nation.”89  
Similarly, the time of the nation’s founding is presented as kairotic rather than 
chronic; it is the culmination of a typological succession of expanding liberty stretching 
back to the Protestant Reformation, occurring in God’s time and with a unique outpouring 
of God’s guidance and providence. Marshall and Manuel provide an expansive view of 
the Constitution as a culmination of kairotic history: 
When one considers the major events swirling slowly around the biggest 
gears—the American Revolution, the Age of Reason, the Industrial 
Revolution, the rise and wane of empires, the gradual aligning of the 
forces of darkness and light, and the gradual dimming of the brightest 
Light—time seems much compressed. It becomes apparent what the Bible 
means when it says that to God a thousand years is as a single day. 
Knowing human nature and knowing how few would freely choose His 
way, God knew what the twentieth century would hold in store—the 
totalitarian darkness that would arise out of Europe, Russia, and Asia—
and knew that England alone would never have the spiritual power to stop 
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it. And so, early in the seventeenth century He planted the seeds of Light 
that would make a difference hundreds of years later.90 
Similarly, Falwell directly juxtaposes the Constitution and the Bible, implicitly bestowing 
the latter’s divine inspiration on the former: 
I am positive in my belief regarding the development of the Constitution 
that God led in the development of that document, and as a result, we here 
in America have enjoyed 204 years of unparalleled freedom. The most 
positive people in the world are people who believe the Bible to be the 
Word of God. The Bible contains a positive message. It is a message 
written by 40 men over a period of approximately 1,500 years under 
divine inspiration. It is God’s message of love, redemption, and 
deliverance for a fallen race. What could be more positive than the 
message of redemption in the Bible? But God will force Himself upon no 
man. Each individual American must make His [sic] choice.91 
In this historical narrative, the first Great Awakening is seen as a necessary precursor to 
the American Revolution; as Americans began to understand themselves as individuals 
before God and began seeing themselves in terms of their personal relationship with 
Jesus, the narrative suggests, they began to chafe at the King’s sovereignty over them. 
Thus, when the King and Parliament continued to tax them without representation, they 
rebelled—first with the Boston Tea Party, then at Lexington and Concord, and finally 
with the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration, in this narrative, is as much a 
theological document as a diplomatic or political statement; the assertions in the 
Declaration that “the laws of Nature and Nature’s God” are being violated by the British, 
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and that we are “endowed by our Creator” with inalienable rights, are understood to be 
essential acknowledgements by the founders of the nation that rights cannot exist without 
reference to God. 
The American Revolution, fought in defense of the God-given rights of the 
American people, was blessed by God throughout; at certain key points, like 
Washington’s raid on Trenton or his army’s successful retreat from Brooklyn, the 
narrative suggests that supernatural intervention—not just fortuitous coincidence—was 
responsible for key elements in the Americans’ success. Without these interventions, the 
Americans would have been doomed; this is evidence that God was on the side of the 
Americans, that the success of the Revolution was part of God’s plan. In the wake of the 
Revolution and the failed Articles of Confederation, the founders of the nation gathered 
to write a Constitution; evangelical authors point out that several states had, as 
qualifications for state delegates to the Continental Congress, that the delegate in 
question be not only a theist but a trinitarian. Evangelical authors also point to several 
other religiously-significant stories from the composition of the Constitution; they claim 
that many of the Constitution’s authors were clergy and most were active in their local 
churches, and also point to an anecdote suggesting that Benjamin Franklin (who is 
described by secular historians as a deist) called for a prayer to open the daily sessions 
during a particularly difficult moment, in hopes of invoking divine guidance. 
The era of the nation’s founding is extremely significant in this narrative, in that 
the narrative suggests that the founders of the nation universally intended for America to 
be an explicitly Christian nation. The First Amendment is explicitly understood not to 
erect the “wall of separation between Church and State,” as Jefferson would later write in 
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his letter to the Danbury Baptists, but rather to forbid the federal government from 
establishing any one Christian denomination over another. In this view, the founders 
intended only for Christians to have the right to freely exercise their religion in this new 
Christian nation; while others might be permitted to exercise their religions, it was not 
because they had the right to do so, but rather because the Christian government 
graciously allowed it. Furthermore, the narrative suggests, the Constitution’s original 
purpose was to limit the federal government; those who use the narrative point out that 
individual states had established state religions long after the passage of the First 
Amendment (in Massachusetts, the church remained established until 1833). 
Furthermore, the nation’s founders loom large in this narrative, where they are 
portrayed as having a sort of timeless wisdom for understanding what makes a successful 
state; their words are used in this narrative not only as statements of the intentions of the 
nation’s founders, but function prophetically as words for future generations to heed. 
Their intentions for the United States are seen as binding on the nation; the founders’ 
understanding of the United States as “a Christian nation,” and the intent on some of their 
parts to see that the children of the non-elite were educated in the reading of the Bible, is 
seen as a sort of legal proof that twenty-first century America should continue to be 
bound to their wishes. John R. Pottenger describes this as the “genetic fallacy.”92 
The American Revolution and the French Revolution 
The American Narrative also draws a sharp contrast between the American 
Revolution and the French Revolution, using the terrors of the latter to introduce into the 
narrative the theme of the dangers of the Enlightenment and its intellectual heir, secular 
humanism. American Narrative retellings emphasize the “amorality and atheism” of the 
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French Revolution, suggesting that “more than a century of secularistic thinking” had led 
to a revolution that ended in the terror of Robespierre and the tyranny of Napoleon, while 
the American Revolution and subsequent constitutional process led to a republic that has 
lasted for more than two centuries. 93 I will highlight three major themes in the contrast 
drawn by the American Narrative between the American and French Revolutions. 
First, the French Revolution’s leaders are characterized as “proponents of 
amorality and atheism,” partially because of France’s historic Catholicism: 
History affirms that many skeptics and rationalists were educated in Jesuit 
colleges. Being thus exposed to a characterization of Christianity through 
Catholic dogma and never exposed to the living Christ, these men turned 
to atheism and a resultant humanism that has deified the human race as 
proud and arrogant.94 
Voltaire and Rousseau are held out as the prime figures of the French Revolution, 
characterized as arrogant atheists95 who were “antagonistic to all religion.”96 The 
American founders, in contrast, are presented as not just overwhelmingly Christian, but 
overwhelmingly Protestant Christian; Protestantism not only influenced their 
anthropological views (as we will see below) but also stressed the importance of an 
education in Scripture, with the result that “virtually every one of them knew the 
Scriptures and was positively influenced by them.”97 The influence of Protestantism on 
the American colonies and early republic was great enough that it resulted in what 
Schaeffer describes as a “Christian consensus,” in which even those who did not 
personally subscribe to Christianity or held a nominal faith could not but have been 
influenced by the Protestant worldview. (Schaeffer’s argument that non-Christians can 
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hold beliefs influenced by Christianity will become important in differentiating him from 
the Reconstructionists.) 
But we should realize that the word Christian can legitimately be used two 
ways. The primary meaning is: an individual who has come to God 
through the work of Christ. The second meaning must be kept distinct but 
also has validity. It is possible for an individual to live within the circle of 
that which a Christian consensus brings forth, even though he himself is 
not a Christian in the first sense. This may be true in many areas—for 
example, in the arts or political thought. Many of the men who laid the 
foundation of the United States Constitution wee not Christians in the first 
sense, and yet they built upon the basis of the Reformation either directly 
through the Lex Rex tradition or indirectly through Locke.98 
The French Revolution’s godlessness led to the second major contrast, which was the root 
of the two revolutions’ moral codes. The French Revolution is characterized by “‘natural 
law’ [which] excluded all Divine revelation and was man-centered not God-centered,”99 a 
belief that “man is […] free to do his own thing.”100 The French notion of freedom was 
actually license; Schaeffer writes of Rousseau that “the freedom he advocated was not 
just freedom from God or the Bible but freedom from any kind of restraint—freedom 
from culture, freedom from any authority, an absolute freedom of the individual—a 
freedom in which the individual is the center of the universe.”101 Without a frame of 
reference in moral absolutes, this notion of freedom inevitably resulted in “rights” 
becoming nothing more than an exercise in power, as Whitehead writes: “The argument 
for rights, separated from any basis in a reliable frame of reference, becomes capricious 
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and merely a matter of definition of terms by whoever has the power to make the 
definition stick.”102 The chaos of the French Revolution is presented as a natural result of 
a moral code centered around humanity and without a place for God. 
The American Revolution’s notion of morality, on the other hand, is presented as 
being based on the notion of absolute divine standards, which could only be known by 
those who read and understood the Bible. The narrative roots this moral viewpoint in 
three sources: Samuel Rutherford, John Locke, and William Blackstone. Schaeffer 
heavily emphasizes the role of Samuel Rutherford, a Scottish political theorist who 
argued that civil authorities should be restrained by God’s law, and that those authorities 
whose laws violated God’s law lost their authority. Because most historians do not 
attribute such a significant role to Rutherford in shaping the American founders’ 
worldview, scholar Barry Hankins argues that rhetors who emphasize Rutherford’s 
influence are indicating that their own views of American history were influenced by 
Schaeffer.103  
John Locke’s work follows from that of Rutherford; Schaeffer, in fact, argues that 
Locke simply secularized the views of Rutherford with his emphasis on universal and 
transcendent liberties rather than universal and transcendent moral laws.104 Whitehead 
identifies William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England as “the basic legal 
treatise” throughout much of the history of the early Republic; Barton suggests that the 
founders shared Blackstone’s view that “civil laws could not contradict the laws of God 
revealed either through nature or the Bible,”105 while Whitehead writes that Blackstone 
“took it as self-evident that God is the source of all laws, whether they were found in the 
Holy Scriptures or were observable in nature.”106 
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Rooting the founders’ political views in Rutherford and Blackstone’s specifically 
sectarian views enables the American Narrative to reframe some of the key linguistic 
emphases held in common by the American and French Revolutions; the two revolutions’ 
differing moral worldviews led to profoundly different understandings of the meanings of 
the terms natural law and liberty. First, the emphasis on Rutherford and Blackstone’s 
influence in the American Narrative reframes the Declaration of Independence’s 
reference to the “laws of Nature and Nature’s God” as a reference to an explicitly 
religious vision. The American Narrative suggests that because the founders held with 
Rutherford and Blackstone that God’s moral law was universal and absolute, and that 
God’s moral law found its highest or perfected expression in Christian morality, “the laws 
of Nature” were not universally-discernible moral principles, and “Nature’s God” was not 
the nonsectarian God of Hart’s civic piety107 or Bellah’s civil religion.108 Rather, “the 
laws of Nature” were Christian moral laws, and “Nature’s God” the Christian God—
references that lead both Barton and Whitehead to conclude that any American law or 
system that contradicts Christian moral principles is not valid.109 Further, the Declaration 
of Independence’s statement about natural law is understood as binding on the 
Constitution; Whitehead writes, for example, that “the Constitution presupposes the 
Declaration and the higher, fundamental law to which the Declaration witnesses.”110 
The founders’ emphasis on universal morality shifted the meaning of the language 
of liberty as well. While both American and French revolutionaries used the language of 
liberty and freedom, the French revolutionaries’ view of liberty as license is contrasted 
with “liberty as the founders understood it [that] meant liberty under God—the freedom 
to do what is right.”111 Or, as Falwell writes, “true liberty is found only in obedience to 
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law.”112 This emphasis on the liberty to act, rather than the liberty from restraint, is at the 
root of Schaeffer’s argument that while the Enlightenment worldview of license led to 
anarchy, the Reformation worldview at the root of the American founding could produce 
“freedom without chaos.113” Liberty without the self-restraint and social restraint 
imposed by a widespread agreement on a universal moral code would lead to confusion. 
In the American narrative, this vision of positive liberty also animated the 
founders’ views on the purpose of education; in this model, children were taught to read, 
write, and think not primarily for economic success or the attainment of knowledge about 
the world (though these were certainly additional purposes), but rather for the purpose of 
their understanding for themselves the moral laws of the universe as found in the Bible. 
As Barton writes, “the Founders understood that Biblical values formed the basis of the 
republic and that the republic would be destroyed if the people’s knowledge of those 
values should ever be lost.”114 American freedom is dependent on education in this 
narrative not because education teaches children to think critically or because it 
empowers them to take part in the public discourse, but rather because it teaches them the 
moral values that produce a hierarchy of authorities, including family, church, and 
business—thus obviating the requirement for excessive control of their moral behavior by 
the external force of the state. 
The third major point of contrast drawn in the American Narrative between the 
American and French Revolutions is in their view of human agency. The French 
Revolution is characterized as overly optimistic about humanity’s capacity for pro-social 
behavior without the restraint of religion or morality; Marshall and Manuel characterize 
them as believing that “the potential power of man’s mind and virtue of his heart made it 
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possible to have the Brotherhood of Man without the Fatherhood of God.”115 The result 
of this worldview was a life without any form of restraint, both corporately and 
individually. Corporately, this meant that the state would be freed to act without limits, 
and because people could be trusted to act in pro-social ways, there was no need for 
internal or external checks on the state’s power. Individually, this meant that people 
would be free to act however they wanted—for each to “do whatever is right in his [sic] 
own eyes”116—so long as it did not violate the rights of another, without being constricted 
by sectarian religious moral codes, whether those codes were externally imposed or 
internalized. 
The American founders, on the other hand, are portrayed as holding a more or less 
Calvinist view of human moral agency; the fact that the founders “understood the reality 
of man's fallen nature” meant that they knew that human beings could not be trusted to 
act in pro-social ways without some kind of internal or external restraint. As Marshall and 
Manuel write,  
Why does [the Constitution] work so well? Aside from the Divine origin 
of its inspiration, the Constitution was the culmination of nearly two 
hundred years of Puritan political thought. The earliest church covenants 
started with the basic, underlying assumption central to their faith: the 
sinfulness of humanity’s fallen nature, in which ‘dwells no good thing.’ 
That may appear depressingly negative to anyone who wants to believe in 
the innate goodness of man.117 
The founders’ views of human depravity led them to include checks and balances into the 
nation’s governmental system; these checks and balances were both internal (between the 
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various branches of government) and external (the Constitution, the states, and ultimately 
the people themselves as a bulwark against the expansion of government into areas where 
it did not belong118). Furthermore, the American Narrative’s characterization of the 
founders’ notion of human depravity reinforces the contrast between the American and 
French visions of liberty. The American vision of liberty is framed as a positive right: the 
freedom to exercise self-restraint, based on one’s awareness of one’s own depravity, in 
pursuit of doing good. The Enlightenment vision of liberty, by contrast, is portrayed as 
the freedom from any limits or constraints on one’s own depravity. 
The Golden Age: The Early Republic 
The post-revolutionary period serves as the introduction to America of the conflict 
that will define the remainder of the American Narrative, between the Enlightenment 
(and, later, secular humanism) and Christianity, particularly evangelical Protestant 
Christianity. The contrast between the French Revolution and the American Revolution 
bleeds over to American soil, concurrent with the formation of political parties. On the 
one side of this divide were those Americans who adopted Enlightenment values, such as 
the Unitarian and Transcendentalist movements in New England119 and the Jacobins, like 
Jefferson, who valorized France during the Revolution.120 On the other were established 
evangelical Protestants like Timothy Dwight and the evangelizers of the Second Great 
Awakening, seeking to preserve the nation’s Christianity against the first steps of the 
humanist onslaught. 
Antebellum slavery and the Civil War present an interesting dilemma for the 
American Narrative even more than for many other narratives about the nation’s history. 
First, the historical base of the Christian Right was white Protestants in the southeastern 
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United States—many of whom trace their history back to those who took up arms for the 
Confederacy during the Civil War. But the more significant complication is the heroic 
portrayal of the nation’s founders, many of whom were slaveowners, in the narrative 
about the nation’s origins—particularly the portrayal of Washington, who held slaves 
throughout his life, as a Christian moral titan and leader of the founding generation.  
This complication is only heightened by the argumentative purpose of the 
American Narrative’s portrayal of the nation’s founders in defining present-day identity, 
where American Narrative rhetors present the narrative of heroic Christian founders as 
the true history of the nation, over against contemporary critical historical revisionists 
who deemphasize the founders’ religiosity or critique their practice of slaveholding.121 
Contrary to those “educational elites” who seek to discredit or even remove the founders 
from American history classes in order to sap the younger generation’s patriotic spirit,122 
American Narrative rhetors seek to preserve the memory of the founders as patriotic, 
moral Christian heroes. 
In order to escape this contradiction, the narrative suggests that the nation’s 
founders—even those who owned slaves—personally deplored slavery and wished to be 
rid of it, recognizing the moral deterioration that came with the owning of slaves and 
resenting the colonial European origins of the practice.123 In this reading of history, the 
Declaration of Independence’s statement that “all men are created equal” is not an 
indictment against the hypocrisy of the founders, but rather represents an effort by the 
founders to realize those claims. Barton, for example, credits the nation’s founders with 
“planting and nurturing the first seeds for the recognition of black equality and for the 
eventual end of slavery,”124 and suggests that “the Revolution was the turning point in the 
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national attitude [toward slavery]—and it was the Founding Fathers who contributed 
greatly to that change.”125 
Slavery and Abortion 
The more significant rhetorical role of the slavery debate in the American 
Narrative, though, is typological, in which slavery in the antebellum United States is 
presented in parallel with abortion in the contemporary United States. First, both slavery 
and abortion are presented as forms of national sin—a failure of American government, 
religion, and society to truly acknowledge the humanity of the oppressed which put the 
nation in deep spiritual peril. Marshall and Manuel are illustrative in this regard; while 
they are eager to present northern abolition as a result of the Puritan influence (as part of 
their overall thesis of the Puritans as the ideal Americans), they also suggest that “the 
blame for the [spiritual] condition lay as much with the North, as with the South. [...] The 
list of missed Northern opportunities went on endlessly. The responsibility was 
nationwide.126”  Similarly, the whole of the nation is responsible for the sin of legalized 
abortion; as Falwell writes, “Abortion stands as an indictment of murder against America 
for killing unwanted babies.”127 Schaeffer suggests that just as the nation sinned by 
allowing the law to define Dred Scott as a non-person in 1857, so too the nation sins 
today by allowing the law to define fetuses as non-persons: 
By the ruling of the Supreme Court [Roe v. Wade], the unborn baby is not 
counted as a person. In our day, quite rightly, there has been a hue and cry 
against some of our ancestors’ cruel viewing of the black slave as a non-
person. This was horrible indeed—an act of hypocrisy as well as cruelty. 
But now, by an arbitrary absolute brought in on the humanist flow, 
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millions of unborn babies of every color of skin are equally by law 
declared non-persons. Surely this, too, must be seen as an act of 
hypocrisy.128 
By defining slavery as a national sin, the American Narrative suggests that the 
fundamental cause of the Civil War was not southern intransigence or economic 
differences, but rather a form of spiritual and moral rupture in which the nation reaped 
the inevitable results of that sin: “a nationwide day of judgment, when God's wrath would 
fall on the North, as well as the South.”129  God had given the people numerous 
opportunities to turn from their ways, Marshall and Manuel write; “the purging of slavery 
from the land could have taken place through nationwide repentance and revival,”130 as it 
did in England. But despite the waves of revival that swept through the land during the 
Second Great Awakening, the American people did not take that opportunity to fully 
comprehend the evil of slavery or repent of their role in it. 
The typological parallel suggests similar judgment in America’s future, should the 
nation not similarly avail themselves of the contemporary opportunity to engage in 
nationwide repentance for the sin of legalized abortion. This divine discipline, like that 
handed down to Israel in the Old Testament, could take the form of a natural disaster, 
another civil war, or an invading army, writes Robertson: 
If the past is any guide, we know that a righteous God will not hold back 
His judgment forever. A great nation can slowly be destroyed by pervasive 
moral decay. We sow the seeds of our own destruction, or God Himself 
can strike sudden devastating blows—violent earthquakes, hurricanes and 
tornadoes, massive flooding, extended drought, widespread disease, even 
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the impact of an asteroid. Or God can raise up fierce enemies who delight 
only in destruction or death.131 
Though the various other aspects of the national decline (which I will discuss shortly) are 
also given a place in the reasons for God’s judgment, abortion is often singled out as a 
primary reason; Kennedy, for example, writes that “surely, God’s anger and judgment are 
due a nation that kills the innocent for personal convenience and destroys the home in the 
name of selfish personal ‘satisfaction.’”132 In this case, at least, the American Narrative 
presents a continuity of time and some room for human agency, in portraying the nation 
as capable of collective repentance and revival.  
Second, the narrative emphasizes the role of evangelical Christians in the 
abolition movement. William Wilberforce stands out as a hero in this regard, as someone 
who was openly motivated by his evangelicalism to put an end to the institution of 
slavery in the United Kingdom; Schaeffer writes that “one could wish that the United 
States had had some outstanding Christian as consistent as Wilberforce,”133 suggesting 
that the reason slavery took hold in the United States was because the churches there 
were not willing to speak out on behalf of the slaves.134 Kennedy and Newcombe, 
similarly, write that “the abolition of slavery was largely a Christian movement,”135 
situating abolitionism in a larger narrative about the role of evangelical Christians in 
social reforms throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the anti-
dueling movement, Prohibition, African-American civil rights—and the anti-abortion 
movement, in which Randall Terry and his direct-action group Operation Rescue are 
presented as the spiritual heir to the abolitionists, the temperance movement, and the 
heroes of civil rights.136  
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Like the abolitionists, the anti-abortion movement is presented as taking an 
unpopular stand that would be vindicated by the judgment of history:  
Yet sadly enough, when it came to dealing with the greatest social evil of 
the age, the groundswells of local revival did not produce the necessary 
tidal wave of change. The revivals failed to touch the vital nerve of 
slavery. [...] Today prophetic voices can again be heard, warning of 
personal and social evils, which if left unrepented of, will bring a fresh 
judgment of God upon our beloved land. The national curse of abortion 
can claim responsibility for the annual killing [sic] over a million unborn 
babies. […] One wonders how long we can continue to presume upon the 
divine favor earned for this land by the faithful, obedient Christians among 
our forefathers.137 
The parallel between slavery and abortion gives the rhetor considerable leeway in 
choosing whether to compare the present situation to the antebellum era, in which 
divisions over slavery ran deep while evangelical abolitionists called the nation to 
repentance, or to the Civil War itself when the divisions broke into outright hostility; 
Kennedy and Newcombe avail themselves of the latter comparison, writing: “During the 
Civil War, in his classic Gettysburg Address, President Lincoln said that this nation 
needed ‘a new birth of freedom.’ Today, we are engaged in another type of civil war, and 
we are again in need of a new birth of freedom.”138 
Finally, both slavery and abortion are presented as having fundamentally pagan 
origins, which Christians accepted despite the Bible’s clear witness. Both Schaeffer and 
Whitehead emphasize the role of Aristotle’s philosophy in the defense of slavery, with the 
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latter suggesting that slavery illustrates “the danger of natural law thinking.”139 Marshall 
and Manuel attribute the presence of slavery in the Americas to Satan, suggesting that he 
had “sown the seeds of darkness”140 in an effort to “choke out the Light”141 of Christ on 
the North American continent by introducing a practice that would not only cause 
division and strife but would also imperil the nation spiritually. 
Similarly, Whitehead joins Schaeffer in suggesting that abortion is the ultimate 
sign of the moral degradation wrought by secular humanism and the acceptance of 
nonbiblical, non-absolute moral standards. “With the loss of absolutes and with the 
application of evolutionary principles, the dignity of man is severely diminished. […] 
The logical conclusion of man’s significance being no greater than ‘a baboon or grain of 
sand’ found its expression in the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, which upheld 
the right to abortion-on-demand. To the Supreme Court an unborn child, as a nonperson, 
had little significance.”142 
The Decline of America and the Failure of the Church 
The next major development in the American Narrative is the nation’s decline. At 
the nation’s founding and throughout the nineteenth century, America remained 
nominally, if not uniquely, Christian; however, throughout the twentieth century, the 
nation lost sight of its Christian roots and began to adopt humanist pluralism as the 
national religion. As LaHaye and Hindson write: 
All through the twentieth century, we allowed godless secularism to 
replace the Judeo-Christian values of our society. God has been 
deliberately and systematically removed from prominence in our culture 
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and in our intellectual lives. We have made Him irrelevant to our culture. 
Tragically, we have also made our culture irrelevant to God.143 
As a consequence, the American Narrative suggests, virtually every indicator of national 
success and prosperity plummeted, particularly throughout the tumultuous 1960s and 
1970s; the rates of abortion, teen pregnancy, and sexually-transmitted disease rose, while 
standardized test scores, marriage, and economic prosperity fell. The narratives differ 
somewhat in their dating of the beginning of the nation’s decline, but all agree that by the 
1960s things were headed seriously downhill. 
Much of the blame for the nation’s decline is cast on the Supreme Court, which 
between 1950 and 1975 handed down rulings outlawing de jure segregation in public 
facilities by race and official prayer in public schools and striking down state laws 
requiring public officials to swear belief in God and banning or restricting contraception 
and abortion. In so doing, the American Narrative suggests, the Supreme Court set the 
stage for what Kennedy and Newcombe describe as a “secular witch hunt against any 
sneaky vestiges of religion left in public places.”144 Barton sums up this complaint, 
writing that as a result of the Supreme Court’s rulings on religion in the public square, 
“nine unelected individuals now exert more control over how, when, and if public 
religious activities will occur than any other body in America.”145 
But the Supreme Court is not solely to blame for the nation’s decline in the 
American Narrative; so too are the churches, which failed in their duty to preach the 
Gospel and in their duty to stand against the rising tide of humanism and moral decline in 
the schools and in the culture. The decline itself stands as evidence of the church’s 
failure, as Whitehead writes: 
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We as Christians share a major responsibility for what has happened, since 
a significant factor has been the dwindling influence of Christianity, which 
has allowed humanistic thought to rise and dominate. The pronounced 
effect this has had on our world is illustrated by the evident moral 
decadence of the West.146 
One part of the church’s failure is its willingness to compromise on societal issues for the 
sake of evangelism; instead of speaking out against social evils, Whitehead writes, 
Christians chose to embrace the expansion of governmental power: “All too often the 
Christian community has compromised while laboring under the naive impression that in 
this way ‘the church could reach more people.’ As such, it is not the non-Christian who is 
most to blame for the cruelty we see today. It is the silent church.”147 
Another part of the failure of the church is attributed to its inability to truly 
understand the nature and pervasiveness of secular humanism; though the church or 
individual Christians would occasionally speak out on moral issues, they were unable to 
see the overall pattern of decline. As LaHaye writes: 
Only one organization in America can stop the complete ‘humanization’ 
of our nation: the church of Jesus Christ. Unfortunately, the church seems 
apathetic in its response to humanism, possibly because the wolf has so 
neatly hidden beneath his woolly disguise. Knowledgeable Christians will 
rise up against religious heresy or a curtailment of basic freedoms, but 
their fighting instincts do not seem to be aroused by the terms secular 
humanism or scientific humanism. [...] Under the guise of philosophy, 
humanism has been granted a reputable position in American society.148 
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Similarly, Schaeffer writes of the decline that “the failed responsibility covers a wide 
swath. Christian educators, Christian theologians, Christian lawyers—none of them blew 
loud trumpets until we were a long, long way down the road toward a humanistically 
based culture."149  
The other aspect of the church’s failure is its concentration on spiritual and 
religious matters to the detriment of politics, law, and culture. This line of thought is 
particularly prevalent among American Narrative rhetors from the Calvinist tradition, 
since that tradition emphasizes the sovereignty of God over all the world—including 
society and government. The churches, however, failed to take God’s sovereignty 
seriously enough and were content with developing the spiritual health and devotion of 
their congregants, to the detriment of the wider culture. Schaeffer writes, for example, of 
the “evangelical leadership” of his day, that “it has shown the mark of a platonic, overly 
spiritualized Christianity all too often. Spirituality to the evangelical leadership often has 
not included the Lordship of Christ over the whole spectrum of life.”150  
Whitehead is a particularly harsh critic of the church in attributing blame for the 
nation’s decline. He suggests that the seeds for the church’s failure to arrest humanism 
were sown in the 19th century when the church embraced “Revivalistic piety,” failing to 
defend Christianity even as “humanists were thrusting their ideas into education, science, 
and the arts.” Whitehead continues: 
Unfortunately, the church has been all too willing to use the categories of 
‘secular’ and ‘religious’ when no such distinction exists in reality. All 
things have been created by God. Thus, all things have their origin in God 
and should be under Christ’s lordship. The pietist renunciation thus raises 
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a core issue: the lordship of Christ. […] If Christ is not Lord over the arts 
and science, then man is. This is humanism in practice. It was difficult for 
the church to dispute humanistic ideology because the church itself was 
practicing humanism by separating the spiritual from the totality of life 
and reality.151 
Even an emphasis on personal evangelism and conversion of others, he writes, has not 
stemmed the tide; it “won some souls but lost the battle for society.”152 The church (and 
individual Christians) are called to exercise God’s sovereignty over everything, not just 
their own lives and hearts. 
The Breakdown of Authority 
The failure of the church to defend the nation against the humanist threat 
ultimately led to a complete breakdown of hierarchical authority. This breakdown started 
at the very top of the chain of authority, but its ultimate effect has been to remove 
authorities that mediate between central government and the individual.  
The highest level of authority in the American Narrative (as in the Cosmic 
Narrative) is, of course, God, whose absolute laws are expressed in propositional form 
through the proper interpretation of the natural world, the human condition, human 
history, and most importantly the Bible. All human governments and societies are 
ultimately subject to this final authority, whether they want to be or not; however, only 
those societies that understand and willingly subject themselves to that authority can 
enjoy what Schaeffer characterizes as “freedom without chaos.”153  
This social construct is possible because biblical authority infuses the rest of the 
hierarchy, creating a bilateral relationship between the tiers; because of the authority of 
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God’s law over all human authorities, even the lowest level of the hierarchy—the 
individual—was empowered to critique any level above him or her on the basis of the 
overarching biblical law. As Schaeffer writes, “In the days of a more Christian culture, a 
lone individual with the Bible could judge and warn society, regardless of the majority 
vote, because there was an absolute by which to judge. There was an absolute for both 
morals and law. But to the extent that the Christian consensus is gone, this absolute is 
gone as a social force.”154 
Because the rest of the social hierarchy—including those elements that do not 
exercise direct coercive authority, like the church—is also mediating the authority of 
biblical morality, “freedom without chaos” is possible. Individuals accept not only the 
external controls of absolute morality but also the internal controls that curb self-
indulgent tendencies, and thus these societies are able to exercise the positive freedom to 
do good valorized by the American Narrative without requiring an excess of 
governmental control.  
The American Narrative asserts that the founding generation (and the Puritans 
before them) understood this hierarchical authority; hence, they built “a government of 
law rather than of the arbitrary decisions of men—because the Bible as the final authority 
was there as the base.”155 The power of this central government was intentionally limited, 
with lower levels of mediating authority—the state and local governments, businesses, 
charities, the church, and the family—filling the gap between the federal government and 
the people, exercising biblical authority while being more responsive to local, family, or 
interpersonal conditions. 
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Without the highest authority of absolute Biblical morality as the glue holding 
together the bilateral relationships between the levels of the hierarchy, however, this 
system breaks down—and the American Narrative asserts that this is precisely what has 
happened from the late nineteenth century to the present. As Kennedy and Newcombe 
write: 
A myth that’s prevalent in our society is this: ‘There are no absolutes. All 
truth is relative.’ I’m sure you’ve heard it a thousand times. This is 
currently believed by 62 percent of adults. If young people between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-five are included, the figure rises to 74 
percent. A hundred years ago, or even fifty years ago, that would have 
been unthinkable. A century ago, I’m sure 99 percent of Americans 
believed there were absolutes and truth was not relative.156 
The unmooring of the hierarchy from biblical authority replaces an absolute and objective 
standard with an arbitrary and subjective one; as Schaeffer puts it, “humanism in private 
morals and political life is left with that which is arbitrary.”157  
The result of this breakdown in the highest authority has been a general disrespect 
for authority more generally, meaning that those authorities that cannot exercise coercive 
power lose it. In particular, three of the intermediate authorities between the central 
government (with its coercive power) and the individual (irreducible), which could not 
exercise coercive power, have broken down: the family, the church, and patriotism. The 
vacuum of authority between the individual and the state left by the decline of the family, 
the church, and patriotism is quickly filled from both sides: the individual in the assertion 
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of anti-social liberties, and the state in the assertion of greater economic and cultural 
control.  
The most important level of hierarchical authority in the American Narrative is 
the family, whose essential function is not just to raise up children into godly adults but 
also to be an intermediate authority between all levels of government and individual 
people: 
Not only does the family prepare future citizens and leaders, but 
traditionally it has served as a buffer (a safety zone) between the 
individual and the state. It affords members of the family protection from 
total statist control. However, with the breakdown of family autonomy—
accompanied by state interference into family affairs—the buffer is fading. 
If this continues the individual will be left naked against the state.158 
It is for this reason that Kennedy and Newcombe can assert that “whatever hurts the 
family hurts society.”159 Consistent with the theme of “culture war,” the breakdown of the 
family is characterized not as an unintended result of the decentering of Christianity from 
American culture, but as a primary goal of the totalitarian humanist elite: 
It is no coincidence that the family is attacked by those who object to ‘the 
limits and restrictions placed on their personal freedom of choice’ by 
Christian values and absolutes. They obviously realize what countries like 
the Soviet Union have known for years: If one can destroy the traditional 
family unit—set child against parent and give the ultimate authority in 
child rearing to the state—the basic institution that stands between total 
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state control of the citizenry is eradicated. And the freedom of thought 
passed down by the family from generation to generation is lost.160 
The family as intermediate authority is presented as being buffeted from both sides in the 
hierarchy, working in concert with one another; individual family members reject the 
authority of the family and are aided in doing this by the government, which continues to 
assert more and more of the powers that the family once held. 
The American Narrative presents as the ideal family structure one in which the 
father is spiritual head of the household with the mother as his theoretically equal partner, 
raising and disciplining children to become Christian citizens in the world.  
Children feel secure in a home where the father acts as the head of the 
family, lovingly cares for their mother, loves and respects God, and trains 
them to obey His principles. It is essential to family harmony that the wife 
submit to her husband’s leadership for the Lord’s sake. Such a woman will 
enjoy the love, respect, protection, and provision of her husband; and she 
will provide her children with an example of the proper role model of a 
woman, even in today’s society.161 
This structure has been threatened by women’s assertions of equality and children’s 
assertions of autonomy. Women, who had once enjoyed a place of honor as the keepers of 
the home, “believed that lie that it isn’t good enough to be ‘simply a mother and a 
housewife’”162 and sought careers; as a result, women have been less able to perform 
their “natural desire to supply the needs of [their] home[s],”163 and have been more 
independent of their husbands, leading to marital problems.164 The family hierarchy is not 
simply a social construct but a biblical absolute; Falwell writes of the Equal Rights 
 134 
Amendment that it “defies the mandate that ‘the husband is the head of the wife, even as 
Christ is head of the church’ (Ep. 5:23).”165 
Similarly, children are being goaded by humanist public schools and the humanist 
media into asserting their own autonomy and rebelling against their parents—and are 
being aided in their efforts by the government, which wants to take from the family the 
authority to raise children. As LaHaye writes: “The Bible addresses only two commands 
to children: ‘obey your parents’ and ‘honor your mother and father.’ Both are in contrast 
to the philosophy of child advocates and humanist government bureaucrats, who consider 
parents unqualified to raise their own children…”166 The American Narrative suggests 
that parents who discipline their children in any way are at risk of losing them to a 
government that is eager to take away the family’s authority: 
Parents need to be particularly cautious today when disciplining their 
children, because some humanists in government spend all their time 
ferreting out and attacking parents who believe in discipline, accusing 
them of child abuse. We have met parents who lost custody of their 
children after spanking them for running away from home or going to 
school dances; in some cases they had their children taken away because 
the parents required church attendance.167 
These assertions of women’s rights and children’s autonomy are the symptoms of the 
larger disease, the loss of absolute authority; where once it was understood that the 
family hierarchy was ordained by God, humanists in government and education have 
succeeded in persuading Americans that the “nuclear family” is just one of many possible 
configurations for the family unit, none better than any other. In this way, the disciplinary 
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authority of the family as mediator of God’s absolute law—both upwards to the church 
and government and downwards to individual children—is being broken down. 
Another layer in the social hierarchy whose disciplining authority has broken 
down is the church; multiple American Narrative rhetors reminisce fondly about an era 
when “church discipline” was in effect, whereby a member of the congregation who was 
sinning against church norms could be sanctioned or expelled from membership in the 
church: 
Church discipline is almost unheard of today. The early church practiced 
it, and the truly separated church that is filled with the Spirit today will 
still practice it.168 
Rebellion, in fact, has been so romanticized in recent years that church 
discipline is literally unheard of. Today, if anyone were threatened with 
dismissal from a local church, he or she would probably shrug, laugh, and 
leave.169 
The second quotation illustrates the consequences of the breakdown of these two societal 
hierarchical authorities which exercised their authority without formal legal power; it is 
the spirit of “rebellion” against established hierarchical authorities—particularly parents 
and the church—that is the ultimate cause of social unrest. Rebellion leads to 
lawlessness, which ultimately leads to the rise of the totalitarian Antichrist, as LaHaye 
suggests: 
The present generation is preparing for the rule of Antichrist by its 
insistent, contagious desire for lawlessness. One of the plaguing problems 
of the younger generation is that of rebellion against law and order and a 
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desire to reject restraint. Instead of morality, honesty, and decency based 
on the fixed standard of God’s word, we find immorality and self-
expression. Self-indulgence is the watchword of life today!170 
A third hierarchical element of social control that is portrayed as having broken down is 
patriotism; while the American Narrative decries much of the expansion of the national 
government’s authority, it still paradoxically valorizes the symbols of the national 
government itself and of a notion of national community—and suggests that the agenda 
of the humanist enemy is to eliminate patriotism and love of America with the ultimate 
goal of subsuming American government underneath the government of the United 
Nations. As LaHaye writes, the humanist is “a socialist one-worlder first, an American 
second.”171 
Much of the breakdown in patriotism is attributed to the educational system. 
Certainly, the American Narrative suggests that American public schools’ treatment of 
American history is revisionist and emphasizes the nation’s wrongs. Furthermore, 
Kennedy and Newcombe suggest that new history curriculums (in 2003) are illustrative 
of this revisionist history designed to eliminate patriotic fervor: 
Everything that is ‘traditional’ will be downplayed, altered, or left out. The 
role of the founding fathers will be grossly downplayed. Any good that 
America has done will be left out of history or modified. What brought on 
various problems, such as the 9/11 terrorist acts, will be adjusted to be 
politically correct.172 
In contrast, Kennedy and Newcombe suggest a more “balanced” approach to American 
history, which emphasizes that while the nation is “far from perfect” and has “many flaws 
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[…] there is no doubt that it is the most blessed nation that has ever existed on the face of 
the earth. It has more freedom and abundance than any land has ever enjoyed in the 
history of this planet.”173 Patriotism, like the church, exercises its power without legal 
authority; it serves as yet another curb on an individual’s desire. Thus, like both the 
church and the family, the loss of patriotism is both a symptom and a cause of further 
self-indulgence, rebellion, and lawlessness. 
The result of this breakdown in hierarchical authority has been what Falwell 
describes as “the tide of permissiveness and moral decay.”174 This moral decay, in turn, is 
the cause of the nation’s other problems. Falwell writes: 
But the fact remains that at the root of America’s problems today is the 
decay of our individual and national morals. This has resulted in the 
subsequent decadent state and instability of everything else in America—
including economics, politics, defense, etc. The choices we as Americans 
have made in moral and religious questions have determined the way 
America is going today.175 
Similarly, Kennedy and Newcombe write: 
In less than forty years, our culture has gone from the strong family values 
of a society with a Christian consensus to a society that glorifies violence, 
illicit sex, and rebellion. We have severed ourselves from the roots of what 
made us great in the first place. We have gone from Leave it to Beaver to 
Beavis and Butthead in some thirty to forty years.176 
Other rhetors take up the same theme, presenting America’s moral decline as the cause of 
the increased rate of suicide,177 school shootings,178 increases in drug addiction,179 
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increased rates of violence180 and crime,181 educational decline,182 the (perceived) 
military decline of the United States vis a vis the Soviet Union in the 1970s183 and, 
subsequently, the rise of Islamic terrorism in the 2000s,184 the economic downturn,185 the 
rise of welfare186 and the Social Security crisis,187 and political corruption188 and 
apathy.189 There is a symmetry between the assertion that the church’s failure to stop 
humanism was due to its failure to understand that God is sovereign over all spheres of 
life, and this assertion that moral decline is at the root of national decline; in both 
instances, the narrative argues that the church needs to fight back in the “culture war”—
and take it seriously as a war. As Kennedy and Newcombe write: 
In this country we are very much involved in a ‘culture war,’ a war for the 
minds, souls, and lives of every American, which has been going on apace 
and growing in its intensity. You may hear this described in many other 
ways, but ultimately this is a battle of faith against unbelief, a battle for 
God or against Him.190 
The American decline in morality and respect for hierarchical authority is, thus, an 
existential threat not only to the nation but to the world; should this decline into “self-
indulgence” and “lawlessness” continue, chaos will inevitably result—and the people will 
demand an authoritarian figure to restore some semblance of order, even if that order is 
based on arbitrary principles: “Society cannot stand chaos. Some group or some person 




Unlike the future in the Cosmic Narrative, the future in the American Narrative is 
open-ended; the American people have the power to decide whether the nation will 
prosper or collapse. The present in the American Narrative is a time of continuous 
liminality; every moment is a moment of national choice, where America can choose 
either the path of righteousness or the path of judgment. In 1980, Falwell wrote that 
“America is at a crossroads as a nation” facing the “fateful ‘Decade of Destiny’ — the 
1980s,”192 and LaHaye similarly wrote of the 1980s as a “decade of destiny” in which 
“the issue [of humanism or Christianity] will be decided.”193 Whitehead wrote in 1982 
that “We are at an important crossroads in time and history.”194 Twelve years later, in 
1994, LaHaye wrote that “the future of America is up for grabs and will be determined 
before the twenty-first century.”195 Marshall and Manuel similarly wrote in 2009 that 
“once again, America stands, like Biblical Nineveh, at the crossroads of mercy and 
judgment.”196 Every election, every moment, every decision is a crucial one, and the 
nation could be swept up in revival or plummeted into judgment without warning. 
Judgment in the American Narrative is every bit as immanent as revival; the 
choice is stark and immediate because God could choose to exercise divine wrath on the 
deserving nation at any moment for its sins. As Falwell writes, “when the majority of our 
population forgets that this is indeed ‘one nation under God,’ then we do not deserve to 
survive.”197 This divine wrath can be speedy or slow, writes Robertson: 
A great nation can slowly be destroyed by pervasive moral decay. We sow 
the seeds of our own destruction, or God Himself can strike sudden 
devastating blows—violent earthquakes, hurricanes and tornadoes, 
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massive flooding, extended drought, widespread disease, even the impact 
of an asteroid. Or God can raise up fierce enemies who delight only in 
destruction or death.198 
Indeed, the nation’s slow decline rather than cataclysmic collapse can itself be seen as a 
sign that God continues to want to bless America, “to allow us as much time as possible 
to repent.”199 
Robertson writes that even the nation’s nominal Christianity will not be enough: 
“Do we suppose that we will be spared the judgment of a righteous God just because we 
mouth religious platitudes and sing ‘God Bless America’?”200 This nominal Christianity 
by a people in moral decline provides God with even further reason for holy wrath: “We 
call ourselves a Christian nation, but in fact a majority of us are secular humanists and 
self-idolaters. We cannot continue misusing the name of God and avoid His 
correction.”201 Barton asserts that this consciousness of God’s impending judgment 
should infuse every political decision: “In evaluating a policy, a citizen should first ask, 
‘What will be the result of this proposed policy in light of the principle of national 
accountability—or what the Founders called the principle of “rewards and 
punishments”?’”202 Because the order of the world reflects God’s absolute law, God can 
be either a direct or indirect agent of that destruction; the “the evils and destruction that 
have fallen upon every other nation that has turned its back on God”203 can take many 
forms: divine acts of wrath, collapse from internal conflict or economic disaster, or 
conquest by external invaders. 
The only thing that can save America from divine wrath is to return to the values 
of the early Republic—undergoing spiritual change and restoring the missing 
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intermediate elements of the social hierarchy. Indeed, despite their having been deceived 
by the lies of humanism, many Americans intuitively want to go back to that simpler 
time, as Falwell writes: “I believe that Americans want to see this country come back to 
basics, back to values, back to biblical morality, back to sensibility, and back to 
patriotism. Americans are looking for leadership and guidance.”204 
In the short term, these returns can take the form of small victories, but the only 
thing that could truly save the nation over the long term in the American Narrative is a 
large, decisive victory for Christianity over humanism. This victory must be more than 
political, though; because the intermediate institutions of authority that have broken down 
are primarily nongovernmental in nature, changing the government alone to one that 
centers Christianity and respects the intermediate authorities of family and church will 
leave only another vacuum of power. Rather, the change required is primarily a spiritual 
and religious change on a national scale to restore the Christian consensus to society as a 
whole. This change will involve three elements: revival or conversion, national 
repentance, and right thinking and action. 
The first element is revival or conversion; in other words, Americans who are not 
Christian (or who are nominally Christian) must be born again, and those who are born 
again evangelicals must experience a rebirth of spiritual zeal. This is an essential element 
for reversing the decline—and here the language shifts from the less sectarian “Judeo-
Christian values” to explicit language imploring Americans to convert to evangelical 
Christianity. As Kennedy and Newcombe write: 
I believe that if we are ever going to experience a new birth of freedom in 
America, it must begin with the new birth. Period. Unbelievers didn’t 
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settle America and frame its government and institutions. And unbelievers 
won’t get America back on track. 
Not that we can’t use help from all willing quarters. I welcome 
cobelligerents, if you will, in the fight against abortion or pornography. 
But to change American culture completely, we need to change a majority 
of Americans—from within. 
Only the gospel of Jesus Christ can do that.205 
Since the problems in society stem from a church that is unwilling to assert absolute 
divine authority and a culture that is unwilling to accept it, the solution involves a public 
recommitment to that authority. 
A precondition for national revival is repentance; the nation must acknowledge 
that the nation’s decline is, at its most fundamental level, a result of sin rather than error. 
As Falwell writes, “God desires to give America revival. But before there can be revival, 
there must first be a conviction of sin, and there cannot be a conviction of sin until there 
is awareness of sin. The hope for America is for her people to believe the Bible to be the 
Word of God and to begin to live by the laws of God.”206 This process of repentance must 
be a fully national project, where Americans “as a people” will “humble themselves 
before God […] repent of our national sins and prayerfully seek His ways.”207  
But the need for repentance is even greater for those who are already committed 
Christians than it is for those who are not, because the Christians have compounded their 
participation in the nation’s sins with the abdication of their responsibility to assert 
absolute truth in the face of human relativism. As Kennedy writes: 
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Repentance from sin is the condition on which God will hear our prayers 
and heal our land. How tragic that we Christians seem to have ignored that 
part! How tragic that repentance is so desperately needed today in the 
Church as it kneels to pray for the repentance of the nation!208 
Similarly, for Marshall and Manuel, one of the guiding arguments of their history of the 
Puritan era and the early Republic is that “God blesses repentance.”209 However, this is 
precisely the element that is missing from contemporary Christianity because of 
contemporary Christians’ overvaluation of spiritual comfort: 
Repentance is the missing ingredient in much of modern American 
Christianity. [...] Repentance involves heartfelt change. And change, the 
lifelong process of being conformed to the image of God’s Son, involves 
pain. Unlike Dwight or Asbury, JQA or Jackson, most us of today are 
unwilling to go through much emotional or spiritual pain. We can wear 
out our knees praying for revival, but if we are not willing to go through 
the pain of repentance, the Great Awakening we seek will not come. 
But there can be a victorious conclusion. We have forgotten that true 
repentance is not only tremendously freeing, cleansing, and uplifting, but 
it brings the blessing of God in its wake! Further, repentance on the part of 
a few can spread throughout a family, a church, or a whole society. The 
salt can regain its savor!210 
Even repentance for national sins will not be enough, though, unless Americans truly 
understand what caused the national decline in the first place and the nature of the enemy 
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they face, and reorient their Christian lives not only to greater inward spiritual revival, 
but also to greater external social revival and renewal. As Whitehead writes: 
The church must learn to externalize the principles of its faith as practiced 
by Christians during the Reformation and in early America. The truths of 
the Bible must flow from the mind into the world. A false pietism, a false 
‘spirituality,’ and all the exclusively internal activities that so often make 
up the contemporary church bring neither revival nor reformation. The 
light must be taken from beneath the basket and placed on the hill.211 
Similarly, LaHaye makes understanding the nature of humanism a precondition for 
revival itself, writing that revival “will only come, however, if we become informed of 
what humanism is, who the enemy is, and how to fight their subtle form of religious 
evil.”212 
Knowing the whole truth is not enough; it is the Christian’s job to act, influencing 
the whole culture and infusing it with the absolute truth of Christianity.213 Schaeffer 
offers the Great Awakening revivals as an example, writing that “The old revivals are 
spoken about so warmly by the evangelical leadership. Yet they seem to have forgotten 
what those revivals were. [...] they [the revivals] also called for a resulting social 
action.”214  
The most significant arena in which revived Christians must demonstrate their 
authority is in the political and governmental sphere, flushing out humanism and 
asserting God’s sovereignty over the whole body politic, as LaHaye writes: “From school 
board to city council to state legislature to Congress, we need elected officials who 
realize they are responsible to God for the way they rule their city or this country.”215 
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Elsewhere he argues that Christian ministers should be involved not only in spiritual and 
political revival generally, but more specifically in raising up leaders from within the 
movement, “recruiting godly men to run for public office, where their moral influence 
can be felt.”216 
Epistemic Function 
Despite the productive tensions in their constructions of identity and time, there 
are noteworthy harmonies between the Cosmic Narrative and the American Narrative in 
terms of their epistemic functions. Both narratives articulate three major epistemological 
assertions for their audiences to accept.  
First, both narratives set out the notion of an absolute and objective truth that is 
not necessarily accessible to everyone. While parts of this truth are evident to those who 
take the appropriate lessons from history or who truly listen to their consciences, the 
whole of the truth can be found only by means of special revelation from God to 
humanity. The anthropological viewpoint set out by the narratives makes it impossible for 
anyone to have access to the whole of the truth without direct revelation from God in the 
form of the Bible, because the truth-value of the narratives is based not in the universe 
itself but in the personal authority of God. In other words, it is only because God is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and trustworthy that the category of “truth” exists at all. 
Second, both narratives suggest that the nature of this objective and absolute truth 
is not simply descriptive (like scientific truth), though there is certainly a descriptive 
aspect to it; rather, this truth is fundamentally and necessarily prescriptive and hortatory. 
In other words, it is moral truth first and foremost—and the moral truth-value of the 
narratives’ claims serves as a warrant for their descriptive claims as well, suggesting that 
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because the Bible so perfectly lays out the moral order of the universe, its assertions 
about the physical order of the universe must also be true. 
Finally, because the absolute truths are moral and hortatory rather than descriptive 
in nature, and because one cannot see those truths without accepting the validity of God’s 
special revelation to God’s people, understanding the whole truth requires a wholesale 
change in one’s own identity. The narratives both assert that the only people who can 
fully comprehend them are those who see themselves within the narratives and allow the 
narratives to shape their view of the world. Though the truths themselves are absolute, 
they are not comprehensible to a passive outside observer; their truth is understood only 
when they are lived into. 
General and Special Revelation 
Christian theologians have traditionally separated what they characterized as 
God’s revelation about God’s own nature and about the nature of the universe and 
humanity into two categories of revelation. General revelation is characterized as that 
revelation which is available to all humanity, regardless of their religious instruction or 
cultural heritage, through the use of human reason and intuition. This not only includes 
the human ability to decipher the scientific or physical laws of the universe through 
observation and reason, but also includes what Christian theology has characterized as 
inherent human moral or spiritual longings or inclinations among humans—inclinations 
like the need for God, the knowledge of one’s own sinfulness, or “natural” moral laws 
like those against murder, rape, etc. 
Special revelation, in contrast, is God’s revelation of God’s self to particular 
people or groups through more or less direct communication. This category of revelation 
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includes the whole of the Bible (as God’s ongoing message to humanity) as well as the 
stories in it, which are themselves seen as particular instances of special revelation—
God’s special message to particular peoples, such as the ancient clan/nation of Israel or 
the followers of Jesus. According to evangelical theologian Stanley Grenz, general 
revelation and special revelation can be differentiated from one another in two further 
ways. First, he writes, general revelation is “disclosed naturally rather than 
supernaturally,” in contrast to special revelation; this enables humans to reach the truths 
of general revelation through reason, while special revelation remains inaccessible to 
human reasoning. Second, “general revelation is ‘noetic’ rather than ‘salvific’”; in other 
words, while general revelation can make humans aware of their need for God, only 
special revelation can provide enough knowledge of God to ensure salvation.217 
The limitations of general revelation are a major theme particularly in the works 
of those major Christian Right thinkers who are closer to the Calvinist Reformed 
tradition, such as Francis Schaeffer. The Calvinist tradition has always put special 
emphasis on the idea that “the effects of the fall extend to every aspect of human 
existence; no human person possesses the ability to gain access to God by personal 
merit.”218 This is the first of the five points of Calvinism, which are often expressed in the 
acronym TULIP; the doctrine of humanity’s complete fallenness is represented by the T, 
which stands for “total depravity.”219 
In his history of Western thought, Schaeffer argues that the elevation of general 
revelation led to the split between the Renaissance/Enlightenment tradition, which he 
suggested led inevitably to the chaos and repression of the French Revolution and Soviet 
Communism, and the Reformation tradition, which produced what he called “freedom 
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without chaos.”220 This split, he writes, began with thirteenth-century theologian Thomas 
Aquinas, who had “an incomplete view of the Fall” because he saw it as affecting only 
human will, with human reason left untainted, leaving people “free to mix the teachings 
of the Bible with the teachings of the non-Christian philosophers.”221 In contrast, he 
writes, later Reformers would believe that “people could not begin only from themselves, 
and on the basis of human reason alone think out the answers to the great questions which 
confront mankind.”222 
It is noteworthy that this theologically-based notion of the limitations of general 
revelation is embedded in and reliant upon narrative—namely, the beginning of the 
Cosmic Narrative, in which Adam and Eve bring sin into the world (and “blight” the 
whole of nature)223 by disobeying God’s command not to eat of the tree of the knowledge 
of good and evil in the Garden of Eden. Prior to this narrative event, human reason, like 
all other human faculties, was, while limited by humanity’s status as a created being 
rather than the Creator, not tainted by sinfulness. 
Moreover, the historicity of the narrative of the Fall is essential to the whole 
construct, according to Cosmic Narrative authors like D. James Kennedy, who writes that 
in the view of history presented by evolution, “Christ becomes a useless excrescence, 
someone who is unnecessary because there is no need for salvation . . . because there is 
no original sin . . . for there was no Adam.”224 Similarly, Falwell suggests that the 
rejection of the Genesis account as literal truth is part of “the satanic campaign to 
discredit the Bible,” writing that a literal and historical fall is necessary because, “if man 
did not sin and fall from his original state, there is no need to accept the Gospel 
message.”225 
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Objective and Absolute Truth 
The assertion of traditional Protestant theology that not only human reason but 
nature itself is fallen as a result of the historic Fall also means that appeals to objective 
truth cannot rest on any ontological fact about the universe itself; because human 
observation (like human reason and human will) is fallen, even our seemingly-objective 
observations about the universe can lead to erroneous conclusions if they are made 
without reference to an authoritative and objective source. Thus, the existence of absolute 
and objective truth about anything is based not on the existence of an objective universe 
which we are all observing, but on the personal authority of a God who exists outside that 
universe, who created the universe, and whose observations are not tainted by fallen 
human nature.  
In other words, true statements about the universe are true not primarily because 
they match human observations about the universe or accurately predict the results of 
future observations, but primarily because the omnipotent, omniscient God who created 
the universe says they are true. Where empirical observation and human reason agree 
with the assertion of truth by the divine authority, they are accurate and confer greater 
authenticity on the divine narrative; however, when they disagree with God’s absolute 
truth, they prove the basic untrustworthiness of empirical observation and human reason. 
This is a crucial move, rooting both special and general revelation in the personal 
authority and sovereignty of God. The objective truth-value of special revelation is 
naturally dependent on the authority of God; if God is not authoritative in revealing 
God’s-self, God’s relationship to humanity, human salvation, or absolute and objective 
moral standards for human behavior, then special revelation falls apart.  
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The Cosmic Narrative, in rooting even the dependability of general revelation in 
the authority of God, goes a step further, however; if God is not God, then we cannot 
even say anything true about nature, for it is God’s consistency and authority that 
maintains the very physical laws of the universe itself. Absent divine authority, Schaeffer 
suggests, even the truths of general revelation available through science would be 
unreliable, because there would be no assurance that the laws of the universe would 
remain the same from one moment to the next. “Christianity is the mother of modern 
science because it insists that the God who created the universe has revealed himself in 
the Bible to be the kind of God he is. Consequently, there is a sufficient basis for science 
to study the universe.”226 
The appeal to divine authority as the root of absolute truth emphasizes another 
important epistemological point, which is that absolute truth is not purely descriptive, but 
is more importantly also prescriptive. In other words, absolute truth is more a moral fact 
than it is a scientific one. Absolute truth is inherently and necessarily hortatory in nature, 
rather than ontological; instead of simply explaining and defining the world as it is, the 
existence of absolute truth defines the world as it ought to be. The assertion of absolute 
truth in the narratives is more about defining the moral, political, and economic 
components of “God’s law” than it is about defining any kind of ontological or scientific 
truth. 
The equivocation of descriptive and prescriptive absolutes also works in the other 
direction, to assert that those who suggest that there are no moral absolutes are really 
saying that there are no absolutes at all. “When a teacher or professor says there are no 
absolutes, you need to understand that he is also saying, ‘There is no God,’ because, you 
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see, God is the ultimate absolute. He is absolutely supreme. He is absolutely infinite in 
His power and wisdom and knowledge—in all of His attributes. What He says is the 
ultimate and absolute truth. Keep in mind that when someone says that there are no 
absolutes, this person is simply giving you a veiled and cloaked atheism.”227 
The functional result of this is that even descriptive truth is not value-free; rather, 
it serves as evidence to support the whole edifice of truth, at the apex of which are the 
prescriptive claims. Descriptive truth is seen as evidence for prescriptive truth in two 
ways. First, ontologically, the existence of absolute descriptive truth itself is seen to be 
serving as proof of God’s immutability and absolute authority. The very existence of the 
descriptive, of consistent scientific laws and of a predictable universe, stands as a 
general-revelation evidence for the special-revelation prescriptive absolutes of the Bible. 
Second and perhaps more importantly, the content of the descriptive truth—
particularly history—is seen as bearing witness to the validity and absolute authority of 
the prescriptive truth of divine moral law. When nations follow God’s law, they prosper; 
when they do not follow God’s law, they suffer. The two narratives offer a productive 
tension in presenting the agency (or the extent of agency) causing these outcomes. 
On the one hand, moral law is portrayed as a universal force no less powerful than 
physical laws like universal gravitation or electromagnetism. As Robertson writes in The 
Secret Kingdom: “Jesus quite bluntly said, ‘If you do this, then this will happen.’ When 
He added no restrictions as to time, place, nationality, and the like, then they were laws, 
in the same sense as the natural laws established by God—those governing motion, 
gravity, sound and such. They simply work.”228 In other words, it is people themselves 
that bring about their own prosperity or suffering through their good or evil acts. That 
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good acts bring about blessing and evil acts bring about suffering is marshaled as more 
evidence of the universe’s creation by a holy and just God; it is because the universe 
reflects the divine nature that it will naturally reward those who exhibit virtues like self-
restraint, hard work, love of neighbor, and sexual morality. 
The contrast between the American and French Revolutions in the American 
Narrative is used as a prime example of the ways in which the denial of divine moral law 
is portrayed as naturally leading to degradation and chaos. The American Narrative 
suggests that the root of the difference between these two revolutions was their basic 
worldviews; the Americans held an essentially Protestant worldview, in which there were 
absolute divine standards and humanity was depraved and inclined to sin, while the 
French held to an Enlightenment worldview in which morality was seen as a human 
construct and human wisdom could solve all of the nation’s problems. The subsequent 
history of the two revolutions is presented as an inevitable consequence of these starting 
points; the Americans created a stable system of checks and balances where sin’s effects 
could be mitigated229, while the French Revolution brought forth “a bloodbath and 
display of horrors”230 that ultimately led to the rise of Napoleon as a dictator who could 
restore order and sanity.231 The inevitability of these consequences is so apparent that 
only the willfully blind could not see it, as LaHaye writes: 
We would expect true thinkers to profit by their mistakes, even in the field 
of philosophy. But such is not the case. In view of the total failure of 
Enlightenment humanism to produce reason, liberty, freedom, and 
progress through the French and Russian revolutions, and in light of the 
chaos, suffering, and totalitarian repression they instituted—which is the 
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ultimate consequence of no absolutes—one would hope that the humanist 
mind would become suspicious that perhaps man without law really can’t 
be trusted. But these historic lessons are lost on the humanist mind.232 
In the American Narrative, the lesson of history is this: Because the nature of God’s 
universe is such that there is a universal moral law, and humans are naturally inclined to 
transgress against that law, those nations that do not enshrine those concepts into their 
own laws are doomed to chaos and totalitarianism, while those that do will find 
prosperity and hope. Even without any explicit divine intervention, these results will 
inevitably follow; the people of a nation are the agents of their own fate. 
The other option available to the rhetor is to make God the agent of this prosperity 
or suffering, either through an apparently-natural coincidence or a supernatural act. Often 
those involved in the narratives are not even aware that their paths are being guided from 
on high, as in the example of Christopher Columbus’s travels not taking him to the 
mainland of North America. Both Marshall and Manuel and Kennedy and Newcombe 
suggest that Columbus was guided southward by God so as to leave the future United 
States available for colonization by Protestants, and more particularly by the New 
England Puritans: 
And to think, if it had not been for the flight of some birds [leading 
Columbus to the West Indies], America would probably have the same 
culture and religion as that of South and Central America today. Were the 
cloud and those feathered creatures just a coincidence, or the hand of 
God? I believe that just as God used a talking donkey to set Balaam 
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straight (Num. 22:21-31), so He used a cloud and a flight of birds to 
change Columbus’s destination.233 
A few farsighted Puritans could sense God’s hand in a coincidence of 
timing that was too extraordinary to be accidental. Had Columbus landed 
farther north... […] Had her northeastern coast not been reserved for the 
Pilgrims and Puritans... To some, it must have seemed almost as if they 
were standing in the middle of a gigantic model of one of those 
newfangled pocket watches, with the wheels and gears of ‘coincidence’ 
swinging around and meshing and turning other gears, which swung and 
turned others.234 
At other points, however, the characters in the narrative are portrayed as clearly aware 
that their path has been supernaturally blessed by God. This is particularly true for 
narratives about the American Revolution, centering on the person of George 
Washington; David Barton has written a whole book, The Bulletproof George 
Washington, about what is termed Washington’s “miraculous” survival of several key 
battles during the French and Indian War and the American Revolution.235  
Washington is also brought out as a character witness to testify about God’s 
providence to contemporary audiences: “Rather, America would be a free nation, and it 
would be that Puritan and evangelical form of Christianity that would give birth to our 
nation. Was this the hand of God, or merely coincidence? Again, Washington himself said 
that an America who was ungrateful to God in light of all of His providential acts on 
behalf of our country was ‘worse than an infidel.’”236 Washington’s attribution of both his 
 155 
own and the United States’ survival to “providence” is remarked upon in virtually every 
retelling of the American Narrative. 
Similarly, the suffering of the wicked is also portrayed as both a natural effect of 
evil in a moral universe, and as an intentional act of wrath by a just and righteous God—
with past acts of divine wrath presented as evidence of the future potential suffering 
facing the American people should they not repent of their evil ways and return to God. 
As Falwell writes: 
We the American people have to make a choice today: will it be revival or 
ruin? There can be no other way. One only has to turn to history to find 
that this is a proven fact. [...] America will be no exception [to several 
Bible verses promising ruin to nations that forget God]. If she forgets God, 
she too will face His wrath and judgment like every other nation in the 
history of humanity. [...] When a nation’s ways please the Lord, that 
nation is blessed with supernatural help.237  
In this way, the narratives insist that objective fact and absolute morality reinforce one 
another; the existence of absolute morality, and of God’s punishment for (or the natural 
course of) immorality, is asserted as displaying itself to the student of history. Consistent 
with their overall approach, the narratives present biblical narratives as simultaneously 
typological and historical, as existing in both epic kairotic time and prosaic chronic time. 
The Old Testament narratives of God punishing the Israelites for their national sins by 
sending invading armies of Assyrians and Babylonians are presented as no less 
historical—and no less didactic—than constructed historical narratives of homosexuality 
and decadence bringing about the fall of the Roman Empire. 
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Truth Knowable Only by the Elect 
The notion of absolute and objective moral truth is only part of the 
epistemological viewpoint set forth by the narratives, however; epistemology not only 
implicates questions about the existence and nature of knowledge, but also how human 
beings can come to obtain it. Christian theology has historically divided the process by 
which people come to grasp the truth into the categories of “general revelation” and 
“special revelation,” with the former being available to all people everywhere, and the 
latter being available only to those to whom God has revealed it.  
Historically, conservative Christian theology has tended to err on the side of an 
epistemology in which special revelation played a crucial and deciding role; where liberal 
theology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw Christianity as an expression of a 
universal human experience, conservative theology developed in its assertion of the 
peculiarity of the Christian religion—and especially the inerrancy of the Bible—as the 
foundation for theological thought.238 
A contrast between the work of Francis Schaeffer and the Christian 
Reconstructionists is illustrative of this debate. Drawing from one of his teachers, 
Cornelius Van Til, Schaeffer suggested that it is a person’s presuppositions—his or her 
worldview, fundamental beliefs about the universe and knowledge—that dictate the 
extent to which he or she can understand the truth and, more importantly, act 
appropriately in response to that truth. The proper presuppositions, he argued, could only 
come from belief in the inerrancy of the Bible and God’s absolute and eternal moral laws 
as a fixed standard; as he wrote, “we need absolutes if our existence is to have meaning—
my existence, your existence, Man’s [sic] existence.”239  
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Schaeffer also believed that human reason, while fallen, could still get a person at 
least part of the way to the saving knowledge of God, in showing the nonbeliever that his 
or her worldview was internally consistent and led to disastrous consequences for both 
the individual and society.  In fact, he suggested, contemporary people (unlike those of 
the past) are already further along in being ready to accept Christianity: “Already men 
[sic] are partway to the gospel, for they too believe that man is dead, dead in the sense of 
being meaningless. Christianity alone gives the reason for this meaninglessness, that their 
revolt has separated them from God who exists, and thus gives them the true explanation 
of the position to which they have come.”240 
To Schaeffer, even the special revelation of Scripture is intelligible, 
understandable, and believable for anyone who approaches it, because it is objective 
reality. The objectivity of special revelation, he argues, is what differentiates “Biblical” 
Christianity from “existential” philosophies—particularly the theological systems of neo-
orthodox theologians like Karl Barth or Reinhold Niebuhr. The neo-orthodox theologians, 
Schaeffer argued, followed secular philosophy in fragmenting knowledge, so that the 
“religious truth” of Christianity was not reliant on the historic or scientific truth of the 
Biblical narratives. This, Schaeffer argued, made their systems “antitheology,” since they 
had sacrificed “a unified field of knowledge” that brought together history, science, and 
theology.241 In doing so they had created a theological system that “must simply be 
believed” without making any kind of verifiable statement.242  
Schaeffer’s version of Christianity, in contrast, is based on special revelation that 
is not only verifiable but falsifiable by means of general revelation; as he puts it, 
Christianity “is prepared to face the consequences of being proved false and say with 
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Paul: If you find the body of Christ, the discussion is finished; let us eat and drink, for 
tomorrow we die.”243 To Schaeffer, a logical person, whether Christian or not, who 
approached modern philosophy and Christianity with an open mind could accept 
Christianity as an objective reality. 
This is where Van Til himself and others who drew on his theology, notably 
Christian Reconstructionists Rousas J. Rushdoony and his disciple Gary North, broke 
strongly with Schaeffer.244 As Gary North puts it, Van Til held to “the explicit biblical 
foundation of presuppositionalism: the denial of neutral common-ground natural 
logic.”245 Schaeffer acknowledged a role for general revelation—for the ability even of 
nonbelievers to know something true about God and the universe based on the lessons of 
history,  the cosmos, and reason. Van Til and the Reconstructionists rejected that idea, 
arguing that nonbelievers could not possibly approach truth without Christian 
presuppositions.  
This created a sort of feedback loop in Van Til’s theology, where in order to truly 
understand and comprehend the truth of the Bible, one had to accept without question the 
presupposition that the Bible is true. Crapanzano summarizes Van Til’s view that “at a 
certain point in argument, indeed in interpretation, reason just falters. You can only assert 
the truth of revelation […]  You depend on the force of your (propositional) truths to 
determine the situation— the presuppositions which are entailed by and entail these 
truths.”246 In other words, faith, to Van Til and company, was a necessary prerequisite for 
knowledge; nobody could be argued into faith. This was in line with Calvinist theology, 
which holds that a person was saved because God has chosen them to be saved, and not 
because they made any decision on their own. (In contrast, many evangelicals hold to an 
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Arminian soteriology, where people make the free choice to accept God’s gift of 
salvation.) 
Schaeffer, however, was unwilling to abandon the idea that people could be 
rationally argued into accepting Christianity; for this, he was accused by North of hiding 
his Calvinist beliefs in order to be accepted by his new evangelical audiences.247 Rather 
than assert (like Van Til and company) that in order to know or understand objective 
theological and moral truth one must presuppose the whole truth of revelation, he argued 
that one must only presuppose “the classical basis of antithesis”—that is, to accept that 
there is such a thing as absolute and objective truth, and that any idea operating in 
antithesis to that absolute and objective truth must necessarily be false.248 If one believes 
that there is a truth to be found, Schaeffer thought, then one can examine Scripture’s 
claims about science and history and find none of them to be false, while finding all other 
possibilities unacceptable. 
This is an important debate for the validity of the American Narrative, which is 
strongly undermined by a wholesale rejection of general revelation. If America’s 
founding was based in any part on philosophies that were not explicitly Christian and 
based entirely in special revelation, then those who deny general revelation must reject 
the nation’s founding documents, in part if not in whole.  
Gary North fully understood the extent to which a rejection of general revelation 
dooms the American Narrative’s presentation of the American founding as a kairotic 
moment. He mildly criticized his mentor (and father-in-law) Rushdoony, suggesting that 
Rushdoony failed to understand that the intellectual leaders of the founding generation 
were guilty of “importing alien religious and philosophical principles under the cover of 
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language that had long been considered Christian,”249 and thus that the constitution is 
“explicitly not Christian. It was designed that way. But if it is not Christian, then it must 
be anti-Christian. There is no neutrality, after all.”250 North also suggests that those who 
attempt to paint the Constitution as a Christian document are guilty of “mytho-history 
designed to calm the fears of Bible-believing Christians as they look back to the origin of 
the Constitution.”251 He rejects arguments that the framers intended a Christian nation, 
writing that “the Framers at the Constitutional Convention issued a death warrant against 
Christianity, but for tactical reasons, they and their spiritual heirs refused for several 
generations to deliver it to the intended victims.”252 
On the other hand, Schaeffer and those who draw on his work, including 
Whitehead and Barton, argue that the Constitution could reflect Biblical principles and 
remain valid despite the fact that those who wrote it were not all Christian, and that those 
who were Christian were also influenced by philosophies that were not explicitly 
Christian, such as the work of John Locke. This, they argue, was due to the influence of 
what Schaeffer describes as the “Christian consensus”; even those founders and 
influences that were not themselves Christian were so steeped in a culture and worldview 
based on Christianity that they reflected Biblical values often without realizing it. Thus, 
even avowed nonbelievers like Franklin or Jefferson could not help but espouse Christian 
principles, at least in part, to the extent that they were appealing to the English and 
American colonial tradition of “Christian consensus” rather than to the French tradition 
of the humanist Enlightenment. 
The epistemological process, then, becomes not about seeing some new truth in 
the world that one was constitutionally incapable of seeing before, but rather about 
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encountering and accepting the validity of the truth that one should have been able to see 
all along. As Crapanzano writes, this goes deeper than simply changing one’s individual 
understanding; salvation “is not so much a change in the way the world is experienced 
subjectively, but in the world itself, as it comes to be known, as it presents itself 
objectively.”253 It is not that the objective world is perceived differently by the converted; 
it is that the converted is capable of truly seeing the objective world as it is. 
In other words, according to this epistemological approach, while the objective 
truth is accessible to anyone who encounters God’s Word, it will still only be truly 
understood and believed by those who accept the assumptions of the Cosmic Narrative—
namely, the authority of the Bible as an inerrant record of God’s work throughout the 
history of the cosmos and of humanity—and who see their own identities implicated as 
part of that narrative.  
This epistemological approach is soteriologically flexible. One can hold, with the 
Calvinists, that salvation is solely for God’s elect as predestined from the beginning of 
time, suggesting that only those whose hearts are quickened by God to truly believe 
God’s word will be able to understand this truth, despite its theoretically being available 
to all. On the other hand, Arminians can assert that God’s truth remains available to all 
who believe in it and that the door of invitation is open to everyone, not just to those who 
have been given a special revelation from God. 
This approach also creates soteriological flexibility in another way, by creating 
space for the “Christian consensus” asserted by Schaeffer, Barton, and LaHaye. If moral 
truth is available to everyone who can read the Bible and see its witness in history, then 
even those who do not entirely accept the Scriptural witness and undergo a truly 
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evangelical conversion experience could be capable of comprehending at least some of 
this moral truth, even if they do not accept the whole of it. Thus they can assert that even 
those of the country’s founders who were not personally pious, or who held unorthodox 
views, could still create a system that reflected the deep spiritual truth of Christianity 
because the whole of society was awash in biblical literacy and in Protestant values like 
total depravity, as Schaeffer writes: 
But we should realize that the word Christian can legitimately be used two 
ways. The primary meaning is: an individual who has come to God 
through the work of Christ. The second meaning must be kept distinct but 
also has validity. It is possible for an individual to live within the circle of 
that which a Christian consensus brings forth, even though he himself is 
not a Christian in the first sense. This may be true in many areas—for 
example, in the arts or political thought. Many of the men who laid the 
foundation of the United States Constitution wee not Christians in the first 
sense, and yet they built upon the basis of the Reformation either directly 
through the Lex Rex tradition or indirectly through Locke. To whatever 
degree a society allows the teaching of the Bible to bring forth its natural 
conclusions, it is able to have form and freedom in society and 
government.254  
This form of flexibility does not just operate in the past, however; the American 
Narrative, in particular, also asserts a sort of “Christian consensus” (or “Judeo-Christian 
consensus”) in the present as well, albeit weakening, in the form of a silent majority that 
still stands for traditional values despite the humanism of the elites. This creates space for 
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what Schaeffer called “cobelligerency” even among those whose theological viewpoints 
are not compatible; LaHaye writes that “pro-moral political leaders may be Protestants, 
Catholics, Mormons, or Jews. Though differing in theology, they are in harmony on such 
issues as abortion, homosexuality, pornography, prostitution, murder, integrity, and the 
responsibility of government to protect the family, not destroy it.”255 It is because the 
absolute truth of morality exists in both general revelation and in clearly-accessible 
special revelation that it can be grasped even by those whom LaHaye, in his apocalyptic 
work, makes clear he does not think are truly Christian.256 
Essential to this viewpoint is the notion that truth is fundamentally propositional 
in nature. As theologians Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke argue, the project of 
modern (as opposed to postmodern) evangelical theology was to glean universal, 
propositional truths from the narrative of the inerrant Bible: 
According to this [evangelical] model, the theologian, assisted by the 
canons of logic, applies the scientific method to the deposit of revelation 
found in scripture in an ongoing quest to compile the one, complete, 
timeless body of right doctrines, formulated as a series of statements or 
theological assertions, each of which is true in its own right.257 
It is essential to note, however, that evangelical theology insists that assent to these 
propositional assertions is not, in itself, salvific. Rather, one must have a conversion 
experience, be born again, and put Jesus at the center of one’s life, the effects of which 
will be shown in one’s willingness to confront one’s own sin and to change one’s ways. 
Kennedy, for example, writes to the reader that on the day of judgment, “if you have 
continued impenitently in your sins, if you have been satisfied with only nominal 
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Christianity, if you have been satisfied to have your name upon the roll and not Christ 
upon the throne of your heart, if you have rejected Him, if you have spurned the 
invitation of His gospel—then, for you, it will be the fulfillment of the worst of all your 
nightmares.”258 Similarly, LaHaye writes, “All human beings have been tempted of Satan 
and have had to decide whether to respond to God or Satan. All have sinned, but God 
through the gift of His Son, Jesus Christ, on Calvary’s cross has given everyone a second 
chance. That second chance, available only on this earth, involves the acceptance of 
God's gift of salvation in the person of His Son. If you have never made that decision, 
you are making a contrary decision right now.”259 
In other words, one cannot be saved simply by assenting to the propositional truth 
found in the Cosmic Narrative of the Scriptures; rather, the process is one in which one 
sees oneself as taking part in that narrative by accepting the sacrificial death and 
resurrection of Jesus and changing one’s own life to put Jesus at the center of it. This is 
not a change in belief, per se; it is a change in identity which in turn affects one’s ability 
to perceive the objective world. 
Because it contains a singular, universal, absolute truth which can ultimately be 
stated propositionally, the Bible must be presented as a coherent and unified whole rather 
than as a series of disparate parts. The coherence of Scripture is both argued and asserted 
as a miraculous apologetic for its inerrancy and truth:  
Another bit of evidence we must consider in our attempt to validate the 
existence of God is the Bible: the oldest and most amazing book in the 
world. Written over a period of 1,600 years by more than 40 different 
people, it has a supernatural consistency about it. No other book has been 
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so loved, so hated, so persecuted, or so used as the Bible. [...] Nineteen 
hundred years ago, this book was completed, never to be corrected or 
updated. Its pages contain many signs of the supernatural, such as 
hundreds of prophecies that have historically been fulfilled. Its 
archaeological accuracy is acclaimed to be incredible. To those who have 
studied it carefully, it bears all the signs of what it claims—divine 
authorship.260 
The notion of a singular and coherent Scripture is also bolstered by the fundamentalist 
and evangelical hermeneutical technique of “proof-texting”—of using verses or passages 
of Scripture, often out of any context, as citations supporting one’s assertions. 
Crapanzano writes that this practice “creates a ‘space’ in which the different authorial and 
narrative perspectives of the cited texts are implicitly exploited to produce the illusion of 
an external objectivity.”261 
The technique of proof-texting is carried over into the hermeneutics of the 
American Narrative as well. Barton in particular is fond of this technique, in which he 
strings together numerous quotations from the founders of the United States to bolster his 
argument that they intended for America to be a Christian nation. These quotations, like 
proof-texts in theological argument, are presented outside of their original context, and 
carry the implication that the founders’ vision for the country was a coherent and unified 
single vision. 
Interestingly, Barton’s coherency technique seemingly pulls him a bit away from 
Schaeffer and Whitehead’s notion of a “Christian consensus” as sufficient for the 
formation of a fundamentally Protestant national and legal structure. Because Barton is 
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presenting the founders as speaking more or less with one voice in envisioning a 
Christian America, he has to account for the various degrees of religious commitment 
found among them—hence, his argument in The Jefferson Lies that while Thomas 
Jefferson (whose historical reputation is as one of the less religious of the founders) may 
have strayed from strict Christian orthodoxy later on in life, “there never was a time when 
he questioned the overall value of Christianity to individuals or to a nation. And there 
never was a time when he was anti-Jesus or when he rejected Christianity.”262  
The Cosmic Narrative’s coherency argument, as seen in the technique of proof-
texting, is not the only epistemological assumption to bleed over into the American 
Narrative. The nation’s founding documents (the Constitution and Declaration of 
Independence) and—to a lesser extent—other texts from the nation’s founders (such as 
speeches, personal letters, and public documents like the Federalist Papers) are exegeted 
like Scripture.  
This does not mean that the American Narrative asserts the inerrancy of the 
founding documents—Schaeffer in particular is highly critical of the founders’ tolerance 
for slavery263—but rather that rhetors appealing to the American Narrative have a similar 
hermeneutical approach to these documents as Cosmic Narrative rhetors do to the Bible. 
In both instances, the text is approached as a kairotic expression of timeless and universal 
truths, with an exegetical purpose of gleaning what Grenz and Franke called (in relation 
to Scripture) “one, complete, timeless body of right doctrines” as propositional truths 
from the text.  
The truth expressed by the founding documents thus takes on religious as well as 
political character. In the American Narrative, America’s founding documents do not 
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serve only as evidence of timeless political values like the proper ordering of society and 
economy, the rights of citizenship, and the republican form of government. They also 
serve as evidence of timeless religious values, particularly the superiority of Protestant 
Christianity in creating a social and cultural consensus in which “freedom without chaos” 
is possible.264 
In this light, American Narrative rhetors’ assertions about the influence of the 
Bible and of Reformed political thought (through Samuel Rutherford and John Locke) on 
the founders and the founding documents do not serve only as warrant for the narrative’s 
claims about the intentions of the founders to establish a Christian nation. They take on 
an additional character of conferring on the founding documents a similar status to that of 
authoritative commentaries on Scripture—not on the same level as inerrant holy writ 
passed down by God through human amanuensis, but as expressions of the timeless 
principles of Scripture. 
Because the principles expressed in the founding documents are both timeless and 
religious in nature, the founders can be portrayed as prophetic voices who were able to 
create a constitutional structure that could anticipate and address the problems of 
contemporary, post-industrial, urbanized and suburbanized America just as effectively as 
it addressed the problems facing the eighteenth-century, largely-agrarian, post-Revolution 
America. In other words, the founding documents are decontextualized, even as the time 
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Chapter 3: Space and Time 
In October 2014, a new film version of Left Behind—the first of a series of novels 
by Timothy LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins taking place in the premillennial 
dispensationalist version of the End Times—was released. Despite starring popular 
Hollywood actor Nicolas Cage, the film did poorly at the box office, finishing in sixth 
place in its first weekend of release, and by its fourth weekend in theaters, the film had 
been dropped by five-sixths of the theaters that had originally shown it. (Left Behind 
ended up in 122nd place in the 2014 domestic box-office rankings.1) 
On October 29, on his radio show Wallbuilders Live, David Barton discussed the 
“really pathetic” performance of the film. Despite the fact that the book series on which 
the film was based was co-written by a prominent figure in the Christian Right, featured 
heavily evangelical themes, and was one of the most significant pop-culture phenomena 
to arise out of evangelicalism in the past several decades, Barton expressed pleasure that 
the film had not been popular even among evangelicals: 
Quite frankly, I was somewhat happy the movie was a bust. And that 
seems like a strange thing to say, but it’s because of eschatology. […] 
What's happened as a result [of rapture theology], and what I saw 
throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s and even in the early 2000’s was that people 
said, ‘Hey, it’s all prophesied. Jesus is coming back and it’s an absolute 
waste of time to get involved with anything, because the rapture’s going to 
happen and everything we’re doing is wasted energy at that point anyway, 
so let’s not get involved.’ […] 
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And so what happens is that Christians, we have missed something very 
simple. And that simple thing is in the commands of Jesus. There are 45 
commands that Jesus gives believers in the New Testament, if you read all 
of the gospels all the way through, there are 45 things Jesus tells us to do. 
And one of those things that He says is Luke 19:13, He says, ‘You occupy 
until I come.’ That ‘occupy until I come’ means you’re supposed to be 
involved.2 
Barton expressed one of the clear tensions between the Cosmic Narrative and the 
American Narrative. Even accounting for versions of the Cosmic Narrative that break 
from the strict premillennial dispensationalism (with a pretribulation rapture) expressed 
by fundamentalists like Timothy LaHaye or Jerry Falwell, the central theme of the 
Cosmic Narrative is that the future has already been written by God and that the story of 
God’s people on earth as revealed in the Bible does not leave much space for the United 
States or for the temporal, historical triumph of Christianity. In the American Narrative, 
on the other hand, the future is uncertain and unwritten, and the American people are the 
authors of their own fate—with God as the agency by which the consequences of the 
American people’s decisions are realized, rather than the agent who chooses the direction 
in which the plot of the story will go. 
In her analysis of the Left Behind novel series, Kristy Maddux recognizes the 
problem of agency, arguing that the novels are significant in creating space for human 
agency within the context of premillennialism by constructing a vision of Christian 
citizenship in which the Christian, secure in his or her faith, is empowered by God to take 
action in the ongoing fight against evil. This vision for citizenship, she suggests, allows 
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Left Behind to transcend the limitations of premillennial eschatology, which posits a telic 
and imminent eschaton, “disrupting the dualisms” of the divide between premillennial 
and postmillennial views to formulate a vision that is “simultaneously tragic and comic, 
imminent and immanent, telic and cyclical, and literal and analogical.”3 She also argues 
that the novel series defines its world by reference to “three binary pairs—good and evil, 
reality and appearance, and truth and persuasion.”4 Within the world defined by those 
binaries, she writes, the novels set forth a vision of human political agency that is 
aggressive, anti-intellectual, and non-discursive—a vision that is translated into the 
contemporary, cyclical, non-apocalyptic world. 
Maddux also correctly identifies the limitations on human agency in the Left 
Behind novels as well as the space created for it. The novels’ characters and their 
audience of present-day Christians, Maddux writes, “must accept the foreordained 
unfolding of events” while taking part in them—including the inevitability and timing of 
the rapture and tribulation, the loss of the United States, and the ultimate collapse of all 
world authorities, none of which can be altered by human agency.5 Further, as Maddux 
identifies, the locus for religious identity in the Left Behind novels is personal and 
individual rather than corporate; the Rapture clearly affects individuals regardless of their 
nationality or group affiliation, based on whether or not they have accepted Jesus Christ 
into their heart, and salvation requires nothing but individual faith in Jesus. The “powers 
that be” in the world—government, culture, established religious authorities—are the 
enemies of the ragtag, underground, secret group of true Christians in the last days as 
they struggle against the agenda of the Antichrist. 
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As a religious leader who made eschatology a prominent part of his theology as 
well as an activist who urged his audience to take action in the political and cultural 
spheres, LaHaye was also clearly well aware of this tension and of the need to reconcile 
the telos of his premillennial dispensationalism—the decline of the political, cultural and 
economic systems of the world—with his call for action within those spheres. As he 
wrote in The Battle for the Mind: 
Most knowledgeable Christians are looking for the Second Coming of 
Christ and the tribulation period that He predicted would come before the 
end of the age. Because present world conditions are so similar to those 
the Bible prophesies for the last days (see 2 Timothy 3:1-7; 2 Peter 3:1-15; 
Matthew 24:6,7,37,38), they conclude that a takeover of our culture by the 
forces of evil is inevitable; so they do nothing to resist it. This is 
unscriptural! We are commanded to resist the devil and to put on the 
whole armor of God, that we may be able to withstand in the evil day (see 
Ephesians 6:13). […] 
That tribulation [the seven-year tribulation of premillennial 
dispensationalism] is predestined and will surely come to pass. But the 
pre-tribulation tribulation—that is, the tribulation that will engulf this 
country if liberal humanists are permitted to take total control of our 
government—is neither predestined nor necessary. But it will deluge the 
entire land in the next few years, unless Christians are willing to become 
much more assertive in defense of morality and decency than they have 
been during the past three decades.6 
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In this passage, LaHaye utilizes one of the strategies by which premillennial 
dispensationalists encourage political action—a strategy that Susan Friend Harding 
describes as the “little tribulation,” “a small window of progressive history in the last 
days, a brief moment in time when Christians could, and must be, agents of political and 
social change.”7 In the space of time between the present and the rapture that begins the 
prophesied, predestined, and inevitable End Times, there is room in which Christians 
have some measure of agency, the ability to successfully resist evil not only in their 
individual lives and religious institutions, but to empower the whole of the culture to 
resist evil and stave off the “pre-tribulation tribulation” that awaits the country if the 
“liberal humanists” take power. 
The effectiveness of this narrative is limited, however, because, as Harding 
suggests, “the temporal window they opened up was in fact just a window. It could be 
shut at any time. It did not alter the basic structure of history, of either the end-times or 
the great tribulation.”8 This is evident in this passage from LaHaye as well; even though 
it comes from a book geared specifically toward encouraging political and social action 
by Christians, it does not hold out a great deal of hope for the ultimate success of political 
action. Christians are called to resist evil first because they are commanded by God to do 
so, and then in order to strengthen themselves for the trials to come. In doing this, they 
may even succeed for a time in staving off the “pre-tribulation tribulation”—but the 
ultimate decline of every political, cultural, and economic power and the resulting 
worthlessness of any investment into those powers remains inevitable. Evangelical 
Christians may win individual battles—and will ultimately win the war after Christ’s 
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return at the end of the Great Tribulation—but the institutions they are fighting to save 
will surely pass away. 
It is notable that LaHaye does not argue with his invisible interlocutors’ assertion 
that the end is likely imminent; he, too, can read the signs of the times and interpret them 
according to biblical prophecy, and will not gainsay anyone who suggests that the present 
generation could be the last before the end of everything. If the present conditions truly 
are signs of the imminence of the Great Tribulation and the End Times, LaHaye would 
certainly agree that any attempts to make the world better through political or cultural 
action are futile. Nevertheless, because God commands and because there is some hope 
that the tribulations of the immediate future are not signs of the end of days, Christians 
must resist. 
As Barton notes, LaHaye’s approach (which has shifted in focus toward the 
apocalyptic as his career has progressed, perhaps in part due to the popularity of the Left 
Behind series) is a kind of cold comfort, particularly for those who believe that the date 
of the eschaton is fixed, predestined, and imminent. If the greatest effect a Christian’s 
political and cultural activism can have is to stop a “little tribulation”—a victory that 
would have no effect on the predestined date of the Great Tribulation, at which point the 
governmental and cultural institutions for which the Christian was fighting will all 
collapse—then why not concentrate on saving as many souls out of the tribulation 
instead? This is a crucial challenge for premillennial eschatologies: to find a place for 
human agency in a world formed by the belief that every human action is part of a 
preordained and fixed narrative in which the final act will occur as a result of a divinely-
effected rupture with the present world order. 
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I will not argue with the conclusions drawn by Maddux about the world 
constructed by the Left Behind novels, which I find both persuasive and illuminating. 
What I will suggest instead is that within the larger rhetorical landscape of the Christian 
Right, a more complicated picture emerges that amplifies, rather than contradicts, the 
rhetorical functions she identifies in the Left Behind novels. The Left Behind novels set 
out a limited space for human agency, creating a comic frame not within the context of 
the novels themselves but through the relationship between the teleological and dying 
world of the novels and the cyclical and ongoing world of the novels’ readers. In the dual 
narrative structure I am identifying, the comic and cyclical frame becomes part of the 
story. 
The resonances and dissonances between the Cosmic and American Narratives 
imply a world in which the timing and nature of the end times themselves can be altered 
by human agency, and in which nations as well as individuals are loci for religious 
identity and have at least some teleological role in the eschatological future. In other 
words, the broader context further disrupts the dualisms identified by Maddux, offering 
the rhetor significantly more flexibility and space for human agency and enabling the 
connection with broader narratives that unify the disparate elements in American culture. 
This structure necessarily implicates all three of Gutterman’s major components 
of narrative: setting, identity, and interaction with other narratives. The implications of 
this structure for the setting of the narratives largely take place within the rhetorical 
construction of time. The narratives view the temporal canvas from different positions. In 
the American Narrative, the rhetor is situated in the present, looking to the known past of 
chronic time and the unknown future, reasoning from cyclical history to “learn the 
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lessons” of the past. In the Cosmic Narrative, the rhetor is effectively positioned at the 
end of time looking back to the beginning, with the whole of the narrative known, and 
reasoning from linear typology to see future events as “fulfilling” or “completing” past 
ones in kairotic fashion. By manipulating these two visions of time, rhetors can use the 
ambiguities created by the spaces between these narratives to situate historical events in 
cosmic time or cosmic events in historical time, in effect “baptizing” the events of history 
with cosmic and teleological significance, and “historicizing” the cosmic and 
metaphysical narratives created by eschatology by bringing them into the mundane, 
everyday, cyclical world.  
The implications for identity are closely linked to the implications for time, as a 
character’s identity in a closed, completed narrative is tied to his or her ultimate 
teleological destination. The two narratives set out two different loci for religious 
identity; in the Cosmic Narrative, it is only the individual who can make religious 
choices, and the consequences for those religious choices occur at the Last Judgment 
outside of ordinary space and time, while in the American Narrative, nations as well as 
individuals can make religious choices and experience the consequences for those 
choices in chronic history. The tension between these two visions of identity opens up a 
new space for human agency, enabling rhetors to reverse the natural tendency of 
premillennial eschatology to take a dim if not oppositional view to the political and 
cultural powers of this world and reconfigure a premillennialism that is supportive of 
certain formulations of political and cultural power in the service of the great cosmic war 
between good and evil.  
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Finally, the notion of collective religious identity suggests flexibility in the 
circumference of the identity formulation identified in the narrative as “us,” shifting 
between the protagonist as an embattled minority of “true” believers amidst a sea of 
nominal Christians, and the protagonist as a member of the “silent majority” of pro-
family Americans whose power over their country has been usurped by a minority of 
secular humanist elites. This creates the space for the last of Gutterman’s characteristics 
of narrative, the interaction with other narratives. How does an evangelical Protestant 
Christian approach Roman Catholic believers who do not share the Cosmic Narrative’s 
distrust of temporal authority? How could evangelical Christian leaders advocate for the 
election of Mitt Romney, whose Mormonism many of their theologies hold as a heresy at 
best and a dangerous cult at worst, or make common cause with Jewish leaders like Rabbi 
Daniel Lapin whom they believe to be ultimately hellbound? These barriers are 
overcome, I suggest, by appealing to the tension between determinism and choice in the 
Cosmic Narrative—emphasizing the evil of secular humanism as a unifying element 
between the Cosmic and American Narratives and the narratives of other religious 
traditions, and suggesting to Cosmic Narrative adherents that the salvation of America 
from a “pre-tribulation” state could have cosmic implications in delaying the coming 
Rapture and Tribulation beyond the audience’s lifetime, thus transforming the 
premillennial vision of decline and rupture into an effectively postmillennial vision of 
cyclical rebirth. 
Narrative Setting: Space and Time 
The question of narrative setting is almost entirely a question of time rather than 
space, as the major events of both narratives occur in roughly the same space. There are 
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only two major spatial difference between the settings of the American Narrative and the 
Cosmic Narrative. First, the Cosmic Narrative adds heaven and hell to the range of space 
in which the drama plays out. Cosmic Narrative rhetors are quick to emphasize that 
heaven and hell are literal places rather than symbolic or allegorical ones; LaHaye 
suggests that the biblical heaven—“the third heaven, or the throne of God”—is a physical 
space that is somehow separate from and encompassing the “stellar heaven, which 
contains the great galaxies that we view on a starry night.”9 At the same time, however, 
within the Cosmic Narrative, heaven and hell do not exist within ordinary space/time as 
places human beings could theoretically see or visit if they had a powerful enough 
telescope or a deep enough mineshaft; the narrative suggests that their literal reality will 
only become clear after the eschatological story is complete, when God separates 
humanity and populates heaven and hell with the saved and the damned. These realms 
thus function largely as temporal settings rather than spatial ones.  
The second major difference between the two narratives’ construction of space 
concerns the location’s role in the drama. For the American Narrative, unsurprisingly, the 
central location is the United States, with the rest of the world serving as a setting for the 
actions of human agents only insofar as those actions affect the United States. In the 
Cosmic Narrative, the action is centered in the Middle East, and particularly in two cities: 
Jerusalem and Babylon (which the narrative locates in or near Baghdad, Iraq), and the 
United States plays little or no role. That distinction in settings is much more significant; 
I will discuss that significance later on in this chapter. 
Aside from those differences, the Cosmic Narrative and the American Narrative 
share a spatial setting, limited to the planet earth (and very little beyond) as the canvas for 
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the unfolding story. Even in the places in the Cosmic Narrative where the whole of the 
cosmos should theoretically be part of the narrative—the creation of the universe in 
Genesis 1 and the end of time in Revelation—the action is largely restricted to Earth, 
rather than spread out over the whole of cosmic space. In the creation narrative, other 
celestial objects are created on the first day (the heavens) and the fourth day (the sun, 
moon, and stars). Even in the most clear and detailed of Christian Right eschatological 
visions (that of Left Behind coauthor Tim LaHaye), the Sun is the only relevant cosmic 
object other than the planet Earth (and the comets and asteroids bombarding it) during the 
Great Tribulation; the fate of the universe as a whole from the edge of the solar system to 
the most distant galaxies does not play a role in LaHaye’s eschatological narrative.  
The element of setting in which the American Narrative and Cosmic Narrative 
differ substantially is that of how they rhetorically construct time. The resonances and 
dissonances between the way time works in the American Narrative and the Cosmic 
Narrative function to create new elements of human agency and new spaces for human 
action within these narratives that would not have otherwise fit within each narrative’s 
own construction of time. 
In the American Narrative, time is functionally chronic in nature; even though 
some moments in time are given greater weight than others, time itself proceeds from 
beginning to end in a more or less linear fashion. The rhetor, situated in the present, does 
not know how the narrative will end; while the American nation’s spiritual and moral 
strength has reached its nadir either now or in the very recent past, American Christians 
still have the power to decide whether the present moment will be the first step in the 
recovery of the nation’s moral and spiritual strength, or another stage in the long (and 
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perhaps suddenly catastrophic) decline of the United States. Thus, the American 
Narrative utilizes the Burkean comic frame, building up time as historic, cyclical, and 
episodic; the purpose of the narrative is so that present-day Americans might learn the 
lessons of history, correct the nation’s grievous moral error, and transcend the sinfulness 
of the present age into a brighter future. 
In the Cosmic Narrative, time is functionally kairotic in nature; while the 
narratives of creation, redemption, and fulfillment are positioned as historical events, the 
only one of the three major points in the narrative that is positioned as part of the chronic 
timeline of history is the middle event of Jesus’s incarnation, crucifixion, and 
resurrection. The rhetor is situated, in essence, outside of time, in relating a divinely-
authored narrative that reads both past and future with the same amount of certainty; 
given that the whole of the narrative is essentially fixed in place, the role for human 
agency is limited to discovering that narrative at work in the present moment, and 
ensuring for oneself that the part one plays in the narrative is among the saved rather than 
the condemned. This emphasis on final condemnation or redemption is typical of the 
Burkean tragic frame, creating a model for time that is telic and linear. In reasoning 
typologically from the future backward, seeing present events as the fulfillment and 
completion of past events that gives meaning and purpose to the past, the narratives’ 
ultimate purpose is to persuade their audience to choose in that moment to give meaning 
to Christ’s sacrifice by becoming a Christian or deepening their faith. 
As the Cosmic and American Narratives interact and intersect, however, these 
rhetorical constructions of time become available to create new spaces for human action 
within the confines of each narrative. In the American Narrative, the history of the United 
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States is read kairotically and typologically; audiences are invited to see themselves in 
the role of the nation’s founders not as a form of historical comparison, but on the level 
of fulfilling the “type” of the founding generation, as a teleological completion of the 
work of God begun with the nation’s founders. But the more significant function of this 
blending of chronic and kairotic time is seen in the Cosmic Narrative, in which the 
flexibility of kairotic time creates the implication that human agency can alter the timing 
of the eschaton itself, by speeding or halting the conditions that are seen as prerequisites 
for the beginning of the final act of the cosmic drama.  
The spaces created for human agency effectively blend the actions prescribed in 
both narratives. The Cosmic Narrative’s call for Christians to be active in winning souls 
to Christ and deepening their own faith is transformed into forms of patriotic duty as well 
as religious obligation. But more significantly, the American Narrative’s suggestion that 
political and cultural activism to recover the “Christian consensus” of the American 
nation is given greater meaning. If the United States can experience a recovery of its 
spiritual and moral center and return to its role in world missions, this recovery could 
slow, halt, or even reverse the global decline that is a prerequisite for apocalypse, thus 
staving off the eschaton a little longer, perhaps even past the lifetimes of those now 
living—transforming the premillennial vision of continuous decline into an effectively 
postmillennial (if temporary) vision of recovery and renewal. 
Time in the American Narrative: Chronos 
In his groundbreaking work on nationalism, Benedict Anderson wrote that one of 
the most important effects of the modernity that gave rise to the contemporary notion of 
the nation as an “imagined community” was a change in the way time is perceived. 
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Borrowing from Walter Benjamin, Anderson argued that “what has come to take the 
place of the mediaeval conception of simultaneity-along-time is, to borrow again from 
Benjamin, an idea of ‘homogeneous, empty time,’ in which simultaneity is, as it were, 
transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal 
coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.”10 This is the kind of time that 
operates within the American Narrative, the chronos of the ticking watch and the 
Gregorian calendar. While some moments are clearly more important than others, there is 
no hint of a heilsgeschichte or “spiritual time” outside the bounds of ordinary time or 
“simultaneity-along-time.” 
Even the instances of divine intervention in the American Narrative are examples 
of what Anderson describes as “simultaneity […as] temporal coincidence,” naturalistic 
occurrences within the ordinary realm of space and time, rather than miracles that break 
the plane of that setting to bring about physically impossible phenomena. There is no fire 
from heaven, no water into wine, no curing the blind or raising the dead in the American 
Narrative. God chooses to work through “providence,” an extremely-improbable 
convergence of natural events: Washington avoids being shot in a pitched battle with 
American Indians during the French and Indian War,11 a miraculous snow enables 
artillery to be moved from Ticonderoga to Cambridge,12 or a thick fog enables 
Washington’s army to escape Manhattan without being detected by the British.13 They 
are miracles of divine providence either because the people involved in the events (like 
Washington) say they are, or because the rhetors relating the narrative say they are—not 
because they are undeniably supernatural acts. 
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Furthermore, every event in the narrative timeline has a fixed year and a date 
associated with it, from the beginning of the American story (Columbus’s landing in the 
West Indies) to the present. The only events in the American Narrative that occur prior to 
the landing of the Europeans on the American continent are the acts of naturalistic divine 
intervention that keep them from discovering the continent until the appointed time—
after the English Reformation, so that the North American continent would be populated 
by Protestants from Europe rather than Roman Catholics.14 The indigenous peoples who 
lived on the continent prior to the arrival of the Europeans function more as part of the 
landscape itself—at times allied with Satan to drive the Christian light off the continent,15 




In the chronological American Narrative, because cause precedes effect, 
predictions can be made based on the similarity of present historical circumstances to 
those in the past; this places the narrative in a frame of reference that emphasizes 
transcending sin as error and overcoming it. The narrative structure here is basically 
cyclical and episodic, in which “history repeats itself.” Those who understand history 
have a choice: they can learn from the mistakes of the past and avoid them, or they can 
fail to learn from the mistakes of the past and become themselves an illustration for 
future generations. 
There is an important additional element in this historical reasoning. In Chapter 2, 
I discussed the ways in which the American Narrative and Cosmic Narrative both base 
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their epistemologies on a transcendent and universal moral truth, which is proven through 
appeals to the historical narrative; the existence of other objective truths, such as 
scientific, mathematical, or logical truth, stems from the omnipotence and trustworthiness 
of God as expressed first and foremost through the existence of objective moral truth. 
The placement of moral truth at the foundation of the epistemological structure suggests 
that the lessons to be learned from the past are not primarily economic, political, or 
military in nature, but moral and spiritual ones. As Falwell writes: 
But the fact remains that at the root of America's problems today is the 
decay of our individual and national morals. This has resulted in the 
subsequent decadent state and instability of everything else in America—
including economics, politics, defense, etc. The choices we as Americans 
have made in moral and religious questions have determined the way 
America is going today.17 
The narrative of American history “proves” that nations that place God at their moral 
center enjoy prosperity and peace, while nations that do not place God at their moral 
center (like France during the French Revolution) ultimately suffer the consequences of 
their sin, whether those consequences be by intentional divine intervention or by the basic 
moral nature of the universe causing those nations’ collapse on their own.  
That is not to say that the American Narrative does not posit economic and 
political lessons to be learned from history; the enemy ideology of secular humanism is 
portrayed as socialist, democratic/despotic, and libertarian over against the capitalist, 
republican, and more authoritarian ideology that plays the role of hero in the American 
Narrative. However, the economic and political lessons stem from the moral lesson. 
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Secular humanism is socialist because it places humanity at the center of the universe 
rather than God, and thus does not trust God’s providence to provide for all of society 
through capitalism and charity. Secular humanism is democratic and despotic because it 
does not want to acknowledge that human beings have divinely-ordained rights as the 
republican outlook does. Secular humanist is libertarian because it does not acknowledge 
the absolute moral laws set down by God.  
An Uncertain End: The Jeremiad 
If the problem is moral, then the solution, too, is a moral one. This jeremiadic 
structure suggests that it will not be sufficient for American Christians to simply work for 
capitalism, republicanism, or more government authority over private morality; God and 
God’s absolute moral laws must be returned to the center of American life, which means 
that the American people must experience a form of spiritual revival and recommitment 
to God in order to recover their prosperity and peace and reduce or remove the danger 
that America will suffer the consequences of its decline into sin and depravity. The 
problems of the present era—wars and rumors of wars, crime and violence, social 
chaos—are a form of discipline from God, seeking to bring America to repentance for its 
sins and draw the nation back from its moral decay and into the blessings of God. Part of 
that solution is to make understanding of this jeremiadic structure a prerequisite for 
political office; leaders need to understand that they and the nation as a whole will be 
held to account for their actions. Barton suggests that American leaders need to 
understand (as the nation’s founders did) that “our political acts cause God to respond 
either as an ally or an adversary” and that “proposed laws and policies be judged with full 
cognizance of their spiritual implications.”18 This narrative structure is at the root of the 
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September 13, 2001 conversation between Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson from Chapter 
1 as well; God allowed the 9/11 attacks to happen and lifted his “hedge of protection” 
from America in order to warn the wayward nation that more chaos and more destruction 
would follow if the nation did not return to God and restore the “Christian consensus” to 
American culture. 
The choice left to America, then, is to choose which version of history will repeat 
itself, to choose which narrative path the nation will ultimately follow. If the “silent 
majority” of “pro-moral Americans” allows the secularist minority to continue to seize 
more and more power, and fails to assert itself in the form of national moral and spiritual 
revival, then America will finally suffer the fate of the godless revolutionary societies of 
France and Russia—chaos followed by authoritarianism. Schaeffer sets the tone for this 
historical procession in writing about the decline of absolute morality: “But we must 
notice that there is a second result of modern man's loss of meaning and values which is 
more ominous, and which many people do not see. This second result is that the elite will 
exist. Society cannot stand chaos. Some group or some person will fill the vacuum. An 
elite will offer us arbitrary absolutes, and who will stand in its way?"19 LaHaye also 
envisions the future without national revival:  
Until enough morally minded Americans understand what has taken place 
in the past few decades, the humanists will continue leading us toward the 
chaos of the French Revolution; after all, it was that same philosophy that 
destroyed France and paved the way for the dictator Napoleon Bonaparte. 
This time, the humanists hope to name their own dictator, who will 
create—out of the ashes of our pro-moral republic—a humanist utopia: an 
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atheistic, socialistic, amoral humanist society for America and the rest of 
the world.20 
In this pessimistic, dystopian future, the anarchy of moral chaos combines with external 
threats to the nation’s security, which grow in strength due to secular humanists’ trust in 
toothless world organizations like the United Nations and God’s removal of divine 
protection from America, to create a national demand for greater social order, even at the 
cost of Americans’ liberties—which a tyrannical authoritarian dictator will be all too 
happy to provide. The future in this scenario is dependent on history as a cycle, in which 
the pattern of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes arising from the ashes of the social 
chaos that results from the loss of absolute morality is repeated in America. 
The other choice set out in the jeremiad is to restore the “Christian consensus”—
and this, too, is set up as a cyclical historical parallel, with the English Wesleyan revivals 
and with the Great Awakenings—particularly the first Great Awakening, in the decades 
just prior to the American Revolution—set out as the historical touchstones for the 
nation’s revival and return to prosperity and blessing. Notably, the historical effects of 
the Great Awakening are presented as both natural and supernatural. LaHaye cites “many 
historians” in writing that the Great Awakening “provided the colonists with the mental 
and moral toughness to declare their independence from England and endure the rigors of 
the Revolutionary War, which lasted for seven long years. That victory was attributed by 
many to 'the strong hand of Providence'—hardly the reaction of a nation of deists and 
secularists.”21 Marshall and Manuel attribute even greater historic effect to the Great 
Awakening revivals, suggesting that “the most important factor” resulting from the 
revivals was not spiritual conversion, but rather their political and practical effects in 
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emphasizing “the reformation of society by the Spirit of Christ, operating through the 
newly regenerate.”22 
The non-supernatural effects (renewal of spirit and community values) of the past 
Great Awakening—and, by implication, of the potential “Great Awakening IV”23 that 
American Christians can bring about with God’s help—augments God’s supernatural 
desire to “hear from heaven and heal our land” in the revival.24 The return of American 
morality and social reform through the national unity, renewal of spirit, and social reform 
sparked by national revival will correspond with what Marshall and Manuel write “was 
frequently proven” through early American history: “that when people began to earnestly 
repent, what followed was the return of God's grace.”25 As the people draw closer to God 
by renewing the national spiritual life and restoring the Christian consensus, so too will 
God respond with increased blessing and increased protection for the nation in its mission 
to the world. 
However, whichever choice America makes—whether or not the revival takes 
place and the nation’s spiritual and moral health is restored—the consequences for the 
nation are set to play out within chronological history rather than in a future 
eschatological judgment. Individuals may be judged at God’s throne for what they did or 
did not do in relation to America’s moral decline and potential revival, but for the nation 
as a whole, “rewards and punishments for nations” will be “in this world rather than the 
next.”26 The future in the American Narrative is the same as the past: the ongoing 
chronological tick of historic time, the rise and fall of nations, and history proving time 
and time again that those nations that place God’s moral law at their center will prosper 
and be free, while those that do not place God’s moral law at their center will ultimately 
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crumble and fade. Though the threat faced by the United States is an existential one, it is 
existential only for the United States; should America continue to experience moral and 
spiritual decline, other places, such as the Korean Peninsula27 or the former Soviet 
Union,28 could experience God’s blessing and the resultant revival in order to fill the gap. 
Time in the Cosmic Narrative: Kairos 
While the present-day portion of the Cosmic Narrative does exist within temporal 
chronology, the most important events of the narrative occur outside of the chronic time 
of history and science—and events within the chronological timeline are viewed from a 
kairotic standpoint outside of time that views history from the future backward, rather 
than from a chronic standpoint viewing history from the past forward. The kairotic view 
of time does not operate in place of chronic time, but rather brings meaning and structure 
to the otherwise seemingly accidental march of chronic history. The reason that the 
important events of the narrative exist outside our understanding of chronic time is 
primarily epistemological, rather than ontological. We do not know the exact date of 
Creation nor how long Adam and Eve spent in Eden prior to the Fall, and we do not 
know the date of the Rapture and the beginning of the End Times not because these are 
indeterminate, but because the Author of the Cosmic Narrative has chosen not to reveal 
them to the human players in the great drama of the universe. 
The narrative of the creation of the world is understood as a real, historic event—
but in effect, for purposes of the narrative, this event occurs outside the space and time of 
our history. The Creation Museum does indicate approximate dates for the creation of the 
world (circa 4004 BCE) and the global flood (circa 2348 BCE).29 However, the former 
date in particular still exists effectively outside of ordinary time, as the literalist creation 
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narrative suggests that after God created the world and created the Garden of Eden for 
Adam and Eve to live in, they resided there for an unspecified period of time before 
Adam and Eve were tempted by the serpent and fell by eating the fruit of the Knowledge 
of Good and Evil. During that time, the Creation Museum indicates that there was “no 
aging in the universe”; in the wake of the Fall, not only humanity but the universe as a 
whole “began aging.”30 If, prior to the Fall, the universe existed in a static state, then the 
narrative of the Fall effectively represents the beginning of chronic time itself. The 
Creation Museum also argues that the Noahic Flood, coming about 1,800 years later, 
reconfigured the continents of the world into their present configuration, effectively 
rupturing the antediluvian world both spatially and temporally from chronic history.31 
Further, the scientific support provided by “creation science” for the Cosmic 
Narrative’s doctrine of creation is presented only as a sort of argumentative bolster, rather 
than as convincing and sufficient in and of itself. The Creation Museum is explicit on the 
point that Biblical literalism, rather than scientific inquiry, is the starting point for their 
assumptions about the universe, including the dates of creation;32 so, too, LaHaye writes 
that “accepting the creation of man by the direct act of God has always been a matter of 
faith in the revelation of God.”33 Nowhere in the Cosmic Narrative is it suggested that 
one might proceed from the scientific evidence for creation to faith in the authority of the 
Bible, from reasoning the reality of creation in chronic time to believing in the narrative 
purpose and function of creation in kairotic time. Rather, the narrative of personal 
salvation always proceeds from faith in an inerrant Scripture and in God’s purpose in 
creation—kairotic time—to the reasoned acceptance of creation—still primarily a moral 
and spiritual phenomenon—as a scientific explanation for the world’s origins in chronic 
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time. The evidence for creation provided within the chronic spheres of science and 
history only serves to demonstrate the basic moral, spiritual, kairotic truth of the 
narratives. 
Similarly, at the other end of the Cosmic Narrative, the narrative posits that it will 
be impossible to place the End Times within chronological time until they commence 
with the Rapture. On multiple instances, LaHaye, Falwell, and others cite Jesus’s warning 
to his disciples against predicting the date of eschaton: “About that day or hour no one 
knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.”34 While Cosmic 
Narrative rhetors speculate that the time of the Rapture could be imminent based on 
world events, they do not set a specific date, month, or year. Falwell even suggests that if 
someone did predict the “correct” date for the Rapture, God would change the date so 
that he or she would be wrong:  
Not long ago, Edgar R. Whisenant wrote a book, 88 Reasons Why the 
Rapture Will Be in 1988, in which September 7, 1988, was chosen as the 
date of the Rapture. It did not happen. If Whisenant had been right, the 
Lord would have changed the date so that he would not have been right.35 
The Rapture and the beginning of the End Times are thus effectively outside of time, 
representing not continuity with the chronological timescale of history, but an effective 
rupture with history and a true end to the historical narrative. Though the events of the 
premillennial dispensational eschatology do themselves have fixed lengths—for example, 
exactly seven years of tribulation from the Rapture to the “Glorious Appearing” of Christ 
to commence the battle of Armageddon and inaugurate the millennium, subdivided into 
fixed periods for each of God’s judgments against the earth—their location within the 
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historical chronology is not yet known to us as we continue to play our parts in the 
Cosmic Narrative. 
A Kairotic and Narrative Future 
The Cosmic Narrative’s view of time is fundamentally linear in nature; while 
cyclical patterns do occur, they occur within the context of a historical narrative that is 
heading for a final consummation. Evangelical theologian Stanley Grenz suggests that the 
origins of this outlook in ancient Israel were the beginning of a truly historical 
consciousness: “God directed Israel to view life in a different manner. Events did not 
merely follow a repeatable pattern. Rather, each was a unique occurrence, and together 
these events were a trajectory which had a beginning and would have an end. Hence, 
occurrences formed a history—a narrative.”36 However, he suggests, secular historians 
removed God from the center of this linear narrative and replaced God with humanity, 
leading to linear narratives of human progress or regress.37 This, he suggests, formed the 
basis of the chronic history from which the contemporary historical narrative derives—
including the American Narrative. 
In place of a purely chronic timescale of history, the Cosmic Narrative utilizes a 
kairotic view of time—in which chronic time continues only because of a “pause” in 
another reckoning of time. In the Old Testament book of Daniel, the prophet/seer 
envisions that the world will end after seventy more “weeks” of years, or 490 years. 
Dispensational theologians calculate that the book of Daniel was written 483 years—
sixty-nine “weeks” of years—prior to the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, positing 
that everything that has occurred since Christ takes place in “a gap or parenthesis” 
between the sixty-ninth and seventieth week.38 Using a sports analogy, Falwell calls this 
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a “divine ‘time out’” during which “God has stepped in and stopped the clock of 
prophecy at Calvary”39; this “time out” will end soon, at which point the seventieth week 
of Daniel (including the tribulation, etc.) will commence apace. 
Dale L. Sullivan draws on the New Testament as well as on theologians from the 
modern era (particularly Paul Tillich) to present a conception of kairos which signifies 
“loaded time”—moments in which the divine breaks through into the temporal world.40 
He suggests that the New Testament in particular emphasizes two of these kairotic “great 
fulfillments”: the first advent of Christ in first-century Palestine, and the second advent of 
Christ in the eschaton at the end of time itself.41 Similarly, Philip Sipiora links New 
Testament references to kairos to eschatological vision, suggesting that the eschatological 
kairos represents a final rupture in chronic time: 
Time, as chronos, proceeds linearly until He authorizes the coming of the 
ultimate kairic moment, the time of judgment. There is possibly also an 
ethical dimension to this movement, in that ‘final justice’ is deferred until 
the kairic moment. One’s ultimate fate becomes sealed forever only when 
the time is appropriate for judgment. The notion of ‘God’s time’ adds an 
element of mystery and uncertainty into the calculus of human behavior 
and action, particularly as it refers to God’s ultimate judgment of human 
behavior.42 
Richard Benjamin Crosby expands further on the work of Sullivan and Sipiora to suggest 
kairos as “a means of making the invisible visible,” with the end purpose not of 
persuading one’s auditors through a rational or emotional process (the traditional aims of 
rhetoric) but rather of revealing the divine itself.43 This, he suggests, is a fundamental 
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difference between “religionists” and secular rhetors to the affairs of the temporal and 
political world:  
Religionists simply exist within a different world of time and space, and 
they are willing to make decisions based on a standard other than political 
reason. […] Kairos allows them [the religious] to engage and influence 
politics through revelation and inspiration. […] Kairos is a tool they can 
use to engage and, ultimately, circumscribe the political world. Indeed, it 
defines the relationship between the divine and the political.44 
In other words, the invocation of the divine kairos transforms the rhetorical act into a 
form of religious experience, placing the immediate and temporal experience in the space 
of a divine narrative about the universe. In a later article, Crosby also challenges the 
traditional view of kairos as ephemeral and contingent, suggesting that when spatial 
settings are added to the equation, kairos “may also be understood as an eternal force 
essential to particular spaces and, by extension, spatially induced consciousness.”45  
Notably, when the above scholars discuss theological notions of kairos in the 
post-New Testament era, they refer to “liberal” modernist theologians like Paul Tillich, 
Rudolf Otto, or Edwyn Bevan. While they also draw on the New Testament’s uses of 
kairos, in discussing the implications of kairos for rhetoric, they appeal to the God-
terminology of liberal theology—of God as the indescribable experience of the 
“numinous,” for example.46 This presupposes a separation between kairotic time and 
chronic time; for example, in the Sipiora quotation above, chronic time must end before 
the kairotic moment of the eschaton.  
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In other words, these contemporary rhetorical-critical treatments seem to assume 
that the difference between religious and irreligious worldviews is one of perspective or 
interpretation—in Crosby’s words, “a different world of time and space.”47 As Sullivan 
writes: 
Aletheiac rhetoric, conversely, cannot be a techne; still it claims to unveil 
the truth. Even so, it admits that truth, or the unveiled vision, can be 
resisted and that the most we can hope for is the auditor’s decision to 
believe. Because it always requires a leap of faith, no matter how small or 
large, aletheiac rhetoric does not demand submission as does scientific 
demonstration. […] This rhetoric is not simply emotional; its aim is not 
lower than the mind; rather it is suprarational rhetoric that goes beyond the 
rational capacity to confront an individual's being with the radiance of 
Being.48 
The presumption here seems still to be that the experience of kairos is perspective-
dependent, ephemeral, and subjective—an individual temporal expression of what the 
liberal theologians describe as the sublime or the numinous, something indescribable and 
irreducible, completely outside of the lived reality of everyday life. Even as Crosby 
suggests that the National Cathedral represents an effort to create a “sacralized space” in 
which the “revelatory opening, or aperture” of kairos “can be sustained indefinitely,”49 
the experience of that space is still ephemeral; the space is one of the “construction and 
maintenance” of kairos, which is nevertheless still experienced in specific moments (such 
as George W. Bush’s speech at a prayer service there on September 14, 2001).50 Kairos is 
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a breaking-in to chronos, a rupture in the everyday lived experience of an individual or 
group. 
Unity of Chronos and Kairos in the Cosmic Narrative 
Importantly, in the Cosmic Narrative, kairos is not separate from chronos. Divine 
kairotic time is not an imposition onto chronic time, as if the two could be separated and 
understood as independent phenomena. Rather, kairos truly is the imposition of the 
divine presence into the temporal world, in ways that place those moments securely 
within—rather than separate from—chronic time. Christ’s resurrection is simultaneously 
both an act of divine revelation in which the supernatural and the temporal converge in a 
unique way, and a historical phenomenon that is no less real, no less historical, no less 
objective than the assassination of Caesar in 44 BCE.  
This unity between kairos and chronos is fundamentally different from the 
modernist liberal theological attempt (by Bultmann and others) to read the biblical 
narrative as pure heilsgeschichte, a form of spiritualized and kairotic “salvation history” 
that has no relationship to the historie of chronos. The modernist liberal approach of 
heilsgeschichte would read the Bible as a set of allegories or unreliable narratives which 
are valuable despite their historical and scientific inaccuracy because they point to deeper 
theological or spiritual truths. The Cosmic Narrative holds that truth is absolute and 
inseparable, rooted in the authority and trustworthiness of God; if the Bible’s claims 
about history and science are not reliable, then its claims about salvation are also not 
reliable. Schaeffer, for example, strongly criticizes Karl Barth for his “theological form 
of existentialism” which moved theological thought “into the area of non-reason” by 
suggesting that the Bible made “mistakes” in history or science.51 If God is God, and if 
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the Bible is God’s most reliable form of special revelation, then God’s trustworthiness 
must be reflected both in those things that can only be understood by faith (such as 
salvation) and in those things that can be understood through human reason. 
It is the Cosmic Narrative’s historicity, its retellers say, that makes it unique; 
while other religions presume this separation between divine and temporal experience, 
Christianity purports to show God’s actions in objective, provable history, as the 
following quotations illustrate: 
Indeed, if we are willing to forget our presuppositions and examine the 
evidence objectively, the resurrection of Christ becomes something which 
is obviously true. It has been examined by some of the best authorities in 
the world—authorities most qualified to make such an examination and to 
do it painstakingly.52 
Islam is a religion that has no real evidence to support it, whereas 
Christianity has the evidence of Jesus Christ, the evidence of His miracles, 
the evidence of His perfect life, and most importantly, the evidence of His 
resurrection from the dead. We have incredible evidence, more so than we 
have of any event in ancient history, historians have told us.53 
To the extent that elements of the Cosmic Narrative do not fit into the rational, chronic 
time frame, it is not because of a fundamental incompatibility between the narrative’s 
temporal setting and chronic time. The retellers of the Cosmic Narrative are quick to 
point out that Jesus says that nobody knows the day or the hour except for his Father in 
heaven; it is because we occupy a place within the narrative, because we are still on the 
stage of the drama as it plays out, that we do not know when it will end. To the Author of 
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the narrative, chronos and kairos are one and the same; once believers join God in the 
heavenly kingdom, they too will understand how everything fit together to fulfill God’s 
plans for the universe. The chronological problem is epistemological—not ontological. 
Typological and Telic Reasoning 
As the Cosmic Narrative has been written by a God who is fundamentally outside 
time, then, the form of reasoning employed within the Cosmic Narrative is not simply 
read from the past forward seeking patterns of cause and effect; rather, it is read 
typologically from the present backward, seeing patterns of fulfillment and completion. 
Present (and future) events give meaning and significance to past events—or, as the 
Liberty Bible Commentary puts it, “the Old Testament is revealed in the New, while the 
New is concealed in the Old.”54 This shifts the context for the exegetical practice of 
finding parallels between biblical and present-day situations. If one sees the Bible 
narratives as both works of literature (with attendant authorial practices like 
foreshadowing, metaphor, etc.) and historical fact, then the use of such narratives as an 
interpretive lens for the contemporary world carries with it the implication that we 
ourselves are part of the same story, part of a continuity of narrative that stretches from 
the historical facts of the Bible to the age of the church and the present historical context, 
all the way through to the end of time itself.  
Susan Friend Harding describes typology as a structure for interpreting the 
narratives of Scripture and history in which “earlier events prefigure later events, and 
later events complete, or fulfill, earlier, incomplete events.”55 This interpretive 
framework enables rhetors to draw implicit connections between juxtaposed stories. 
Harding illustrates typology by relating Christian pastor Marvin Campbell’s attempt to 
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convert her, in which Campbell juxtaposed his story of his accidentally killing his own 
son in a construction accident with the tales of Abraham’s near-sacrifice of Isaac in 
Genesis 22 and the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus in the Gospels. In the gaps 
between the narratives, Harding suggests, they give meaning to one another; Isaac is a 
“type” of Jesus, who is in turn a type of Campbell’s own son. The latter narratives 
“fulfill” or “complete” the former, making all of the narratives function as interpretive 
lenses on one another and casting the present moment in which Harding had to decide 
whether or not to be converted to Christianity in a similarly interpretive frame, with the 
implication that if Harding decided in that moment to follow Jesus, her decision would 
fulfill not only the death and resurrection of Jesus, but the death of the pastor’s son as 
well: 
But like their stories, his too was incomplete. It invoked a haunting sense 
of something missing. Why did Campbell’s son die? Or, more precisely 
given the typological sequence, for whom did Campbell’s son die? The 
answer, of course, had already been provided as well by the previous 
stories. He died for me. The Reverend Campbell sacrificed his son, 
narratively speaking, for me.56 
The very real emotional and narrative stakes for Harding’s decision in the moment, and 
the smooth connection between the kairotic/chronic time of biblical narrative, the 
kairotic/chronic time of Campbell’s own personal narrative, and the kairotic/chronic 
present provide a clear illustration that typology is not an interpretive framework in a 
critic’s sense of the word, in which the object of interpretation is understood as a literary 
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or creative work that is separate from (if dependent on) the recalcitrance of the “reality” 
of history.  
It is important to understand that in a worldview defined by a unity of biblical 
narrative as narrative and historical fact, when a rhetor draws typological parallels 
between biblical and present-day scenarios, that linkage is not just literary-critical, 
symbolic, or metaphorical. As Crapanzano puts it, for those who hold this perspective, it 
“provides not just a model for understanding the chain of events that we come to call 
history, but it actually modulates the perception of the events and their concatenations.”57 
In this hermeneutics of historical interpretation, the whole of history as we experience it 
from day to day is a tale that has already been written, a story by and about God. The 
history presented in the text of the Bible differs only from the history that has transpired 
since the last book of the New Testament was written only insofar as the former is an 
absolutely authoritative and true source, whereas our knowledge of the latter is limited by 
the historical evidence we have.58  
In other words, in this view, the march of history is not a series of coincidences, 
random occurrences, or even expressions of “pure” human will; it is a literary narrative in 
which present-day humans as well as past ones are living out events that occur within the 
temporal range of the Scriptural narrative, even if the narrative itself elides the interval 
between the second century of the Common Era and the beginning of the End Times. If 
we are all part of the Scriptural narrative, then the literary qualities of that narrative are 
also applicable to postbiblical history; thus, history itself is a work of literature, one 
written by a divine hand and revealed to us in the present in partial, fragmentary form 
through Scripture, but in the future in its completed and fulfilled form. Therefore, the 
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tools of literary hermeneutics and interpretation can be applied not only to the biblical 
narrative but also to the narratives of one’s own life, of one’s church, one’s community—
and one’s nation.  
In other words, the Cosmic Narrative invokes kairos as an expression of what 
Leff describes (from Eliade) as “sacred time”—but not, as Leff suggests, as “an 
interruption in our normal sense of temporality.”59 This view of time goes beyond even 
Sipiora’s interpretation of New Testament usages of kairos, in which “the Christian, 
always and already, faces eschatological choices in the decisions of daily life.”60 Rather, 
it is incorporated into and unified with the flow of the chronic in such a way as to imbue 
history with a sense of the literary and dramatic not as a symbolic or metaphorical lens 
overlaid on the “raw material” of historical fact, but as a structure and an order that is 
every bit as real and objective as the historical events themselves. Auditors are invited to 
see their lives as fractal microcosms of the structure of history—as part of a great and 
constructed narrative, a literary masterpiece with a divine author, in which justice is 
ultimately assured.  
The function of kairos in the context of the contemporary Cosmic Narrative is 
thus the opposite of what Sipiora (correctly) interprets as the kairotic vision of the New 
Testament; where Sipiora sees the rupture of the kairotic final judgment as something 
which “adds an element of mystery and uncertainty into the calculus of human behavior 
and action, particularly as it refers to God’s ultimate judgment of human behavior,”61 in 
the context of the Cosmic Narrative it functions as a form of what the old hymnal might 
call “blessed assurance.” Because the story has already been written, its ending is known 
to all who have eyes to see and ears to hear; the wicked will receive their just desserts, 
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and those who have remained faithful to God will receive rewards beyond their wildest 
imaginings. 
As discussed previously, one of the factors that unifies the American and Cosmic 
Narratives is the idea that reality as a whole is undergirded by divine moral authority as 
expressed through Scripture, that we are onstage players in the great drama of the cosmos 
authored by God and played out in real time. This is a framework for interpreting reality 
itself, an expression of what Harding describes as “a oneness within the divine plan” in 
which “there is no distinction between biblical and historical stories.”62 History itself as 
well as each person’s individual story is a narrative with an author; as such, the 
hermeneutical tools that collapse and reconfigure time within literary narratives are also 
available to collapse and reconfigure time within life itself, even if, as participants in the 
narrative rather than its author, we are unable to completely understand the process. 
Interactions between Temporal Frameworks 
The resonances and dissonances between these alternative views of time—one 
looking for historical cycles from the past forward, the other looking for a prophetic telos 
from the present backward—function in transformative ways to refigure the settings for 
both narratives. The American Narrative is read as history and as literature, with a 
kairotic and typological perspective added to the more traditional reading of history. The 
tendency to read present history in terms of the literal fulfillment of biblical prophecies 
and types adds a new dimension to the traditional American jeremiad, lending prophetic 
and typological qualities to the nation’s founders and their actions and reading them as 
heroes in new books of the Bible—books which have already been written by God, but 
which will not be shared with humanity until the story has reached its conclusion. This in 
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turn confers additional meaning on traditional conservative tropes: disinheritance and 
original intent. 
Perhaps more significant, though, are the ramifications for the American 
Narrative on the Cosmic Narrative. Read in the light of the American Narrative’s 
jeremiad, the tragic and deterministic qualities of the Cosmic Narrative are refigured into 
a more flexible and malleable shape, creating new spaces in which it is implied that 
human agency—and particularly American Christians’ agency—can alter the kairotic 
timing of the eschaton, by affecting the historical conditions presented in the Cosmic 
Narrative as prerequisites for the Rapture. 
Typology and Prophecy in the American Narrative 
As Sacvan Bercovitch outlines, the use of typology is not a new phenomenon in 
Americans’ rhetoric about themselves; the Puritans and their New England successors 
through the Great Awakening made extensive use of typology as a hermeneutic approach 
as they sought to define their identity and mission in the New World. The Puritan form of 
the jeremiad cast the colonists in the role of the “New Israel,” who were brought by God 
out of England to the North American continent to fulfill a special and crucial role in the 
redemptive history of the world—a vision in which they “proclaim[ed] the colony to be 
the fulfillment of the biblical types, like the saint made perfect in Christ.”63 Bercovitch 
emphasizes that the New England Puritans envisioned their relationship with the old 
Israel as a “total identification—literal, spiritual, and figural,”64 in which the Puritans 
“could claim all the ancient prerogatives”65 and claim that the Bible’s promises of 
blessing for the people of Israel applied equally to the New England community. This 
was a vision grounded in the notion that the literary structure of the Bible was 
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indistinguishable from the narrative of history itself, a worldview which “unite[d] 
allegory and chronicle in the framework of the work of redemption.”66 
This biblically-based typology was lost, Bercovitch writes, as the English colonies 
in North America gained a sense of collective identity; where once the Puritans’ jeremiad 
had laid out a narrowly sectarian definition of the Puritan community, now “the meaning 
of Protestant identity became increasingly vague; typology took on the hazy significance 
of metaphor, image, and symbol; what passed for the divine plan lost its strict grounding 
in Scripture; ‘providence’ itself was shaken loose from its religious framework to become 
part of the belief in human progress.”67 While the American jeremiads that emerged still 
envisioned America as playing a crucial role in redemptive history, the form of the 
narrative shifted away from a story about the unfolding of the divine plan in which 
America was a New Israel chosen to fulfill the Bible’s vision for redemption, to a story 
about human progress in which American national symbology itself was “invested […] 
with the attributes of the sacred.”68 Thus, while the theme of the American nation as 
uniquely blessed and provided for by the divine to fulfill a holy mission remains, the role 
of the typological—in which history itself is imbued with literary structure, and in which 
the present is seen as fulfilling the past in a very real way—has been replaced in 
American rhetoric with hermeneutical formations that separate meaning and purpose 
from reality. 
The Cosmic Narrative and its kairotic hermeneutic of time, though, invites a more 
explicit and literal reading of typology back into the American Narrative, imbuing it with 
the idea of (as Bercovitch puts it) “the American experience […as] a new, last book of 
Scripture.”69 This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in Marshall and Manuel’s 
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evangelical reading of early American history, The Light and the Glory, in which they 
extol the Puritans as the ideal community—and in the process of praising the Puritans’ 
approach to Scripture, covenant, and community more generally, specifically single out 
their hermeneutic of typology: 
The Pilgrims and Puritans actually referred to themselves as God’s New 
Israel. But it wasn't that they thought they (and the Christian Church) had 
replaced Israel. We would discover that they used the Church’s traditional 
method of interpreting the Old Testament: typology. This meant that they 
saw ‘types’ of New Testament events or persons in the Old Testament. [...] 
America's early Christian settlers, then, used typology to interpret God's 
dealings in their own lives. They felt that certain passages in the Bible, 
originally addressed to Israel, also applied to them…70 
Marshall and Manuel endorse the Puritans’ vision of themselves as a type of Israel, 
calling the Puritan experience God’s “most significant attempt since ancient Israel to 
create a ‘New Israel’ of people living in obedience to biblical principles, through faith in 
Jesus Christ.”71 Further, they continually reinforce the notion that the covenant made by 
the Puritans with God remains in effect to this day, drawing a clear line from ancient 
Israel, to the Puritans, to the Founders, to the present in which each fulfills and completes 
the work of those who came before: 
In 1775 when the U.S. Marine Corps was founded, the recruiting slogan 
stated that it was seeking ‘a few good men.’ That is essentially what God 
said to Gideon in ancient Israel, when He reduced his army from thirty-
two thousand to three hundred. And it was what He seemed to be saying 
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three and a half centuries ago, as He began to gather those who were 
willing to give up everything for His sake in order to dwell in His ‘New 
Israel.’ How much of the grace that continues to cover this country today 
and how many of the incredible blessings that have been poured out upon 
this land are a direct result of their obedience and willingness to die to 
self?72 
This is reminiscent of Susan Friend Harding’s illustration of typology; just as Harding’s 
potential conversion would have given meaning to the death of the preacher’s son, the 
near-sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham, and the death of Christ, so too would Americans 
returning to the covenant made by the Puritans with God give meaning to the sacrifices 
and obedience of the Puritans, the U.S. Marines of the founding generation, and Gideon’s 
army in ancient Israel. Time flows in both directions as part of God’s plan; the present 
does not just repeat the past, but fulfills it as well. The fact that the Puritans drew 
inspiration from the biblical tale of Nehemiah for their own experiences of rebuilding a 
new Jerusalem out of exile was no accident; part of God’s purpose in guiding 
Nehemiah’s experience and in making it part of God’s special revelation to God’s people 
was for precisely that situation. So, too, is it no accident if present-day Christians draw 
inspiration from the Puritans’ struggles, and from the Puritans’ own inspiration in 
Nehemiah; that, too, was part of the divine purpose in bringing the Puritans to the North 
American continent, to inspire Christians of the present. Because God knows the future 
and sees the fulfillment of every story from the earliest stages, God has arranged human 
history as a writer arranges a well-plotted novel, so that all of the pieces fit together. 
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Because nothing in history is an accident, the American founders are read not 
only as historically admirable figures, but also as typological ones. To the extent that 
their words or actions inspire or are reflected in the words and actions of contemporary 
Americans, that inspiration or reflection only serves to reinforce the relationship between 
prefigurement and fulfillment, thus bolstering the idea that American history, like the 
history of the cosmos as a whole, is not related merely by cause and effect from the past 
forward. Rather, American history is a complete story in which things occurring in the 
present and future illuminate and fulfill the purposes of the divine author in the past. 
This perspective confers new meaning on the trope of disinheritance that runs 
throughout traditional conservative narratives about America as well as through the 
Christian Right’s American Narrative. Traditionally, the trope of disinheritance has been 
used by conservative voices in American politics to argue against attempts to expand the 
body politic and extend civil or citizenship rights to those who traditionally were out of 
power. Virtually every effort by oppressed peoples to decenter wealthy white 
heterosexual men of northern and western European descent from power in the American 
body politic—such as the expansion of immigration, feminism, the African-American 
and Latino civil rights movements, organized labor, and the LGBT liberation 
movement—has been met by arguments that the people struggling for equality in 
America did not truly understand the values and ideas upon which the country was built. 
In effect, these movements’ opponents argued, the new element would displace the true 
Americans from their rightful role as the heirs to the prosperity and freedom left to them 
by those generations that came before. 
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The American Narrative’s portrayal of the founding generation as Christian 
makes the religious element to this trope (which has generally been present to a greater or 
lesser degree) much more explicit. The values passed down by the nation’s founders owe 
more to the Puritans than to Virginian Enlightenment liberals, and are thus primarily 
religious in origin; the nation’s true heirs are not those who merely share the principles of 
self-control, hard work, risk-taking, and freedom, but specifically those who continue to 
hold to, as LaHaye titles one of his books, the “faith of our founding fathers.”73 It is they 
from whom the nation has been taken, he writes, and they who must “wrest control of this 
nation from the hands of the secularizers and place it back into the hands of those who 
founded this nation, citizens who had a personal and abiding faith in the God of the 
Bible.”74 Similarly, Whitehead complains that the American legal system has over time 
undergone a transition in which Christianity has fallen “from a preferred position within 
the religion clauses” and been “relegated to the level of all other systems of belief—and 
of unbelief.”75 The charge to Christians within the American Narrative is not to take or 
claim national institutions, but to retake or reclaim these institutions and restore them to 
the Christian basis from which they purportedly originated. 
When the nation’s forebears are understood not simply as historical examples, 
however, but as types in a prophetic structure of prefigurement and fulfillment, this trope 
takes on new meaning. Not only is the new element displacing “traditional” Americans  
from their place as the rightful heirs to the values and prosperity of the nation’s founders; 
they are also pulling the nation away from the intentions of those founders, and thus, as 
Falwell writes, from fulfilling God’s purposes in founding the nation: 
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America must not turn away from the God who established her and who 
blessed her. It is time for Americans to come back to the faith of our 
fathers, to the Bible of our fathers, and to the biblical principles that our 
fathers used as a premise for this nation’s establishment. We must come 
back lovingly but firmly, and establish as our priorities once again those 
priorities that are God’s priorities. Only then will we become important to 
God, and only then will we once again know the great blessings of the 
Power that has made and preserved us as a nation!76 
Insofar as the “secular humanists” have removed America from “the God who established 
her and who blessed her,” they are thwarting God’s intention to fulfill “God’s priorities” 
through the nation, with the result that America is no longer “important to God” and 
removed from God’s blessings. Kennedy and Newcombe also touch on the theme of 
prefigurement and fulfillment when writing that American Christians “owe it to our 
forefathers who sacrificed so much to establish this nation on godly principles to gain 
back this lost territory.”77 In retaking the nation, Christians add meaning and value to the 
work of the founders, serving as antitype to the founders’ type. 
The Cosmic Narrative’s temporal perspective makes it clear that the story of 
America, like all of history, was written by a divine author outside of time. Thus, the 
characters in the story of American history, like the characters in a novel, are not fully 
aware of the ultimate purposes of the author, but fulfill the author’s purposes nonetheless 
in speaking to the future of the story without realizing it. Thus, the most significant 
characters in the American story—the Puritan leaders, the founding generation, the 
religious leaders of the First and Second Great Awakenings—are positioned as prophets 
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whose words and actions prefigure and can be fulfilled by the contemporary generation. 
Even if they were not aware of the significance and prophetic nature of their words and 
actions (and how could they have been?), because they played significant parts of God’s 
plan for America, they also served on some level as amanuenses for God, divine channels 
used by God to present God’s own message for the benefit of the present generation.  
Positioning the American founders as prophets who were speaking to future 
generations as well as their own puts a new spin on the traditional conservative 
interpretive approach of “original intent.” Proponents of this interpretive framework 
argue that all texts have a “true” meaning, and that this meaning resides not in the text 
alone, nor in a form of synthesis between interpreter and text or text and context, but 
rather in the meaning intended by the text’s author(s), as determined by other statements 
by or about the author about that text. As Vincent Crapanzano points out, this interpretive 
framework lies at the heart of contemporary conservative legal thinking, particularly as 
regards the U.S. Constitution; to the extent that the intentions of the American founders 
for a particular section or amendment can be determined from other texts (such as the 
Federalist Papers, debates at the Constitutional Convention or in Congress, or personal 
letters), this perspective suggests that those intentions should bind the meaning of the 
passage in question.78 
As Crapanzano notes, the originalist model in law is “a fully secular stance, which 
stresses correct methodology and ignores the condition of the interpreter”; in contrast, the 
other subject of Crapanzano’s study on literalism, fundamentalist Christians, “believe that 
correct interpretation depends on the moral and spiritual condition of the interpreter.”79 
This interpretive approach, which suggests that special revelation can only be truly 
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understood by those whose relationship with Jesus gives them “ears to hear,” has 
resonance in both the Cosmic Narrative and the American Narrative. The kairotic 
perspective lends this resonance additional spiritual significance; if the American 
prophets are part of the divine plan in speaking to the present generation as well as their 
own, then their words and deeds are, at least on some level, a form of special revelation 
from God. As such, the true meaning for the contemporary world of those words and 
deeds can only be understood fully by those whose spiritual identity grants them “ears to 
hear.” Like Scripture, the true meaning of the American prophets is theoretically 
accessible to all, but only those who approach the texts with the appropriate worldview 
and presuppositions will be able to truly comprehend the intentions of their authors—and, 
more importantly, truly comprehend the intentions of the Author of the American story, 
in passing down to the present generation these particular texts from these particular 
voices. 
It is the latter point that offers greater interpretive possibilities. The dominant 
hermeneutical approach among evangelicals for biblical exegesis is to let Scripture 
interpret Scripture; in other words, if the literal meaning of the text itself is unclear, the 
next method for determining its meaning should be to find other parts of Scripture that 
can act as an interpretive lens. Crapanzano describes this process, in which exegetes will 
“cite single verses or short passages without contextualization” as commentaries on one 
another to make the passages being used function as simultaneously internal and external 
to the text: “They are internal insofar as they are part of Scripture, and they obtain their 
authority from that position; they are external insofar as they occur in different books by 
different authors.”80 This, he writes, “creates a ‘space’ in which the different authorial 
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and narrative perspectives of the cited texts are implicitly exploited to produce the 
illusion of an external objectivity.”81 Indeed, multiple Christian Right rhetors cite the 
coherency of the Bible as proof of its authority—for example, LaHaye: 
Written over a period of 1,600 years by more than 40 different people, [the 
Bible] has a supernatural consistency about it. No other book has been so 
loved, so hated, so persecuted, or so used as the Bible. [...] Nineteen 
hundred years ago, this book was completed, never to be corrected or 
updated. Its pages contain many signs of the supernatural, such as 
hundreds of prophecies that have historically been fulfilled. Its 
archaeological accuracy is acclaimed to be incredible. To those who have 
studied it carefully, it bears all the signs of what it claims—divine 
authorship.82 
To the extent that the American corpus represents a form of special revelation passed 
down to the present generation as part of the divine plan, the temporal field of the Cosmic 
Narrative invites us to see it not as a series of individual texts representing their authors’ 
wills and intentions, but rather as a single text in which, like the Bible’s multiple authors, 
the American prophets each act as amanuenses for God in contributing their part to the 
divinely-ordained whole. Though there may have been disagreements among them and 
some were not orthodox Christians, all “were pro-Bible and had somewhat of a Christian 
worldview,”83 such that they presented a united front. Falwell, for example, writes that 
“our Founding Fathers were not all Christians, but they were guided by biblical 
principles. They developed a nation predicated on Holy Writ.”84 Similarly, Barton writes 
that “our Founders—as well as subsequent courts and Congresses—believed intensely 
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that religion in general, and Christianity in particular, produced the public morality 
without which civil government would not long survive.”85 
This case is bolstered by the same forms of juxtaposition I discussed above in 
biblical exegesis, the placement of “proof texts” to create the “illusion of an external 
objectivity”; just as Scripture interprets Scripture, so too do the American prophets 
interpret the American prophets. Barton provides perhaps an archetypal example, 
collapsing quotations from multiple founders in multiple contexts into a single sentence 
to suggest that they were unified in support of a divinely-ordained and objective standard 
for public policy: 
To help evaluate proposed policies, learn to ask, ‘Will this act violate 
God’s clear standards, thus inviting Divine wrath (Thomas Jefferson) and 
“national calamity” (George Mason), or will it rather produce “the 
propitious smiles of heaven” (George Washington) and God’s “concurring 
aid” (Benjamin Franklin)?’86 
The fact that some of the American founders, such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas 
Jefferson, rejected orthodox Christianity only strengthens the case that the American 
prophets had a unified and coherent vision of a Christian nation in the American 
Narrative, by presenting evidence for a “Christian consensus” that transcended religious 
commitments. Even those founders who were unable to accept Christianity as a religion, 
the narrative suggests, accepted the establishment of Christianity as an ethical system that 
would be good for the country: 
The strongest civil code is impotent against malicious behavior unless the 
heart itself can be restrained, and even Benjamin Franklin joined Thomas 
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Jefferson (two of the least religiously orthodox Founders) in believing that 
the teachings of Christianity best accomplished that goal.87 
Because the American prophets are presenting God’s message rather than their own, as 
part of a unified and coherent vision of America and its future, their words take on 
oracular qualities; their original intentions for the country are not simply legally binding, 
but as a special revelation from God are morally and spiritually binding as well. The 
founders’ belief (according to the narrative) that democracy without morality is 
unsustainable, and that morality without religion is impossible, plays the same role in the 
constitutive and political context as Scriptural prophecy does in a theological one, with 
the same idea that because this is a message from God, it is on some level timeless and 
absolute rather than contextual and temporal. Collapsing this temporal field has some 
interesting consequences for identity as well, which I will discuss in the next chapter. 
The Eschaton in Chronic Time: Conditionality 
Reading the Cosmic Narrative’s kairotic, linear, and telic temporal setting into the 
American Narrative functions to imbue the American Narrative with Scriptural 
undertones, and bring new meaning to the traditional conservative trope of disinheritance. 
The temporal outlook of the American Narrative, when reflected back upon the Cosmic 
Narrative, is even more significant in its ramifications, bringing forth the implication that 
human activity can affect the timing of the divine plan in meaningful ways. 
One of the major problems for the Christian Right has been that many of the 
movement’s leaders and adherents subscribed to premillennial eschatology, making it 
more difficult to justify political and cultural action. If the Cosmic Narrative is already 
written, and if the End Times are imminent with their destruction of all political and 
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cultural institutions, and if we are all judged individually anyway, then the ongoing 
decline of the United States into depravity is not only understandable but inevitable. 
Thus, it is a waste of time and energy to try to reform America’s political and cultural 
structures, and American Christians should concentrate their efforts toward evangelizing 
and saving as many individual souls as possible out of the oncoming tribulations. 
Susan Friend Harding suggests that in response to this problem, Christian Right 
leaders like Tim LaHaye and Jerry Falwell developed “a new kind of time within the end-
times, a potentially progressive period in what was otherwise a hopelessly regressive 
era.” This took the form of “another, pretribulational, judgment, a ‘little tribulation’ that 
preceded the great tribulation, also precipitated out, one that had not been clearly foretold 
in the Bible.”88 Tim LaHaye clearly lays out the idea of this “little tribulation” in The 
Battle for the Mind: 
[The Great Tribulation of eschatology] is predestined and will surely come 
to pass. But the pre-tribulation tribulation—that is, the tribulation that will 
engulf this country if liberal humanists are permitted to take total control 
of our government—is neither predestined nor necessary. But it will 
deluge the entire land in the next few years, unless Christians are willing 
to become much more assertive in defense of morality and decency than 
they have been during the past three decades.89 
Here we see Harding’s “little tribulation,” the explicit theological outlook espoused by 
those Christian Right rhetors who seek to make their calls to political and cultural 
activism consistent with their premillennial eschatological viewpoints. 
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But even still, as noted above, this “little tribulation” is a sort of cold comfort to 
American Christians, who are still faced with not just the possibility but the inevitability 
that the United States will ultimately be destroyed. Barton rightly identifies this as a 
tension that the more apocalyptic rhetors, particularly LaHaye, never quite resolve; 
LaHaye’s more political and cultural works, such as The Battle for the Mind, A Nation 
Without a Conscience, and Mind Siege reflect a different prose style and different, 
seemingly incompatible, views of time and identity from his apocalyptic theological 
works like Revelation Unveiled, Are We Living in the End Times?, and Global Warning. 
Yet when the uncertain end of the American Narrative is brought into the mix, 
even more interesting implications arise. While emphasizing that “no one knows the day 
or the hour,” Christian Right apocalyptic writers—particularly LaHaye—emphasize the 
importance of the “signs of the times,” certain technological, governmental, and/or 
cultural conditions that can be seen as indications that the rapture and the End Times are 
right around the corner. These conditions are understood as occurring within ordinary, 
chronological and physical space and time, not as miraculous ruptures of the physical 
order—and more importantly, the fulfillment of these conditions is dependent upon the 
actions (or inactions) of the Church and the nations, including the United States. 
One of these conditions is that before the End Times commence, the Gospel must 
be preached to the ends of the earth. As LaHaye and Hindson write: 
Our Lord paralleled the worldwide preaching of the gospel with the timing 
of His second coming. He said, ‘This gospel of the kingdom will be 
preached in the whole world as a testimony to all nations, and then the end 
will come’ (Matthew 24:14). No date is given to calculate when this will 
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be fulfilled, but the promise of Scripture is clear. When the last convert to 
come to faith in Christ completes the body of Christ, the church age will 
conclude, and Christ will return to rapture the church to heaven.90 
Making the global spread of the Gospel into a precondition for the Rapture adds a new 
dimension to the American Narrative’s suggestion that God brought forth and preserved 
the United States primarily to serve as a base for global missionary work. In both his 
1980 book The Battle for the Mind and his 2000 book Mind Siege: The Battle for Truth in 
the New Millennium (the latter coauthored with David Noebel, but reusing verbatim a 
great deal of material from The Battle for the Mind), LaHaye draws on his worldwide 
travels with his wife to argue that four-fifths of all world missionary efforts originate in 
the United States, meaning that “the eternal souls of millions of people depend on 
American Christians to supply them with the good news”91—but that the continued 
strength of the United States as a base for world missions is at risk due to the 
encroachment of secular humanism. Returning the nation to the “Christian consensus” 
will pay dividends not only in preserving the American nation from God’s wrath, but also 
for spreading the Gospel around the world and hastening the End Times. 
But it is the opposite implication that is even more profound. The Cosmic 
Narrative makes the continuing moral decline of the political and social order a 
precondition for the beginning of the End Times—but the American Narrative suggests 
that the decline of the political and social order, at least in the United States, can be 
arrested and reversed. The seeming contradiction between these two visions imbues 
political and cultural activism with a new meaning: By reversing the spiritual decline of 
the United States and reviving the nation as a spiritual bulwark against the satanic and 
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secular humanist forces at work in the world, conservative Christian activists have the 
power to delay the eschaton itself. 
In several places, LaHaye (and his various coauthors) suggest that the spiritual 
strength of the Church is God’s tool for restraining the forces of evil—not only in the 
historic, temporal realm, but in the kairotic and spiritual realm as well. For example, 
LaHaye and Hindson write that “it is the Christian's spiritual success, based upon an 
adherence to God's Word, that restrains the coming of the Antichrist and the false 
prophet.”92 When the church is removed from the world in the Rapture, the now-
unrestrained Antichrist will be free to do his worst. However, LaHaye and Hindson also 
suggest that the Antichrist’s rise will be evident prior to the Rapture as well: “We do not 
know the timetable of God, but we can smell the ashes of a decadent society that may 
soon face extinction. It is only a matter of time before the human race faces the prospect 
of annihilation. But first the deceiver will arise, promising to bring peace to the world.”93 
Charting the rise of “the deceiver” prior to the Rapture suggests that should the Church 
continue to restrain Antichrists around the world, that precondition for the Great 
Tribulation will remain unfulfilled. 
But in A Nation Without a Conscience (1994), Timothy and Beverly LaHaye go 
further. Arguing against the idea that the imminent eschaton of premillennialism makes 
political and cultural activism pointless, they imply that the preconditions for the 
eschaton are themselves flexible—and that because the United States remains as a 
restraint upon the forces of evil worldwide, God will not “punish” the nation by allowing 
it to fall asunder in the apocalypse of the Tribulation. By remaining Christian, the United 
States could reset the conditions for the eschaton by pushing them back even to the end of 
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the twenty-first century. Though they grant that “our decaying culture mirrors [the 
Bible’s] prediction of the last days,”94 they nevertheless argue: 
No one knows for certain whether these are indeed the last days. Being a 
teacher of Bible prophecy, Tim is inclined to agree that we may indeed be 
in the last days, but the Bible is not specific, and we may be a hundred 
years or more away from the last days. No one really knows. 
Consequently, instead of just waiting for the Rapture to take all Christians 
up to the Father's house, we must realize that Christ may not return until 
the end of the next century.95 
LaHaye and LaHaye go on to argue that God does not want to destroy the United States 
because “the judging hand of God has never fallen on any nation in history that had the 
percentage of Christians that this nation possesses.”96 The born-again Christians of the 
United States, in addition to being a “restraining influence”97 on the progress of evil both 
within the country and around the world, are also the ones who are holding back God’s 
hand from destroying the American nation, just as God would have held back from 
destroying Sodom and Gomorrah if there had been ten righteous souls within that city.98 
Even the majority of Americans who are not themselves born-again Christians are good 
enough to restrain God’s hand of judgment on the nation; God’s wrath is not against 
these “sheep,” but against the “evil shepherds” in “the entertainment industry, education, 
media, and government” who are leading them astray.99 It is for this reason, LaHaye and 
LaHaye write, that “we do not think God will destroy America, but we might expect him 
to discipline her” within the scope of history through things like terrorism, economic 
downturns, disease, or natural disasters.100 
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While LaHaye and LaHaye do not explicitly argue that the timing of the eschaton 
could depend upon whether or not American Christians succeed in calling the nation to 
repentance and revival, the way in which they position their argument makes the 
implication clear. LaHaye and LaHaye position their fictional interlocutors, the 
“doomsayers,”101 not merely as arguing that God will destroy America; rather, the 
pessimists are suggesting that the world conditions have deteriorated to the point where 
the events of the premillennial apocalypse are clearly imminent, and that America, like 
the rest of the world, will clearly deserve its fate in the coming Great Tribulation. Thus, 
by implication, God is holding back on the apocalypse itself because God does not want 
to judge and destroy the United States. The continuing Christian influence in America is 
not only preserving the nation from destruction in the chronic time of history, but is also 
saving the whole of the planet from destruction in the kairotic time of eschatology. 
LaHaye is not the only rhetor to draw the Cosmic and American Narratives 
together to this implied conclusion. Pat Robertson also engages in a similar exercise in 
his 1991 book The New World Order, in which he posits the existence of a global 
conspiracy of “the Establishment”—led by the Council on Foreign Relations, the United 
Nations, the Trilateral Commission, and the Illuminati—that has been working over the 
past several hundred years to institute a “one-world collectivist government” and stamp 
out Christianity and capitalism.102 This conspiracy is really only the beginning of the 
agenda, though; the conspirators’ true function is to be part of Satan’s apocalyptic plan to 
prepare a mechanism by which the Antichrist can wield power once he has received 
“particular empowerment and authority” from Satan, thus bringing about the End 
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Times.103 The only thing standing in the way of this agenda, Robertson writes, is the 
United States: 
Such a world government can come together only after the Christian 
United States is out of the way. After all, the rest of the world can federate 
any time it wants to, but a vital, economically strong, Christian United 
States would have at its disposal the spiritual and material force to prohibit 
a worldwide satanic dictator from winning his battle. […] If America is 
free, people everywhere can hope for freedom. And if America goes 
down, all hope is lost to the rest of the world.104 
Robertson presents the rise of the one-world government and the Antichrist as 
simultaneously both inevitable and avoidable; while “the triumph of God’s world order is 
certain”105 and the Bible’s prophecies about the End Times remain as true as ever, that 
does not mean that this particular moment in history must be the point in the Cosmic 
Narrative when the forces of darkness prevail in bringing about the apocalypse. Instead, 
Christians in America face the choice of the jeremiad yet again: “Rebuild the foundation 
of a free, sovereign America from the grassroots” through Robertson’s newly-founded 
Christian Coalition,106 or witness the rise of the Antichrist in the one-world government 
that the conspirators of “the Establishment” are working to put in place. 
If the eschaton is a century or more away, as LaHaye suggests it may be, then the 
landscape for Christian activism is altered; rather than fighting to preserve a nation that 
will be destroyed by God during the events of the Tribulation, American Christians can 
restore the nation to the vision of American prophets—a nation ruled by the Christian 
consensus. While the premillennial eschaton continues to lie in wait at some 
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indeterminate point in the future, for the moment, the wrath of God is not yet upon the 
world. With a morally-restored and newly-prosperous America returning to God’s 
purposes for the nation—spreading capitalism, republicanism, charity, and (most 
importantly) the Christian gospel across the globe—not only are the “pretribulation 
conditions” that are a prerequisite for the beginning of the End Times rolled back (and 
any potential Antichrists nipped in the bud), but also the restored America offers a 
foretaste of the millennial kingdom, a sort of typology in reverse. This is, in effect, a 
postmillennial vision; if the American forerunner to the millennial kingdom is going to 
last for at least the next century, then the vast majority of LaHaye’s readers will have 
died before the beginning of the End Times. The pattern shifts from telic back to cyclical, 
as America reveals yet again God’s pattern in history of discipline, repentance, and 
restoration, and God demonstrates through America yet again what happens when a 
nation is in covenant with God. This future is defined by continuity rather than rupture.  
Conclusion: (Re)reading Time 
The American Narrative and the Cosmic Narrative offer two different visions for 
time. One is comic, defined by a chronic view of time in which cause precedes effect and 
history teaches lessons to the future through cyclical patterns. The other is tragic, defined 
by the linear progression towards a teleological endpoint and utilizing a kairotic view of 
time in which the past is fulfilled in the present and future, and the present and the future 
give meaning and purpose to the events of the past. The resonances and dissonances 
between these two temporal visions animate both narratives with new implications that 
create new spaces for flexibility and address the individual narratives’ potential 
weaknesses. 
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For the American Narrative, a kairotic view of time significantly raises the stakes 
for action and suggests a perspective in which the most significant figures in the 
American Narrative are read not just as great people and patriots, but as prophets who 
served as amanuenses for God in speaking truth to future generations as well as their 
own. Their words and actions are connected to one another in such a way as to suggest 
that they shared a coherent and complete vision for the country, which allows their stories 
and their words to be used similarly to Scripture, juxtaposed with one another in an 
attempt to convey the timeless, universal, objective truth toward which they pointed. This 
has substantial implications for the formation of identity; in the next chapter, I will 
discuss the ways in which evangelical exegetical tendencies produce a reading of the 
American Narrative as Scripture in which contemporary categories of identity and 
ideology, in effect, “overwrite” the historical context and collapse the gap between the 
culture of the late eighteenth century and today’s evangelical Christian subculture. 
For the Cosmic Narrative, the cyclical, chronic, jeremiadic view of time found in 
the American Narrative clashes with the notion of the human story as telic and divinely 
authored—a tension that many Cosmic Narrative rhetors, particularly those in the 
apocalyptic tradition, have never quite resolved. The American Narrative’s temporal 
perspective, however, also brings out some of the latent qualities of the eschatological 
viewpoint found in the Cosmic Narrative, such as the notion that the end will be preceded 
by “pretribulation conditions,” a set of “signs of the times” that can be read by Christians 
who are open to God’s message to reveal the imminence of the eschaton. When the 
jeremiadic structure of the American Narrative is applied to these latent qualities, a new 
picture emerges in which American Christians can, in restoring America, stave off the 
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Tribulation for a time, effectively turning the premillennial vision of the “doomsayers” 
into a (temporarily) postmillennial foretaste of the millennial kingdom. This, too, has 
substantial implications for the formation of identity, particularly with regards to the 
apocalyptic Cosmic Narrative’s skeptical if not oppositional view of political, cultural, 
and economic powers; to the extent that the United States has a teleological future in the 
End Times narrative, there exists the potential for a measured acceptance of certain forms 
of political, cultural, and economic powers, with the United States leading an ultimately 
doomed coalition of righteous nations in a war against an eastern alliance guided by the 
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Chapter 4: Identity 
One of the central functions of worldview-forming narratives is to establish and 
constitute identity. In retelling or reenacting the narrative, the rhetor sets forth for his or 
her audience a vision and definition of who they are—a vision and definition which, if 
accepted by the audience, places them into the narrative and sets out structures that can 
have ramifications for their understandings of epistemology, teleology, and morality. In 
conventional political narratives, such as Maurice Charland’s example of the Quebecois, 
the intended audience is the protagonist and central character of the narrative.1 The White 
Paper which advocated Quebecois independence posited the Quebecois as a unique 
people set apart from English-speaking Canadians, rather than bit players in the Canadian 
narrative. Possessed of a narrative all their own, with an identity and a direction distinct 
from that of Anglophone Canadians, the Quebecois were the heroes of their own story.  
Charland’s example illustrates the extent to which identity formation is a question 
of circumference, of defining the size of the circle that differentiates “us” from “them.” 
As “French Canadians,” the identity of the people of Quebec was swallowed up into the 
whole of what it meant to be Canadian. Their Francophone status was a modifier on their 
identity; they were Canadians first, and Francophones second. The White Paper invited 
citizens of Quebec to shrink the circumference of identity to see themselves as Quebecois 
first and foremost; Canadians from Ontario, Prince Edward Island, or British Columbia 
could not share in that identity. 
The White Paper is also an example of the teleological implications of 
narratively-embedded political identity. One of the defining characteristics of narrative is 
that its characters do not stand still; rather, they drive and are driven by a plot in which 
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they and the circumstances around them change. In political narratives like that of the 
Peuple Quebecois, the end of the story has not been written—but the narratives create a 
sense of certainty by presenting comparisons to other struggles for identity and 
independence that were successful, thus imbuing the identity of the Quebecois with the 
fates of those other independence movements and presenting their historical struggles as 
guideposts for the choices of present-day Quebecois. The telos of the Quebecois is clear; 
should they choose to seize this moment, they are destined to be an independent and free 
people, rather than a single province in a larger nation that is linguistically and culturally 
alien to them. 
The dual narrative structure of the Christian Right’s rhetoric complicates these 
implications in ways that operate both internally and externally to the text. Internally, the 
dual narrative structure has to account for the contradictions between the narratives, 
which present two different structures for the circumference and locus of religious 
identity. The Cosmic Narrative casts its audience as “true Christians,” a minority even 
among nominal Christians, who will stand as individuals to face God’s judgment upon 
their religious decisions; conversely, the American Narrative casts its audience as a silent 
majority of pro-family Americans, whose mission is to restore the religious identity of the 
nation so that it is not judged with wrath by God. These contradictions can do rhetorical 
work in enabling rhetors to widen or narrow the circumference of identity to suit their 
purposes, but they can also constrain the internal dynamics of the Christian Right as a 
movement, particularly with regards to the role of power. 
The identity structures that arise internally to the text also combine with narrative 
epistemological and temporal structures to create additional complications that are 
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external to the text, as the evangelical Christian Right’s narrative structure interacts with 
the larger landscape of American political and religious conservatism. These 
complications occur not only in places where the plot of the evangelical Christian Right’s 
narrative structure conflicts with those of conservative Roman Catholics and Latter-Day 
Saints, libertarians, and neoconservatives, but also where those structures of identity, 
epistemology, and time/teleology conflict.  
I recognize that the split I present here between “internal” and “external” 
dynamics is a somewhat artificial one, given the frequent rhetorical interplay between the 
narrative structures of the Christian Right and those of other worldviews within the space 
of American conservative rhetorics. This is particularly the case as the evangelical Right 
encounters other forms of Christian conservatism, such as the Mormonism of Glenn Beck 
or W. Cleon Skousen, or the Roman Catholicism of Rick Santorum or Antonin Scalia. 
Despite the frequent interaction between the narrative structure of evangelical Christian 
Right rhetoric and those of other branches of American conservative thought, however, 
there is still a point of divergence: both the American Narrative and the Cosmic Narrative 
have at their root a normative version of Christianity which is either explicitly presented 
or implicitly coded as evangelical Protestant. Similarly, while evangelical Christian Right 
rhetors use the same form of strategic appeals to resolve the internal and external 
contradictions presented by the narrative structure, the content of those appeals differs 
according to the audience. 
There are two basic strategic appeals used within the evangelical Christian 
Right’s dual-narrative structure to address these internal and external contradictions. 
First, the narratives attempt to unite disparate identity visions in opposition to a common 
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enemy. Internally, this common enemy is “secular humanism,” which can also be used as 
an encompassing term to provide a “true” explanation for both of the common enemies 
that appear in the external dynamics: socialism/communism and (particularly since 
September 11) Islam. The common enemy motif creates a flexible external constraint on 
the category of identity that creates a sense of emergency and urgency, in which internal 
contradictions must be put aside while evangelical Protestants (internally) and “pro-moral 
Americans” (externally) fight for their lives. 
Second, the narratives make full use of the range and flexibility of civil religious 
symbology, shifting between coding these symbols as normatively Protestant and 
evangelical (for internal use) and as symbols of a kind of “mere Americanism”2 that can 
include the broader scope of American conservatism while nevertheless excluding those 
in the enemy category above (for external use). This use of symbology presents a vision 
for political, cultural, and social power that is rhetorically useful both internally and 
externally. Internally, this vision of power overcomes the Cosmic Narrative’s naturally 
skeptical (or oppositional) view of the powers-that-be, suggesting that power can be 
constructive in uniting and moving forward the American and Christian missions; 
externally, civil religious symbology unites American conservatives behind a crusading, 
militant vision to crush the antagonistic forces they have portrayed as the enemy. 
In this chapter, I discuss the internal dynamics of identity formation that arise 
from the two narratives’ differing visions of and for their protagonists and their 
audiences. I lay out three aspects of these differing visions: the locus of religious identity, 
the circumference of the audience/protagonist in-group, and the attitude toward power. I 
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then discuss how appeals to the common enemy of secular humanism and to a 
normatively Protestant vision of civil religion address these contradictions in identity. 
Loci of Identity 
The first two clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution set 
forth the framework for the relationship between religion and the American federal 
government: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” Legal scholars have named the two clauses 
setting forth the relationship between religion and the state: the Establishment Clause 
(“no law respecting an establishment of religion”), which suggests that government 
cannot privilege or impose any one religious viewpoint over others; and the Free Exercise 
Clause (“or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”), which suggests that government 
cannot prevent individuals from holding and practicing their own religious viewpoints. 
While both of these clauses ultimately locate the power of religious decision-
making in the hands of lower-level bodies (initially states, localities, and individuals, but 
later narrowed by Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to just 
individuals) they limit the power of the state in different ways and represent opposite 
poles of a continuum for understanding the locus of religious identity. On one end, the 
Establishment Clause implies the possibility for a communal and national locus for 
religious identity, in prohibiting the state from imposing one; on the other end, the Free 
Exercise Clause suggests a personal and individual locus for religious identity in 
prohibiting the state from infringing upon individuals’ religious practices.  
These two clauses are an excellent lens for exploring the subject-positions laid out 
by the Cosmic and American Narratives. On the one hand, the Cosmic Narrative sets out 
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the notion that religious identity is individual and sets the circumference of religious 
identity through a clear (if not always apparent) line of demarcation between the “saved” 
and the “unsaved,” and furthermore suggests that even among those who claim to be 
Christian, many, if not the majority, are not truly saved—a distinction that will be 
revealed at the culmination of the narrative, when God (the author and true protagonist of 
the Cosmic Narrative) sits in judgment over all. The American Narrative, on the other 
hand, sees the locus of religious identity as communal and presents a wider 
circumference with less clear lines between “in” and “out,” so as to envision its audience 
as the silent majority. As the protagonists in that narrative, the American people are in 
charge of their own fate—including determining (through their actions) how God will 
judge the nation as a collective whole. 
Cosmic Narrative: Individual Religious Identity 
“It’s not about you.”3  
The very first sentence of the best-selling The Purpose-Driven Life, written by 
evangelical pastor Rick Warren, points to the thesis of the work as a whole—that at the 
center of each individual’s life story is not the individual him- or herself, but rather God 
and God’s purposes for the world and for each individual. The Purpose-Driven Life 
represents itself as a countercultural antidote to the self-help genre, suggesting that the 
secret to fulfillment is not to know oneself or achieve self-actualization, but rather to 
know God and make God’s intentions the guiding force in one’s life. The purpose of life 
(and of The Purpose-Driven Life) is to understand that each individual’s personal 
narrative, like the narratives of history, the rise and fall of civilizations, and ultimately of 
the cosmos itself, is really about God. The central message of The Purpose-Driven Life, 
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in other words, is that God is the author of every true narrative in the universe—as well 
as the subject, the hero, and the protagonist. 
At the same time, though, The Purpose-Driven Life is addressed by Warren to the 
reader, and focusing on the ways in which the reader can align his or her life with God’s 
purposes. It is explicitly intended to persuade the reader to take a step on a spiritual 
journey toward evangelical Christianity: to persuade the non-Christian or nominal 
Christian to truly accept Jesus as his or her personal Lord and Savior, and to persuade the 
already-saved evangelical to deepen his or her spirituality and become more involved and 
active in the church. Thus, Warren implicitly and explicitly grants the reader the agency 
to change his or her thoughts, actions, and inclinations, in effect recentering the reader in 
his or her own life story even as he argues that the reader should be decentering him- or 
herself. So in that sense, Warren’s protestations aside, The Purpose-Driven Life truly is a 
book “about you.” 
This apparent contradiction reflects what Crapanzano identifies as “an ambiguity 
inherent in evangelical Christianity”:  
Who is the hero of these stories? Ultimately, it is God, but He is no 
ordinary hero, for He commands the storyline. Man’s [sic] position is 
more complicated. His fate is already determined—he is either one of the 
elect or he is not—so how can he be a hero in the stories he tells? And yet 
he is. […] The evangelical’s stories are success stories in miniature—the 
American dream cast in spiritual terms (that are not altogether resistant to 
material claims). They proclaim humility as they announce election.4 
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Crapanzano illustrates well the tension within evangelical self-narrative as to who is the 
protagonist of the tale: is it God’s story, or is it one’s own?5 This tension is also reflected 
in the Cosmic Narrative. While on a grand scale, the narrative is clearly God’s story from 
beginning to end, with God as both author and protagonist, the fact that Christians are 
asked to envision themselves and their place in the narrative complicates matters 
somewhat. 
The individual Christian occupies an important place within the Cosmic 
Narrative. Rather than being just one face in the crowd of billions, the narrative holds that 
each individual is known and loved by God, so much so that, according to a popular 
evangelical saying, “Even if you had been the only person on earth who sinned, Jesus 
would have still died for you.” It is the individual who is presented with the gospel, the 
individual who responds to it, and the individual who repents and forms a personal 
relationship with Christ. Those who have individually accepted Christ into their hearts 
will be saved; those who have not will be damned. The question of salvation is not 
simply as a facet of the individual’s identity, but as the whole of it; as Jerry Falwell puts 
it, “if a person is not a Christian, he [sic] is inherently a failure.”6 All of humanity is split 
according to this category of identity, as D. James Kennedy writes: 
The Scriptures inevitably cleave mankind in half: There are those that are 
the sheep, and those that are the goats; there is the wheat, and there are the 
tares; there are the good fish and there are the bad; there are the saved and 
there are the lost; there are those who are on their way to heaven and there 
are those who are on their way to hell.7 
Similarly, Timothy LaHaye writes: 
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…there are only two kinds of people. The Bible repeatedly refers to the 
believing or unbelieving, the saved or unsaved, the condemned or not 
condemned, the righteous or unrighteous, the just or unjust, the wise or 
unwise. […] either a person’s name is written or it is not written in the 
Book of Life. It must be one way or the other.8 
The Cosmic Narrative is explicit on this point: There is no salvation for any category 
other than the individual. Membership in a church or citizenship in a godly nation cannot 
by themselves bring a person to salvation or spare them from hellfire; in order to be 
saved, each individual must undergo a personal salvation experience, “the most basic 
spiritual experience,”9 in which they are “personally calling on the name of the Lord”10 
and accepting Christ into their heart. As the Liberty Bible Commentary puts it: 
People may be members of good churches and still be lost and go to hell. 
The sheep may have had a vague idea it was lost, but this coin could 
picture those with no knowledge of being lost. We need to search for those 
who are lost to bring them to Christ.11 
And D. James Kennedy again: 
How tragic it is that so many millions of people in this country have been 
satisfied merely to have their names on a church roll, and to be baptized or 
confirmed. Yet they have never experienced the transforming, 
regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, which alone can make them 
acceptable for admission into heaven.12 
Moreover, this conversion experience must be complete and totalizing; to the extent that 
one does not align the whole of their identity around Christianity and place Christ at the 
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center of their heart, their salvation is at risk. Those who have not undergone a born-
again experience may identify as Christians and think they are Christians, but they are not 
really Christians, because “there is no other kind of real Christian except those who have 
been born anew—those who have been regenerated from above.”13 Needless to say, this 
can be a source of anxiety for individual evangelicals, who might worry that they have 
not done enough to center Christ in their lives; that anxiety is often utilized by Christian 
Right authors to spur their audience on to deeper forms of devotion. A true Christian, 
Kennedy writes, will not have fear or anxiety about the coming judgment: 
Are you really a Christian? You know how you can tell don’t you? If you 
really belong to Christ, then right now, you can pray from your heart this 
prayer which concludes the canon of Scripture: ‘Even so, come, Lord 
Jesus.’ Come quickly!14 
The dividing line between “real Christians” who are saved, and everyone else who is not 
saved, is a question of the heart, as Kennedy writes: 
But if you have continued impenitently in your sins, if you have been 
satisfied with only nominal Christianity, if you have been satisfied to have 
your name upon the roll and not Christ upon the throne of your heart, if 
you have rejected Him, if you have spurned the invitation of His gospel—
then, for you, it [the day of judgment] will be the fulfillment of the worst 
of all your nightmares.15 
Kennedy sets out a clear distinction between “only nominal Christianity” and putting 
Jesus “upon the throne of [one’s] heart”—between what Augustine called the “visible” 
and “invisible” church. The group of people sitting in the pews on Sunday morning is not 
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necessarily the same as the group of people who will join Jesus in heaven at the end of 
time. In fact, writes Kennedy, the latter are much fewer in number than the former: 
How tragic it is that so many millions of people in this country have been 
satisfied merely to have their names on a church roll, and to be baptized or 
confirmed. Yet they have never experienced the transforming, 
regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, which alone can make them 
acceptable for admission into heaven.16 
Those Christians who have not been “born again” or who hold to a merely nominal 
Christianity are viewed as “lukewarm,” and, as the book of Revelation suggests, “spit 
out” by God who would prefer even the coldness of a nonbeliever over a lukewarm so-
called believer.  In some retellings of the Cosmic Narrative (particularly those favored by 
those tied to historic Christian fundamentalism), whole denominations and families of 
Christianity are broadly painted as at the very least theologically suspect, if not apostate; 
according to these retellings, while there may be a “faithful remnant” who are keeping 
the historic zeal of those denominations alive, their leadership and direction are corrupt, 
and perhaps (likely) hopelessly so. The most common targets among Nicene Christianity 
for such attacks are Roman Catholicism and the mainline Protestant denominations. 
In rejecting nominal Christianity, Cosmic Narrative rejects the notion of “works 
righteousness,” the idea that one might be saved by acting Christian while not putting 
their faith in Jesus as Lord and Savior, as displaying “the mere externalities of religion”17 
and insufficient for salvation. Those externalities, however, are still viewed as markers or 
manifestations of salvation, by which one might determine whether oneself (or someone 
 259 
else) is a true Christian. Kennedy suggests that true Christians will be known by their 
evangelism, their service to the church, their personal devotional life, and their tithes: 
Some Christians have remained in craven silence throughout these years. 
Some must come before Him without one soul—one other person—who 
has come to know Christ because of you. What a tragedy that is! Dear 
friend, are you a faithful witness for Jesus Christ? Not only by your life, 
but also by your lips? Do you serve Christ and His church? You took a 
vow that you would serve Christ to the best of your ability in his church, 
and yet have you ever given one day, or even one hour, to the service of 
Christ? You are never to be found in church on Sunday evening or at 
prayer meeting. You are never to be found in any hour of service. When 
all of the appeals are made, they all go right over your head. You offer no 
service for Christ. […] Ah, I even wonder if you are really saved at all. 
Some do not make it a habit to read God's Word or to seek Him faithfully 
in prayer. Others do not bring their tithes and offerings to Christ. Instead, 
like Demas, you have loved this present world. All of these things will 
come out at the judgment.18  
In the context of the Cosmic Narrative, the idea of a “Christian nation” does not make 
sense. Nations cannot be religious at all in the Cosmic Narrative; only individuals, who 
will be subject to God’s judgment based on whether or not they have accepted the 
Gospel, repented of their sins, and invited Jesus into their hearts, can have a religious 
identity. Even within the confines of the church, the Cosmic Narrative suggests, there are 
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many who will not be saved because they have not truly had a personal salvation 
experience. 
American Narrative: Communal Religious Identity 
In contrast, the American Narrative suggests that not only is a “Christian nation” 
possible, but that it has indeed happened in the history of the United States. This vision of 
religious identity has communal and national qualities. In this vision, the United States, 
as a people combining Christian piety and a Protestant work ethic with republican and 
free-market values, can be a beacon of prosperity and hope to the world—and the true 
American community, as the protagonists of the narrative, are those who understand and 
share that vision for the country. And while the nation may not face judgment in the final 
reckoning that takes place outside chronic history (as befitting the American Narrative’s 
nested position inside the larger timeline of the Cosmic Narrative), America will most 
certainly face God’s judgment as a nation. The presence of godly individuals within an 
increasingly-ungodly nation will not be enough to save the nation from divine wrath. 
The contemporary American Narrative’s appeals to collective religious identity 
set the stage for a drama of collective blessing—or collective judgment. The narrative 
casts its protagonists in the role of the Israelites of the Old Testament, continually facing 
the choice between following God’s ways or religious compromise. If they follow God’s 
ways, they will reap the benefits of God’s blessing; if they compromise or backslide, they 
will suffer God’s wrath and judgment against the people with whom God has made a 
covenant. Jerry Falwell, for example, reviews several Bible verses promising ruin to 
nations that forget God, concluding that “America will be no exception […] If she forgets 
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God, she too will face His wrath and judgment like every other nation in the history of 
humanity.”19  
Moreover, in a manner similar to the individual in the Cosmic Narrative, the 
nation must experience true religious conversion and follow God with its whole heart, 
mind, and strength. All of the nation’s institutions must be subjected to God’s 
sovereignty; cultural artifacts must promote God’s values, social and family relationships 
must reflect the divine order, and perhaps most importantly, the government must be 
reformed to more closely align with God’s law.  
Just like nominal Christianity or “works righteousness” in the Cosmic Narrative, 
the presence of theistic civil religious symbology alone will not be enough to preserve the 
nation from wrath. As Pat Robertson writes: “Do we suppose that we will be spared the 
judgment of a righteous God just because we mouth religious platitudes and sing 'God 
Bless America’?”20 Robertson further emphasizes the sense of collective responsibility in 
arguing that the liberals who are risking the nation’s destruction “speak of the desire to be 
free from religion, free from religious restraint, and free to ‘do their thing,’ regardless of 
its effect on the rest of us.”21  
Falwell further explicates the relationship between the individual and the 
corporate in the American Narrative, writing that “a nation must be willing to submit 
both individually and corporately to God's authority in order to experience God's 
blessings.”22 While individual salvation and individual spirituality play a role in this 
edifice of identity, they are ultimately a part of the religious identity of the nation as a 
whole. This confers a great deal of weight on political decision-making, as such decisions 
become wrapped up in the question of American national identity; will citizens make 
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political choices that preserve America’s Christian heritage and thus save the nation from 
judgment, or choices that undermine that heritage and thereby condemn the collective 
whole? 
For in this construction of American identity, it truly is the nation’s heritage that 
is at stake. Just as The Purpose-Driven Life roots the individual’s religious identity within 
God’s purposes for that individual’s life, rhetors appealing to the American Narrative 
root the nation’s collective Christian identity in the purposes and intentions of those who 
founded the nation. That category not only includes the founding generation of the United 
States—the signers of the Declaration of Independence and framers of the Constitution—
but also their spiritual forebears in the Puritans and the First Great Awakening. These 
forebears, the American Narrative suggests, established Calvinist-leaning Protestantism 
as a form of national cultural religion; even if the founders themselves may have had a 
more diverse array of religious beliefs, the (Reformed Protestant) Christian consensus 
was strong enough to produce a normative collective Christianity that was potent enough 
to invoke God’s providence and blessing upon the enterprise as a whole.  
Further, the American Narrative argues that the nation’s founders understood 
collective religious identity as a controlling force in establishing the definition for terms 
like “freedom” and “liberty.” As Kennedy and Newcombe write, those terms “cannot 
properly be defined without considering purpose: that for which something was made. 
[…] Liberty as the founders understood it meant liberty under God—the freedom to do 
what is right.”23 Falwell similarly writes that “our religious heritage and our liberty can 
never be separated. America is in trouble today because her people are forgetting the 
origin of her liberty, and questioning the authority and inerrancy of the Bible.”24 In this 
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edifice, the definitional terms of American self-understanding can only be understood 
within the context of a collective religious identity, a “liberty under law”25 in which 
republican government is free to be limited in scope because the people as a whole are a 
moral and upright people who respect “God’s immutable laws”26 and control their own 
personal, individual desires for the good of the collective whole, rather than “doing what 
is right in their own eyes.”27 
In the absence of that collective religious identity as a controlling factor, terms 
like “freedom” and “liberty” have been perverted by contemporary liberals, who do not 
understand them within their proper context in which people were free “to worship and 
serve Christ, to do what they believed to be right, according to the Word of God.”28 
Rather, the liberal humanists want “freedom from law, unless [they] can remake the laws 
into decrees that legalize license.”29 The individual does play a role in this model of 
identity, but only insofar as his or her choices reflect the founders’ model of liberty as a 
form of self-control and freedom to do good within the context of biblical law, rather than 
as a form of license. 
Circumference of Identity 
Though the American Narrative and Cosmic Narrative differ in their visions of 
the locus of religious identity, they do both hold out a model of collective identity in 
some form, even if (in the Cosmic Narrative) that collective cannot have a religious 
nature in and of itself. The American Narrative suggests collective national religious 
identity as the expression of the nation’s religiosity and cultural consensus, in inviting 
audiences to identify themselves as part of a Christian nation. While the basic unit of 
religious identity in the Cosmic Narrative is the individual, there are markers of visible 
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and invisible collective identity. Visibly, there is the sense of the Church as a whole—not 
as a vehicle for salvation, but as the persecuted Bride of Christ who will stand triumphant 
alongside Christ after the events of the end times. Invisibly, as we have noticed, the 
Cosmic Narrative bifurcates humanity with very clear lines into the saved and the 
unsaved, the Christians or the damned. Both of these visions of collective identity suggest 
a circumference for the circle that contains the group with which the audience is invited 
to identify. 
Cosmic Narrative: The Church vs. The World 
The Cosmic Narrative articulates a locus of religion where the individual’s 
ultimate fate is determined not by group membership but by their having personally 
undergone a salvation experience and made Jesus the center of their life. The clear 
bifurcation between the saved and unsaved is mirrored in another key distinction in the 
Cosmic Narrative’s articulation of group identity: the division between the Church and 
the World. The Church is Augustine’s invisible church, those who are regenerated by 
Christ and born again; the World is everyone and everything else.  
This split draws primarily from language in the New Testament which was 
written to and by persecuted Christians seeking to define, understand, and encourage their 
community in the midst of suffering. True Christians, the narrative suggests, will never 
be accepted by the world, a vision based on Bible verses like James 4:4, which states that 
“friendship with the world means enmity against God.”30 The church is to remain set 
apart and holy, rather than compromising with the pagan world in the pursuit of temporal 
power. LaHaye writes that seeking friendship or acceptance from the world (and 
inevitably compromising one’s faith in order to receive friendship or acceptance) is a sign 
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that a Christian does not have faith in the power of Christ: “The only time Christians have 
the unlimited power of the Holy Spirit at their disposal is when they are obedient to the 
will of God. When they disobey God and make alliances with the world, they are entering 
into a powerless state that will enmesh and ruin them.”31 In this model, the world is and 
always will be necessarily opposed to the will of Christ; those who love Christ must 
reject the world. 
Persecution by the world is put forward as a marker of the strength of one’s faith; 
2 Timothy 3:12 states that “everyone who wants to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will 
be persecuted.”32 The Cosmic Narrative presents the early church, a tight-knit group of 
believers who faced arrest, violence, and martyrdom at the hands of the Roman Empire 
for their beliefs, as the ideal for Christianity. Though Christians in America do not face 
violent martyrdom or legal suppression (with a strongly-implied “yet”), the idea of 
persecution still plays a central role in the aspirational narratives of contemporary 
evangelical Christianity. Modern Christians are persecuted now, according to the Cosmic 
Narrative, not by imprisonment or lions in the gladiatorial ring, but by ridicule and 
mockery from nonbelievers, and by a systematic attempt to silence Christianity in the 
public square. LaHaye, for example, writes that “Christianity is either ridiculed, 
misrepresented, or ignored” on television33. Robertson similarly argues that those (like 
him) who speak the truth are subjected to “libel and scorn” and a “torrent of unwanted 
vituperation.”34  Evangelical Christians, writes Gary Bauer, are uniquely singled out by 
the media for attack: “While we are constantly warned to be ‘sensitive’ in how we depict 
or talk about various ethnic and racial groups, apparently in Hollywood ‘Christian-
bashing’ is acceptable entertainment.”35 
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But the explicit, overt media ridicule reserved for evangelical Christianity or for 
Christian public figures like Pat Robertson or Tim LaHaye is presented as simply a more 
public and overt example of the microaggressions that evangelical Christians throughout 
the country experience (or simply fear) every day. As Robertson writes, “[Satan] has 
rendered Christians ever so slightly embarrassed about being Christians. [...] They're 
afraid of being categorized as religious freaks, or perhaps old-fashioned or out-of-step 
with the world. They are nervous about being discovered in prayer or other attitudes 
perceived as different.”36 Falwell similarly suggests that these microaggressions are part 
and parcel of being truly saved:  
When you got saved, you probably thought everyone would pat you on the 
back and tell you, ‘Boy, you’re a great guy.’ You went back to work; and 
instead of your friends cheering you and praising you, they laughed, 
criticized you, and whispered about you behind your back. [...] You found 
opposition from everybody everywhere. Opposition is part of the hardness 
you have to endure.37 
The Cosmic Narrative suggests that another form of microaggression against Christians is 
blatant blasphemy, both in the media and in everyday culture. This is presented not only 
as a special form of sin (as a violation of the Third Commandment not to take the name 
of God in vain) but also as a libelous attack on God and, by extension, God’s followers: 
To libel means intentionally to write things about other persons that are 
false and would publicly injure their reputation or expose them to public 
ridicule. While such attacks on individuals remain illegal today, in 
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previous years, such attacks on God and Christ fell under the laws 
constructed to protect reputations—the laws against libel.38 
The ridicule and blasphemy faced by both everyday Christians and by prominent 
Christian public figures, though, is not merely presented as a form of oppression in and of 
itself, but also as a precursor to more explicit forms of oppression. As Kennedy and 
Newcombe write: 
One time I was preaching about the new tolerance, and after the service 
someone who survived the Holocaust said to me, ‘You are exactly right. 
That is what happened to the Jews. They first ridiculed them. They 
laughed at them. [...] And then they began to condemn them, then to 
silence them. They began to persecute them. And then they began to 
imprison them. Finally they began to kill them.’ The new tolerance truly 
leads to intolerance.39 
It is important to note the historical linkage at work here: in linking the plight of ridiculed 
Christians in the United States to that of Jews in Nazi Germany in the years prior to 
Hitler’s Final Solution, Kennedy and Newcombe present evangelical Christians not only 
as a minority but as a minority on a par with Israel, God’s chosen people. This kind of 
typological linkage is not simply a historical analogy, but draws in past and present, 
connecting contemporary evangelicals to the sufferings of the Jews in the Bible book of 
Esther, the sufferings of the early Christians under the boot of Rome, the dangers faced 
by the modern state of Israel in the Middle East, suggesting that they are all part of a 
grand and overarching story of the universe in which future events fulfill and make sense 
of past ones. Christians in the Cosmic Narrative are not the holders of political power; 
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they are the victims of oppression, enjoying (temporary) protection only because 
American laws do not (yet) permit the open persecution of Christianity.  
The fact that such ridicule can exist in a country where the majority is nominally 
Christian only serves to prove that the true Christians, the evangelicals, are a minority in 
the culture. The fact that evangelicals are offended by the ridicule of Christianity and 
blasphemy against God is a sign that they have a true reverence for God; the toleration of 
such mockery by the nominal Christian majority is a sign that they do not take their faith 
seriously enough. As Kennedy writes: 
I don't know about you, but it hurts and offends me to hear God's name 
used in vain. It's almost like a physical slap sometimes. We were silent 
when we should have spoken up, and as time has passed, the blasphemy 
no longer fazes us as a society anymore. More and more people are doing 
it. That does not make it right, however.40 
The Cosmic Narrative draws parallels between the characterization of the contemporary 
epidemic of ridicule and blasphemy (which will lead to more blatant persecution down 
the line) and the persecution faced by the early church from the Roman imperial 
authorities. Perhaps the most significant of these parallels is the narrative’s explanation of 
the origin of the attacks against Christians: Satan. As we have seen, the overarching 
theme of the Cosmic Narrative is that even before creation, the cosmos was already 
embroiled in a constant and largely-invisible spiritual war between the forces of God and 
the forces of Satan. One of the strategies used by the demonic side of this spiritual war is 
to discredit and attack God’s loyal soldiers, the true Christians—both overtly through 
persecution and ridicule, and covertly by promoting a nominal and “respectable” 
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Christianity that compromises with the world, rather than challenging it in the name of 
Christ, as LaHaye writes: 
Many so-called ‘Christian’ churches today […] are not Christians at all 
and are condemned by the Savior Himself because they preach a message 
other than the one laid down in the Word of God. In reality, they are the 
synagogue of Satan, not the Church of Jesus Christ.41 
Unlike the overt persecution of the church, which “only causes the Church to flourish and 
continue in a perpetual state of revival,”42 the acceptance of a nominal and syncretist 
form of Christianity by the powers of this world dulls the church’s spiritual zeal by 
making it a church of the world, not just a church in the world. LaHaye suggests that 
Constantine’s conversion and establishment of what would become the Roman Catholic 
Church are a cautionary tale, arguing that when the church was “married to governmental 
authority and elevated to a place of acceptance, it declined in spiritual blessing and 
power.”43 While Satan is still behind the ridicule and blasphemy of the contemporary 
world, intended to draw nominal Christians away from evangelical Christianity and 
demoralize the true Christians, the presence and popularity of nominal Christianity does 
not pose a risk to the Cosmic Narrative’s construction of true Christianity as a minority 
set in opposition to the world. On the contrary, the existence of a nominal, compromising 
Christianity only bolsters the claim, by making the mainline Protestant denominations 
and Roman Catholicism the unwitting tools of the Satanic war against God’s true army. 
Further, the Cosmic Narrative suggests that true Christians are the minority in 
culture, and will be until the final judgment; the majority of people are too set in their 
sinful ways, too unwilling to face their sins, repent, and accept Christ’s salvation, to be 
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truly saved. Kennedy and Newcombe, for example, suggest that “about half of the 
professing Christians in America today”44 are really nominal and lukewarm Christians 
who have never truly undergone a conversion experience and been born again; similarly, 
LaHaye writes that in today’s society, “the Bible is not believed by the majority of 
people” because of the attempts by Satan (working through “skeptics in education, the 
entertainment industry, science, and even the liberal ministry”) to discredit it,45 and that 
“a majority of the adult population of the earth have followed [Satan] in his rebellion 
against God.”46 The doctrines of original sin and total depravity paint a rather pessimistic 
anthropological picture, suggesting that when given the opportunity to do so, most people 
will either sin against the will of God or grow so comfortable as to forget God. 
In positing true Christians as an embattled and persecuted minority who are set 
upon by an evil and fallen World, this vision of identity sets up a Manichaean world that 
sees any form of “compromise” as a grave danger to one’s soul and one’s salvation. The 
Cosmic Narrative suggests that any Christian who does not face ridicule or persecution 
(if only in the form of microaggressions), or who does not wince inwardly when someone 
takes the name of God in vain, is probably enjoying his or her comfort and respectability 
because he or she has compromised too much with the world. Rather than compromising 
with the World, the object for the Christian in the Cosmic Narrative is to save people out 
of the World and bring them into the invisible Church. 
American Narrative: The Silent Majority 
In contrast to the Cosmic Narrative’s vision of the bulk of humanity as fallen and 
inclined to do evil, the American Narrative suggests that the default position of the 
American people is to do the right thing; when left to their own devices and freed from 
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any kind of corrupt outside influences, the narrative suggests, Americans are a basically 
godly and virtuous people who would choose righteousness for themselves and their 
families and limited government to protect them from evil abroad. This vision offers a 
certain amount of fluidity for the circumference of the subject-position in the narrative—
a circumference that can be strategically broadened and narrowed to paint a picture of a 
vast “silent majority” of white, middle-class, suburban or rural, patriotic evangelicals 
who hold to the ideal of the nuclear family, who are being unwittingly cheated out of 
“their” country by a shadowy cabal of coastal, urban secular humanist elites, who use 
poor urban people of color as their unwitting stooges. 
American Narrative rhetors invite their audience to see themselves as part of a 
vast majority of “pro-family” Americans who have “etched on the hearts […] the simple 
belief that we are ‘One Nation, Under God.’”47 These Americans want to raise their 
families to be wholesome and good, as part of a nation motivated by its religious faith. As 
Gary Bauer writes: 
Religion has motivated the average citizen as well. […] Americans may 
not cite Bible verses when they debate these issues, but they certainly base 
their opinions on their understanding of ‘right or wrong.’ And our moral 
concepts evolve directly from our religious faith.48 
This vision of the American people as essentially wise and wholesome is not presented as 
a contradiction to the Christian theological concepts of original sin and total depravity; 
these notions are present in the American Narrative as well, particularly in the idea that 
the founding generation crafted the Constitution as an explicitly Protestant document 
reflecting a pessimistic anthropology. Rather, the construction of Americans as a 
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fundamentally-good people is rooted in American exceptionalism, and particularly the 
American Narrative’s presentation of American history as rooted in the Puritan vision for 
the world. Dobson, for example, writes: 
I’m encouraged to report that hope does thrive, and that it emanates from 
the collective wisdom of the American people. We should never 
underestimate the ability of our countrymen to choose between good and 
bad alternatives. This characteristic has prevailed within us for nearly 300 
years, going back to the influence of the Puritans and the framers of the 
U.S. Constitution.49 
Because this silent majority continues to be influenced by the Christian consensus that 
was in place until the middle of the previous century, they maintain a (steadily declining) 
remnant of the Puritans’ worldview even though most of the silent majority are not born-
again Christians. LaHaye, for example, suggests that while only about 30% of the 
American adult population is born-again (and thus could be expected to “vote for 
morality […] if the issues were made clear”), they are joined by another 30% of the 
population who are “pro-moral religious” mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics, 
Mormons, and Jews, and yet another 20-30% who are “idealistic moralists” who “were 
raised in a Christian consensus and possess a God-given, intuitive moral conscience.”50  
To the extent that the silent majority is not standing up for the moral values they 
purportedly hold, it is because they have been indoctrinated and deceived from childhood 
by secular humanists who seek to undermine the traditional American family. LaHaye 
and Noebel, for example, argue that America has more “self-centered people” today than 
ever before not because of original sin (which would suggest that Americans, like all 
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other humans, are inherently inclined to be self-centered), but rather because they were 
raised too permissively:  “Children raised without loving parental correction grow up to 
be self-centered and selfish, and their attempt to be independent or autonomous leads 
them to futility or chaos.”51  Similarly, LaHaye and LaHaye write that millions of 
Americans have been “educated—or indoctrinated, depending on your point of view—by 
secularists” and, as a result, “usually accept liberal moral values for themselves and for 
society in general.”52 This leads them to conclude that if the nation turns around and 
returns to God’s ways, God’s judgment may not fall on the nation as a whole, but rather 
on “those who have indoctrinated and educated people” into godless values.53 
Furthermore, Americans have allowed themselves to become too comfortable, 
producing faith that is “a mile long and an inch deep”; the prosperity brought about by 
the hard work and Christian consensus of America’s forebears is a double-edged sword, 
producing a people who “seek comfort rather than growth” and who see themselves as 
“the final arbiters of righteousness, the ultimate rulers of our own experience and 
destiny,” rather than submitting to God’s authority.54 The comfort and ease in which they 
live causes them to remain unaware of the threat to their lifestyle posed by secular 
humanism; those who accept the American Narrative accept the task of “awaken[ing] the 
85 to 90 percent of Americans—Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Mormon, Muslim—to the true 
condition of the country.”55 
Agency plays a key role in all of these explanations for the silence of the majority 
of “pro-moral Americans” while the nation experiences ongoing moral decline; the 
American Narrative suggests that the American people are experiencing indoctrination, 
loss of morals, and increasing chaos not (as total depravity would suggest) because they 
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have not experienced God’s grace and therefore are naturally inclined to make choices 
that lead them further away from God, but because they are “sheep” who have been 
passively led astray by “evil shepherds.”56 Americans are still characterized as basically 
good people who have gone wrong by failing to defend themselves, rather than basically 
fallen and sinful people who cannot defend themselves against the demonic onslaught 
without divine assistance. The solution, therefore, is not merely to pray that God blesses 
the nation with spiritual revival—though that is certainly a necessary component of the 
solution—but rather to take action in culture by supporting and voting for pro-moral 
candidates, taking part in cultural activism to stem the tide of pornography, profanity, and 
blasphemy, or working to retake their public schools and other public institutions for 
family values. 
The Role of Power 
Both narratives’ visions for the circumference of group identity articulate a 
particular relationship between the audience/protagonist and the structures of economic, 
cultural, and especially political power. As the oppositional stance of “church versus 
world” in the Cosmic Narrative might suggest, that narrative articulates a subject-position 
that stands in wary opposition to the powers-that-be; if the powers of “the world” are not 
explicitly aligned against evangelical Christianity, they are at least not to be trusted, and 
certainly not to be pursued. The American Narrative, meanwhile, sets out a more 
ambiguous image of political and cultural power structures in which they occupy an 
established sphere and fulfill an established set of functions in both God’s order for 
human civilizations in general and the United States in particular. If the powers of the 
world, guided by godly people, remain within their spheres and fulfill their functions, 
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then they can be forces for good as well as evil. However, if they break from those 
divinely-ordained forms, they become a force for oppression and persecution. 
Cosmic Narrative: Oppositional/Wary 
Taken on its own, the Cosmic Narrative has a tendency to present the temporal 
“powers that be” as untrustworthy allies at best, adversaries at worst. This is partially due 
to the portrayal in premillennial theology of the political, cultural, and economic elites as 
being in the witting or unwitting service of Satan as the Last Days approach. Stephen 
O’Leary notes that Christianity’s apocalyptic tradition, when interpreted literally, takes a 
rather dim view of the political and temporal powers-that-be. This is understandable as a 
historical phenomenon, given that the apocalyptic narratives were first developed during 
the first few centuries of Christianity when the Christian community was suffering from 
persecution at the hands of the religious and political authorities. O’Leary notes that 
Revelation depicts the temporal political powers “in demonic terms,” tying them to the 
agenda of Satan himself.57 This eschatological narrative served a constitutive function, 
giving meaning to the persecution Christians were suffering by suggesting that God was 
allowing the evil Roman authorities to rule “only by a mysterious divine permission” and 
that the Roman Antichrist would ultimately join his master, Satan, in eternal banishment 
to the lake of fire.58 
Historically, the Christian tradition steered away from this oppositional view to 
temporal power after the Roman emperor Constantine publicly converted to Christianity 
in 313 CE and, later, made Christianity the official state religion of the Roman Empire 
and the Empire the official defender of theological orthodoxy. Obviously, the Roman 
Emperor’s conversion from the chief persecutor of Christianity to the chief defender of 
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the orthodox faith could not be easily reconciled with an eschatological vision that 
painted him as the Antichrist, a demonic figure in league with Satan himself. This led to 
two eschatological innovations: a role for a mighty defender of the faith in the last days, 
and—much more prevalently—a new interpretation of the eschatological passages of 
Scripture that read them as allegorical or symbolic language, rather than as literal 
descriptions of phenomena that would occur within the context of predictable, chronic 
history.  
The latter shift, from a literal and historic apocalyptic eschatology to a more 
spiritual and allegorical view, is generally associated with Augustine of Hippo, one of the 
most significant theologians in the history of Christianity and a key figure in the overall 
transition of Christianity from a persecuted religion out of power to the official religion 
of empire. The new eschatological hermeneutic developed by Augustine and other 
theologians during that era (known as amillennialism) enabled the eschatological moment 
to be put off indefinitely, suggesting a discontinuity between the chronos time of the 
present historical moment and the sacred kairos time of the End Times as prophesied in 
Scripture. The significance of this moment in the history of the church is not lost on 
evangelical and fundamentalist theologians; Tim LaHaye suggests that the move to an 
allegorical hermeneutic of eschatology in particular was a significant moment in the 
spiritual corruption of the Roman Catholic Church, when “theology and philosophy 
supplanted the study of Scriptures.”59  
This allegorical and spiritual hermeneutic—and its neutral to positive stance 
toward temporal political powers—remained largely intact even among the Protestant 
sects that split off from Roman Catholicism during the Reformation. Though the Radical 
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Reformation saw occasional outbreaks of millenarianism in isolated cities (such as John 
of Leiden in Münster), the major theological figures of the Protestant Reformation 
(Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Knox) held largely to Augustine’s amillennial interpretation as 
they sought alliances with the established political powers of the day or held political 
power themselves. 
The nineteenth century was the significant articulation point for evangelical 
eschatology, as the explosion of knowledge in the physical sciences led to an 
environment in which Protestant theologians believed that science, history, and Scripture 
were aligned with one another—and that much like nature for the scientist, the Bible 
could function for the theologian as the source of encrypted, hidden, but discoverable 
truths not only about God, but also about science, history, and the future.60 When this 
hermeneutical approach was applied to eschatology, it effectively reunited the chronos 
and kairos that were separated from one another by the amillennial approach that took 
hold during Augustine’s time, giving form to an eschatological narrative that took place 
within history (or, at least, at the culmination of history) rather than outside it. The most 
lasting result of this interpretive framework in eschatology was premillennial 
dispensationalism, the apocalyptic timeline developed by John Nelson Darby and 
(largely) adopted by the fundamentalist movement in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  
This new approach, which is described by its proponents as a recovery of the 
theology of the early church, also has the early church’s tendency to view temporal 
political powers as hostile entities. Timothy LaHaye, for example, writes in Revelation 
Unveiled that “human beings look favorably on government as a great help to them, 
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whereas God looks on government as a great hindrance to them, as does anyone who has 
studied history and observed government's bestial treatment of humanity.”61 The 
opposition of the powers-that-be to the true Christians functions constitutively, with 
fundamentalists (particularly after the Scopes trial) portraying themselves as the faithful 
“remnant” of true Christians holding firm to their beliefs amidst the corruption of the 
mainline churches and the skepticism of the public at large. Premillennial 
dispensationalism gave meaning to the mockery and revulsion directed by “the world” at 
the fundamentalists, suggesting that it would ultimately give way to vindication during 
the coming tribulation, when Christ’s faithful would be raptured away to paradise while 
the rest of the world quite literally went to hell. 
Premillennialism is not the only force that guides the Cosmic Narrative toward 
skepticism or opposition to the powers-that-be. Also at work is the strong thread of 
persecution within evangelical aspirational rhetoric. The idea that persecution is a sign of 
righteousness, that one is truly standing for the faith—and, conversely, that seeking 
acceptance from the powers-that-be is a sign that one is compromising with evil rather 
than standing up to it—implies that the powers-that-be are inherently hostile to true 
Christianity. The ideal Christians in the Cosmic Narrative—the early church—were a 
persecuted minority standing against the power of Rome, experiencing spiritual and 
numerical growth not despite their conflicts with temporal or political power but because 
of them. Ongoing persecution and the ever-present possibility of martyrdom strengthened 
the early Christians by making their faith more dynamic and central to their identity, and 
by preventing them from getting too comfortable or settled in their faith. 
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American Narrative: Elites 
The American Narrative’s portrayal of the American people as a basically good 
people led astray by bad leadership has some surface similarities with the Cosmic 
Narrative’s mistrust of the powers-that-be, but presents a much more ambiguous view of 
the political and cultural powers. While the American Narrative also suggests that the 
present powers-that-be are standing in opposition to Christianity and persecuting 
Christians through ridicule and blasphemy (with the intention of changing the laws and 
culture in order to increase the tenor of that persecution), this is presented as a temporary 
situation. The stance of those currently in political and cultural power in opposition to the 
true Christian faith is not an inherent or inevitable characteristic of political and cultural 
power, as the Cosmic Narrative would suggest; rather, the current powers’ hostility to 
true Christianity is a temporary situation brought about because the silent majority were 
lulled into complacency and overwhelmed by indoctrination.  
The present situation is thus not a natural state of affairs, but a violation and an 
imposition on the natural state of affairs; those who presently hold power are thus 
usurpers who have, through a strategy of deception, taken away the inheritance that 
belonged to the true American people, the pro-moral and pro-family majority. Thus, the 
proper response is not for the church to reject political and cultural power, for fear of 
compromising with those who are persecuting the church; rather, Christians are called to 
awaken their fellow pro-moral Americans to exercise their agency and retake political 
and cultural power from those who stole it, to restore the Christian consensus to the 
culture and return the nation to its mission of spreading the intertwined gospels of 
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evangelical Christianity, republican government, and muscular capitalism to the lost 
nations of the world. 
It is difficult to sustain the Cosmic Narrative’s critique of political and cultural 
power as inherently corrupting or evil while also presenting people like Winthrop, 
Washington, and Madison as heroes and great leaders who understood that the role of 
government was to be a means by which Christian morality and Christian values could 
not only be enacted and protected in society, but also spread throughout the world. In the 
American Narrative, the powers of government, culture, and education do not represent 
an inherent danger to Christians; it is only when those powers exceed their divinely-
ordained authority and begin to impede on the spheres of society that God intended for 
the church and the family that they threaten the divine order.  
LaHaye, for example, counters those who believe that clergy should not be 
politically active by writing that “we wouldn’t have to, if politicians would confine 
themselves to government, economics, and national defense, but today they are intruding 
into areas of morality and the family, attempting to legislate outside their domain.”62 
When government acts outside its domain, it usurps not only the authority of other human 
institutions like private business, the church, or the family, but also the authority of God; 
by making people dependent upon government rather than on their own work or private 
charity, government replaces God. Tim and Beverly LaHaye, for example, complain that 
“society is being conditioned to look to government, not God, for guidance,”63 and 
Falwell similarly laments that “today Americans […] are looking to government rather 
than to God, who ordained government.”64 Whitehead suggests that faith in government 
(which he roots in Marxism) has risen to the level of a “state religion” which “is already 
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involved in a bitter conflict with the religion of Christ.”65 The argument that the false 
religion of government is usurping the authority of God implicitly shifts the ground for 
the dispute over the size of government: those who argue for government to have a more 
active role in the economy and society are no longer simply providing a different solution 
to society’s problems, but are marked as blasphemers who seek to undermine not only the 
divinely-ordained hierarchy of human power, but also God God’s-self.66 
In the American Narrative, contra Reagan, government itself is not the problem. 
The mere fact that government has a role in the divinely-ordained hierarchy suggests a 
space in the American Narrative for government to be a force for good rather than a 
threat to God’s social order. Falwell writes, for example, that government is part of God’s 
overall design for “a republic governed by laws predicated on the Bible”—including free-
market capitalism and trusting private charity to assist the poor, which he suggests are 
biblically-rooted ideas.67 Similarly, Whitehead writes that “as long as the state does not 
claim absolute authority and autonomy, it can exercise a lawful role in establishing order 
and civil justice.”68  
It is important to note that the limited role for the state in the American Narrative 
is not similar to the libertarian vision of a completely laissez-faire government that 
exercises as little control as possible over all aspects of society, including public 
morality. Rather, as Whitehead suggests, “part of the state's task of protecting the good 
[…] is to create an atmosphere where men can be saved and come to the knowledge of 
the truth.”69 As discussed above, this reflects a definition of terms like “freedom” and 
“liberty” in which the role of the powers-that-be is to enable people to make good choices 
to the benefit of the collective whole, rather than giving them license to make any choices 
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no matter their consequences for the nation. Ultimately, the powers-that-be—including 
not only governmental and cultural powers, but also the institutions of the church, private 
business, and the family—must recognize that they are exercising authority that has been 
delegated to them by God, to provide concrete and contextualized enactments on earth of 
God’s timeless and universal laws.70 
The American Narrative’s positioning of power not as inherently evil but as a 
neutral tool to be used by Christians for the protection of the family and the good of the 
gospel is, like the vision of the Christian consensus and the Christian nation, rooted in the 
narrative’s presentation of American history. Whitehead, for example, writes that the 
founders’ emulation of English common law was a good understanding of the limits and 
role of government, producing a Constitution that “acknowledg[ed] that a system of 
absolutes exists upon which government and law can be founded.”71 Similarly, Falwell 
writes: 
When America was founded, the legitimate purpose of government was to 
protect the lives, the liberties, and the property of the citizens. It was not 
the purpose of government to redistribute resources or to enforce any 
particular results in the relationships and dealings of the citizenry among 
themselves. Simply stated, government was to protect the God-given 
rights of the people.72 
The emphasis on “God-given rights” here is important to the American Narrative’s 
formulation of political and cultural power; the narrative suggests that the founders had a 
clear vision not only that rights came from God, but that the specific content of those 
rights could be derived from the divine revelation of Scripture. This conception of natural 
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law was so central to the “Christian world-and-life view” of the founders, write Kennedy 
and Newcombe, that it was even central to the vision of non-Christian founders like 
Benjamin Franklin; all of the founding generation, they write, were steeped in 
Blackstone’s conception “that natural law comes from God (in nature) and that revealed 
law also comes from God (in revelation, in the Holy Scriptures).”73 
Challenges and Resolutions 
It is evident that there are some significant points of dissonance between the two 
narratives’ frameworks for the audience/protagonists’ subject-position, group identity, 
and relationship to power. Some of these challenges can be addressed by overtly shifting 
the circumference of identity based on one’s situations or purposes; Timothy LaHaye, for 
example, differentiates between religious organizations with which he is willing to 
cooperate as a pastor on matters of evangelism and theology and those with which he is 
willing to cooperate on issues of political and social activism. This enables him to 
articulate both the narrow vision of a “biblical fundamentalist with strong doctrinal 
positions” of a restricted community of born-again Christians as a minority within the 
larger culture, and a broader vision based in the American Narrative of a silent majority 
of pro-moral Americans who want a return to the traditional values of their forebears.74 
This call for “cobelligerency,” as Schaeffer called it, is echoed by numerous rhetors who 
perceive the threat of secular humanism as being great enough to put aside theological 
differences for the good of the greater whole. 
The narratives also create challenges and dissonances for subject-position identity 
for those who are implicated (to a greater or lesser degree) as subjects in both narratives, 
particularly with regards to their relationship with the political and cultural powers-that-
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be, because they set out different (and contradictory) paths for the relationship between 
their subject/protagonists and the political and cultural powers of this world. 
The historical appeals used within the Cosmic Narrative’s motif of persecution 
pose a problem for the American Narrative’s image of the silent majority. In the Cosmic 
Narrative, the persecution of the early church is seen not only as a sign of righteousness 
but also as a force used by God for the strengthening of the church’s faith. For the first 
centuries of its existence, the Christian movement was not only a minority movement but 
a small one at that, and in many of the stories about persecution in the New Testament 
book of Acts, the persecution of Christians by the legal authorities was condoned or even 
demanded by the general populace. In other words, the church stood at odds not only 
with the powers-that-be, but with the majority of the public as well, giving rise to a 
formulation of “the world” that included not just the elites and the authorities but every 
person or institution that was not of Christ. The contemporary parallel to the popular 
aspect of those persecution narratives is the suggestion that born-again Christians in 
modern-day America will experience persecution not only in the form of ridicule or 
censorship by the elites in the culture industry, but also in the form of ridicule and 
microaggressions from co-workers, neighbors, friends, or family, even if their persecutors 
are nominally Christian. This model threatens to indict the silent pro-family majority of 
the American Narrative; if the persecution motif in the Cosmic Narrative is carried 
through, not only does this silent majority passively condone the microaggressive 
mockery of born-again Christians, but many members of that same majority are actively 
participating in it. 
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These dissonances are addressed through two strategic appeals. The first strategic 
appeal, the via negativa, is to a common enemy, one that can be presented as an 
alternative religion that is simultaneously the once and future enemy and persecutor of 
the true Christian faith (for the Cosmic Narrative), and a massive breach and usurpation 
of the social structure ordained by God for the nation God has chosen to spread the 
gospel and freedom throughout the world (for the American Narrative). This common 
enemy is secular humanism, which is portrayed within the context of the narratives as the 
demonically-driven force behind the various other threats that face both the American 
nation and Christianity as a whole.  
The second strategic appeal, the via positiva, is to the symbols of theistic civil 
religion as a common set of symbols that are recast as an endorsement not of the vague, 
ecumenical god of pro-moral cobelligerency between Protestants, Catholics, Mormons, 
and Jews, but specifically as the Christian God calling the nation’s evangelicals to lead 
the nation into a state of (Protestant-flavored) Christian spiritual revival. The conflation 
of the nostalgic “traditional Americana,” which includes the “old-time religion” valorized 
within the rhetoric of the Cosmic Narrative, with an evangelical form of American 
Protestantism, functions to code the symbols of civil religion as signs of the true 
Protestant faith of the nation—signs that can also be used outside the context of the 
narratives to build alliances among various disparate (religious and non-religious) 
conservative voices. 
Both of these strategies have a similar epistemological pattern in which the 
resonance between the American and Cosmic Narratives suggest alternative 
interpretations for the identities they construct (the antagonist-identity of secular 
 286 
humanism and the protagonist-identity of Protestant Americanism) than those that are 
prevalent in the wider culture. In the case of the via negativa, the American and Cosmic 
Narratives argue that the only true enemy is Satan’s agenda of secular humanism, which 
is presented as the ultimate cause of virtually every bad thing that happens to the United 
States—including terrorism, economic woes, natural disaster, and moral decline; in 
contrast, while the wider culture does seek connections between the threats and 
challenges facing the nation, the idea that a unitary agenda unites them all is not widely 
accepted, and discussion of “secular humanism” by name is rarely part of the public 
discourse outside the Christian Right. Similarly, in the via positiva case of civil religion, 
the American and Cosmic Narratives reinterpret civil-religious symbols and rituals not as 
a means of including and unifying the nation as a whole around a common set of beliefs 
independent of religion (as the wider culture tends to view them), but as signs that the 
founders intended for the nation to be dominated culturally and religiously by evangelical 
Christians. 
In both instances, then, the set of meanings produced by the interaction between 
the American and Cosmic Narratives functions as a kind of special revelation—a form of 
knowledge which can only be truly comprehended by those who have ears to hear and 
eyes to see it. At the same time, though, the narratives themselves insist that these truths 
are accessible to anyone who has a proper interpretation of the commonly-accepted 
historical record—and, moreover, implies that because these truths are at the center of the 
American Narrative, they are held in common among Americans, at least on some level. 
This epistemological ambiguity creates the opportunity and space for the manipulation of 
identity categories for Christian Right rhetors. On the one hand, their interpretations of 
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secular humanism and civil religion can serve as a sort of code language that serves to 
define those who understand the truth from those who do not, and to appeal to their 
adherents as those who possess the whole picture, thereby further reinforcing both the 
positive and negative identity strategies. On the other hand, by suggesting that such 
knowledge is (at least on a gut level) understood by everyone, they assert widespread 
support for their agenda and position the symbols of evangelical Christianity (as they 
interpret them) outside the realm of argument or disputation in American discourse. This 
ambiguity in identity also creates several different routes to justify political and cultural 
power, reinforcing the Cosmic Narrative’s discomfort with the “powers-that-be” in the 
present tense while at the same time undermining that discomfort in the future tense. 
The via negativa: Secular Humanism 
Scholarship on the construction of identity through discourse has long understood 
the essentiality of difference in defining identity. Stuart Hall, for example, writes that 
“identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their 
capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside,’ abjected. Every identity has at its 
‘margin,’ an excess, something more.”75 As the circumferences for the circle defining the 
in-group defined by the American Narrative and Cosmic Narrative compete with one 
another, the definition of the out-group takes on a more definitional role. Consequently, 
both narratives present a more or less unified vision for those who stand outside the circle 
and seek to oppose and oppress those within. 
Within the context of the two narratives, secular humanism provides a common 
enemy whose opposition can not only explain the contradictions between the narratives’ 
constructions of identity, but also provide a transcendent explanation for the multiple 
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forces perceived to be organizing in opposition to American evangelical Christianity. 
Secular humanism is presented as an amoral alternative religion operating in competition 
with Christianity—and as such, with an agenda to neuter or eliminate the Christian faith. 
While the Cosmic and American Narratives emphasize different aspects of the secular 
humanist agenda, the two narratives’ portrayals of secular humanism are not in conflict 
with one another, in contrast to the dissonances that exist in the two narratives’ 
constructions of subject-group identity.  
Secular humanism bridges the gap between the silent majority and the persecuted 
minority in two ways. First, as an alternative religion, it provides an explanation for the 
persecution of born-again Christians. Through a sophisticated machinery of 
indoctrination and thought control, the secular humanists who run public education and 
the culture industry (including Hollywood and the television and radio broadcast 
networks) have brainwashed the silent majority of pro-moral Americans into thinking 
that born-again Christians are either ridiculous or dangerous. Second, secular humanism 
is painted as part of Satan’s agenda from the beginning of the world and as the 
explanation for all of the problems and obstacles facing the United States, thereby setting 
up a logic whereby all other antagonists are subsumed underneath the banner of secular 
humanism. If one wants to fight America’s earthly enemies (Islamic terrorism, the 
breakdown of community, economic decline) or Christianity’s spiritual enemies (moral 
decline, relativism, heresy, disbelief, and ultimately Satan himself), the enemy is one and 
the same: the secular humanists who are destroying the nation, undermining Christianity, 
and ultimately serving the agenda of Satan. In other words, no matter which of the 
Cosmic Narrative’s or the American Narrative’s circumferences of in-group identity is in 
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play at any given time, opposition to secular humanism remains a constant and primary 
concern. This, in turn, requires that one support the Christian Right’s ideal form for a 
prosperous and godly United States against which the secular humanists are fighting. 
Secular Humanism as an Alternative Religion 
Central to the narratives’ conception of secular humanism is the notion that 
despite secular humanism’s self-portrayal as a non-religious viewpoint, it is in fact an 
alternative religion with its own holy texts, dogmas, and beliefs that are no less real and 
definable than those of Christians. This idea creates a rhetorical space in which any 
attempt to enact religious pluralism or religious neutrality in government, media, or 
culture can be portrayed as part of the secular humanist agenda. If both irreligion and 
Christianity are religious viewpoints, then neutrality is impossible; those who argue that 
Judeo-Christian religious values should not occupy a dominant place in the public square 
are really calling for secular humanist religious values to take that dominant position, 
whether or not they admit or even understand that they are doing so. 
Tim LaHaye is perhaps the most prominent voice in presenting secular humanism 
as an alternative religion. To LaHaye, the scriptures of secular humanism are the 
Humanist Manifestos, a series of three documents (written in 1933, 1973, and 2003) that 
lay out the views of the religious and secular humanists who signed the documents. The 
Humanist Manifestos, he writes, “are not the weird ideas of a few obscure imbeciles 
unworthy of our consideration,” but rather “the religious beliefs of some of the most 
influential people in America,”76 representative of the beliefs of all secular humanists. In 
contrast to the “nonsectarian religious values” of pro-moral Americans, the Humanist 
Manifestos suggest that morality is relative and contextual: 
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Ask a Roman Catholic, Baptist, Jew, Muslim, Mormon, or Presbyterian, 
‘Is it wrong to lie, cheat, steal, kill, or commit adultery?’ They will usually 
answer with a resounding yes. But ask a secular humanist, atheist, 
communist, or socialist, and he'll respond, ‘Not always,’ ‘In some 
circumstances,’ or ‘There are no absolute rights or wrongs.’ Both answers 
are based on religion; in fact, both rely on ‘Scripture.’ The religious 
answer from the Judeo-Christian Scriptures, the secularists from the 
Humanist Manifestos I and II.77 
This is a key pivot point for LaHaye: Not only does he argue that secular humanism is a 
fully-developed religion, but it also opens up the space for him to argue that the “pro-
moral” viewpoint he advocates is not in itself a fully-developed religion, but is instead a 
point where numerous other fully-developed religious viewpoints intersect. In this way, 
he can argue that the American founders truly did intend a separation of church and 
state—but that they did not consider the “nonsectarian religious values” of the “Judeo-
Christian Scriptures” to fall afoul of that doctrine. He suggests that deceptively, 
“religious humanists have labeled their doctrine secular humanism, ours religion. Then 
by claiming that morals originated with the teachers of the Bible, they, too, are classified 
as religious. Thus both religion and morality are excluded from our public schools.”78 
The establishment of secular humanism in government, on the other hand, does violate 
the Establishment Clause, since it is a specific religious viewpoint—and, moreover, a 
viewpoint held by a minority who seek to impose their religion on the God-fearing 
majority: 
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Some of [James Madison’s] best arguments on religious freedom and 
separation of church and state are particularly appropriate today, when 
secularists seem to have no aversion to using the awesome power of 
government to advance the religious beliefs of humanism, particularly in 
our government-controlled public schools.79 
The present situation, then, is (in LaHaye’s eyes) completely contrary to the will of the 
American founders, who intended for government to “accommodate” religion by 
establishing a common-ground absolute morality with which people of all religions could 
agree, thus providing the space for religious viewpoints to be expressed as the foundation 
of the American formulation of human rights: 
The First Amendment has been so distorted that it is producing what it 
was written to prohibit—an established philosophy of secular humanism, 
which in every sense is itself an established religion—and this in a nation 
that once accommodated religion because its founders believed that 
‘unalienable rights’ came from God our Creator and were thus 
safeguarded through a relationship with him.80 
At times, David Barton’s understanding of the religious nature of secular humanism 
would, on its face, seem to disagree with LaHaye’s portrayal of secular humanism as a 
fully-fledged religion. Barton argues that the American founders defined religion as one’s 
beliefs about one’s duty to the “Supreme Being,” with the presupposition that any true 
religion would include belief in the supernatural; thus, the “original intent” of the First 
Amendment does not protect atheism, secular humanism, or any other viewpoint that 
does not include belief in God. 
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In earlier decisions on the First Amendment, neither atheism nor secular 
humanism qualified as ‘religions’—for obvious reasons. [...] At a 
minimum, the Founders identified a religion by its belief in some Supreme 
Being; without that belief, there could be no ‘religion.’81 
The declaration that secular humanism is a religion that deserves First Amendment 
protections, Barton argues, makes the position of religious neutrality in government 
untenable, as government cannot exclude religious viewpoints without promoting 
irreligion, and vice versa: “since either religion or nonreligion will be endorsed by its 
presence, how can ‘neutrality’ and ‘no favoritism’ be maintained under such 
standards?”82 
This apparent contradiction on the religious nature of secular humanism is 
resolved by considering the American Narrative’s definition of “religious freedom” under 
the First Amendment as a form of positive liberty rather than negative liberty. As 
Kennedy and Newcombe write:  
Liberty has always been endangered—and has been under increasing 
assault—by those who are not free in Christ. […] The modern humanist is 
daily on his platform crying out for license. He does not want freedom 
under law—he wants freedom from law, unless he can remake the laws 
into decrees that legalize license.83 
This quotation also illustrates that the language of “religious freedom” cloaks an effective 
hierarchy of religious values to be respected by government. By conflating “those who 
are not free in Christ” (in other words, those who are not born-again, evangelical 
Christians) with secular humanists, Kennedy and Newcombe imply that those who do not 
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adhere to evangelical Christianity are, to at least some degree, humanists “crying out for 
license.” While non-evangelicals may not be completely humanized (on the following 
page, Kennedy and Newcombe present a more open circumference that includes “the 
Judeo-Christian tradition of the Ten Commandments”84), they are clearly compromised in 
a way that the “free in Christ” are not. This hierarchy of values thus places evangelical 
Protestantism at the head, making evangelicalism the full expression of “religious 
freedom,” with the less-pure versions of Christianity (Roman Catholicism, mainline 
Protestantism) and conservative Judaism occupying a more ambivalent space (which is, 
nevertheless, still above that of the secular humanists). 
All rhetors within this tradition, however, agree that secular humanism is not a 
neutral least common denominator upon which to build public and civic institutions in 
which all can participate regardless of their religious beliefs. On the contrary, they argue, 
one of the most insidious aspects of secular humanism is its tendency to cloak itself in the 
language of neutrality, irreligion, or science rather than coming clean about its religious 
nature. This disguise enables secular humanism to evade the Supreme Court’s 
prohibitions on religion in government—and particularly on the teaching of religion in 
public schools, where secular humanists are constantly tempting innocent young minds to 
abandon their Christian faith. The disguise worn by secular humanism includes 
presenting itself as “open-minded” and “nonjudgmental,” in contrast to conservative 
Christian critics. This is, in reality, a smokescreen to cover up the intolerance of the 
secular humanist religion towards any belief systems that acknowledge God or God’s 
moral law. As LaHaye writes: 
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[T]oday’s humanists, who grandly proclaim their tolerance of opposing 
views and proudly advocate respect of the opinions of others, become so 
vicious in their expressed hatred of Christianity and its absolutes. […] 
Because the biblical revelation and moral absolutes of Christianity 
comprise ‘public enemy number one,’ they work relentlessly for their 
destruction.85 
Similarly, Whitehead writes that “the new ‘religion’ of secular humanism cannot and will 
not be tolerant of the biblical, Christian values still embodied in the American legal and 
social structure.”86 This trope of “open-minded hypocrites” enables Christian Right 
rhetors to set themselves up as the models for the true tolerance, in the same way as they 
are models for the true religious freedom. The false version of tolerance is “a weakening 
of the lines between good and evil, right and wrong,”87 in which “your religious beliefs 
are no better than anyone else’s since, after all, everything is relative.”88 In contrast, the 
true version of tolerance is to “put up with or bear with people who hold to views or 
beliefs or values or lifestyles that you don't agree with,”89 but with the implicit 
understanding that you are both pursuing the same fundamental good—or, as Barton 
writes: 
Christian principles […] produced America’s toleration for other religions; 
and while America did legislate according to Christian standards of 
conduct for social behavior, it did not tell other religions how, where, 
when, or even whether to worship.90 
The rhetoric surrounding secular humanism is flexible enough that its proponents can be 
portrayed in both earthly and cosmic terms. In earthly terms, they are hedonists who grate 
 295 
at the suggestion that there is any absolute moral law to which they adhere (particularly 
one which would impede their sexual desires), or they are the brainwashed dupes of the 
nation’s enemies, who seek to weaken the United States by striking at the family 
structure that sits at its foundation. In cosmic terms, they are, wittingly or unwittingly, 
fulfilling the agenda of Satan himself to weaken the United States as a missionary nation 
to the world, perhaps in advance of the End Times in which the Antichrist will arise and 
institute a demonically-inspired world state. 
Just as the Cosmic Narrative bifurcates the populace into individuals who are 
either “saved” or “unsaved,” so too does the Christian Right’s narrative construction of 
secular humanism suggest that no social institution—government, business, education, 
the news media, Hollywood—can remain neutral in the culture war. If a social 
institution’s choices do not reflect the values of the Christian Right—whether the broader 
“coalition” values of the pro-moral movement, or the more narrow values of conservative 
Protestantism—then they are reflective of the secular humanist agenda. 
This is perhaps most evident in Christian Right rhetors’ dismissal of the charge 
that they seek to “legislate morality” with the suggestion that any law is, in effect, a 
legislation of morality. Kennedy and Newcombe, for example, write: 
To say that morality cannot be legislated is just a lie. The truth is that you 
cannot legislate anything but morality. [...] The question is simply, Whose 
morality is going to be legislated? It is either going to be God’s morality, 
as expressed in the Judeo-Christian tradition of the Ten Commandments, 
or it is going to be man’s morality, as expressed in the Humanist 
Manifesto, which sanctions everything that used to be called immorality.91 
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In this line of thinking, to the extent that the law permits an act, it encourages it and 
thereby declares it moral; similarly, any act penalized or prohibited by law is being 
declared immoral. This logic fuels the more recent suggestion that the successes of the 
LGBT liberation movement in overturning same-sex marriage bans or passing anti-
discrimination laws are dangerous not only for the religious freedom of those who wish 
to discriminate against LGBT people on religious grounds, but also for the nation’s 
youth. To the extent that the law treats LGBT people equally with cisgender 
heterosexuals, it is encouraging young people to “experiment” with homosexuality or 
fluid gender identities.92 To the extent that the law makes divorce easier to obtain, it 
encourages couples who are experiencing marital difficulties to get divorced instead of 
working to reconcile.93 There is no such thing as a law that is “neutral” on the question of 
LGBT rights or divorce; if the law treats LGBT people equally with cisgender 
heterosexual people, or makes it easier for married couples to obtain a divorce, it is 
encouraging and condoning those acts by exhibiting a moral viewpoint in which such 
things are permissible. 
Secular Humanism At War with Christianity 
If religious neutrality in government, society, culture, or the media is impossible, 
then every cultural institution becomes a battlefield between the “pro-moral” and the 
secular humanists. This rhetorical form resonates with themes in both narratives. The 
American Narrative’s open-ended teleology suggests that the nation sits on the knife’s 
edge between disaster and blessing, which is ideal for seeing every struggle, no matter 
how small, as a potential tipping point for the nation’s fate. The Cosmic Narrative’s 
overarching theme is that there is a great war between God and Satan that spans all of 
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space and time. As with much of the rhetoric about secular humanism, the public schools 
serve as LaHaye’s example: 
Once [secular humanism] is identified as a dangerous religion and 
expelled legally from our public schools, it will collapse under its own 
weight, for the American people—particularly parents—will never agree 
to subsidize the spiritual destruction of their children.94 
This quotation exhibits as a nuance another crucial aspect of the characterization of 
secular humanists. Regardless of the tension between the narratives’ construction of 
protagonist identity as persecuted minority or the silent majority, the narratives agree that 
secular humanism is not the viewpoint of the majority; rather, secular humanists are a 
minority who have embedded themselves into positions of power in cultural institutions 
(“government, education, commerce, the media, and in some cases, liberal churches”95), 
where they will be able to have a disproportionately-large influence on society despite 
their small numbers.96  The secular humanists are aware that their values do not reflect 
those of the American majority: 
If [humanist measures] were debated and voted upon by the people, they 
would be turned down; yet the politicians blithely enact legislation that is 
antithetical to the will of the majority. Have you ever asked why? It is all 
very simple, if you face the fact that we are being controlled by a small but 
very influential cadre of committed humanists, who are determined to turn 
traditionally moral-minded America into an amoral, humanist country. Oh, 
they don’t call it humanist. They label it democracy, but they mean 
humanism, in all its atheistic, amoral depravity.97 
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Because secular humanists understand that their values are in conflict with those of 
Christians and pro-moral Americans, they seek to maintain their influence by using their 
positions as elites in the culture industry to engage in a campaign of indoctrination and 
“mind control.”98 The public education system serves as one of the central settings for 
this agenda, with the innocence of children heightening the themes of crisis, threat, and 
fear that pervade both narratives’ portrayal of the contemporary era.99 In this construction 
of the secular humanist agenda, the humanists, by becoming predominant in the public 
schools,100 use education to inculcate children with their morality.  
The narratives’ portrayal of the dangers of secular humanist public education is 
rooted in the epistemological resonance between the American and Cosmic Narratives. 
Both narratives suggest that the ultimate truth holding the universe together is not the 
impersonal and objective laws of science or mathematics, but rather the personal 
authority of God the Creator and God’s absolute moral law, without which the 
established laws of science and mathematics would not be trustworthy. Because secular 
humanists in public school are trying to teach facts without values, the narratives suggest, 
they are failing at teaching both. 
Portraying indoctrination as the means for the spread of secular humanism creates 
another articulation point for bridging the narratives’ competing circumferences of 
identity. Those members of American Narrative’s “silent majority” who support aspects 
of the secular humanist agenda are doing so not because they would agree with the whole 
of that agenda, but because they have been deceived and indoctrinated by secular 
humanists; if they only knew what the secular humanists’ goals for society were, they 
would surely oppose any inkling of secular humanism. At the same time, the narratives 
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suggest that the reason many members of the majority could be deceived was because 
they have not truly experienced salvation through Jesus Christ and are not currently 
active in Bible-believing churches at which the secular humanist agenda is clearly laid 
out and opposed; thus, in tune with the Cosmic Narrative’s identity construction, the 
indoctrination trope sets out an implicit division between the nominal Christians whose 
minds were open and susceptible to secular humanist indoctrination, and the truly born-
again Christians whose complete Christian worldview insulated and protected them from 
such deceptions. 
Secular Humanism Uniting and Subsuming All Other Enemies 
The second means by which the rhetorical construction of secular humanism as 
via negativa bridges the gap between the Cosmic Narrative and American Narrative’s 
conceptions of identity is by subsuming both narratives’ articulations of the enemy, thus 
providing an overarching explanation for all of the problems that face both the United 
States and the Christian faith. By presenting the struggle between Christianity and secular 
humanism (or the philosophies that evolved into secular humanism) as a war that has 
raged continuously throughout both the kairotic timeframe of the Cosmic Narrative and 
the chronic timeframe of the American Narrative, all of the struggles faced by the faith, 
the nation, and the individual can ultimately be traced back to Satan’s secular humanist 
agenda.  
The rhetoric of secular humanism enables Christian Right rhetors to conflate the 
agenda of American social liberals with that of the enemy abroad, and to conflate 
opposition to evangelical Christianity and opposition to the United States, thus setting out 
a hard external boundary for the circumference of identity. If the enemies of America are 
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the same as the enemies of conservative Christianity, and if the domestic enemies of the 
social conservative agenda are the same as the foreign enemies of the global American 
agenda, then the moral duty of opposition to America’s foreign enemies must involve 
devotion to the social and theological agenda of conservative Christianity. To this view, 
American identity is not just capitalism, republicanism, the nuclear family, baseball, 
Mom, and apple pie, under the guarding eye of the vague providential god of civil 
religion. Rather, because the historic secular humanist (satanic) agenda opposes both 
America and Christianity, American identity by implication is explicitly evangelical and 
Protestant, drawing moral strength from the inerrancy of the Bible. With secular 
humanism in the role of the transcendent earthly cause of every existential threat facing 
the United States and Christianity, opposition to the secular humanist agenda becomes 
the duty of every American and every Christian—thus creating the conditions by which 
rhetors can deftly conflate the identity categories, so that being a good American means 
being a good Christian, and vice versa. 
The via negativa of secular humanism plays a major role in the motif of national 
decline. The narratives suggest differing explanations for the purpose and ultimate telos 
of the nation’s decline, but the portrayal of secular humanism enables rhetors to suggest 
that the root cause in both instances is the same—the satanically-linked secular humanist 
agenda. But this does not mean that secular humanism is a recent threat; in both 
narratives, the ideology of secular humanism is linked to the archetypal temptations that 
have faced the narratives’ protagonists since the very beginning of the story. In the 
Cosmic Narrative, for example, secular humanism is only one manifestation of a timeless 
idolatry: 
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But did these humanistic ideas originate with the Greeks? Hardly! They 
were a superstitious, polytheistic people, whose religion permeated their 
thinking, but even they didn’t originate these ideas, for such teachings can 
be traced back to Confucius, Buddha, and even Babylon, the source of all 
religions.101 
This reinforces the Manichaean worldview of the Cosmic Narrative: just as truth and 
goodness are a unified, single entity, so too are falsehood and evil. Despite the illusion 
that there are a multiplicity of non-Christian faiths, those with eyes to see can understand 
that whether they are Eastern (Buddhism, Confucianism) or Western (Greek humanism), 
all religions (contrasted here with Christianity as a truth that transcends religiosity) are 
merely different versions of the single false religion of Babylon.  
Similarly, Marshall and Manuel cast the entire American story against the 
backdrop of spiritual warfare, suggesting that the recent rise of secular humanism is 
merely the latest stage of a satanic plot against Christianity in the New World that goes 
all the way back to Columbus’s initial “discovery” of the Americas in the fifteenth 
century. Satan, realizing that he could not stop God from planting a Christian nation on 
the American continent, set out to corrupt the Americans by using “dupes and unwitting 
servants” to turn their hearts away from God and toward their own desires, leading to the 
self-destruction of the nation either by civil war or by steady internal erosion.102 
Schaeffer makes a similar argument in How Should We Then Live?, suggesting that 
present-day secular humanism is merely the evolutionary end result of the humanism of 
the Renaissance, “a value system rooted in the belief that man is his own measure, that 
man is autonomous, totally independent.”103 
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Secular humanists in the United States are also portrayed as being in league—
ideologically if not strategically—with the nation’s foreign enemies, with the common 
agenda of weakening the United States and Christianity. For the first decades of the 
Christian Right’s existence (during the Cold War), this theme involved adapting an 
already-existing trope among American political conservatives that members of the 
American center-left were (wittingly or not) aiding the Soviet foe in the spread of 
international communism and the weakening of the United States. This rich rhetorical 
soil enabled Christian Right figures to utilize already-existing appeals within anti-
communist discourse such as the weakening of the American family and the decline of 
American military masculinity, bringing them to the conclusion that the center of 
American strength was not just the nuclear family, but the evangelical Christian nuclear 
family, grounded in sound conservative theology. Christian Right rhetors took advantage 
of the same premises that conservative rhetors had used to argue for greater military 
belligerence against the Soviet Union and greater order on the home front, but brought 
them to a more sectarian conclusion. For example, in Listen, America! (1980), Jerry 
Falwell wrote: 
Communists know that in order to take over a country they must first see 
to it that a nation’s military strength is weakened and that its morals are 
corrupted so that its people will have no will to resist wrong. When people 
begin to accept perversion and immorality as ways of life, as is happening 
in the United States today, we must beware. This should be a danger 
signal and a warning to our country. Our enemies know that when we are 
weak morally, and when we have lost our will to fight, we are in a 
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precarious position for takeover. Communists seek to discredit the 
authority of the Word of God. Today in America we find the Bible being 
questioned by many of our people.104 
Falwell pivots here from the conservative theme of American military and moral decline 
to a case for biblical inerrancy. Because communists seek to undermine American moral 
strength, and because American moral strength is based in the inerrancy of the Bible, then 
opposition to communism requires not only that one support the military might of the 
United States in standing against the global communist agenda, but also that one adapt 
biblical inerrancy in order to resist the communist attempt to “discredit the authority of 
the Word of God.” He further develops this theme several pages later: 
While we know that Russians understand only force, we have been busy 
taking God out of our society in general and our schools in particular, 
instead of thinking about protecting our people. Now our young people are 
reaping the consequences of America's sins. And at the Kremlin we are 
viewed with derision.105 
Usually, the portrayal of the nation’s enemies as “understand[ing] only force” could be 
expected to lead to an argument for military action and against negotiation or 
compromise, and Falwell himself certainly makes the argument often enough in Listen, 
America! that the United States should take a more belligerent stance against the Soviet 
Union.  
In this instance, however, he pivots the trope in a different direction, arguing that 
keeping God in society and in the schools is itself an act of force against the Soviet 
Union. In doing this, Falwell redefines “force” as primarily a form of moral power; 
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America lacks the force to defeat the Soviet enemy because the nation has sinned in 
removing God from society and education. The military decline of the nation and the 
threat to national security posed by the Soviet enemy are merely symptoms of the overall 
disease of moral decline. If the nation were morally strong and held to biblical inerrancy, 
Falwell writes, the Soviet threat would be much less intimidating, as America’s young 
people would be imbued with the kind of moral strength that produces the will to fight 
and to win. Thus, by undermining the authority and inerrancy of the Bible, American 
social liberals and secularists have put the nation in a position ripe for Soviet takeover, 
whether or not that was their intention. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Islamic fundamentalists have 
taken over the rhetorical space of “primary foreign threat” that the Soviet Union occupied 
until the end of the Cold War. It would seem at first glance to be much more difficult to 
connect the agenda of liberal secular humanists in the United States to that of 
fundamentalist Muslims overseas than it was to connect it to the Soviet agenda. While 
American liberalism could be presented as a moderate, politically-acceptable form of 
communism or socialism during the Cold War, there is an almost polar opposition 
between American liberals’ support of women’s rights, reproductive choice, and LGBT 
rights (to say nothing of the Christian Right’s portrayal of secular humanists as atheists, 
hedonists, and relativists) and the rigid views of sexuality and gender, tight restrictions on 
religious and sexual expression, and strict religious law of fundamentalist Islam. It would 
be difficult to argue that American liberals are ideologically sympathetic to foreign 
fundamentalist Muslims, as conservative rhetors during the Cold War era argued liberals 
were toward foreign communist influence. 
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As a result, Christian Right rhetors in the post-9/11 context rhetorically link 
secular humanists and fundamentalist Muslims by emphasizing their opposition to God’s 
purposes, as expressed in the Cosmic and American Narratives. Both secular humanists 
and fundamentalist Muslims are trying to stymie God’s purposes for humanity by 
opposing Christian evangelism—secular humanists  by eroding “religious freedom” 
domestically and undermining the cultural force of Christianity, fundamentalist Muslims 
by persecuting evangelical Christians in the countries they control. Secular humanists and 
fundamentalist Muslims also have in common their desire to weaken the United States of 
America as a militarily- and economically-dominant force in the world.  
In a way, this line of reasoning is a classic example of turning a liability into an 
asset. Because Christian Right rhetors cannot credibly argue that secular humanists are 
ideologically sympathetic to the fundamentalist Muslim enemies of the Christian United 
States, they can suggest that secular humanists are so consumed with their opposition to 
and hatred of evangelical Christianity and American dominance that are willing to ally 
even with those who would be their bitterest foes in other contexts, so long as it brings 
down the United States. 
Pat Robertson encapsulates this line of thinking by suggesting that liberals are 
embracing radical Islam as a form of rebellion: 
[Liberals] want to rebel against the established order, and the established 
order of western civilization is basically Christian. […] And so if 
somebody wants to rebel against that, then anything else goes. So here 
comes an ideology out of Saudi Arabia, 7th Century Saudi Arabia, talking 
about persecution of women, cutting off hands, decapitating people, 
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butchering whole populations because they happen to share a different 
faith and the so-called Left is saying, ‘this is the ideology we want.’106 
This theme has become particularly prevalent since the election of Barack Obama, as 
many Christian Right figures attempt to reconcile the president’s support for LGBT rights 
and reproductive choice with their opinion that he is, if not secretly a Muslim, at least 
sympathetic to the agenda of Islamic fundamentalists (including their opposition to both 
women’s rights and LGBT rights) and actively promoting and protecting them both in the 
United States and abroad. The explanation presented for these seemingly-irreconcilable 
positions is that both Islamic militants and secular humanism weaken the United States, 
as Gina Miller of website BarbWire107 makes clear: 
We see what the Muslims are doing in our nation and around the world.  
We see the Muslim sympathizer in the White House (who has allowed 
Muslim Brotherhood operatives into his administration) downplay Islamic 
terror in our nation, mislabeling the jihadi terror attack at Fort Hood as 
‘workplace violence.’  We have seen Barack Obama (or whatever his 
name is) arm and finance Islamists in the Middle East.  We have seen him 
leave our southern border wide open to illegal aliens and Muslim 
terrorists.  We have seen him allow our Ambassador and others to be 
murdered by Islamists in Benghazi.  We have seen him purge our military 
and intelligence communities of rational reference to Islamic dangers and 
forbid them from monitoring mosques—all this while he decimates our 
military and floods it with ‘out and proud’ homosexual deviants.108 
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In this scenario, President Obama is working hand-in-glove with fundamentalist Muslims 
abroad—if not as an active ally, then as a passive “sympathizer”—with the shared goal of 
weakening the United States. 
The battlefields of the great war between God and Satan and between America 
and its enemies, are not merely external, however. Because this is a struggle between 
ideas and ideologies, each person’s mind is also a site of pitched battle, with the enemy 
constantly seeking a foothold. The ideology of secular humanism has the potential to 
infect not just the body politic—in the form of syncretism and worldliness (in the Cosmic 
Narrative) and secularism and liberalism (in the American Narrative)—but also the heart 
and mind of the individual believer. Thus, the believer must be on constant guard to 
ensure that such thinking does not gain a beachhead in their own mind. This idea looms 
so large that Tim LaHaye titled his first major book about political activism The Battle 
for the Mind in 1980, writing that “what this life is all about is THE BATTLE FOR YOUR 
MIND: whether you will live your life guided by man’s wisdom (humanism) or God's 
wisdom (Christianity).”109  
Characterizing secular humanism not just as an external threat but as an enemy 
within one’s own heart and mind makes it all the more dangerous. Instead of being 
openly antagonistic and, thus, easily identified as an enemy, secular humanism is 
constantly trying to gain a foothold in the mind of individual believers by sowing doubts 
about the authority of the Bible and undermining their own simple faith in God. This 
characteristic binds together the archetypal enemy in the Cosmic Narrative (Satan) and 
the archetypal enemy in the American Narrative (the liberal elite), as LaHaye writes: 
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Genesis shows Satan’s first attempt at discrediting the Word of God when 
he asked Eve, ‘Did God really say?’ and his first attempt at denying the 
Word of God, ‘You will not surely die’ (Gen. 3:1-5). Sad to say, the 
thousands of years since then finds [sic] human beings still believing 
Satan and not God. Today the Bible is not believed by the majority of 
people but rather is subjected to the criticism of skeptics in education, the 
entertainment industry, science, and even the liberal ministry. This 
skepticism has tragically resulted in the doom of many unsuspecting 
souls.110 
This skepticism is not only a danger to the locus of religion in the Cosmic Narrative, the 
individual; it is also a danger to the whole of the body politic, the locus of religion in the 
American Narrative, because of the linkage between the nation’s spiritual well-being and 
its well-being in other areas. Falwell, for example, writes that if the American people 
allow secular humanism to undermine the authority of the Bible—either in their own 
hearts or in the policy sphere—then they put the whole of the body politic at risk: “Our 
religious heritage and our liberty can never be separated. America is in trouble today 
because her people are forgetting the origin of her liberty, and questioning the authority 
and inerrancy of the Bible.”111 
The Cosmic and American Narratives share a common epistemological outlook, 
in which God’s moral authority precedes and undergirds the recalcitrance of the physical 
world and the reliability of history. Thus, by undermining the moral authority of God and 
the faith in one’s mind and soul—in both the individual mind and the corporate body 
politic—secular humanism thus also presents a threat to the physical safety, economic 
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security, and happiness of both individual believers and the nation as a whole. Even more 
perniciously, secular humanism attempts to undermine that connection by suggesting that 
the blessings that are promised by both God and history for those who follow God’s law 
can be achieved without the requirement that one follow God’s law.  
Because Americans have allowed secular humanism to take hold within the once-
Christian nation, then, disaster—both human-made and natural—is the result. For 
example, Marshall and Manuel write:  
The opening pages of this book mentioned some social indicators of the 
lifting of God’s grace—the holocaust of abortion, the rapidly decaying 
moral fabric of our public and private lives, the attacks on traditional 
marriage, and the disintegration of the American family. The recent 
increase and intensity of natural disasters seem to bear further witness to 
it. Earthquakes, floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, and raging forest 
fires—if one were to view them with the benefit of time-lapse 
photography, it would be difficult not to conclude that God had a 
controversy with all humankind, and especially America.112 
This explanation for natural disaster leaves a certain amount of rhetorical flexibility, 
however; rhetors can position natural disaster as a sign that God’s judgment has caught 
up to the United States and that the nation’s chickens are finally coming home to roost, or 
that God has not forgotten about the United States and is calling the nation to return to its 
covenant with God. The epistemological uncertainty, in which the audience (from their 
vantage point) cannot know which of these two explanations is the correct one, assumes 
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the nation’s decline and invites the question of whether or not the nation has passed the 
“point of no return”: 
If God continues to lift His grace, it will not be long before we will be in a 
state of chaos very much of our own making. Whether the end comes with 
a bang or a whimper, we seem to be approaching a national point of no 
return, beyond which it will be too late for America to come back.113 
Christian Right rhetors are fully aware that much as polite political society (including 
many of their peers) rejected (or were politically pressured to reject) Jerry Falwell and 
Pat Robertson’s explanation of divine wrath for the 9/11 attacks, there is a similar 
rejection of any explanation for natural disasters but the naturalistic one. The fact that 
Americans, by and large, seek scientific rather than spiritual explanations for such 
disasters only serves as more proof of the nation’s decline, as Barton and Barna write: 
Unlike today’s Americans, who disapprove of God’s job performance in 
handling natural disasters, citizens in earlier generations widely embraced 
the Bible's teachings that weather calamities and disasters were often a 
product of our own public sins and wickedness rather than any failure of 
performance on God’s part.114 
This interpretation also sets up natural disaster as an epistemological test: those who have 
eyes to see are capable of understanding the whole truth, including the truth of the 
nation’s decline, even as those who lack that epistemological outlook grasp for other 
explanations. That natural disasters are not interpreted as divine wrath, leading to national 
self-examination and repentance, is understood as yet another sign that the “Christian 
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consensus” that guided the nation’s founders is no longer present in the United States—
and a further sign that the nation deserves God’s wrath for abandoning God’s moral law. 
The theme of the epistemological test occurs throughout the Christian Right 
rhetoric discussing secular humanism. While the general public see only a series of 
disparate threats like the crumbling family, rising crime, Soviet belligerence, economic 
turmoil, and natural disaster, there is a further truth available to those who have eyes to 
see and ears to hear. Those who understand the fundamentally spiritual root of the threat 
posed by secular humanism are the only people capable of truly comprehending that all 
of the problems faced by the United States and by evangelical Christianity can be traced 
back to the satanic agenda of secular humanism. The portrayal of secular humanists as the 
natural enemies of Christianity because of the contrast between that religion’s absolute 
moral demands and their own hedonism might run the risk of painting secular humanists 
as too individualistic and scattered to present a real, coordinated threat. Presenting them 
as cats-paws for Satan suggests that even though their actions may appear to the 
untrained eye as disjointed and uncoordinated, those who truly believe and understand 
that the agenda of evil has a dark mastermind can see how their actions serve Satanic 
purposes, even if the individuals themselves are not aware of it. 
Secular humanism, thus, represents a complete and totalizing existential threat. 
Because it stands in enmity against both Christian evangelism and American influence, it 
threatens to box in the universal messages of Christianity and Americanism and cut short 
American Christians’ missionary efforts. Because it threatens the moral fabric of the 
nation and the individual, it has the potential to open up both to external dangers, not the 
least of which is God’s righteous discipline or wrath. No matter which locus of religion 
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one adopts, no matter with which narrative one identifies more fully, the secular humanist 
threat undermines skepticism towards both narratives by suggesting that one set aside 
whatever differences or questions one may have in confronting this existential threat.  
And because the secular humanist bogeyman is a threat to both narratives’ 
conceptions of the subject, it conflates those subjects. If one wishes to support the United 
States by combatting those who would stand against it, one cannot do so without also 
accepting (in some form) the evangelical Christian agenda, since the secular humanists’ 
opposition to that agenda—and to the family structures undergirded by the Christian 
consensus—is part and parcel of their ongoing efforts to weaken the United States. 
Similarly, those who would be tempted to suggest that God is no respecter of nations and 
that citizenship in the Kingdom of God necessarily precludes complete citizenship in any 
of the nation-states of the World, the rhetoric of opposition argues that the same people 
who oppose Christian evangelism are also trying to undermine the United States, which 
stands as the last bastion of evangelical hope in a world that is either steadily rejecting 
God (like Europe), rejecting Protestantism in favor of a socialist Catholicism (like 
Central and South America), or adopting the enemy religion of Islam (like Africa and 
Asia). Those who wish to see evangelical Christianity continue as an influential force in 
the world, thus bringing more souls to Christ, are thus obligated to defend the United 
States as the bulwark of true Christianity. 
The via positiva: (Re)interpreting Civil Religion 
It is against the backdrop of the via negativa that we see the other major strategy 
for negotiating the gaps in circumference between the Cosmic and American Narratives: 
the appeal to the symbolic systems of civil religion, wielded in service of the constitutive 
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American and Cosmic Narratives. In using and recirculating these civil religious 
symbols, however, Christian Right rhetors recast the ecumenical and nebulous “divine 
providence” of traditional civil religion into the mold of the evangelical Christian God, 
and in so doing, harness the constitutive functions of civil religious symbols to suggest an 
alternative teleological vision for the nation in which “true American values” are recoded 
as particular to evangelical Christianity, rather than universally accessible by those of any 
(or no) faith.  
In Christian Right discourse, the God of “in God we trust” and “one nation under 
God” is not the generic, eternally-providential God of the American Jeremiad, Bellah’s 
formulation of civil religion, or Hart’s generic formulation of civic piety, but the 
Christian God—and, moreover, a specifically Protestant and evangelical reading of the 
Christian God. The archetypal “family” of the pro-family movement is not just the 
nuclear family living in a house with a white picket fence in an idyllic small-town 
neighborhood; it is an evangelical Protestant nuclear family in which the father (as 
spiritual head) and mother (as spiritual caretaker) raise children not just to be good 
citizens but to be good born-again Christians, ready to fulfill God’s religious, economic, 
and political mission for the United States. The American mission is also recast, 
articulating a vision in which the nation stands not just as proof that American economic 
and political ideas work, but that those ideas can only be truly understood and fulfilled by 
a people who live under a Christian consensus, which grants them the self-control to be 
able to handle liberty, the moral strength to resist evil, and the blessings of God to protect 
them from their adversaries. 
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There are several important implications for this redefinition of civil religion that 
enable it to negotiate the Cosmic and American Narratives’ alternative visions for 
identity. First, because of the role played by civil religious symbols in the formation of 
American collective identity, these symbols are invoked not by argument but by 
assertion; in Aristotelian terms, they loom largest not in the deliberative form, but in the 
epideictic. In American civil religion, the notion of unity plays a constitutive role; 
American civil religion asserts that a nation of disparate ethnic groups and backgrounds 
is held together by a shared commitment to a set of core ideals and values. By asserting 
that the core ideals and values that unite the nation are rooted in a conservative and 
sectarian vision of Christian consensus, the American Narrative places that vision beyond 
the realm of deliberation and debate and puts its imagined interlocutor in the unenviable 
position of undermining that unity. Further, by casting the United States as God’s chosen 
champion not only of the values of freedom, republicanism, and capitalism, but also of 
Christian mission and evangelism worldwide, the recasting of civil religion asserts a 
positive role for American temporal power, undermining the Cosmic Narrative’s 
discomfort with the earthly powers. 
Second, because these symbols are utilized throughout American discourses of 
self-definition, rather than being used more exclusively by the Christian Right, the 
Christian Right’s recast meaning for these symbols exists alongside the more traditional 
understanding, often without manifesting any externally-visible changes in the re-
enactment of the rituals of civil religion. This makes the recast symbols of civil religion 
function as a sort of code language, another epistemological test that cements the 
identities of protagonist and antagonist in the narrative. The “true” meaning of civil 
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religious symbols functions in the same role as special revelation, over against the more 
expansive traditional meaning of civil religious symbols and general revelation—audible 
only to those who have ears to hear, and visible only to those who have eyes to see. 
Recasting Civil Religion 
In the discourse I am examining, the traditionally nonsectarian patriotic and 
nostalgic symbols of civil religion are used as pivot points to circle the conversation into 
more specifically religious territory. This is, in a sense, a reverse tactic of that identified 
by Vanessa Beasley in her exploration of American presidential rhetoric and its use of the 
notion of shared beliefs (and particularly civil religion) to constitute a unified American 
people from their diversity and complexity.115 Christian Right discourse invokes that 
unity (established, in part, through the rhetorical acts Beasley identifies) and then seeks to 
define it in more sectarian terms. In other words, the American Narrative captures the 
idea of mass assent to civic piety in all its forms, and recasts it as assent to specifically 
evangelical piety. 
The traditional understanding of civil religion, first detailed by Robert Bellah in 
1967, paints it as an entity ambiguous in its details which occasionally has a prophetic 
function in holding the powers-that-be to a transcendent moral criterion, but more often 
serves the priestly function, reinforcing the legitimacy of the state. To Bellah, because 
one of the purposes of civil religion—particularly in a religiously-plural nation like the 
United States—is to provide a universal set of symbols and rituals around which the 
people can gather, it portrays an ambiguous God who lacks sectarian or partisan aspects 
beyond God’s favor for the United States, thus decreasing the likelihood that the civil 
religion will conflict with any religious viewpoint in the nation (such as evangelical 
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Christianity) that does not undermine the state. Civil religion, for Bellah, posits a 
transcendent set of values that can (theoretically) coexist alongside individuals’ own 
religious beliefs while also being accepted by those of differing (or no) religious belief in 
the supernatural. Hart’s thesis on civic piety reframed Bellah’s civil-religious construct as 
a contractual agreement, but did not challenge Bellah’s basic definition of the deity at the 
center of the structure as non-sectarian;116 even Medhurst’s direct challenge to Hart’s 
thesis in 2002 suggested that more specific and sectarian religious appeals appeared 
alongside “traditional” civic piety/civil religion, rather than replacing it.117 
The Christian Right, however, reads the symbols of civil religion in a different 
way, as evidenced by this quotation from Pat Robertson in his 2004 book The Ten 
Offenses: 
The Christians who settled America embraced Jehovah as their God. 
When we say, ‘In God we trust,’ the God we mean is Jehovah of the Ten 
Commandments. When we sing ‘God Bless America,’ we are singing to 
Jehovah God. [...] We have had no other God throughout the history of 
this nation. The God who rescued the Jews from Egypt is the God of the 
founders of America.118 
It is interesting that Robertson chooses “God Bless America,” written by Irving Berlin in 
1918 and revised by him in 1938, as an example, as that song could easily be 
characterized as the quintessential symbol of a Bellah-esque civil religion. In the lyrics to 
“God Bless America,” a nonsectarian, theologically-indistinct, and benevolent God 
watches over the United States, blessing the nation and calling attention to the 
expansiveness of its natural landscape without requiring anything of the nation’s people; 
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though God’s guidance is sought, it is within the context of God as guardian/protector, 
“stand[ing] beside” the nation through tumultuous times (“the night with the light from 
above”).119  
The historical context of the song only bolsters its claim as an archetype of the 
civil-religious story Bellah suggests we are telling about ourselves. Irving Berlin had a 
lifelong public commitment to the Judaism in which he was raised, evidence that the 
civil-religious vision is not exclusively or normatively Christian. Berlin also was a 
naturalized citizen, having emigrated as a child with his family from their native Russia 
as they fled the anti-Jewish pogroms of Tsar Nicholas II.120 That Berlin, a Jewish 
immigrant, could identify so strongly with the Protestant-dominated United States as to 
call it “my home sweet home” calls forth an image of America as a beacon of freedom, 
safety, and prosperity for people of all faiths. 
But Robertson reads “God Bless America” in a different way—and in his reading, 
he undermines the notion of civil religion/civic piety as a transcendent value set that can 
coexist with individual sectarian religiosity. Though Robertson’s references to God’s 
actions in this quotation are from portions of the Bible that Judaism and Christianity have 
in common (possibly out of awareness of Berlin’s Jewish faith), he makes it clear—both 
in this passage and throughout the book—that the true “Jehovah God” to whom “God 
Bless America” refers is highly sectarian. Robertson’s Jehovah God is not, in any 
meaningful sense, even the ecumenical “Judeo-Christian” Old Testament God, but the 
God of “the Christians who settled America”: the sectarian, triune God worshipped by 
evangelical Christians, who will condemn every single person who does not embrace 
Jesus Christ, including non-converted Jews like Irving Berlin, to an eternity of hellfire. 
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To Bellah, the symbols of civil religion resist the pull of sectarianism in an effort 
to serve as a symbol that unifies the nation rather than dividing it. Vanessa Beasley goes 
further to suggest that when these symbols are used by people in power to constitute the 
nation, they exert a coercive force in stifling dissent: “If faith in a civil religion as well as 
the self-restraint assumed to be necessary for such faith are themselves quintessentially 
American characteristics, then the citizenry’s greatest enemies would be those who would 
reject them by calling attention to difference.”121  
Beasley uses presidential inaugural addresses to assert a (theoretically) “overtly 
inclusive” vision of national identity.122 But Jerry Falwell makes use of the very same 
source material in Listen, America! to invoke the unity asserted by presidential appeals to 
civil religion, and turn it toward more sectarian ends: “It can be found when reading the 
inaugural addresses of our Presidents that there is reference to the Almighty God as the 
Author of our liberty or to His Providence, without which we would not be blessed.”123 
Elsewhere in the book, he utilizes a cluster of symbols to make it clear that the “almighty 
God” referenced in the inaugural addresses is decidedly sectarian: 
I personally feel that the home and the family are still held in reverence by 
the majority of the American public. I believe there is still a vast number 
of Americans who love their country, are patriotic, and are willing to 
sacrifice for her. […] I believe that Americans want to see this country 
come back to basics, back to values, back to biblical morality, back to 
sensibility, and back to patriotism.124 
By sandwiching “biblical morality” among the core symbols of civic piety and nostalgia 
like “basics,” “patriotism,” “sensibility,” and “the home and the family,” Falwell presents 
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a vision of the Christian consensus in which such morality is understood as no more 
divisive and no more subject to interpretation than those other pillars of the American 
civil religion, and places his audience among those who, by holding “the home and the 
family” in reverence, are affirming the “basics” of “biblical morality.” 
Falwell reinterprets the symbols of civil religion as pointing not to a nondescript 
and unifying divine providence, or to values shared in common among Americans or 
even among American Christians, but to an explicitly biblical morality—which he further 
defines as being based on a specific evangelical interpretation of the Bible as “absolutely 
infallible, without error in all matters pertaining to faith and practice, as well as in areas 
such as geography, science, history, etc.”125 The American founders’ invocation of civil 
religion and even Christianity as they understood it is thus framed in this light: 
I believe America has reached the pinnacle of greatness unlike any nation 
in human history because our Founding Fathers established America’s 
laws and precepts on the principles recorded in the laws of God, including 
the Ten Commandments. God has blessed this nation because in its early 
days she sought to honor God and the Bible, the inerrant Word of the 
living God.126 
This positions Falwell to define “biblical morality” by assertion rather than argument. 
Falwell suggests that his vision of that morality is in conflict—but not with other, 
equally-American visions of morality or interpretations of the Bible, for that would 
acknowledge division among the American people who are united by this commonsense 
assent to a shared civil religion. Rather, he suggests, biblical morality is in conflict with 
those who seek to undermine the whole of the American edifice.  By asserting “biblical 
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morality” as a common-sense symbol of national unity—the family Bible sitting next to 
the Stars and Stripes, Mom, baseball, and apple pie atop the hearth of Americana—
Falwell removes the contentious question about the role of religion and religion-based 
morality in American government and society from the field of interpretation and 
argument. To even question Falwell’s vision of America, in which evangelical “biblical 
morality” is a central theme, is to attack the whole of the edifice of American civil 
religion—and thus, to open oneself to the accusation Beasley lays out above, of harming 
American unity by “calling attention to difference.” 
David Barton also uses this tactic in The Myth of Separation: 
In many areas, with the willing assistance of the Court, the minority belief 
has become the ‘majority’ view—the law of the land. An example is the 
removal of school prayer. The Court’s own records reveal that only 3 
percent of the nation had no religious ties of any type—no belief in God. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court aligned itself with the 3 percent and 
declared that, in opposition to the beliefs of the 97 percent, the 
acknowledgement of God and non-denominational prayer to Him would 
be prohibited in schools.127 
It is important to note that this argument occurs some two-thirds of the way through 
Barton’s book; previously in his book, Barton had argued that the nation’s founders had 
intended not only for the nation to be religious, but specifically that they had intended a 
normatively Protestant Christian nation. He suggested that when the founders referred to 
“religion,” they were referring not to the generic divine providence of civil religion or to 
the religious pluralism of the American people, but specifically about Protestant 
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Christianity. In that context, Barton’s suggestion that 97% of the nation is religious takes 
on new significance, propelling it out of the general space of civic or nominal religion 
and into a much more specific, sectarian space. Priming his audience to read even the 
most generic statements of belief in God as calls for the privileging of theologically-
conservative Protestant Christianity, he has already painted the details of the portrait; the 
97% number provides the outline into which those details are filled. 
Ambiguity as Epistemological Identity Signal 
This reinterpretation of civil religion, if taken to its extreme, threatens to create a 
kind of epistemological bifurcation between those who use the symbols without knowing 
their true meaning, and those who understand that those symbols are calling a specifically 
Christian nation into being. Christian Right rhetors assert that the “conventional” 
understanding of civil religion as nonsectarian and open to peoples of all (or no) faith is a 
product of false consciousness and indoctrination from secular humanist elites, who have 
removed America from its Christian roots by positing the nation’s founders as secularists 
and deists, rather than acknowledging their true commitment to a (proto-)evangelical 
Christianity. The ways in which Christian Right rhetors argue for the centrality of 
“biblical morality” in the symbols of American civil religion also create a space for a 
deep ambiguity, as they assert that their sectarian vision of morality lies at the heart of 
what it means to be an American, implying that all Americans who hold the symbols of 
the flag, the hearth, Mom, and apple pie in reverence also hold “biblical morality” in 
reverence, at least on some level. 
Part of the latter may be a matter of necessity for discourse about civil religion, as 
opposed to the discourse surrounding secular humanism. Secular humanism as a 
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rhetorical trope is used predominantly within the Christian Right, and does not have 
much (if any) of a foothold in the wider political conversation. But the symbols of civil 
religion are constantly circulating throughout the wider American culture, meaning that 
even as Barton and others are attempting to present an alternative interpretation of civil 
religious rituals as carrying specific and sectarian meaning about the intent of the 
American founders and God’s purposes for the nation, other political and cultural figures 
are utilizing the symbols and rituals of civil religion in their more traditionally-
understood inclusive and non-sectarian fashion. 
Because the symbols and rituals of civil religion continue to carry a more 
universal and ecumenical meaning, at least among political conservatives, they suggest 
the “silent majority” identity of the American Narrative in which evangelical Christians 
can gather with other pro-moral Americans around a set of symbols that represent a more 
universal form of “mere Americanism”—patriotism, nostalgia, family, Mom, apple pie, 
white picket fences, and baseball in the summer—and place sectarian “biblical morality” 
at the center of these symbols. At the same time, though, as these symbols are recast as 
signs of the evangelical Protestant founders’ deep Christian faith and their intentions for 
the United States as a Christian nation, they also constitute a more specific form of 
identity for evangelical Christians that is more in line with the Cosmic Narrative’s 
distinction between “nominal Christians” and born-again Christians, in which they are 
invited to see themselves as uniquely in tune with the intentions of the founders, in a way 
that cannot be experienced by those who merely fall into the “pro-moral majority” but 
who do not have a specifically born-again Christian identity. In other words, the 
interpretation of civil-religious symbols is another epistemological test to determine who 
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has eyes to see and ears to hear, while Christian Right rhetors exploit the ambiguities in 
their meaning to present their interpretation as outside the realm of deliberation. 
In the September 13 interview with Pat Robertson that began this project, Jerry 
Falwell provides an example of this ambiguity in meaning: 
JERRY FALWELL: Pat, did you notice yesterday? The ACLU, and all the 
Christ-haters, the People For the American Way, NOW, etc. were totally 
disregarded by the Democrats and the Republicans in both houses of 
Congress as they went out on the steps and called out on to God in prayer 
and sang ‘God Bless America’ and said ‘let the ACLU be hanged.’ In 
other words, when the nation is on its knees, the only normal and natural 
and spiritual thing to do is what we ought to be doing all the time — 
calling upon God.128 
Here are both interpretations of civil religion in action. Congress’s action falls into the 
traditional interpretation of civil-religious symbols. In the wake of a devastating terrorist 
attack (one of the targets of which, the Pentagon, was just across the Potomac River from 
the Capitol), they have gathered to pray and to sing “God Bless America,” the archetypal 
example of the theological vagueness of traditional civil religion. Falwell, however, 
recasts the Congressmembers’ actions as an assertion of national unity not around a 
generically provident God, but around a sectarian vision that accepts God-fearing 
Americans and rejects the disunity fomented by secular liberals and “Christ-haters.” Later 
in the interview, Falwell suggests that the Congressional prayer gathering joins other 
prayer gatherings throughout the country as signs that “if we will fast and pray, this could 
be God’s call to revival.”129  
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Where Congress’s action, viewed outside the context of Christian Right discourse, 
carries a relatively clear meaning as an expression of unification around nonsectarian 
American civic piety, Falwell muddies the waters and creates an ambiguity in that 
meaning by asking: which God were the members of Congress asking to bless America? 
Then he answers his own implied question: They were praying to the evangelical 
Christian God, which is of course an indication that they stand with the Christian Right in 
opposition to the People for the American Way, the ACLU, and “all the Christ-haters.” 
They were doing “the only normal and natural and spiritual thing to do,” in preparation 
for a national revival. Falwell utilizes the ambiguous interpretation of civil-religious 
symbols to create a gap in meaning, and then stands in that gap as interpreter to provide 
insight and revelation to those with ears to hear.  
Falwell thus creates space to assert a dual vision for the protagonists of his 
narrative that both unites them with and elevates them above their fellow Americans. On 
the one hand, the protagonist of the narrative stands with Congress and all of the true 
American people in singing “God Bless America” and, in so doing, asserting revivalist 
evangelical piety as the glue that binds America together, and rejecting those who would 
place that piety into the discursive arena as the true enemies of this new unity. On the 
other hand, the protagonist (thanks to the education he/she received from Falwell and 
other Christian Right leaders) is able to properly interpret not only the civil-religious 
symbology of Congress singing “God Bless America,” but also the historical 
phenomenon of 9/11 itself, connecting it to the modern history of Israel, to instances of 
violence and redemption in American history, and to the continual cycle of syncretism, 
discipline, and revival in the Israel of the biblical narrative. This positions the protagonist 
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as special, having received and properly understood a form of revelation that the general 
public, indoctrinated as they have been by secular-humanist public schools and a secular-
humanist culture, cannot perceive. 
Conclusion: Code Languages and Revelation 
Both the American and Cosmic Narratives have similar mutually-reinforcing 
epistemologies, in which those who have received special revelation from God in the 
acceptance of the message of Scripture are said to experience a shift in understanding, 
which makes them capable of truly comprehending God’s revelation to the world. This is 
not a shift in interpretation or hermeneutics, in which the same phenomena are perceived 
differently; rather, adherents describe it as an epistemological revelation in which they 
can see the world as it truly is, through the lens of the whole of God’s revelation to 
humanity, rather than only partially, as those who are capable of perceiving only the 
vague outlines provided by general revelation.  
In contrast to Reconstructionists like Gary North, however, those who put forth 
the Christian Right’s narratives continue to assert some value to general revelation, both 
in suggesting that it is possible for those who have not experienced Christian conversion 
to perceive at least some measure of God’s moral law through nature, history, intuition, 
and reason, and in arguing that those who have not experienced Christian conversion can 
nevertheless form and operate a government undergirded by Christian moral principles so 
long as they live in a society in which a Christian consensus exists. 
A similar dynamic is at play in the identity-forming discursive tropes of the via 
negativa and via positiva, in which the enemy of secular humanism and the unifying 
force of sectarian civil religion are asserted as boundary-building symbol sets despite (or 
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because of) their ambiguity. The Christian Right narrator creates or exploits these 
ambiguities in identity and sets him- or herself in the middle as the authoritative 
interpreter who can tell his or her audience who they really are—asserting that they are 
both among and above their fellow Americans, just as Americans as a whole are both 
among and above the rest of humanity.  
Here are epistemological ambiguities and levels of revelation layered inside one 
another like Russian matryoshka dolls. By virtue of the special revelation of the 
American Narrative, even if only dimly understood through the indoctrinating lens of the 
secular humanist version of history, the average American understands more (if only at a 
gut level) about God’s desired order for the world than most of the rest of the human race. 
But just like the Cosmic Narrative asserts that there are “Christians” and there are 
Christians—the nominal mainliners, and the on-fire evangelicals who truly seek God and 
engage in spiritual conflict in the great cosmic war—so, too, the American Narrative 
asserts that there are “Americans” and then there are Americans, those who have removed 
the blinders of false consciousness created by secular humanism and are thus capable of 
properly interpreting both the Word and the world, who can fully explicate what (the 
narratives assert) others feel but cannot put into words or understand. 
In other words, just as Christian theology asserts that general revelation gives all 
people at least some kind of glimpse into the nature of the world and of God, so too does 
the American Narrative suggest that, through the symbol-set of civil religion (patriotism, 
family, nostalgia), all Americans have some kind of access to American general 
revelation.  
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In Christian theology, the general revelation of religion is understood as providing 
very few details about God, save that God is all-powerful and provident, and that a low-
resolution version of God’s morality is the basic fact of the universe; the essential details, 
Christian theology asserts, are filled in by God’s special revelation first to the people of 
Israel and then to the whole world through Christ and his church.  
So, too, is American general revelation understood as providing a broad outline, 
but few details, about the religion of Americanness: the nation’s founders are revered as 
brave people, endowed with virtue and foresight, but the details about the nation they 
intended to found are murky, liquid, and often misunderstood. The moral values of 
family, the home, free enterprise, and hard work are honored, but the American general 
revelation does not spell out why exactly they are honored. So the “pro-moral majority,” 
subjected to this general revelation, honor and revere the founders and their values 
insofar as they understand them, but lack the special revelation that would grant them the 
whole truth about the nation’s founders and their intentions for the nation.  
It is this placement of the protagonists in the American Narrative both among and 
above their fellow Americans that gives Christian Right rhetors the tools to manipulate 
those narrative’s visions for the relationship with political power. The Cosmic Narrative 
asserts that true Christians are to be separate from the world, suggesting an identity 
defined by difference or agonism; just as God and God’s holiness are different from the 
fallen physical world, so too are Christians (who have been imbued with God’s holiness 
through Christ) to be different from those around them. Because of this, the “powers and 
principalities” of this world are neutral at best, and antagonistic at worst; the true 
Christian will more than likely attract the enmity of the earthly powers who understand 
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through general revelation (if through a mirror darkly) that the true Christians are right, 
and resent and persecute them for it. 
When the reinterpretation of civil religion is added into the mix, however, the 
Christian American is endowed with the full understanding of both God’s special 
revelation about the cosmos and God’s special revelation through history in the American 
story. At the center of this narrative understanding is the enemy: the satanic agenda of the 
secular humanists, whose agenda one cannot fully comprehend without access to both the 
Cosmic and American forms of special revelation. Without the Cosmic Narrative, one can 
understand secular humanism as a construct that is in opposition to the America intended 
by the founders, but see it as a rhetorical, social, or political problem alone, which can be 
solved through the usual rhetorical, social, or political means. Without the American 
Narrative, one can understand the satanic agenda, but see it as a primarily (or exclusively) 
spiritual problem, to be resolved through spiritual warfare and soul-winning, and political 
or social action waste precious resources that could be used on the battlefields of the 
great cosmic war. 
By presenting the achievement of temporal power in the United States as a 
defensive action, in which America plays an important role in God’s plan for the Last 
Days as the final bulwark against the global domination of secular humanism and the 
base for world mission, the discomfort with temporal power in the Cosmic Narrative is 
eased. At the same time, with the recoding of civil religion as the plain patriotic language 
of the godly American people, despised by the secular elites, it becomes a symbol of 
restoring power to the real Americans—those who are more truly aligned with the spirit 
and intent of the nation’s founders, and who are truly equipped to properly interpret and 
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understand the meaning of civil religious symbology. This makes religious religious 
devotion itself a patriotic requirement. 
These dynamics are internal to the text and to the identity categories it sets out—
namely, (white) evangelical Christian Americans. The rhetoric of the Christian Right 
resolves the tensions between the Cosmic Narrative and the American Narrative by 
reinterpreting civil religion as rhetorically, if not explicitly, prescribing a sectarian, 
Protestant, and conservative form of  Christianity. Those evangelical Christians who fully 
understand the whole truth about the nation’s founders, and who are thus closer to the 
founders’ intentions for the nation, occupy a rhetorical space in which they are both 
among their fellow Americans (as members of the “silent majority” of Americans who 
value morality and family) and above their fellow Americans (as those with access to the 
special revelation of the American Narrative).  
The latter stance in particular threatens to create tension with the other members 
of the conservative/Republican coalition. The most obvious potential tension would be 
between the Christian Right and those who do not share their fiscal and social 
conservatism: fiscally-moderate evangelicals, socially-liberal libertarians, or socially-
liberal business interests. But because the mixture of the Cosmic and American 
Narratives has such a sectarian character—born-again evangelical and Protestant, by 
implication and language if not explicitly laid out—there are also potential tensions 
between the Christian Right and those who share both their fiscal and social 
conservatism, such as conservative (but not particularly religious) mainline Protestants, 
Roman Catholics, or people of other faiths such as Judaism or Islam. These tensions 
require the texts of the Christian Right to engage externally and forge a construct that 
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enables the formation of coalitions while maintaining their vision of a sectarian, 
evangelical Protestant identity not only for the narratives’ individual protagonists, but for 
the nation as a whole. In the next chapter, I will discuss how the Christian Right grapples 
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Chapter 5: Narrative Connection 
In his sociological study of the distinctive traits of evangelical Christians, 
Christian Smith argues that the evangelical movement “flourishes on difference, 
engagement, tension, conflict, and threat.”1 Cultural pluralism, he writes, is not a threat to 
evangelical faith, as traditional scholarship had supposed it to be; rather, evangelicalism 
is able to define its own distinctive voice through constant engagement with the 
pluralistic “other.” In particular, he argues, evangelicals are able to use “those whom 
secularization theory would presume to be threatening to belief—those who believe 
differently or do not believe at all—as faith-reinforcing negative reference groups.”2  
By standing in polar opposition and enmity to the evangelical Christian patriotic 
faith (at least as the Christian Right presents them), “secular humanists” and other liberal 
“others” clearly function in an identity-forming capacity, giving Christian Right rhetors 
the tools they need to navigate the potentially-conflicting visions of identity laid out in 
the Cosmic and American Narratives and generate a vision of identity that draws strength 
from, rather than weakening under, the apparent contradictions.  
A different dynamic is at play as Christian Right elites and members have striven 
to find their place within the larger conservative movement. Francis Schaeffer was 
famous for his call to evangelical Christians to break with the traditional separatism of 
the fundamentalists and engage others who did not share evangelical Christian belief, but 
who did share their desire to restore a moral consensus to the culture, as part of a strategy 
of “cobelligerency” against the threat of secular humanism. But even still, the 
cultural/historical narratives presented by Schaeffer posed a constant threat to these 
“cobelligerent” alliances; at the same time as Schaeffer was suggesting that legalized 
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abortion represented the pinnacle of the humanists’ disregard for life and the herald of an 
oncoming new age of holocaust and chaos and thus justified a strategic alliance with 
Roman Catholics who had long stood in opposition to abortion, he was also laying out a 
historical narrative in How Should We Then Live? that blamed the institutional Roman 
Catholic Church, as well as significant Roman Catholic thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, 
for setting off the chain of cultural events that led to the rise of that humanistic outlook. 
In other words, Christian Right rhetors, utilizing the epistemological structures 
that reside in both narratives, are able to create hierarchies of belonging by appealing to a 
common enemy (the satanic agenda of secular humanism) and a common rhetoric (the 
Christian Nation coding of the symbols of American civil religion)—hierarchies in which 
patriotic evangelical Christians, by virtue of their access to both the special revelation of 
Scripture and the special revelation of God’s plan for the United States of America in 
history, stand simultaneously both among and above their fellow Americans. 
By crafting these hierarchies of American identity, the rhetorical edifice of the 
Christian Right also creates potential tensions with those outside the top tier of that 
hierarchy—not only with the general American public, but also with other political and 
religious conservatives who do not have access to the fullness of both narratives’ forms 
of special revelation. These tensions have destructive potential; insofar as the rhetoric of 
the Christian Right asserts patriotic evangelical Christians’ superiority and unique access 
to the whole truth about the cosmos and the country, there exists the danger that the 
Christian Right could fray or fracture the coalition that comprises the conservative 
movement in the United States. 
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The bulk of this chapter will explore the relationship between the evangelical 
Protestant Christian Right and two of the other religious orientations that occupy an 
ambiguous place within their vision of American identity: Roman Catholicism and 
Mormonism (Latter-Day Saints).3 Because of substantial differences in theology as well 
as worldview, these two religious orientations have often had a contentious relationship 
with evangelical Protestants, even in the decades since the emergence of the Christian 
Right as an identified and organized political bloc. Only in recent years has their 
partnership with the Christian Right in the “pro-family” movement become anything but 
nominal, and even then the relationship has often resembled a strategic alliance more than 
a true sense of consubstantiality. After examining the campaigns of Rick Santorum and 
Mitt Romney—a Roman Catholic and a Mormon, respectively, who sought the support of 
the Christian Right in their presidential ambitions—I will conclude with an examination 
of some of the rhetorical strategies by which the Christian Right and the larger 
conservative movement “keep the peace” within their coalition, despite potentially 
coalition-fracturing differences. Similar to the means by which Christian Right rhetors 
appeal to external enemies and internal symbols with ambiguous meaning to account for 
dissonant visions of identity between the Cosmic and American Narratives, these 
strategic choices also work in negotiating the relationship between the evangelical 
Christian Right and conservatives outside that movement—including Catholics, 
Mormons, and nonreligious conservatives. 
Throughout this chapter, my case studies focus on the attempts of presidential 
candidates from outside the Christian Right’s core evangelical constituency to win the 
movement’s support. I have chosen to highlight presidential candidates because, as 
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Campbell and Jamieson have pointed out, the presidency occupies a special role in 
American public address, with the potential to define or redefine the character of the 
nation through rhetoric.4 For this reason, presidential campaigns are sites of profound 
rhetorical struggle over identity—not only for the identity of the nation, but also for the 
two major political parties and for the various constituencies or interests whose support is 
at stake.  
Methodology: The Presidency 
As presidential candidates have sought the support of the leaders, organizations, 
and grassroots of the Christian Right, presidential contests have served as crystallization 
points for various stages in the movement’s evolution. Journalists, pundits, and historians 
have used presidential campaigns as opportunities to reflect on the state of the Christian 
Right at that moment: their electoral power within the Republican Party, their ability to 
advance their policy goals, and their near-term future. 
The Christian Right’s activism in the 1980 presidential election of Ronald Reagan 
over born-again evangelical Jimmy Carter marked the movement’s identification by 
mainstream journalists as major players in the political conversation; Reagan’s overt 
attempts to seek the support of organizations like Christian Voice and the Moral Majority 
put the leaders of those organizations in a position where they could take credit for his 
victory and attempt to stake a claim on the policy agenda of the new presidency.5  
In Reagan’s 1984 reelection campaign, Reagan wooed and won the Christian 
Right despite his administration’s unwillingness to invest political capital in pushing 
Christian Right domestic policy priorities like constitutional amendments banning 
abortion and legalizing school prayer. He did this by placing a belligerent foreign policy 
 344 
against the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union at the center of his rhetorical outreach to 
evangelicals.6 When Reagan received over 80 percent of the evangelical vote in 1984, it 
was seen as a sign of the Christian Right’s increased influence in the Republican Party.7 
In 1988, frustrated by the continuing lack of interest in Christian Right policy 
priorities during Reagan’s second term, Pat Robertson ran for the Republican presidential 
nomination, hoping that the movement would unify behind him. His campaign was 
dogged, however, by embarrassing video clips from The 700 Club, the sexual 
peccadilloes of prominent televangelists, the discomfort of many fundamentalists with his 
charismatic faith, and the decision of several prominent Christian Right figures (including 
the LaHayes and Jerry Falwell) to back other candidates. After a strong second-place 
showing in Iowa, Robertson could not win enough support in the south to remain in the 
contest. Robertson’s failed run, along with the Moral Majority’s decline in the last years 
of Reagan’s presidency, was seen as a sign of the ongoing divisions between charismatic 
and noncharismatic evangelicals within the movement, and pointed to shifts in emphasis 
in the movement’s rhetoric toward an increased sense of marginalization and a new set of 
political strategies.8 
The most evident sign of the Christian Right’s strategic shift was Pat Robertson’s 
choice to tap Republican strategist Ralph Reed to head his Christian Coalition, which 
would focus on local and state politics as well as the presidency. The Christian Coalition 
broke with many rank-and-file evangelicals to back George H. W. Bush for reelection in 
1992 over primary challenger Pat Buchanan (whose GOP convention speech that year 
brought the term “culture war” into widespread public use).9 The Christian Coalition’s 
willingness to make compromises for the sake of greater political influence was seen as a 
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mark of increased political sophistication by many mainstream journalists, but prominent 
leaders within the Christian Right, like Gary Bauer and James Dobson, saw those 
compromises as betrayals of evangelicals’ core values.10 
In the 1996 election, most of the Christian Right’s leaders lined up behind Bob 
Dole despite Dole’s unease with the movement’s more strident domestic policy 
initiatives—in part because Bob Dole chose Jack Kemp, a long-time ally of the Christian 
Right, as his running mate, and in part because of their vehement opposition to sitting 
president Bill Clinton. When Bob Dole lost, in part due to decreased turnout from 
evangelicals, Christian Right leaders argued that it was a sign that Republican candidates 
would need to give more than nominal support to the movement to win their enthusiastic 
support.11 
In the 2000 election, George W. Bush did well more than that; by publicly talking 
about his born-again experience as a turning point in his life and citing Jesus Christ as his 
favorite “political” philosopher in an early debate, he clearly identified as an evangelical 
Christian and won the support of evangelicals even though one of his primary rivals, 
Gary Bauer, was already a leader in the Christian Right. As the primary field was steadily 
winnowed down, Bush called on Christian Right support to help him beat John McCain, 
who had not made any major effort to woo evangelical voters. While Bush’s elevation to 
the presidency might have been the apex of the Christian Right’s influence (given that he 
would have clearly lost to rival Al Gore had he gotten less than 84 percent support from 
white church-going evangelicals), he continued in the pattern of prior Republican 
administrations by not expending political capital on the movement’s priorities.12 
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Karl Rove’s strategy for Bush’s reelection in 2004 was to energize Christian 
Right voters as a base of support13—and to that end, the November 2003 ruling from the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts striking down that state’s ban on same-sex 
marriage was (in historian Daniel K. Williams’s words) a “godsend,” enabling the 
Christian Right to mount new fundraising and organizing campaigns in the lead-up to the 
2004 election.14 State constitutional initiatives banning same-sex marriage were also 
credited with bringing evangelical voters to the polls, particularly in key electoral states 
like Ohio. The Christian Right had successfully mobilized “values voters” to bring their 
chosen candidate victory, and expected results in his second term; however, he 
disappointed them yet again, as his administration was increasingly bogged down by Iraq, 
Hurricane Katrina, scandals involving administration officials, and a botched Supreme 
Court nomination.15 
In each of those electoral instances, the identity of the Christian Right and their 
role within the Republican Party was at stake; would they force Republican candidates to 
hew to their positions on abortion and LGBT rights, or would they support candidates 
that offered workable compromises on those issues? Would they mobilize for any 
Republican candidate, and would their mobilization see results in the enactment of their 
political agenda? When there was a contested primary election—such as in the 1988, 
1992, and 2000 presidential contests—would they coordinate behind the same candidate? 
Contemporaneous accounts from journalists, columnists, and movement figures alike 
suggest that the Christian Right and their observers in the media understood those 
elections as struggles for the soul of the Republican Party and for the identity of the 
Christian Right. For this reason, they serve as ideal lenses for exploring the strategic 
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choices involved as the Christian Right and political figures from outside the Christian 
Right’s narrative identity structure negotiate their political relationship. I will discuss two 
examples from the 2008 and 2012 Republican primary contests: 
• Rick Santorum, a Roman Catholic who sought to identify himself with the 
Christian Right in the 2012 and 2016 Republican primaries; and 
• Mitt Romney, a Latter-Day Saint who lost to John McCain in the 2008 
Republican primary, but came back in 2012 to win the Republican nomination. 
For each candidate, the narrative structures I have already identified were not “naturally” 
available to them, as they were for self-identified evangelicals like George W. Bush or 
Mike Huckabee, or for candidates who had a natural affinity for consubstantiality like 
Ronald Reagan, as because of their specific non-Protestant religiosity, they could not 
credibly adopt the Cosmic and American Narratives wholesale, as shall be evident in 
Romney’s example. Rather, they and the Christian Right had to strategically negotiate the 
tensions between their own narratives and ways of speaking about their faith and political 
ideology, and the Christian Right’s formulations. Examining these negotiations can 
provide crucial insight into how the Christian Right’s narrative structure interacts with 
other narratives that compete or cooperate for power within the larger conservative 
movement. 
Roman Catholics 
The relationship between the Christian Right and Roman Catholics is 
complicated. The (evangelical Protestant) Cosmic Narrative’s treatment of the history of 
the church in the Common Era is fundamentally at odds with the Catholic identity-
forming narrative, and these narrative differences resonate with substantial differences in 
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worship, practice, and identity-formation between evangelical and Catholic approaches. 
Additionally, the historical tensions between Protestants and Catholics, which stretch 
back to the earliest days of the European colonization of North America, not only serve 
as a contextual background for ongoing divisions within conservative Christianity, but 
are also specifically discussed within the American Narrative as a part of the Christian 
Right’s formulation of American identity. The Christian Right has always had a 
predominantly Protestant face, even as tensions existed between evangelicals and 
fundamentalists within the movement, yet Catholics have contributed significantly to the 
movement’s ongoing development, particularly behind the scenes in connecting the 
movement’s evangelical base with Catholic modes of thought and with the wider right-
wing movement. 
Since the beginning of the contemporary Christian Right in the late 1970s, the 
movement’s evangelical and fundamentalist thought leaders have identified conservative 
Catholics as potential, if not actual, fellow-travelers. Many of the Christian Right’s social 
concerns—opposition to abortion and LGBT rights, concern about the family, and unease 
with public morality as expressed through the media and government—are shared by 
conservative Catholics. At the same time, there is a great deal more to the ideology of the 
Christian Right than mere assent to a package of policy positions; those policy positions 
are, in a very real sense, the political and social implications of a set of narratives whose 
resonances and dissonances function to shape and mold individual and corporate identity, 
space, and time for those who accept them. As will be evident, while Catholics may 
arrive at many of the same positions, they tend to do so on the basis of narratives that 
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differ from those of the Christian Right in several key places, differences that are 
expressed in religious and political practice. 
The epistemological outlook of the Cosmic and American Narratives runs counter 
to many of the epistemological assumptions of the Roman Catholic faith, as truth is 
understood to be comprehensible through Scripture and the witness of history alone 
rather than requiring the mediation of temporal authorities like the tradition and hierarchy 
of the Roman Catholic Church. The Cosmic Narrative’s valorization of the early church 
and its ambiguous-to-negative judgment of the conversion of Constantine both suggest 
that the Roman Catholic “additions” to the ur-Christianity of the early believers 
represented a step backwards from which the religion would not begin to recover until 
Martin Luther more than a millennium later. And the appeal to eschatology (whether 
premillennial or postmillennial) as a future-historical reference point in both chronic and 
kairotic time, rather than as a form of spiritual metaphor, does not play a major role in 
Roman Catholic rhetorical forms, as it tends to play in Fundamentalist and evangelical 
rhetorics. 
Religious/Historical Tensions 
Tension between Protestants and Roman Catholics in the United States is, of 
course, nothing new; it has been a running theme throughout much of the history of 
European-descended peoples in the Americas. Given that Europe itself was a religious 
battleground (whether overtly or covertly) between Protestants and Catholics throughout 
the first centuries of European colonization of the Americas, it was only natural that the 
conflicts and tensions from the parent continent would spill into the colonies. Even the 
intra-Protestant tensions that led the Puritans to found the Massachusetts Bay Colony (to 
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be free to practice their faith without the impositions of the bishops of the Church of 
England) had a background in Protestant/Catholic tensions, as the Puritans saw the rituals 
and requirements imposed upon the churches by the bishops as too closely aligned with 
Catholic practices. 
Protestant churches were established in many of the English colonies that would 
become the United States; after independence, though the First Amendment to the 
Constitution guaranteed free exercise to all faiths, some states would retain their 
established Protestant churches for some decades, and Protestantism continued to be the 
dominant faith of the country. Despite waves of Catholic immigration from Ireland, Italy, 
Germany, Poland, and eastern Europe swelling the Roman Catholic population 
significantly throughout the nineteenth century, Protestantism remained the faith of the 
“establishment,” even as the ground of Protestantism shifted from Episcopalians and 
Presbyterians to Methodists and Baptists as the country expanded westward.16 
Indeed, historian Robert Wuthnow suggests that the major dividing lines in 
American Christianity prior to the 1960s were denominational—with tensions between 
Protestants and Catholics as the most evident signs of that division. Though Protestants 
acknowledged the differences among their denominations, Protestant leaders often sought 
to stand united against what they perceived as the Catholic threat, seeing Catholicism as a 
totalitarian religion incompatible with democratic values (a selling point in the early Cold 
War period), and individual Catholics as cogs in the Roman Catholic machine who had 
not thought as deeply about their faith as had individual Protestants.17 
The mistrust of Roman Catholics has historically been even more pronounced 
among fundamentalists and evangelicals. Marsden, for example, calls attention to 
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numerous occasions throughout the history of fundamentalism in which the Roman 
Catholic Church—and particularly the Pope—was placed at the center of premillennial 
conspiracy theories,18 and Roman Catholic believers considered (at best) to be good 
people who were under the spell of “Popish superstition.”19 Similarly, Wuthnow calls 
attention to a statement from the president of the National Association of Evangelicals in 
1955 numbering Catholicism among the “satanic ideologies” aligned against the true 
Christian faith.20  
These sentiments were not limited to the thought leadership of the fundamentalist 
and evangelical movements either, as the personal accounts of older evangelicals make 
clear. Sociologist Christian Smith (himself an evangelical convert to Roman Catholicism) 
writes that during his youth there was a widespread belief among evangelicals that 
“assumed Roman Catholics were not real Christians and so most likely were not going to 
heaven.”21 Evangelical theologian Richard J. Mouw describes similar experiences, 
writing that he was taught growing up that “Catholics believed things we did not 
believe—things, furthermore, we thought no one should believe,”22 and that “the only 
hope any Catholics had for salvation was that they would get to heaven ‘in spite of what 
their church teaches.’”23 In line with fundamentalism’s long history of separatism, too, 
some non-Christian-Right-aligned fundamentalists continue to condemn their fellow 
fundamentalists or evangelicals who associate with Christian Right organizations that 
include Roman Catholics within their coalitions; Crapanzano quotes one pastor who 
claims that those who join such coalitions have “sacrificed the purity of faith for worldly, 
political concerns.”24  
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These sentiments are echoed in the works of Christian Right authors, particularly 
the “first generation” who came out of historical fundamentalism; even as they were 
attempting to grow coalitions with Roman Catholics, their rhetoric toward their fellow 
evangelicals reflected anti-Catholic attitudes. For example, in Jerry Falwell’s 1990 
commentary about the End Times, Why I Believe Jesus Christ May Return in the 1990s—
a book published by Falwell’s own organization and clearly addressed to his fellow 
evangelicals—Falwell cautions evangelicals against presuming that Roman Catholics are 
unsaved25 or against viewing the Roman Catholic Church as the prophesied apostate 
“one-world church” under the leadership of the Antichrist that arises during the 
Tribulation.26 At the same time, he also suggests that the Roman Catholic Church was 
responsible for the spread of false eschatological teaching within Christianity, writing 
that premillennialist eschatology was forgotten as the Roman Catholic Church arose in 
the fourth century because “Rome viewed herself as God’s instrument to usher in the 
promised kingdom of glory.”27 
Despite his advocacy for cobelligerency with Roman Catholics (particularly on 
the issue of abortion), Francis Schaeffer also suggested that the historic rise of Roman 
Catholicism represented a corruption of the true Christian faith, writing that Rome added 
“a humanistic element” in which “the authority of church took precedence over the 
teaching of the Bible”—thus spreading “distortions of the original Christian, biblical 
teaching” that would reign supreme until the beginning of the Protestant Reformation.28 
The tensions between Protestantism and Catholicism can also be seen in Schaeffer’s 
condemnation of Thomas Aquinas (whom the Roman Catholic Church honors as one of 
the “Doctors of the Church,” whose teachings profoundly influenced Catholic theology) 
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as one of the fountainheads of error in the corruption of Christianity by humanism. 
According to Schaeffer, because of Aquinas’s popularization of the idea that human 
reason is unaffected by the Fall, “philosophy was gradually separated from revelation—
from the Bible—and philosophers began to act in an increasingly independent, 
autonomous manner.”29  
D. James Kennedy was somewhat more circumspect in condemning practices that 
evangelical Christians would understand to be Roman Catholic, even if he did not 
mention Roman Catholicism by name; for example, in writing about the Second 
Commandment (which forbids graven images), Kennedy singled out for condemnation 
practices that are sure to be read and understood by his audience as common among 
Roman Catholics: 
The third use of art—and the only one God condemns—is the devotional 
use of art. For example, someone bows before a picture or a statue or any 
kind of representation of anything in Heaven and on earth, especially the 
things that supposedly represent God.30 
To an evangelical Protestant, Kennedy’s implication is clear: The practice of using icons 
or religious art in prayer or devotion—a practice that is coded as Roman Catholic—is a 
violation of the Second Commandment, and thus, the Roman Catholic Church is leading 
its followers into sin. 
But Timothy LaHaye is perhaps the strongest of these ideological leaders in his 
critique of Roman Catholicism—even going so far as to imply at times that Roman 
Catholicism and Christianity are separate faiths. For example, as he lays out his 
“landscape of religion” in making his case for cobelligerency between evangelical 
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Christians and those of other faiths or Christian denominations as part of the grand “pro-
moral” coalition, he notably places Roman Catholicism outside Christianity—such as in 
1980’s Battle for the Mind, where he suggests that a pro-family coalition might include 
50 million born-again Protestants allied with 50 million more from “Protestants who do 
not stress a born-again experience, Jews, Catholics, Mormons, and many others whose 
moral ideas are biblical.”31 Similarly, in 1982’s Battle for the Family, LaHaye writes that 
many of the moral values held by “fundamental Christians […] are shared by many 
others: Jews, Catholics, Mormons, and members of most Western religions.”32 In both of 
these “landscape” listings, the hierarchical position of Roman Catholics is clear; by 
placing them between Jews (who are not Christian, by definition) and Mormons (a 
religious group described by many fundamentalists as a heretical cult), LaHaye implies 
that whatever values Roman Catholics may have in common with evangelical Christians, 
they should not be considered truly Christian. Other listings of the landscape do place 
Roman Catholicism next to liberal Protestantism—suggesting that the Roman Catholic 
Church, like liberal Protestant churches, represents a corrupted form of the faith. 
This message is only amplified in LaHaye’s works that are more clearly geared 
towards an evangelical Protestant audience, such as his commentary on the book of 
Revelation, which he originally wrote in 1974 but edited and republished in 1999 to 
coincide with the explosive popularity of the Left Behind novels.33 In that commentary, 
LaHaye describes Catholicism as “more dangerous than no religion because she [Rome] 
substitutes religion for truth […] Rome’s false religion too often gives a false security 
that keeps people from seeking salvation freely by faith.”34  Like Falwell and other 
Protestant evangelical writers who condemn the Roman Catholic Church as an institution, 
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LaHaye is quick to caveat his condemnation by assuring his audience that individual 
Roman Catholics can indeed receive salvation as born-again believers in Jesus: 
With respect to sincere Roman Catholics who have personally received 
Christ as their Savior and Lord and to those who are evaluating the claims 
of Christ on their lives, I must point out that the Church of Rome today 
does not teach ‘the faith that was once for all entrusted to the saints’ (Jude 
6). Instead, they have added the baggage of fifteen hundred years of 
tradition to the original doctrines of Christianity.35 
The message here clearly lays out what was an undercurrent in many of the other leaders’ 
treatment of Roman Catholicism: If a Roman Catholic is saved, it will be because they 
found the truth of the Christian faith despite the beliefs and practices of the Roman 
Catholic Church, rather than because the Roman Catholic Church led them to the truth. 
To truly accept Christ and come to salvation, a Roman Catholic must reject many, if not 
all, of the things that distinguish Roman Catholicism from the “pure” faith of evangelical 
Protestantism. In other words: Roman Catholics are truly Christian (in the sense of 
having received salvation from Christ) only insofar as they have become Protestants in 
their hearts. 
Stylistic Tensions 
It is important to note here that while the historic oppositional tensions between 
evangelical Protestants and Catholics may have waned in recent years, there are still 
important differences in the two groups’ approaches to the faith, which are rooted in their 
narratives about the cosmos and the history of the Christian religion. While the 
evangelical Protestant Cosmic Narrative and the Roman Catholic Cosmic Narrative are 
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alike in some of their broad strokes, particularly in the biblical events that function as 
hinges in their history (such as the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, which both 
narratives see as the major turning point in the thrust of cosmic and human history), there 
are some key differences between the two denominational groups’ narratives that lead to 
different views on the institutions of the church and the government as well as different 
ways of approaching, talking about, and practicing the Christian faith. 
Most of these differences are found in the narratives’ approaches to the historical 
era following the establishment of Christianity by the Roman emperor Constantine. As 
has been discussed above, evangelical Protestants valorize early Christianity as the truest 
and purest form of the faith which, according to their narrative, became compromised by 
the introduction of state power and the pagan rituals of Rome (which some evangelicals 
call the “great apostasy”). As the Catholic church descended further and further into 
corruption and ritual, individual Christians like John Huss, John Wycliffe, and Martin 
Luther began to read the Bible by itself, rather than filtering it through Catholic church 
tradition, and thus rediscovered the true Christian faith unburdened by a millennium of 
unscriptural (and often pagan) tradition. The Reformation, in this narrative, represented 
the beginning of a return to true Christianity’s emphasis on individual salvation by faith 
alone. Subsequent generations continued the Reformers’ work in developing a 
theological outlook based on Scripture alone and continued to recover the faith and 
practices of the early church. 
As might be expected, the Roman Catholic narrative about the Common Era does 
not see historical events in quite the same way. Based on a passage in the Gospel of 
Matthew where Jesus appoints Simon Peter as the leader of the disciples, telling him that 
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“I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever you bind on earth will be 
bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven,”36 Roman 
Catholics see Peter as the first Pope. In Roman Catholic doctrine, all of Peter’s successors 
to the bishopric of Rome inherited the leadership role given to Peter by Jesus. The Roman 
Catholic narrative also does not see the Constantinian establishment as a compromise of 
the faith, nor the subsequent millennium of church history as a descent into pagan ritual 
and corruption; rather, for Catholics, the Holy Spirit continued to bless and guide the 
Church as Christianity was adopted as a state religion throughout much of Europe, even 
though the humans who ran the church were not free from sin or error. This means that to 
Catholics, the traditions of the institutional church provide an additional hermeneutical 
lens for the reading of Scripture; in Catholic epistemology, the traditions of the 
institutional Church, guided as it has been by the Holy Spirit, can serve as a source of 
theological knowledge, wisdom, and insight alongside Scripture.37  
Not surprisingly, the Roman Catholic narrative also has a different assessment of 
the Reformation. Contemporary Catholics (particularly after Vatican II) acknowledge that 
because of human sinfulness, the Reformation began as a valid response to real abuses 
that had arisen in the Church’s practices. However, they emphasize that when Martin 
Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the Wittenberg church door, his initial goal was to 
reform the practices of the Catholic Church from within, not to divide Christianity; it was 
only after the Church responded badly to Luther’s critique that he (and subsequent 
reformers) felt the need to set up Christian institutions to rival the Catholic Church.38  
Worldview-forming narratives function to shape identity, space, time, and social 
and political positions and practices for those who adopt them; the differences between 
 358 
the Roman Catholic and evangelical narratives about the past two millennia resonate 
strongly with their stylistic tendencies in religious practice and in the approach of 
individuals and institutions to the Christian faith. It is important to note here that these 
differences in approach, while substantial, are not as significant as the evangelical anti-
Catholic polemics might suggest; particularly since Vatican II, the areas of overlap in 
theology and praxis are arguably more significant than the areas in which the two 
approaches differ. As Christian Smith points out, Catholics agree with Protestants that 
individuals are justified by faith and not through good works,39 and both the Catholic and 
evangelical approaches hold Scripture in high regard as a unique and special form of 
revelation from God to humanity (even if Catholic doctrine does not teach inerrancy as 
most evangelicals would understand it).40 As will be clear, the differences in theology 
and practice between Protestants/evangelicals and Catholics are small compared to the 
differences between both of these groups and Latter-Day Saints. 
Those differences remain substantial, however, particularly in the ways in which 
they affect the day-to-day tendencies of evangelicals and Catholics to approach their 
faith. Richard Mouw presents a useful representative anecdote about miscommunication 
between a Roman Catholic priest and an evangelical minister at a funeral, and goes on to 
discuss the broader implications of their differing approaches to the faith: 
The evangelical wants questions about ‘how we are saved’ to be addressed 
explicitly; he wants unbelievers to be invited to accept the message of 
salvation as it is set forth in simple and direct terms. The Roman Catholic 
wants to expose the unbelievers to the ‘normal’ rituals of the church 
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community in the hope that the exposure itself—quite apart from a 
conscious response to a gospel invitation—will be a means of grace.41 
As Mouw lays out, the Roman Catholic approach tends to be much more focused on the 
role of the Church as an instrument of divine grace, and the Christian life taking place 
within the rhythm of the normal everyday practices of the Church; the evangelical 
approach is much more focused on the individual’s relationship with God, with the 
church serving as facilitator for that relationship and as the catalyst for the individual’s 
life-changing “born-again” experience accepting Jesus as his or her personal savior.42  
Similarly, Catholic worship practices are much more liturgically-based than those 
of many evangelical Protestants.43 Evangelical worship practices tend to be centered 
around “cognitive teaching, individual subjectivity, aesthetic enjoyment, and worshippers 
feeling ‘blessed,’ ‘spoken to,’ or having had ‘meaningful’ experiences,” rather than on 
fixed, standardized, and historic liturgical forms. 44 In contrast, Catholic worship practices 
are centered around formalized and standardized liturgical content, which are portrayed 
as vernacular forms of prayers and rituals that have been used within the church for 
hundreds of years. As Smith explains, the difference between experiential practices of 
evangelical Protestant churches and the standardized liturgy of the Catholic church is not 
merely a matter of styles of worship, but gets to “a rather more profoundly different, 
basic approach to history, prayer, the communion of saints, the act of worship, human 
subjectivity, Christian formation, sense of the movement of time, and more.”45 These 
differences in praxis also resonate with the differing narratives about the history of the 
church. Catholic narratives see church history in terms of a continuum between ancient 
and contemporary practices, which strikes a clear chord with worship as a means by 
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which believers can experience grace through the traditions of the church. Evangelical 
Protestants tend to see church history in terms of the rupture and rediscovery of the faith 
in the Reformation and beyond, which resonates with a style of worship that is much 
more focused on the individual’s relationship with God and much less on the individual’s 
relationship with the institutions, traditions, and practices of the historical church (which 
are dubious at best). 
Protestant/Catholic Tensions in the American Narrative 
But the tensions with Roman Catholic thinking are not just present in the Cosmic 
Narrative; aside from the epistemological resonances between the Cosmic and American 
Narratives, many of the particulars of the American Narrative also suggest a hierarchy in 
which Protestantism is seen as a more pure and coherent form of Christianity and 
Americanism than Roman Catholicism. The notion of the United States not only as a 
Christian nation but as a Protestant Christian nation, explicitly set over against Roman 
Catholicism, plays a central role in the American Narrative’s heilsgeschichte from the 
very beginning of the narrative’s sweep. 
Several tellings of the American Narrative present it as conspicuous evidence of 
the divine plan that despite the (Roman Catholic) Columbus’s explorations in the New 
World, he never set foot on any land that would later become part of the United States. 
Marshall and Manuel, for example, see divine import in events that led Columbus into the 
Caribbean rather than northward, writing that while Columbus was exploring the northern 
coast of Cuba, fierce headwinds forced him to turn back, away from Florida which “lay a 
scant ninety miles away in the direction they had been steering,” because “it was not 
God’s time to reveal the true mainland.”46 Even when Columbus reached the mainland of 
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Central America, it was only with great difficulty, leading the authors to conclude that by 
going to the mainland Columbus was “defying God’s will.”47 Kennedy and Newcombe 
make a similar assertion, arguing that a flock of birds that led Columbus south to the 
Caribbean, rather than north to the American mainland, was “the hand of God,” without 
which “America would probably have the same culture and religion as that of South and 
Central America today.”48 (Those familiar with the biblical story of the Exodus could be 
forgiven for seeing those headwinds and that flock of birds as modern forms of the pillars 
of fire and cloud that led the people of Israel through forty years in the wilderness while 
they were being prepared to enter Canaan; evangelical readers, steeped as they are in 
typology, might read this as further evidence of the divine plan.) 
Marshall and Manuel are even more plain about this hierarchy of identity in their 
narrative of American history when they suggest that the heroes of their story, the 
Puritans, understood that God was shaping the course of the history of North America to 
favor their enterprise:  
A few farsighted Puritans could sense God’s hand in a coincidence of 
timing that was too extraordinary to be accidental. Had Columbus landed 
farther north... Had the Spanish colonization of Florida been successful... 
Had Raleigh succeeded in settling Roanoke... Had Jamestown been less of 
a catastrophe... Had America’s very existence not remained cloaked until 
the Reformation... Had her northeastern coast not been reserved for the 
Pilgrims and Puritans... To some, it must have seemed almost as if they 
were standing in the middle of a gigantic model of one of those 
newfangled pocket watches, with the wheels and gears of ‘coincidence’ 
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swinging around and meshing and turning other gears, which swung and 
turned others. But they could see only behind them. Today we can see 
what lay ahead of them as well and sense just how extraordinary was the 
timing of the Puritan exodus.49 
The categories of inclusion and exclusion are clear here: The religious, evangelical, 
Reformed communities of the Puritans and Pilgrims are those whom God has favored to 
settle the North American continent. God steered away the less-desirable elements—pre-
Reformation Europeans, post-Reformation Roman Catholics (Christopher Columbus and 
the Spanish colonists in Florida), and  irreligious Protestants (Raleigh’s Roanoke and 
Jamestown)—in a grand design to ensure that the Puritans would be the first successful 
colony in the future United States. And lest one be tempted to chalk that up to the 
Puritans’ tendency to see God’s predestined hand in everything, the authors assert that the 
American story since the Puritan era has proven their view of the historical narrative even 
more right than they realized.  
Securing divine ordination for the Protestant domination of the lands that would 
become the United States is essential for the American Narrative, as it provides another 
thread of unity between the chronic time of history and the kairotic time of divine 
intervention and creates typological links that further suggest that the Protestants on the 
North American continent, like the Israelites thousands of years earlier, were being sent 
into a land of milk and honey that God had prepared for them, while the Roman Catholics 
of Spain and France were being deliberately kept out of that land precisely because God 
found them morally wanting. 
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It is no accident that Marshall and Manuel spend multiple pages outlining the 
depredations inflicted by the Roman Catholic Spaniards against the indigenous peoples 
they encountered in the Caribbean and in Latin America. Even where Roman Catholics’ 
dealings with indigenous peoples are portrayed in a positive light (such as Junipero 
Serra), they are the sole exception to “the sorry state of complacency and hypocrisy” of 
the Roman Catholic Church of that era;50 as a consequence, God places artificial limits on 
the extent of their efforts, for example by preventing the missions on the California coast 
from discovering the gold that might have led Spain to devote more resources to that area 
and possibly put up more resistance to the Protestant citizens of the United States once 
the new nation’s expansion reached the western coast.51 The Roman Catholic Spaniards’ 
enslavement of the indigenous peoples of the lands they colonized is presented as 
evidence that God’s hand was in the failure of their efforts on the North American 
mainland.  
In contrast, Marshall and Manuel’s treatment of the conquest of North America 
by European-descended Protestants is much more ambiguous. The epidemics that wiped 
out many Native American settlements in New England in the years prior to the Puritans’ 
landing there are presented as a form of divine providence to the Puritan colonists, 
providing them with ready-made cropland without the inconvenience of dealing with the 
land’s present inhabitants.52 When conflict inevitably does arise between the colonists 
and the Native Americans, the authors provide their audience with the gory details of 
Indian raids on New England colonies and make it clear that Wampanoag King Philip 
held a “thinly-veiled hatred of Christianity,”53 thus justifying the colonists’ war against 
his people. In Marshall and Manuel’s rendition of the American Narrative, the indigenous 
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peoples are a literary tool rather than being agents, illustrating the superiority and divine 
favor bestowed upon the Protestant cause by serving as God’s instrument of discipline 
upon Protestants while displaying the depravity of the Roman Catholics. 
A Protestant Constitution 
Placing the divine imprimatur on the specifically Protestant settlement of North 
America is crucial to the American Narrative’s sweep, as it tees up the notion of the 
founding documents of the United States as reflective of Protestant theology and 
ecclesiology, and thus implicitly argues that the nation’s historical success is due to the 
superiority of Protestantism over Roman Catholicism. The American Narrative argues 
that the U.S. Constitution is not only a Christian document, but a Reformed Christian 
document, which enabled the nation’s founders to craft a government that would avoid 
the pits into which the European nations had fallen or would fall.  
“The Constitution was a product of Reformation thinking,” writes John W. 
Whitehead, crediting Martin Luther and John Calvin as having “laid the foundation for 
both the American revolution and the Constitution” without their knowledge (yet more 
evidence of the divine hand).54 Whitehead and Schaeffer, whose Christian Manifesto was 
intended as a precursor to Whitehead’s The Second American Revolution,55 argue that the 
most important influence of Reformed Christianity on the U.S. Constitution was in the 
balance between two ideas. On the one hand, Whitehead writes, Reformed Christians 
believed that “both the church and the civil authorities were under the Bible—the law.”56 
Because everything on earth and in heaven is subject to divine sovereignty, no institution 
has the right to defy the laws of God as expressed through Scripture; a Reformed 
Constitution would neither countenance nor permit any governmental action that runs 
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contrary to God’s moral code, which is understood as the single fundamental fact that ties 
together the very universe. But to balance that out, Whitehead also argues that the 
Reformed worldview allows for “liberty of conscience for each man [sic] to decide what 
the Bible actually says,” and that “no authority […] had the powers to dictate matters of 
conscience.”57 Schaeffer argues that over against the Roman Catholic governments of the 
time, which had been corrupted by their acceptance of Renaissance humanism and its 
“put[ting] man himself in the center of all things”58 and privileging human institutions as 
mediators of divine law, the Reformed worldview could properly balance “form and 
freedom”—a view of positive liberty in which freedom is defined as the freedom to 
determine and fulfill the divine purpose, in one’s own life and in society as a whole.59  
Authority is a key axis in the Reformed worldview as presented by Schaeffer and 
Whitehead; while liberty of conscience and divine sovereignty are in productive tension 
with one another under good government, they resonate with one another when the 
Christian is faced with a situation in which the demands of the legal authorities run afoul 
of his or her understanding of divine law as expressed through the Bible. Whitehead 
argues for Calvin’s belief that “if the civil government transgressed the divine law, the 
Christian was at liberty to disobey,” enabling Calvin to lay out “an authoritarian political 
structure” that was nevertheless “under law and not above it”;60 this belief, he argues, was 
reflected in the Constitution as well, even if the political structure lacked Genevan 
authoritarianism. 
Schaeffer and Whitehead thus suggest that the Reformed balance between liberty 
of conscience and divine authority functions as a check on the power of government by 
subjecting the Christian to a higher allegiance. Interestingly, though, Barton uses the 
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same elements to imply that Protestantism is a truer form of Americanism because 
Protestants can be trusted to have full allegiance to the United States, unlike Roman 
Catholics, whose devotion to the earthly authority of Rome makes their loyalty suspect: 
The Founders were not fearful of Roman Catholics but rather of the aspect 
of Catholic doctrine which they viewed as repugnant to America’s unique 
form of government. Specifically, they opposed the vesting of total, 
absolute, and irrevocable power in a single body (the Papal authority) 
without recourse by the people—and they were able to point to specific 
examples to bolster their argument. […] It was the implications of this 
Roman Catholic doctrine which caused many States to exclude from office 
those who claimed a sole and absolute allegiance to a ‘foreign power.’ 
[…] However, as already noted, this was not a rejection of Roman 
Catholics in general, just of those who embraced doctrines ‘subversive of 
a free government established by the people.’61 
Even as Barton asserts that the American founders did not intend to fully exclude Roman 
Catholics from American identity, he nevertheless grants that the founders’ fears about 
Roman Catholic ecclesiology were valid, and that the doctrine of “the Papal authority,” 
as channeled through the hierarchy of the institutional Church, was irreconcilably 
incompatible with American government. Implicit in that assertion is that one who 
embraces the whole of Roman Catholic doctrine (as Barton presents it) cannot be a good 
or trustworthy American; insofar as any individual Roman Catholic can be trusted, it is 
because he or she has abandoned the Church’s doctrine of papal and institutional 
authority in favor of American republicanism. In other words, Barton suggests, the 
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American founders intended that in order to become truly and fully American, individual 
Roman Catholics must be less Catholic. Barton suggests that Roman Catholics are 
obligated to prove their loyalty to the country in rejecting what Barton asserts is their 
denomination’s doctrine of allegiance to the “foreign power” of the Pope; Protestants are 
subject to no such requirement. 
It is useful to contrast Barton’s parsing of the question of Roman Catholic loyalty 
with the famous example of John F. Kennedy, who defended his Roman Catholic faith 
against accusations of disloyalty during his 1960 campaign for the presidency in a speech 
to Protestant clergy: 
I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is 
absolute, where no Catholic prelate would tell the president (should he be 
Catholic) how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners 
for whom to vote; where no church or church school is granted any public 
funds or political preference; and where no man is denied public office 
merely because his religion differs from the president who might appoint 
him or the people who might elect him.62 
Here Kennedy is, in effect, making an argument from what Reformed Christians might 
call “sphere sovereignty”—in which he saw no conflict between the American 
government’s authority in secular matters and the Roman Catholic Church’s authority in 
spiritual matters. Kennedy asserted that one could be both American and Roman 
Catholic, because those two identity categories were not mutually exclusive; he did not 
have to sacrifice his Roman Catholic identity in order to be a loyal American.  
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Barton, on the other hand, asserts that the separation of church and state is a myth 
and that American government has always been and was always intended to be a kind of 
spiritual authority as well as a secular one‚ promoting “Christian standards of conduct for 
social behavior” even while permitting those of other faiths to continue to practice them 
freely.63 In effect, he suggests that Roman Catholics must become more Protestant in 
order to be loyal; they must abandon the doctrine of Papal infallibility entirely and pledge 
allegiance to the American government as an institution whose authority supersedes that 
of the Church. 
Roman Catholics in the Christian Right 
Despite the public face (and the bulk of the membership) of the Christian Right 
being primarily Protestant (and predominantly evangelical), Catholics have played 
significant roles throughout the history of the Christian Right. Until recently, however, 
those relationships tended to be more strategic than consubstantial—based less on a 
common vision of the nation’s history and future than on bridging the divide between the 
evangelical leadership and grassroots of the Christian Right and the larger conservative 
movement (particularly the New Right).  
As Ruth Murray Brown has outlined, one of the formational events for the 
Christian Right as a political bloc was the campaign to reject the Equal Rights 
Amendment in the late 1970s. For many evangelical women, the anti-ERA campaign was 
their first taste of political activism, and gave them an opportunity to experience 
cooperation as part of a truly ecumenical movement—a movement that was spearheaded 
by Phyllis Schlafly, a Roman Catholic64 (even if much of the anti-ERA movement’s 
outreach to fundamentalist and evangelical women was through evangelical Lottie Beth 
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Hobbs rather than Schlafly herself).65 As historian Daniel K. Williams notes, in their 
willingness to cooperate with Schlafly and other Catholics as well as with Mormon 
women in the Mountain West, the evangelical women who were part of the anti-ERA 
movement often found themselves well ahead of their male pastors, many of whom were 
still wary about ecumenical cooperation with non-Protestants.66  
While Schlafly enjoyed the respect and esteem of many evangelical Christian 
Right leaders, she was more commonly associated with a larger conservative movement 
within the Republican Party: the emerging coalition of young conservative activists who 
dubbed themselves the “New Right.” (This was particularly true after the anti-ERA 
movement’s final success in 1982; while Christian Right organizations continued to press 
a primarily social agenda, Schlafly returned to her focus on national defense and foreign 
policy.67) Other major New Right figures, also Roman Catholic, played major roles in 
organizing and building the Christian Right—such as Paul Weyrich, who orchestrated the 
1979 meeting between Jerry Falwell and other New Right leaders that led to Falwell’s 
founding of the Moral Majority,68 and direct-mail pioneer Richard Viguerie, whose 
advancements in fundraising and organizing were crucial to the success of the anti-ERA 
movement and the formation of nascent Christian Right organizations.69  
These alliances tended to be based more in political calculus (on both sides) rather 
than on a shared theological vision or consubstantiality; as Williams notes, Terry Dolan, 
another major New Right figure who worked to strengthen the Christian Right, was a 
closeted gay libertarian who did not sympathize with the social conservatism of 
evangelicals or his conservative Catholic compatriots in the New Right, but worked with 
Viguerie to build Christian Right fundraising because he “wanted to do whatever he 
 370 
could to oust liberals from office.”70 Further, with the exception of Schlafly in the early 
stages of the Christian Right (the anti-ERA movement), the alliances between Catholic 
leaders in the New Right and the evangelical Christian Right tended to take place behind 
the scenes; the faces of the Christian Right in public were evangelical figures like the 
LaHayes, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson. 
The dominant position of evangelical Protestants within the Christian Right is not 
completely due to a lack of effort on the part of Christian Right organizations, which 
have consistently (if perhaps not wholeheartedly) made efforts to make their coalitions 
look less exclusively evangelical and more ecumenical. Particularly beginning in the mid-
1990s, a newer generation of leaders (such as Ralph Reed) began to realize the 
limitations of a strategy of outreach primarily to evangelicals71 and attempted to broaden 
the movement’s support among Roman Catholics. As Matthew Moen writes, this attempt 
to broaden the movement’s reach was accompanied by a shift in rhetorical strategy, from 
a focus on morality in culture to a focus on liberal value terms such as “choice.”72 But as 
he notes, even this shift in themes grew out of evangelical theology’s heavy stress on 
“individual choice—to commit to Christ, to be ‘born-again,’ to live as godly a life as 
possible.”73 Given the Roman Catholic tendency to emphasize moral and religious life as 
embedded in the rituals and life of a community, rather than as a choice made by an 
autonomous individual standing alone before God and accepting Jesus as his or her 
“personal Lord and Savior,” this emphasis on individualism may have undermined 
evangelical Christian Right outreach to Catholics in the 1990s. 
More than any other issue, opposition to legalized abortion has served to knit 
together the evangelical Christian Right and Catholics in a common cause, even if they 
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have remained largely organizationally separate outside the right-to-life movement. 
Notably, the story of evangelical and Catholic cooperation on abortion is largely the story 
of shifting priorities and emphases among evangelicals to a position that more closely 
matched that of the Catholic Church; in a very real way, evangelicals joined Catholics—
not the other way around—in making opposition to all (or virtually all) legal abortion a 
major theme in their political activism. At the same time, forces at work within Roman 
Catholicism throughout the 1980s and 1990s made abortion a higher-priority issue for 
many conservative Catholics, thus bringing them closer to the Christian Right. 
Prior to the 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling and throughout much of the 1970s, political 
activism in opposition to legalized abortion in the United States was generally regarded 
as a Catholic position74—a factor which, by itself, may have contributed to some 
unwillingness among evangelicals to take activist stances on the issue.75 While many 
fundamentalists opposed abortion in terms similar to those being used by Catholics, their 
political influence was limited by the unwillingness of many fundamentalist leaders of 
the time to work with those (like Catholics) with whom they disagreed on matters of 
doctrine and theology.76  Most other Protestants (including evangelical Protestants) 
tended to view abortion as a tragic decision or as a symptom of deeper social problems 
rather than as a mortal sin in and of itself.77 Evangelical opposition to abortion prior to 
Roe v. Wade was largely centered on a view of abortion as “a manifestation of sexual 
permissiveness.”78 In other words, evangelical rhetoric about abortion prior to the mid-
1970s was centered on the behaviors and morals of the adults involved in the sexual act, 
viewing rising abortion rates not as a sign of society’s devaluing of human life, but rather 
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as a sign of society’s steadily-declining sexual mores as the feminist movement gained 
ground. 
Due in large part to the efforts of Francis L. Schaeffer, his son Franky, C. Everett 
Koop, and Tim LaHaye79 throughout the latter half of the 1970s, evangelical opinion on 
abortion began to shift. Schaeffer was similar to pre-Roe evangelicals in framing abortion 
as a symptom of a society in decline—but rather than viewing it primarily as an 
indictment of the sexual mores of American culture, he saw it as a sign that the culture 
was abandoning the notion that human life itself had intrinsic value as secular humanism 
steadily replaced the nation’s Christian underpinnings. In other words, he framed the 
discussion not primarily around the adults involved in the sexual act, but rather around 
the humanity of the fetus and its inherent right to life. Legalized abortion, infanticide, and 
euthanasia were framed as the ultimate signs that society had abandoned the Judeo-
Christian tradition for the arbitrary ethics of secular humanism; because they represented 
a culture in which life itself had no value, Schaeffer saw them as tipping points that 
would lead inexorably to the complete dissolution of society and divine judgment if 
Christians did not stand up and turn the tide. 
The reframing of abortion as a “life-or-death issue”80 reflecting the decline of the 
very fabric of society, rather than mere sexual decadence, enabled Schaeffer to make 
several crucial rhetorical moves. First, with lives at stake, he could set out abortion as a 
political issue in and of itself; as a kind of tipping point between Christian and secular 
society, abortion could be the focus of an agenda of political activism, rather than just 
another data point alongside out-of-wedlock birth rates and divorce rates in a litany of 
signs that Americans were abandoning the sexual mores of their parents’ generation or 
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that feminism was causing the downfall of the American family. Abortion could be recast 
as a bellwether issue that reflected society’s view of the value of human life:  opposition 
to legal abortion, like slavery in the antebellum 19th century, represented an opportunity 
for Christians to take an absolutist, no-compromise stand and draw contrasts between 
their worldview and that of secular humanism.81 
But perhaps more crucially, reframing abortion as a bellwether issue and as a sign 
of society’s inexorable decline enabled Schaeffer to depart from the separatism of his 
fundamentalist tradition and advocate that evangelicals and fundamentalists work 
alongside any who would join them in combatting the scourge of abortion—whether they 
were Protestant, Catholic, or non-Christian—in a strategy of “co-belligerency.” Though 
Schaeffer argued that those who were not Jewish or Christian would not have “any 
adequate basis for [believing in] the unique dignity of human beings” (as that could only 
be found in the “Judeo-Christian position”82), as long as they understood the dire social 
consequences of continued legal abortion, they could nonetheless be allies in working 
against “this individual problem.”83 Certainly if working with those outside the Judeo-
Christian tradition was acceptable, then allying with fellow Christians—including 
Catholics, with whom Schaeffer had profound and irreconcilable theological 
differences—would also be. Abortion, being an issue of life or death, trumped any 
theological differences—at least for the time being.  
As abortion continued to rise on the list of conservative evangelicals’ issue 
priorities throughout the 1980s and 1990s, prominent Catholic conservatives—most 
notably Richard John Neuhaus—were seeking to “repoliticize” the moral and political 
message of Catholicism, with abortion as the centerpiece of that program.84 Though he 
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had initially been part of the New Left in the 1960s, by the late 1980s Neuhaus had come 
to largely the same conclusions as Schaeffer had in the 1970s and early 1980s: that 
legalized abortion represented a tipping point in the decline of American society. By 
declaring unborn children outside the protection of the law, Neuhaus wrote, the Roe v. 
Wade ruling had started the nation inexorably down a path that could lead to infanticide, 
euthanasia, and possibly even genocide.85  
Importantly, in presenting abortion as a bellwether issue for Catholics, Neuhaus 
was drawing not only on his own construction of American history, but also on the 
writings of Pope John Paul II, who assailed legalized abortion as part of the “culture of 
death.” Though John Paul II wrote and spoke against abortion throughout his papacy, 
perhaps his most complete argument against legalized abortion was found in a 1995 
encyclical Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life); in that encyclical, he suggested that 
abortion (along with euthanasia and embryonic stem-cell research) reflected “a perverse 
idea of freedom, which is seen as disconnected from any reference to truth and objective 
good, and which asserts itself in an individualistic way, without the constitutive link of 
relationships with others.”86 This argument is remarkably similar to that of Schaeffer, 
who also suggested that abortion reflected secular humanism’s rejection of divine law in 
favor of individualized freedom. Though John Paul II’s writing could be seen more as a 
summary of previous Catholic thought on abortion (where Schaeffer and Koop’s 
perspective on abortion represented a more significant departure from previous 
evangelical attitudes on the issue), it is notable that he, along with well-known Catholic 
conservatives in the United States, placed such a heavy emphasis on abortion (and other 
“life issues”) as a bellwether issue. 
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Rick Santorum, Christian Right Catholic 
Rick Santorum, the most prominent Roman Catholic who explicitly allied with 
the evangelical Christian Right to date, has credited his awakening on social issues to the 
congressional debate over partial-birth abortion in 1995-96, which happened at roughly 
the same time as the birth of his son, Gabriel Michael, who died within hours of his birth 
due to severe birth defects. Prior to that experience, he had characterized himself as a 
“reformer” in Congress, never mentioning social issues for fear of the controversies they 
would awaken; after that experience, he put opposition to abortion (and, subsequently, 
opposition to LGBT marriage) at the center of his agenda.87 Historian Damon Linker 
suggests that Santorum was one of several prominent political figures (including former 
Congressman Henry Hyde and Supreme Court justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin 
Scalia) whose views reflect the influence of a group of prominent conservative Catholics 
he describes as “theocons”—primarily Richard John Neuhaus, George Weigel, and 
Michael Novak. The theocons, Linker argues, sought to build an intellectual framework 
for uniting Catholics with the Republican Party’s politically-conservative agenda.88 
Santorum lays out his complete moral vision in his 2006 book It Takes a Family, the title 
of which is an intentional reference to then-First Lady Hillary Clinton’s 1996 book It 
Takes a Village; this moral vision, while compatible with that of the evangelical Christian 
Right in many ways, is based in a fundamentally different worldview.  
First, Santorum explicitly cites as a foundational tenet of his political worldview 
the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity: that social problems should be resolved at the level 
of the smallest possible social unit.89 In other words, if a social problem can be resolved 
by strengthening the ability of the family (the smallest social unit) to resolve it, then it 
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should be resolved by doing that rather than by strengthening larger institutions, such as 
the institutions of civil society or the government. While this doctrine could be implicit in 
the worldview-forming narratives of the evangelical Christian Right, there remains in 
Santorum’s work a fundamentally Catholic vision of the individual’s relationship to the 
collective. As discussed above, evangelicals tend to emphasize religion as a matter of 
individual choice and individual salvation; even when evangelical Christian Right rhetors 
emphasize the nation as a locus for religious identity as part of the American Narrative, 
they are careful to distinguish this sense of religious or moral identity from salvific 
Christianity. One cannot be Christian, they contend, simply by one’s membership in a 
community—whether that community is a “Christian nation,” a church, or even a 
Christian family. Rather, one is only truly a saved Christian after he or she has been born 
again through commitment to Jesus Christ as his or her personal Lord and Savior. While 
Santorum does not explicitly address soteriology in It Takes a Family, the book is 
saturated with the notion of subsidiary social groupings as mediating all relationships and 
interactions—a notion that is mirrored in the Catholic approach to religion and theology, 
in which the individual’s relationship with God is mediated by the church’s traditions and 
hierarchy. 
Second, Santorum’s view of original sin is much more limited than the 
conservative evangelical perspective tends to be, rooted as it is in the Reformed tradition. 
Santorum presents original sin as a natural inclination of human beings toward immoral 
personal behavior, characterizing that position as “the traditional Judeo-Christian 
worldview” and contrasting it with what he characterizes as “liberal” positions: 
Rousseau’s idea that all people are naturally good, or the “postmodern materialist” idea 
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that people are products of their environment.90 This, to Santorum, suggests that the 
solution is “disciplining our sinful inclinations, so that we can become something other 
(and better) than what we ‘naturally’ are.”91 Original sin, then, is a spark for personal 
growth and improvement, which can be overcome through the exercise of self-control 
and adherence to “traditional morality and traditional orthodox religion.”92 
Contrast that with the much more expansive view of original sin found in the 
work of evangelical American Narrative rhetors—a view which, as we have seen, they 
place at the very root of the governmental structure instituted by the American founders, 
and deeply embedded in the theology of the Reformation. Schaeffer, for example, was 
strongly critical of Thomas Aquinas for presuming that human reason could operate 
outside of the constraints of original sin, as Schaeffer maintained that “total depravity” 
would compromise and corrupt every single area of human life, including the human 
mind. The Reformed solution to the problem of “total depravity” is not (merely) self-
discipline for personal improvement, but a complete reorientation of one’s thinking to 
consistently test one’s own conclusions against the timeless truth of God, as expressed 
through general revelation (in the lessons of history reflecting divine morality) and 
special revelation (in the Bible). The theistic humanism of Aquinas, Schaeffer writes, was 
itself a tipping point that caused the Catholic church to lose its moral bearing and slide 
steadily into the moral relativism of the Renaissance and, ultimately, secular humanism.93 
Historian Damon Linker suggests that during the 1980s and 1990s, prominent 
conservative Catholic thinkers like Neuhaus and Weigel went to a great deal of effort to 
“Catholicize” American history by presenting the nation’s founding principles as 
reflective not of a generalized Judeo-Christian worldview or specifically of Reformed 
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Protestantism, but instead as a “default quasi-Catholic religiosity”94 rooted in medieval 
Catholic scholars’ view of the relationship between the individual and society and 
centered on the Catholic notion of “natural law.”95 Insofar as the Protestants who founded 
the nation were indebted to a theological viewpoint, it was not to the Reformed ideas of 
total depravity or sphere sovereignty, but rather to the Catholic idea of natural law. 
Linker summarizes the ultimatum presented by Wiegel to the nation: “Either the United 
States would return to its medieval Catholic roots or the very existence of its democratic 
order would be imperiled—those were America’s only options.”96 
In a 2008 speech at Ave Maria University, Santorum did not go so far as Wiegel 
or Neuhaus in suggesting that the United States was “quasi-Catholic” at its founding—
but while he did acknowledge the Protestantism of the nation’s founders, he implied that 
it was largely a cultural and institutional distinction rather than a theological one. 
Because the nation had been founded by Protestants, it was the Protestant institutions of 
the church and higher education that were charged with defending the nation’s moral 
center: 
And so we saw this domino effect: once the colleges fell, and those who 
were being educated at our institutions, the next was the church. Now, 
you’d say, the Catholic church? No. We all know that this country was 
founded on a Judeo-Christian ethic, but the Judeo-Christian ethic was a 
Protestant Judeo-Christian ethic. Sure, the Catholics had some influence, 
but this was a Protestant country, and a Protestant ethic. Mainstream, 
mainline Protestants, and of course we look at the shape of mainline 
Protestantism in this country and it is a shambles. It is gone from the 
 379 
world of Christianity, as I see it. And so they attacked mainline 
Protestantism, they attacked the church, and what better way to go after 
smart people who also believe they’re pious, to use both vanity and pride 
to go after the church.97 
The contrast between Santorum’s view and that of evangelical historians like Marshall 
and Manuel is evident: While evangelical historians suggest that the particularities of 
Protestant faith were the source of the nation’s strength, in Santorum’s narrative, 
Protestantism was not strong enough to stand up to the attacks of Satan and his minions, 
particularly after academia succumbed to the demonic offensive. While Santorum does 
make a point to distinguish “mainline Protestantism” as the branch of Christianity that he 
thinks is “gone from the world of Christianity”—a perspective that he shares with many 
fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants—the thrust of his argument is that the 
institutions of Protestantism lacked the qualities necessary to withstand the slings and 
arrows of the enemy. 
Latter-Day Saints 
It is important to note that the theological differences between evangelical 
Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Roman Catholics are small in comparison to the 
theological differences between all three of those groups and the Latter-Day Saints. The 
former three approaches (as well as Eastern Orthodox Christianity) can be described as 
“Nicene,” in that they accept the consensus of the First Council of Nicaea, an ecumenical 
council convened in 325 CE, which established a standard theology for the church, as 
expressed in the Nicene Creed.98 Furthermore, while there are some minor differences 
among the various branches of Nicene Christianity over the books that comprise the Old 
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Testament canon, all agree that once the books of the New Testament were completed 
early in the second century of the Common Era, the canon of Scripture was closed; works 
created after the canon’s closure may be accepted as more or less authoritative by one or 
more of the branches of Nicene Christianity, but nothing more will reach the Bible’s level 
as God’s unique special revelation. 
Latter-Day Saints, on the other hand, hold to a theology in which an additional 
testament is added to the Bible: a set of previously-unknown scriptures that Joseph Smith 
claimed he discovered buried in upstate New York. These additional books of the Bible 
reinterpret the basic theology of Christianity in such a way as to create irreconcilable 
incompatibilities between Mormon theology and the theological viewpoint laid out in the 
Nicene Creed. For example, Nicene Christianity holds that God is triune in nature; while 
there are three separate persons in the Trinity (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit), 
they remain one God and one being, a paradox that human beings cannot comprehend. 
Further, in Nicene Christianity, God’s fundamental nature is noncorporeal; while Nicene 
Christians do believe that Jesus Christ was a physical human being, the Nicene Creed 
makes clear that this was the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity as a physical 
being for a short time in order to fulfill God’s plan of salvation, rather than an expression 
of God’s true nature as a physical being.99 In Mormon theology, conversely, the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit are three separate beings, not a single being with three persons, who 
sit in council as the “Godhead.” Mormon theology also holds that the Father and the Son 
are corporeal and physically embodied: 
The Father has a body of flesh and bones as tangible as man’s; the Son 
also; but the Holy Ghost has not a body of flesh and bones, but is a 
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personage of Spirit. Were it not so, the Holy Ghost could not dwell in 
us.100 
Those are but a few of the theological differences that lead many Nicene Christian 
theologians to argue that Mormonism is not Christian, at least not in the same way as 
Protestants, Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Anabaptists, evangelicals, etc. are Christian. 
(As Richard Benjamin Crosby notes, Mormonism’s own tradition of isolation and, at 
times, antagonism toward Nicene Christianity also contributes to the perceived separation 
between Nicene Christians and Mormons.101) 
For evangelicals in particular, the question of whether a given faith is “Christian” 
is theologically significant. Evangelical theology generally holds that while Roman 
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and other denominations of Protestantism are imperfect 
or corrupted forms of the true Christian faith, they are still essentially Christian; 
individuals within those traditions can come to know the true Jesus Christ and be saved 
through the teachings of their churches. Where those churches fail, it is because they have 
allowed compromise with the world, bad theology, or the corruption of sin to interfere 
with the core beliefs they purportedly espouse. 
This is not the case with evangelical theologians’ presentation of Mormonism, 
which evangelical theologians do not believe is a path to salvation alongside the Nicene 
branches of Christianity. Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention has described 
Mormonism as the fourth Abrahamic religion (alongside Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam)102, and even moderate evangelicals like former Fuller Theological Seminary 
president Richard Mouw, who was criticized at one point by many of his fellow 
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evangelicals for his outreach to Mormons, has maintained that Mormons are in need of 
evangelism toward the gospel (rather than having it already).103 
Evangelical Christian Right leaders clearly also consider Mormonism a separate 
religion; for example, in Mind Siege, LaHaye and Noebel use juxtaposition to place 
Mormons in between Jews and Muslims (and, by implication, outside of Christianity), 
writing that “we are in a desperate situation, and we need to awaken the 85 to 90 percent 
of Americans—Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Mormon, Muslim—to the true condition of the 
country.”104 Similarly, Whitehead (literally) damns the Mormons with faint praise, 
writing that “the Mormon Church in many ways mirrors the Christian religion with its 
belief in the Creator and moral absolutes”105—defining Mormonism as outside “the 
Christian religion,” albeit with enough superficial similarities as to establish a potential 
base for limited cobelligerency. 
Hostilities and Suspicions 
As Wuthnow outlines, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, tensions between 
evangelicals and Catholics—like denominational tensions within Nicene Christianity as a 
whole—eased as American Christianity reoriented itself around the liberal/conservative 
divide.106 As conservatives within Protestantism and Catholicism began to more closely 
align with one another around shared cultural, political, and familial values, one might 
have expected a similar kind of rapprochement between evangelical Protestants and 
Mormons during the same time period, and particularly in the 1980s as the Christian 
Right was identified as a visible political force.  
Even as tensions between evangelicals and Catholics were becoming less potent, 
however, anti-Mormon rhetoric continued to circulate throughout the evangelical world 
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during the 1970s and 1980s. Historian Neil J. Young argues that the 1982 film The God 
Makers, which was widely circulated within evangelical circles, played a major role in 
perpetuating hostilities between evangelicals and Mormons. By suggesting that the 
popular image of Mormon families as clean-cut, stable, and strong was a deceptive 
veneer designed to lure suburban American Christians into the satanic “cult” of Latter-
Day Saints, the film cast a more sinister light on what might otherwise have been a major 
factor to connect Mormons with evangelicals in a political and cultural coalition. 
Screenings of the film at evangelical churches were often accompanied by literature 
describing efforts by Mormons to proselytize among evangelicals, or by an “expert” 
speaker or ex-Mormon evangelical convert who could attest to the real agenda of the 
LDS Church. The God Makers also portrayed Mormonism as part of the satanic agenda 
to weaken true Christianity and deceive the people of God, thus placing Mormonism in 
the context of “spiritual warfare.”107 Anti-Mormon rhetoric like The God Makers, Young 
argues, served an important role for evangelical identity formation in the 1980s, enabling 
evangelicals to “draw the limits of conservative political ecumenism” as alliances with 
Catholics and other Protestants around family values threatened the distinctiveness of 
evangelicalism.108  
While evangelical anti-Mormon rhetoric portrayed the supposed cultural and 
political similarities between evangelicals and Mormons as a seductive and sinister ruse 
to further the satanic Mormon agenda, the LDS Church was making efforts to reorient the 
public face of the Mormon faith, seeking to portray it as part of “the pantheon of 
Christian denominations” rather than a separate and distinctive faith.109 By establishing a 
link between Mormons’ attempts to ingratiate themselves with evangelical Christians and 
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the satanic agenda of spiritual warfare against the forces of God, evangelical anti-
Mormon rhetoric cast the LDS Church’s ongoing attempts to portray itself as a Christian 
denomination and enter the political mainstream in a new light. Seen in the context of 
The God Makers, the fact that Mormons shared evangelicals’ family values did not 
represent a potential alliance to reorient politics and culture, but rather a demonic and 
cultic threat to true Christianity—and efforts to bring evangelicals and Mormons together 
around those shared values as a political and cultural bloc amounted to a trap designed to 
seduce Christians into giving power to Satan.  
This perspective percolated throughout fundamentalist and evangelical rhetoric, 
particularly those works which directly articulated their primary audience as other 
fundamentalists and evangelicals. For example, both of the American history textbooks 
for fundamentalist or evangelical high-school-age students (whether in a Christian school 
or homeschooled) that I examined described Mormonism as a cult, with one warning 
students that the religion’s “false doctrines” result from “additions to God’s Word.”110 
(Given the likelihood that evangelical or fundamentalist high-schoolers will be familiar 
with Revelation 22:18, which evangelicals interpret as a warning that the curses of 
Armageddon will be inflicted on anyone who adds to Scripture, this is a rather potent 
critique.111) Similarly, in his book about basic Christian doctrine, D. James Kennedy set 
Mormonism alongside Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Science as “modern cults” that 
“deny the basic foundational tenet of the Christian faith, the Gibraltar upon which all of 
Christianity stands, that Jesus Christ is the unique God-man come in the flesh."112 The 
use of “cult” language is significant, in that it sets Mormonism apart from “legitimate” 
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non-Christian religions (most prominently, Judaism) and strongly implies an ulterior 
agenda and an alliance (witting or unwitting) with demonic forces. 
Anti-Mormon rhetoric presented a teleological conflict between the Cosmic and 
American Narratives. If evangelicals formed an alliance with Mormons, their combined 
forces stood a stronger chance of reclaiming the levers of political and cultural power and 
reinstating “traditional morality,” thus reversing the moral decline portrayed in the 
American Narrative. In so doing, however, they would be giving not only some share in 
political and cultural power but also a degree of theological or cultural approval to a cult 
whose agenda was being guided by Satan himself—thus strengthening the Enemy’s side 
in the great spiritual war of the Cosmic Narrative. So while Christian Right political 
leaders sought to include Mormons within the pro-family coalition, and Mormons played 
a major role in maintaining cultural conservatism in their home base of the Mountain 
West, anti-Mormon rhetoric set out a hard outward boundary for evangelical political 
identity—and Mormonism was on the other side of that boundary. This hostility and 
tension would ensure that for at least the first few decades of the Christian Right as an 
identified political force, Mormons would occasionally be fellow-travelers, but would 
never be treated as full allies. 
Mitt Romney 2008: Assimilation 
This was the context into which Willard “Mitt” Romney emerged as a national 
political figure in the Republican Party and a presidential contender in 2008. Mitt 
Romney was the first Mormon to seriously contend for the Republican nomination since 
the rise of the Christian Right as an identifiable political force.113 Iowa’s first-in-the-
nation nominating caucuses posed a challenge for Romney, as some 60 percent of that 
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state’s Republican caucus-goers described themselves as evangelicals.114 While Romney 
did win some early endorsements from key religious conservative figures—most notably 
Bob Jones III—he was still facing a great deal of hostility from evangelicals like Dallas 
pastor Robert Jeffress, a prominent Southern Baptist minister. Jeffress denounced those 
of his co-religionists who had endorsed Romney, saying that Romney was “not a 
Christian” and his Mormonism was “a cult.”115 
While an analysis of polling data by political scientist Kimberly H. Conger in 
early November 2007 suggested that Romney had strong potential to connect with Iowa 
evangelicals because his positions on social issues were more conservative than those of 
rivals Rudy Giuliani, Fred Thompson, and John McCain, by the end of the month he 
found himself losing evangelical support in Iowa to former Southern Baptist pastor Mike 
Huckabee.116 Huckabee, whose social-issue positions were at least as conservative as 
Romney’s, offered an identity appeal for Iowa evangelicals that Romney could not 
match; as Conger puts it, “when Evangelicals were given the choice to vote for a viable 
Evangelical candidate, that is precisely what they did.”117 Huckabee explicitly courted the 
evangelical vote, as is evident in a Christmas-themed campaign ad in 
November/December 2007 in which he told viewers that “what really matters [about the 
holiday season] is the celebration of the birth of Christ.” Some critics—particularly non-
evangelical religious conservatives—saw a more sectarian message in the ad in the form 
of a bookshelf in the background that was lit in such a way as to look like a Christian 
cross, which they suggested was a not-so-subtle signal to evangelicals that Huckabee, 
unlike the other candidates, was one of them.118 
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But in seeking to appeal to Iowa evangelicals on the basis of shared religious 
identity, Huckabee (whether intentionally or unintentionally) also amplified doubts about 
Mitt Romney’s Mormonism. In several instances on the campaign trail, Huckabee 
alluded to the evangelical anti-Mormon rhetoric of earlier decades, highlighting not only 
the theological differences between the two traditions but also the long history of 
suspicion and conspiracy rhetoric from evangelicals toward Mormons—a history that had 
been stoked by the rhetoric coming from Huckabee’s own Southern Baptist denomination 
for decades.119 While these allusions hurt Huckabee’s standing among non-evangelical 
Republicans, they strengthened his appeal for many evangelicals. 
Because of Huckabee’s rise, questions about Romney’s Mormon faith—
particularly as it related to evangelicals in the Republican Party—began to increase in 
volume throughout November 2007. Romney responded by portraying himself as a 
fellow Christian with evangelicals; he emphasized his personal religiosity while 
downplaying the theological differences between Mormonism and Nicene Christianity, 
implying that Latter-Day Saints were another branch of Christianity, similar to Catholics, 
Lutherans, Eastern Orthodox, or Methodists, and casting evangelicals who were wary of 
his Mormon faith in the mold of their schismatic fundamentalist forebears. This exchange 
from a September 2007 interview with Collin Hansen of Christianity Today is 
emblematic of this strategic choice: 
[HANSEN:] How do you answer evangelicals who want their President to 
have faith but not your faith? 
[ROMNEY:] It depends on what they worry about. Do they want 
agreement on doctrine, and does that really effect [sic] how someone leads 
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as President? Or does someone want a President who shares values and 
will preserve the values and culture of America? That will only happen if 
people band together where we share common values.120 
Hansen’s characterization is emblematic of evangelicals’ conception of the relationship 
between their faith and Mormonism. To Hansen, Mormons and “Trinitarian Christians” 
(as he describes Nicene Christians elsewhere in the interview) are not merely members of 
different branches of the same Christian religion; instead, they are completely different 
“faiths.” However, by explicitly using the term “doctrine” rather than “faith” to describe 
the beliefs of Mormonism in relation to evangelicalism, Romney attempted to place the 
disagreement in a different frame which suggested that the differences between Mormons 
and evangelicals lie in the particulars of their theology.121 This was a potent frame, 
particularly for the evangelical audience of Christianity Today, a magazine founded by 
neo-evangelicals who defined their movement as a rejection of the tendency of old-style 
fundamentalists to split with one another over minor doctrinal differences.122 By 
characterizing the differences between Mormons and evangelicals as differences in 
“doctrine,” Romney implicitly argued that evangelicals who rejected him because of his 
Mormonism were doing so not because of differences in the basics of their faith, but 
because they were seeking doctrinal purity—in effect, accusing those who rejected his 
Mormonism of emulating their schismatic fundamentalist brethren in rejecting all 
Christians whose doctrinal views did not exactly match their own.  
This strategic choice is also evident in an interview with National Review reporter 
Byron York in which Romney responded to criticisms from evangelicals by continuing to 
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elide the question of whether or not Mormonism was a separate religion from 
Christianity: 
You know, the term ‘Christian’ means different things to different people 
[…] Jews aren’t Christian. That doesn’t preclude a Jew from being able to 
run for office and become president. I believe that Jesus Christ is the 
savior of the world and is the son of God. Now, some people say, well, 
that doesn’t necessarily make you a Christian because Christian refers to a 
certain group of evangelical Christian faiths. That’s fine. That’s their 
view. Others say, no, anyone who believes in Jesus Christ as the son of 
God and the Savior should be called Christian. That’s fine, too. I’ll just 
describe what I believe and not try to distinguish my faith from others. 
That’s really something for my faith to do and for the churches amongst 
themselves to consider.123 
Romney shifted the ground of dispute from theology to authority, suggesting that the 
question at hand is not what Mormons believe about Jesus Christ, but rather who gets to 
determine the boundaries of Christianity. While stating that non-Christian religious faith 
should not be a disqualifier for public office in the United States, Romney also subtly set 
up negative self-definition as one marker of authority, creating a hard outer boundary for 
the circumference of Christianity: Those who identify as non-Christian, such as Jews, are 
not Christian. By following that statement with a personal testimony, he also suggested 
that the converse—positive self-definition—is also valid: Those who do claim Jesus 
Christ as savior have the authority to proclaim themselves Christian. Then, Romney 
presented two options for defining the circumference of Christianity: either Christianity is 
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defined by assent to “a certain group of evangelical Christian faiths,” or it is open to 
anyone who professes their faith in Jesus Christ. In doing this, he was attempting to paint 
his evangelical critics into a corner, just as he did in the Christianity Today interview: 
Would they be like their fundamentalist forebears in excluding all who do not assent to 
the doctrines of “a certain group of evangelical Christian faiths”—thus excluding not 
only Mormons but also Catholics, Eastern Orthodox Christians, and many Protestants—
or would they accept anyone who acknowledges Jesus Christ as savior? Finally, by 
suggesting that the boundaries of Christianity are ultimately a question for “the churches 
amongst themselves”—with the implication that the Mormon church is among those 
churches—he suggests that the question of whether Mormons are Christians is an internal 
dispute within Christianity, and thereby inappropriate for the political arena. 
Romney continued on this tack several weeks later with his major address about 
religion, titled “Faith in America,” at the George Bush Presidential Library in College 
Station, Texas; the location, theme, and text of the speech itself drew comparisons to 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s famous 1960 speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial 
Association in which Kennedy attempted to assuage wary Protestants that his presidency 
would be guided by his belief in the separation of church and state, not the particulars of 
his Catholic faith or the authority of the Pope. However, as several scholars have noted, 
Romney in 2007 struck a substantially different tone from Kennedy in 1960124; while the 
latter expressed his belief in a secular government and proclaimed that his religious faith 
would not affect his decisions, the former asserted religion’s importance in the 
foundation of the country and argued for a return to a “common creed of moral 
convictions.”125 Despite Romney’s insistence that he did not need to submit to any 
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religious test in order to be a good president, he also included a proposition of his own 
faith: “There is one fundamental question about which I often am asked. What do I 
believe about Jesus Christ? I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the Savior of 
mankind.”126 This statement of faith has been identified by journalists and scholars as an 
attempt to inject sectarian discourse and identify with evangelicals who are wary of 
Mormon Christology127; as Richard Benjamin Crosby notes, that statement’s function as 
a “kind of shibboleth” for wary evangelicals was made all the more stark because such 
statements about Christ are uncharacteristic of Mormon political discourse.128 Crosby 
argues that this shibboleth is indicative of Romney’s strategy to use the speech as an act 
of “paraliptic-oath-taking”—a strategy in which Romney denied that he needed to pass 
any religious test in order to be worthy for office while attempting to use subtext to 
assure the evangelicals in his audience that he was one of them, in spirit if not exactly in 
doctrine.129 
Romney’s strategic choice to downplay theological differences did not go 
unnoticed by evangelical Christians, and many responded negatively. For example, Rep. 
Bob Inglis, a Republican from South Carolina, told reporters that he had advised Romney 
on the matter: “I told him, you cannot equate Mormonism with Christianity; you cannot 
say ‘I am a Christian just like you.’ […] If he does that, every Baptist preacher in the 
South is going to have to go to the pulpit on Sunday and explain the differences.”130 
Similarly, Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention took issue with Romney’s 
statement of personal faith: “When he goes around and says Jesus Christ is my Lord and 
savior, he ticks off at least half the evangelicals.”131 Conger similarly speculates that the 
controversy over Romney’s religion and his response to the controversy may have, 
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despite the thrust of his strategy, highlighted rather than minimized the differences in 
religious identity between him and the evangelicals he was wooing in a caucus contest 
where “identities were more important than issues.”132  
Because less than one percent of Iowa’s population is Mormon, it is possible (if 
not likely) that for many evangelicals in that state, their only encounter with Mormonism 
prior to the 2008 campaign season had been evangelical anti-Mormon rhetoric, which 
portrayed Mormon family values and social positions as honeypots positioned to draw in 
unsuspecting evangelicals and ensnare them with the false teachings and cultic rituals of 
Joseph Smith.133 In that context, Romney’s attempts to portray his faith as being basically 
similar to that of Nicene Christians may have strongly resonated with that narrative—a 
resonance that could only have been strengthened by mainstream commentators’ 
suggestion that Romney’s positions on social issues (particularly abortion) were 
disingenuous, as he had shifted rightward on those issues since his statewide campaigns 
in the socially-liberal state of Massachusetts in 1996 and 2002.134 
Regardless, though, Romney’s rhetorical presentation of his Mormon faith did not 
win him back enough support among evangelical Iowans to eclipse Mike Huckabee, who 
went on to win the Iowa caucuses. Though Romney did win some caucuses in Mormon-
heavy Mountain West states, John McCain’s victory in the New Hampshire and Florida 
primaries gave him enough momentum to carry a big victory in the twenty-one 
Republican primaries and caucuses of “Super Tuesday” on February 5, 2008. Two days 
later, Romney dropped out of the contest, effectively tabling the question until Romney’s 
next presidential run in 2012. 
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Mitt Romney 2012: The Lesser Evil 
Romney’s Mormonism was again an issue in the 2012 election; despite his 
courting conservative support throughout Barack Obama’s first term as president, 
Romney still faced evangelical suspicions as the beginnings of the 2012 primary season 
approached. In October 2011, the Family Research Council held their annual Values 
Voter Summit, where Republican presidential candidates would seek the Christian 
Right’s support for the nominating contest. At that summit, Robert Jeffress delivered a 
speech endorsing and introducing Texas governor Rick Perry, in which he praised Perry 
as a “born again follower of the Lord Jesus Christ,” while describing Romney only as a 
“good, moral person”135—a comparison that many members of the press quickly tied to 
Jeffress’s attacks on Romney’s Mormonism four years earlier. In press appearances 
following the incident, Jeffress did not back away from his earlier statements, standing by 
his proclamation that Mormonism was “a cult”—but adding nuance by arguing that it 
was a “theological cult,” not a “sociological cult” like the Peoples Temple of Jim 
Jones.136  
Though Jeffress was strongly criticized by many prominent conservatives (most 
notably former Secretary of Education Bill Bennett), he was still voicing opinions and 
suspicions held by many evangelicals.137 Political reporter David Weigel wrote that as he 
talked to evangelicals at the Values Voter Summit, they agreed with Jeffress’s 
characterization of Mormonism as a cult.138 Southern Baptist leader Richard Land also 
defended Jeffress’s statement by explaining in a Christian Post editorial that Jeffress had 
spoken as “a Baptist pastor answering a theological question with a theological answer” 
and suggesting that “secular political reporter interrogators simply did not have the 
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cognitive grid to assimilate and understand [Jeffress’s statements] accurately.”139 But 
notably, Land and Jeffress were both very careful to make it clear that if Mitt Romney 
became the Republican nominee, they would support him in his campaign against Barack 
Obama. 
But even insofar as evangelical leaders were hesitant to support Mitt Romney 
because of his Mormon faith, they were unable to unite behind another candidate to 
challenge him. An early 2012 meeting of evangelical leaders was convened with the 
intention of solidifying support behind a single Republican candidate, but that process 
resulted in a tepid endorsement of Sen. Rick Santorum amid accusations of rigged 
voting—and, according to Young, “revealed […] the lingering divisions that were also 
apparent in the larger Religious Right electorate,” instead of unifying the movement 
behind a single standard-bearer.140 Amid evangelical disunity and a series of rapidly 
rising and fading Republican frontrunners-of-the-moment to challenge him, Romney won 
the 2012 Republican nomination for the presidency and, in doing so, became the only 
person who could conceivably defeat Barack Obama in the November 2012 general 
election. 
The idea that Romney was preferable to the alternative was cited by many 
evangelical leaders as they endorsed Romney. Land’s Christian Post editorial is a 
particular example of a Christian Right leader positioning himself to support Romney in 
the 2012 general election; while the editorial was written in October 2011 in response to 
Jeffress’s Values Voter Summit comments, it anticipated Romney’s nomination and 
suggested that evangelical Christians would be the least likely to make Romney’s 
Mormonism an issue. Evangelicals, Land wrote, had been “taught about Mormonism by 
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their pastors who have seen it as their duty to inoculate their flocks against Mormonism,” 
but were still strongly inclined to vote for Romney if he were the nominee “when the 
alternative is President Obama.” Land suggested that if Mormonism became an issue 
during the general election campaign, it would not be because of evangelicals like Robert 
Jeffress, but rather as part of an effort by the secular press (which had “abandoned any 
semblance of objectivity on political matters”) to sow confusion and doubt among 
independent voters who were not as well-versed in Mormonism as evangelical 
Christians.141 
Indeed, there seemed to be an unspoken arrangement between Romney and 
evangelicals throughout the 2012 campaign—an arrangement that seemed to be in place 
even before the nomination was decided, as Romney’s status as frontrunner throughout 
the run-up to the primary elections meant that damaging his support among evangelicals 
might hurt the campaign of the only person who stood a chance of unseating Barack 
Obama in the general election. Romney’s part of the arrangement was not to engage in 
the kind of rhetoric he had used in 2008 to downplay the differences between 
Mormonism and Nicene Christianity and claim consubstantiality with evangelicals; were 
he to engage in that kind of rhetoric in 2012 after winning the nomination, it would force 
evangelical leaders’ hands and require them to explain the differences yet again in a way 
that would almost certainly soften Romney’s evangelical support. Young notes that even 
in his outreach to evangelicals (such as his May 2012 commencement address at Liberty 
University), Romney “avoided ever calling himself a Christian or suggesting close 
similarities between Mormonism and evangelical Christianity.”142 Instead, Romney 
“name-checked beloved evangelical institutions” and appealed to “shared moral 
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convictions” while referring to the differences between his Mormon faith and that of the 
evangelical Liberty graduates.143  
Evangelicals like Land, for their part, emphasized the danger of four more years 
of an Obama presidency as an alternative to Romney and some (though certainly not all) 
softened their own characterizations of Mormonism in their external rhetorics. As Young 
notes, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association removed sections of their publications 
and websites that referred to Mormonism as a cult after a meeting between Romney and 
Billy Graham at which the latter had “all but endorsed” the former.144 Franklin Graham 
(Billy’s son) also wrote an editorial in support of Romney’s candidacy in September 
2012, in which he sought to destigmatize Romney’s Mormonism for evangelical voters 
by appealing to the “common values” shared by Mormons, evangelicals, Catholics, and 
Jews—values he contrasted with those of Barack Obama and Bill Clinton.145  
As these selections indicate, there were several major differences in context 
between the 2008 and 2012 elections which might have contributed to the differences in 
rhetorical approach. First, as Young notes, Romney seemed to have “learned his lesson” 
about evangelical suspicions of his Mormon faith; while in 2007-08 he sought to portray 
his faith as (essentially) another branch of Christianity, by 2012 he tacitly acknowledged 
that evangelicals did not consider him Christian. Evangelicals responded by softening 
some of the external rhetorics that had stigmatized Mormonism as a “cult.” Second, in 
late 2007 as Romney’s trouble connecting with evangelical voters was reaching its apex, 
there was a candidate on the Republican side in Mike Huckabee whose past as an 
evangelical minister gave him the authority and the trust level to fully take advantage of 
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Romney’s difficulties, while evangelical voters in the 2012 Republican primary did not 
have an alternative figure to unify around. 
But perhaps more significant is that at the height of the controversy over 
Romney’s Mormonism in October and November 2007, the threat of a Democratic 
president was hypothetical—and both of the top Democratic candidates were 
emphasizing their own Protestant faith in an effort to reach out to evangelicals.146 As 
Daniel K. Williams writes, one reason that many evangelical voters warmed up to 
Huckabee during the 2008 campaign was that Huckabee appeared to be trying to change 
the image of political evangelicalism, from a hard-right stance to one that could also 
embrace compassion for the poor and concern for the environment; leaders in both parties 
thought that evangelical voters, whose enthusiasm for the Republican Party was damaged 
by eight years of George W. Bush, could potentially be a “swing constituency” rather 
than automatic votes for the Republican.147 
But after four years of the very real Democratic presidency of Barack Obama—
four years in which marriage equality had become more accepted in the country, in which 
the Affordable Care Act had mandated that even some religiously-based organizations 
fund contraceptive coverage in their health insurance plans regardless of whether 
contraception was compatible with their beliefs, in which the Tea Party movement had 
emerged as a hardline, no-compromise alternative to the Republican “establishment”—
conservative evangelicals had retrenched in opposition to Barack Obama and the 
Democrats. And as the 2012 Republican primary campaign approached and Romney 
emerged as the early frontrunner (and thus, as potentially the only hope of unseating 
President Obama), evangelical leaders began arguing that whatever suspicions they might 
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still hold about Mitt Romney’s faith were trumped by the known danger to their 
worldview posed by four more years of Barack Obama. 
Strategic Ambiguity 
One common critique of the Christian Right from their political opponents 
focuses on what kind of country they envision: if the nation’s legal codes were to be 
reinterpreted according to their understanding, with all American laws being subject to 
higher “biblical principles,” which principles would those be, and whose Christianity 
would prevail? Would it be a theology of biblical inerrancy—a doctrine held by many 
evangelicals, but rejected by other conservative Protestant denominations as well as many 
mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Mormons? Which Bible would be considered 
inerrant in the first place: the one used by most Protestants, the one used by Anglicans 
and Catholics (which includes additional Old Testament books known as the Apocrypha), 
or the one used by Mormons (which includes the material added by Joseph Smith)? Many 
Christian Right rhetors answer this critique by pointing to certain moral beliefs held in 
common by many Protestants, Catholics, and Mormons, as well as Jews and “pro-family” 
individuals who do not subscribe to organized religion.  
But as discussed throughout this project, those beliefs are rooted in remarkably 
different narratives about the cosmos and about the country, which lead to remarkably 
different notions of identity and teleology. I have outlined the ways in which the Cosmic 
and American Narratives shape identity and time to set out a vision for the country and 
for the cosmos that is rooted not in a baseline “mere Christianity,” as C.S. Lewis might 
call it—to the extent that even the “mere” form of Christianity includes those outside the 
Nicene circle, such as Mormons—but rather in an evangelical, Reformed, Protestant 
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worldview. Certainly, “mere” Judeo-Christianity has a place in the American Narrative as 
a clear outer line of circumference, outside which one is certainly not part of the in-group 
of “pro-family Americans,” but there remains a clear hierarchy of American identity even 
within that circumference: Mormons, Catholics, mainline Protestants, and irreligious 
conservatives have to prove that they are willing to compromise where the policy or 
identity implications of their beliefs differ from the evangelical Protestant vision for the 
country, whereas evangelical Protestants need present no such proof, assumed as they are 
to be the true heirs apparent of the founders’ vision for the country. 
On September 23, 2015, Glenn Beck published a post to his Facebook page about 
that night’s upcoming broadcast of his television show, writing:  
There are seven hills of culture. If you plan on surviving as a culture you 
must have these seven hills. 
We have completely lost all but two and we are on the verge of losing the 
last two:  
Family and religion.148 
Later on in the evening, David Barton would clarify the meaning of the “seven hills” to 
which Beck referred, connecting them to a theological/ideological movement known as 
“Seven Mountains Dominionism.” That movement’s main thesis is that God intends for 
Christians not to eschew power and wealth, but rather to adopt what C. Peter Wagner 
defines as the “cultural mandate149” to seize from Satan positions of power in culture, and 
use those positions to further the Kingdom of God on earth. Dominion theologians like 
Wagner and Lance Wallnau (the originator of the “seven mountains” concept150) argue 
that there are seven sectors of culture that Christians are called to dominate: religion, 
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family, education, media, government, arts and entertainment, and business.151 Dominion 
theologians argue that when the Church (aided by the Holy Spirit and guided by apostles 
and prophets) has taken dominion over those seven mountains, it will be able to 
transform cities, nations, and ultimately the world into the Kingdom of God on earth.152 
What is interesting about this particular instance, though, is that Glenn Beck is a 
Mormon—and thus not, by the standards of the dominion theologians, part of the Church 
that God intends to take dominion over the seven mountains of culture.153 While Wagner 
is careful to preface his own work about dominion by claiming that he opposes theocracy 
and supports a democracy with religious freedom, that is his last mention of either 
concept in the book; elsewhere, he argues that where Christians encounter a cultural 
phenomenon that they believe to be a result of Satan having “usurped dominion of 
creation from Adam” and thus not part of the Kingdom of God—such as poverty or 
disease—they are called by God to eradicate it.154 Why would heresy or apostasy (which 
is what dominion theologians believe Mormonism to be, at best) not also fall under 
Wagner’s mandate? And yet, here Beck stands alongside Barton, espousing the dominion 
of the seven mountains—a theology in which Mormons like him are not numbered 
among the divinely-empowered dominant. 
This is perhaps a too-pedantic illustration of one of the strategies used by 
Christian Right rhetors to account for the dissonances I have discussed: a strategic 
ambiguity in terms. To evangelicals who espouse Seven Mountains theology, the 
invocation of that theology is referred back to the whole edifice of dominionism as an 
ideological, theological, and political philosophy; to those unfamiliar with that particular 
theological outlook but who hold to another worldview associated with the Christian 
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Right, the reference might be seen through the lens of a softer formulation of the same 
idea, such as Schaeffer’s notion of restoring “Christian consensus” (a consensus in which 
Beck’s Mormonism might be less unwelcome). Similar to civil-religious language (and, 
at times, incorporating much of that civil-religious language), this ambiguity 
simultaneously unites and divides, creating hierarchies of identity while setting linguistic 
boundaries of circumference for the movement. Everyone within the larger “pro-family” 
movement can agree that the forces of darkness have overtaken many cultural institutions 
that once were dominated by Christian thinking. But “let those with ears to hear, hear”; to 
Christians who sympathize with dominion theology, such rhetoric functions to tell them 
not only that they understood the whole message, but also that others did not—thus 
centering them in the hierarchy of identity. 
A similar phenomenon may be at play in Protestant Christian Right rhetors’ 
invocation of “natural law” as a justification for their political beliefs. As I have indicated 
about Rick Santorum, prominent Roman Catholic writers have suggested that the 
American founders’ references to natural law mark them as having an outlook rooted not 
in the Protestant Reformation, but rather in medieval Catholicism. Because natural law is 
a view held in common by Protestants and Catholics, they suggest, it represents a means 
by which the theological differences between various Christian traditions might be 
overcome; George Wiegel explicitly argues that natural law could unite conservative 
Christians around a common cultural agenda in a way that the evangelical Protestantism 
of Jerry Falwell, which is rooted in exclusivity and singularity, could not.  
While the terminology and perhaps even the specifics of evangelical Protestant 
and Catholic renditions of natural law may be similar, the roots are quite different. 
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Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the most significant figure in Catholic discussions of natural 
law, maintained that humans are capable of understanding and pursuing the basic 
principles of natural law, writing that “since the rational soul is the proper form of man, 
there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act 
according to virtue.”155 For Aquinas, even the particulars of natural law could be grasped 
through the application of human reason alone, so long as human reason was not 
obstructed or “perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature”;156 he 
argued specifically against the idea that the natural law could only truly be known by 
those who have “the Law and the Gospel” (in other words, special revelation).157 Though 
contemporary Catholic doctrine agrees that some form of supernatural revelation is 
necessary to enable a person to overcome what the Catholic Encyclopedia describes as 
“the power of passion, prejudice, and other influences which cloud the understanding or 
pervert the will,” it is because these are obstructions to divinely-created reason, with 
which one can derive “a full knowledge of the moral law.”158 
As we have seen, Aquinas looms large as a villain in Francis Schaeffer’s narrative 
about the adoption of humanism by the medieval Catholic Church, precisely because of 
Aquinas’s argument that human reason is not in itself corrupted by the Fall, and that 
errors in moral reasoning are the result of other, fallen human capacities interfering with 
the proper application of human reason. To Reformed thinkers like Schaeffer and 
Whitehead, human reason is in itself a fallen capacity, and thus in need of correction 
from special revelation. Whitehead writes that “law in the true sense is bibliocentric, 
concerned with justice in terms of the Creator's revelation,”159 and explicitly argues that 
notions of natural law based on human reasoning from nature (such as those developed 
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by the Greeks) “cannot be an effective base to law,” because nature and human reason 
alike are fallen.160 Thus, he writes, “any law that contradicts biblical revelation is 
illegitimate.”161 This view is not unique to the Calvinist wing. Wagner, a Pentecostal 
Christian, also implicitly argues against a Thomist perspective on natural law, writing 
that because Satan had seized humanity’s God-given authority to hold dominion over the 
earth, the moral condition of humanity prior to the coming of Christ was “miserable”: 
Think of the lawlessness, the atrocities, the bloodshed, the oppression, the 
immorality, the idolatry, the witchcraft, the wars and the disease that 
characterized whole people groups in all parts of the world. […] Yes, there 
were godly exceptions, like Job, Noah, repentant Nineveh and the 
Israelites during seasons when God was being glorified. However, these 
exceptions were few and far between compared with the bulk of the whole 
human race, which was under the dominion of Satan, which he had 
usurped from Adam.162 
This is not merely an academic argument, either; as I have suggested, the (explicitly 
Protestant) American Narrative argues that the worldviews of the nation’s founders were 
rooted in the notion that all human capacities—including reason—were corrupted by the 
Fall, and thus required checks and balances in governmental structure, and correction 
from God’s revelation in moral structure, in order to be properly exercised in a 
sustainable, prosperous republic. The Catholic and Protestant/evangelical versions of 
natural law also have different teleological endpoints. Catholic natural law could work 
reasonably well, even if not perfectly, in a pluralistic society, so long as the members of 
that society were properly exercising their capacity for reason (and thus agreed on the 
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general outline of natural law). But Protestant/evangelical natural law requires the 
Christian consensus to be in place, because without a general social agreement that the 
moral rules for government and individual conduct are subordinate to the witness of 
Scripture, there can be no consensus on any legal framework whatsoever; it is impossible 
for an individual to authoritatively understand the outlines of natural law by general 
revelation alone, limited as it is by the fallenness of human reason and the fallenness of 
the natural world itself. 
Despite this gulf between the Catholic and Protestant approaches to natural law, 
there remains at least on the surface a general agreement on most, if not all, of the 
particulars of natural law. This surface similarity functions to enable Catholic and 
Protestant rhetors alike to present natural law as a potentially unifying figure, and the 
arrangement holds so long as a certain ambiguity is maintained about natural law’s 
epistemological roots and teleological ends. Conservative Catholics and Christian Right 
Protestants can agree that natural law absolutely forbids the practice of abortion and the 
legality of abortion as a violation of the fetus’s right to life. The Catholic natural law 
approach, however, views legalized abortion as a sign that the culture has allowed the 
desire for individual license or convenience to interfere with the capacity to understand 
that life in all stages from conception to natural death is sacred; according to this logic, 
one need not be Catholic or even Christian to be able to reason similarly, as the capacity 
for understanding natural law through reason is shared by all people. The Protestant 
natural law approach, on the other hand, sees legalized abortion as evidence that the 
culture has lost the moorings it once had in biblical law, and is slowly descending into 
humanist paganism; the remedy in this approach is not to reason non-Christians into 
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believing in the sanctity of life, but rather to (a) bring more non-Christians to 
Christianity, where they can understand the sanctity of life through special revelation, and 
(b) persuade nominal or inactive Christians that the values they claim to hold require that 
they oppose legal abortion. 
Internal vs. External Rhetorics 
One of the means by which this strategic ambiguity is maintained is through a 
distinction between internally-directed and externally-directed rhetoric. Many Christian 
Right rhetors explicitly call for their fellow movement members to be aware of their 
audiences, particularly when discussing controversial issues that could be easily taken out 
of context or misinterpreted due to the ignorance of those who simply do not have the 
“ears to hear,” or due to the malevolence of the movement’s secular humanist enemies. 
 Richard Land’s editorial about the 2012 presidential election in which he called 
Mormonism the “fourth Abrahamic religion” separate from Christianity, rather than a 
branch of Christianity, is a cogent example; in that editorial, Land also criticized Robert 
Jeffress for not “recognizing his audience” and being aware of how the “secular media” 
might take his words out of context to foment dissension among the ranks of religious 
conservatives. The “secular political reporter interrogators” to whom Jeffress was 
speaking, Land wrote, “simply did not have the cognitive grid to assimilate and 
understand correctly” what Jeffress was saying; in particular, they lacked the ability to 
parse the idea Mormonism is a “theological” cult (defined by Land as any religion 
outside “the parameters of orthodox, apostle’s creed Trinitarian Christianity”) that “does 
not behave as a cult culturally or socially.” Land implied that Jeffress should have known 
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that describing Mormonism as a cult would invoke “‘Branch Davidians’ or ‘Jim 
Jones.’”163 
It is important to note here that Land is not suggesting that the purpose of 
distinguishing between internally-directed and externally-directed rhetorics is to hide the 
true agenda of the Christian Right or to deceive the public; rather, he suggests that giving 
members of the secular media or the general public content that they are incapable of 
properly understanding (due to their lacking the “cognitive grid” to understand it) is 
needlessly inviting them to misinterpret or misunderstand that content: 
Most Evangelicals who attend church on a regular basis understand the 
basic tenants [sic] of the Mormon faith and how they differ from the 
doctrinal teachings of orthodox Christianity. They have been taught about 
Mormonism by their pastors who have seen it as their duty to inoculate 
their flocks against Mormonism. And, knowing Mormonism’s belief 
system, at least four-fifths of them are prepared to vote for Romney when 
the alternative is President Obama. Even Pastor Jeffress himself said he 
would vote for Romney in a general election campaign against President 
Obama. 
However, the vast majority of the 40 percent or so of the American public 
who identify themselves as “Independents” (and who decide every 
American presidential election) have only the most cursory understanding 
of the truth claims or belief system of the Mormon faith.164 
This hearkens back to the hierarchical distinction that began this chapter; those who have 
the insider gnosis of “ears to hear” and to truly understand what Jeffress was saying are 
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elevated in the hierarchy above those who do not understand, and yet who may still 
ultimately act the right way (voting for Mitt Romney) even if they lack that 
understanding. 
 “Religious Freedom” as Dominant Trope 
Land’s editorial also gets at another strategic choice used by the Christian Right 
to transcend potentially coalition-fracturing dissonances between the narrative worldview 
put forth by their rhetoric and those of other religious conservatives. Even as the 
distinctions within the circumference of in-group identity remain fuzzy and ambiguous, 
he makes the outside edge of that circumference as clear as day: despite theological 
disagreements or concerns about “cult” language, evangelicals like Land and Jeffress are 
fearful enough of four more years of Barack Obama that they are willing to overlook 
their wariness of Mormonism.  
This is, of course, a strategy as old as rhetoric itself: uniting one’s allies by 
appealing to one’s enemies. But as I have tried to demonstrate, the secular enemy has 
always been a major figure in discourse associated with the latter-day Christian Right, 
just as the communist enemy was a major figure in right-wing discourses throughout the 
Cold War. And yet, it is only recently that the supposed enmity of “secular humanists” 
has overcome the deep-seated distrust between the evangelical Protestant leadership of 
the Christian Right and Catholics or Mormons, enabling them to form strong strategic 
partnerships. Throughout the first few decades of the latter-day Christian Right as an 
identifiable political bloc, interfaith cooperation with Catholics and Mormons tended to 
be either nominal (claiming an interfaith constituency while still being dominated by 
evangelical Protestants) or tactical (one-issue campaigns like Stop-ERA or the anti-
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abortion movement). So how did the relationship between Christian Right rhetoric and 
the situation “on the ground” change in ways that would enable more effective 
partnerships between evangelical Protestants, conservative Catholics, and Mormons? 
The trope of societal decline has always been a staple of Christian Right rhetoric, 
just as it has been a staple of American rhetoric as a whole. For the Christian Right, the 
idea that the nation is descending into the moral abyss is one of the ideas that resonates 
both with the American Narrative’s valorization of the halcyon days of the founding 
generation, and the Cosmic Narrative’s pessimism about human endeavors in history. But 
historical events in the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century have served as 
crystallization points for this sense of crisis, both among the Christian Right and among 
their socially conservative Catholic and Mormon allies, functioning to provide a decline 
narrative that trumps the suspicions and mistrust that have been barriers to deep, strategic 
cooperation among them in the past. In particular, I highlight two such crystallization 
points that enabled Christian Right and other social conservative rhetors to make a 
narrative case not just for cobelligerency—a tactical alliance for a single cause, like the 
Schaeffers and Koop argued was necessary to mobilize opposition to legal abortion—but 
for consubstantiation. In effect, social conservatives have used these crystallization 
points of social decline to make the case for an imagined community in peril, whereby 
the ambiguities of the positive message are trumped by the clarity of the negative 
message. 
The first crystallization point I will highlight is the shift in legal and public 
opinion on LGBT rights over the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century. On 
January 1, 2001—the first day of the new millennium—the law and public opinion were 
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both in alignment with social conservatives’ views on LGBT rights. Many states still had 
enforceable laws on the books banning sodomy (despite few such cases actually being 
prosecuted). Though a few states allowed same-sex couples to form civil unions with 
most of the benefits of civil marriage, civil marriage itself was not available to same-sex 
couples anywhere in the United States, and a majority of the public supported a 
constitutional amendment restricting civil marriage to opposite-sex partners.165 The U.S. 
military barred openly gay or lesbian service members with its “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy. Only the most progressive corporations and businesses provided benefits to their 
employees’ same-sex domestic partners or openly opposed anti-LGBT discrimination. 
But over the next decade and a half, the landscape shifted rapidly. State laws 
against sodomy were struck down as unconstitutional in the Supreme Court’s 2003 
Lawrence v. Texas ruling. A series of court rulings, culminating in 2013’s Windsor v. 
United States, established same-sex civil marriage as a right nationwide. The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice was revised in 2011 to end “don’t ask, don’t tell” and allow gay 
and lesbian service members to serve openly. Public opinion reversed to an almost 2:1 
margin in support of same-sex civil marriage.166 States began enforcing anti-
discrimination laws against florists and bakers for refusing to serve same-sex couples. 
Most major corporations became openly supportive of LGBT rights, not only in their 
employment policies but also in their public outreach. 
Advocates for LGBT liberation, conscious of the barriers that still remain in place 
for LGBT people, would (rightly) caution against an attitude of triumphalism on the part 
of supporters of LGBT liberation and equality. But from the perspective of social 
conservatives, developments since 2001 have represented a seismic shift in society’s 
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acceptance of LGBT people. In 2001, the law and public opinion were both in alignment 
with social conservatives’ views on LGBT acceptance; now the law not only 
acknowledges same-sex partnerships as valid and equal to opposite-sex partnerships, but 
also (from their perspective) requires social conservatives to “support” same-sex 
relationships by outlawing discrimination against LGBT people. If ever an evangelical 
Protestant needed evidence of a society losing its sense of Christian identity, or a 
conservative Catholic needed evidence that the culture was allowing carnal pursuits to 
trump natural law, or a conservative Mormon needed evidence that they would still be a 
persecuted minority even in a pluralist society, the public shift on LGBT issues over the 
thirteen years between 2001 and 2014 provided more than enough. 
Young identifies one particular incident as a major crystallization point in 
creating consubstantiality between the evangelical-dominated Christian Right, Catholics, 
and Mormons: the 2008 backlash by LGBT rights activists against the LDS church in the 
wake of California voters’ approval of Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriage. 
November 4, 2008, had largely been a disappointing day for conservatives, as Barack 
Obama won the presidency and the Democratic Party increased its congressional 
majorities; one of the few bright spots for social conservatives was the victory of an anti-
LGBT-rights bill in California—a supposed liberal bastion. But it was quickly met with a 
backlash, as supporters of LGBT rights engaged in protest against the people and 
organizations who had backed Proposition 8—and the LDS Church, which had been one 
of the most visible and prominent backers of the campaign to pass the proposition, and 
which also conveniently had locations nationwide where protesters could express their 
opposition to the church’s actions, bore much of the blame. Protest rallies emerged 
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outside LDS temples across the country, from Temple Square in downtown Salt Lake 
City167 to the LDS temple on New York City’s Upper West Side.168 The vehement 
protests from supporters of LGBT rights garnered sympathy for the LDS Church from 
both evangelical and Catholic opponents of same-sex marriage—including prominent 
figures in the Christian Right like Chuck Colson, James Dobson, and Tony Perkins.169  
According to Young, this was a moment of real solidarity between evangelicals, 
Catholics, and Mormons that enabled the Christian Right to reconfigure the outward 
border of political ecumenism, as evangelicals and Catholics were able to identify with 
what they characterized as the victimization of Mormons for standing up for their beliefs 
about marriage. In this consubstantial vision, Young writes, they formed an alliance not 
around shared politics (as previous attempts, including the Moral Majority and Christian 
Coalition, had tried) or shared theology, but rather around the threat posed by liberals to 
their religious liberty170—a sort of shared victimage, where each group saw in the others 
the potential that if they did not all hang together, they all might hang separately at the 
hands of the secular liberals.  
The 2008 election also provided the Christian Right (and the American right-wing 
more generally) with a symbol for all that threatened their values and worldview: the 
newly-elected president, Barack Obama. Since his emergence as a presidential candidate 
in 2007, Barack Obama’s religious allegiance was continually in question. His March 
2008 speech “A More Perfect Union,” one of the most significant speeches of the whole 
campaign, was his response to videos of controversial statements made by the pastor of 
the church he attended, Rev. Jeremiah Wright, and Rev. Wright’s connections to black 
theology.171 Another theory, promulgated by former Saturday Night Live cast member 
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Victoria Jackson, charged that Obama was the Antichrist of premillennial eschatology.172 
Some commentators on the right and the left suggested that Obama is secretly an 
atheist.173 
The most prominent conspiracy theory about Barack Obama’s religion, 
particularly among the Christian Right, is that he is secretly a Muslim. Promoters of this 
theory argue that Obama’s Islamic allegiance is rooted in his upbringing, which included 
time spent in Indonesia living with his mother and his Muslim stepfather174; in the 
meantime, they charge, Obama has publicly claimed to be Christian in order to get 
political power, which he could then use to aid Muslims in their ongoing war against the 
Christian West.175 Right-wing wiki site Conservapedia, which is run by Phyllis 
Schlafly’s son Andy Schlafly, keeps a long (and continually-updated) list of bullet-point 
“evidence” for Obama’s Muslim allegiance.176 These conspiracy theories took particular 
hold among the Christian Right, to the point where 2015 polling found that even in the 
seventh year of Obama’s presidency, after two presidential campaigns and seven years as 
the most recognizable and most-analyzed political figure in the country, some 43-54% of 
Republicans still believed that Barack Obama was a Muslim, despite his openly 
identifying as a Christian.177  
If Mormonism still had a place in the right-wing pantheon of dangerous and 
sinister religious movements at the beginning of Barack Obama’s administration, the 
various religious and ideological allegiances that mainstream and conspiracist right-wing 
discourse attributed to President Obama soon came to occupy a much higher rung. No 
matter whether he was an atheist, Muslim, Antichrist, garden-variety secular humanist 
liberal, or somehow more than one of the above, he soon emerged as the personification 
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of the danger he posed to the Christian Right and their “religious liberty,” and defeating 
him dwarfed concerns about the theological differences between evangelicals and 
Mormons, who shared many socially-conservative values in comparison. After he 
publicly declared support for LGBT marriage equality in May 2012, Pat Buchanan 
described the date of his reelection as “the Antietam of the culture war,” proclaiming that 
the day would decide “whether we still call the United States of America God’s 
country.”178 
Barack Obama’s signature legislative accomplishment, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. “Obamacare,” or the ACA), which passed in 2010, provides a 
representative anecdote for the ways in which the threat to “religious liberty” has become 
an overarching theme in Christian Right discourse that has served to minimize 
differences between evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons. One of the requirements of 
the ACA was that with the exception of explicitly religious organizations (like churches), 
all employers who provided health insurance for their employees were required to include 
contraceptive coverage at no cost to the employee. That provision of the law was 
challenged by Hobby Lobby, a craft-supplies retail chain which sought exemption from 
the contraceptive mandate because its evangelical owner, David Green, believed that 
some medical contraceptives are “abortifacients,” preventing fertilized eggs from 
implanting in a woman’s uterus—thus amounting to the abortion of a conceived child—
rather than preventing fertilization altogether.179 
It is noteworthy that the case against the contraception mandate was brought by 
an evangelical Protestant, rather than a Catholic. Opposition to all forms of abortion or 
contraception has historically been identified with Catholicism, while evangelical 
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Protestants have tended to take a more nuanced approach in which they strongly opposed 
abortion while supporting the legality of contraception (if used by married, heterosexual 
couples) as a means of preventing unplanned pregnancies. While Green’s opposition to 
contraception was rooted in different ideas than the Catholic opposition to 
contraception,180 the fact that an evangelical Protestant was the face of a legal case that 
would have been viewed as the sole province of Catholics a few decades ago is further 
evidence that historic tensions between evangelicals and Catholics are being eroded, or 
subsumed, by the perceived threat posed by secularism. 
It is perhaps even more noteworthy that the Hobby Lobby dispute was not over 
the medical or scientific question of whether or not the contraceptives in question 
actually were abortifacients, but rather over whether David Green’s belief that the 
contraceptives were abortifacients was, in itself, enough to justify an exemption from the 
contraceptive mandate.181 (In fact, an amicus brief filed by numerous medical 
organizations made the case that the contraceptives in question were not 
abortifacients.182) The case made by Hobby Lobby and its conservative allies—both in 
the courts and in the media—centered around the question of whether the government 
could force Hobby Lobby’s owners to participate in a structure they found morally 
objectionable on the basis of their “deeply-held religious beliefs,” without reference to 
whether or not those moral objections were themselves defensible according to an 
internal cohesiveness or logic, or an external reference point.183 
This represents a subtle rhetorical shift on the part of the Christian Right. The 
central narratives of evangelical Christian Right discourse have sought to define 
“religion” narrowly, particularly when discussing the meaning of the term as used by the 
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American founders in the First Amendment—generally restricting the meaning of the 
term to Protestantism or (at the very least) Nicene Christianity. Other religious beliefs 
would be tolerated, but the American Narrative lays out that the clear intention of the 
founders of the country was for the nation to be dominated not just by a vaguely-defined 
“religion,” but specifically by Christian (or “Judeo-Christian”) values. The fact that the 
American Narrative roots its concept of the Christian nation in the founding era—an era 
that predated Joseph Smith’s founding of Mormonism in 1830—excludes Mormons from 
this national vision. As I have indicated, one of the means by which Christian Right 
rhetors address the internal dissonances in identity formation between the Cosmic and 
American Narratives is by reconfiguring civil religion as explicitly not referring to a 
generalized sense of “religion,” but specifically to Judeo-Christian theism.  
In the Hobby Lobby case, though, the case being made to the general public by the 
litigants and their supporters against the contraceptive mandate was not that it violated 
Judeo-Christian theism, but rather that it required the business’s owners to violate their 
own consciences. While David Green’s opposition to contraception was based in his 
evangelical Christian faith, the public case for Hobby Lobby was that it did not matter 
which faith Green espoused, or whether his opposition to contraception was actually 
based in sound theological, ethical, or scientific principles; the fact that he claimed a 
deeply-held religious objection to contraception was in itself enough to justify Hobby 
Lobby’s exemption from the mandate. 
But, of course, it did matter that Green’s objection was based in his evangelical 
Christian beliefs, just as it has mattered that the other prominent religious liberty cases 
that have been supported by the Christian Right’s various legal networks have all been 
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defenses of the rights of conservative Christians (including Mormons) to refuse to 
comply with local or state laws banning discrimination against LGBT people or the 
Supreme Court’s Windsor ruling requiring that civil authorities provide same-sex couples 
with access to civil marriage nationwide. While many Christian Right advocates defend 
freedom of conscience and religious liberty seemingly without reference to which 
religious worldview is at the basis of that conscience and liberty, their critics have rightly 
pointed out that their concern for such matters only extends as far as the circumference of 
Christian Right identity—an identity which has expanded somewhat as Mormons and 
Catholics were steadily accepted as consubstantial in the ongoing fight against social 
liberalism and relativism, but which has still not expanded to include liberal or mainline 
Christians, Muslims, agnostics, atheists, or practitioners of other non-Judeo-Christian 
faiths. 
This is another case of strategic linguistic ambiguity at work, in the phrase 
“religious liberty.” As we have seen, the concept of “liberty” is defined within the 
Cosmic and American Narratives both negatively and positively: liberty is not just the 
freedom from government interference in one’s own affairs, but is specifically the 
freedom to follow the absolute authority of God’s law and to fulfill God’s purpose in 
one’s own life. To put it in Schaeffer’s terms, liberty is not simply freedom—for that is 
the secular humanist/libertarian view, in which all is permissible—but freedom with form 
in society, the freedom of godly and moral people to do what is godly and moral. 
However, the overall public perception of the term liberty leans much more to the 
negative or civil-libertarian side of the equation, where religious liberty is seen as the 
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ability of the individual or family to hold and practice their own faith without interference 
from others, so long as their practice does not violate the rights and liberties of others. 
Conclusion: The Christian Right in the Era of Trump 
In September 1999, after the failure of congressional Republicans’ attempt to 
remove President Bill Clinton from office for his conduct in the aftermath of the Monica 
Lewinsky affair—an attempt strongly supported by the leading lights of the Christian 
Right at the time—the influential evangelical magazine Christianity Today devoted an 
entire issue to questioning “Is the Religious Right Finished?”—a question sparked by the 
thesis of a book by former Falwell lieutenants Cal Thomas and Ed Dobson. While several 
other leaders of the movement at the time, including Ralph Reed, Charles Colson, and 
Jerry Falwell, continued to insist that the Christian Right’s cultural mandate remained in 
full force and that there was still a prospect for winning the culture war, movement 
founder Paul Weyrich took the opposite tack, arguing that while the conservative 
movement had seen electoral success, it had not translated into success for the social 
conservative agenda—because the culture war had already been lost: 
I no longer believe that there is a moral majority. I believe that we 
probably have lost the culture war. That doesn't mean the war is not going 
to continue and that it isn't going to be fought on other fronts. But in terms 
of society in general, we have lost. This is why, even when we win in 
politics, our victories fail to translate into the kind of policies we believe 
are important. 
Therefore, what seems to me a legitimate strategy for us to follow is to 
look at ways to separate ourselves from the institutions that have been 
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captured by the ideology of Political Correctness, or by other enemies of 
our traditional culture.184 
Weyrich’s pessimism was somewhat short-lived, as the election of the openly-evangelical 
George W. Bush cheered the Christian Right after the disappointment of the Clinton 
years. But as Barack Obama won two terms as president, and as LGBT marriage equality 
experienced one win after another in the courts, the more culturally-expansive rhetorics 
of the 1990s and 2000s have been steadily supplanted—at least in terms of public-policy 
priorities—by the concern for religious liberty.  
Multiple commentators on religion and politics have identified this tactical shift, 
particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell and 
the ongoing attempts by the Christian Right on the state and local level to exempt 
business owners and public officials from laws prohibiting discrimination against LGBT 
people or requiring government acknowledgement of same-sex marriages. The main 
public-policy priority of the religious-liberty movement is to lay out enclaves for 
conservative religion by limiting the reach of government (and particularly the federal 
government) on their private property or within their own private spheres, ensuring that 
they will enjoy the freedom to live out their values without government interference or 
coercion.185 As journalist Elizabeth Bruenig put it in her analysis of Mike Huckabee’s 
2016 presidential campaign, the prioritization of religious-liberty laws indicated that 
Huckabee’s (and the movement’s) goals were “markedly foreshortened,” seeking to 
“create enclaves of protection for the practice of conservative Christianity” rather than 
“rescue America wholesale.”186  
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In other words, Bruenig sees this shift in tactics as a complete turn from the 
culturally-expansive mission laid out by Schaeffer, in which there is no distinction 
between religious/private spaces and secular/public ones; to Schaeffer, it is the 
Christian’s mission to sacralize the whole of culture and permeate it with Christian 
values, creating a cultural environment in which freedom with form can ensure prosperity 
and blessing from God. The notion of an entire culture in covenant with God, so 
prevalent throughout Marshall and Manuel’s histories of the United States and 
throughout the evangelical reading of the Cosmic Narrative, is at odds with the short-term 
goal of the religious-liberty movement, which represents a return to the attitude of the 
evangelicals’ Fundamentalist forebears: to separate from a fallen and depraved culture so 
that they can live holy and pure lives, awaiting Christ’s return in glory. To Bruenig’s 
eyes, the religious-liberty movement represents a tacit admission by the Christian Right 
that they have permanently lost the culture war. 
Political commentator Ed Kilgore reads this phenomenon differently; instead of 
seeing the religious-liberty movement as a shift in the overall goals of the Christian 
Right, he argues that the push for religious liberty laws is a shift in tactics, while the 
overall goal of Christianizing the culture remains. In other words, the push for religious 
liberty represents a new phase of the culture wars, rather than surrender by the losing 
side; the Christian Right is seeking not to create enclaves for their values, but rather 
beach-heads, which can serve as a base for expansion and growth.187 Pointing to the 
widespread acceptance of religious-liberty language and culture-war tropes among the 
(then) 2016 Republican presidential primary field, Kilgore argued that the culture wars 
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remain alive and well within the conservative movement, even if they were represented 
by the tactical shift to a religious-liberty strategy. 
The dissonances between the Cosmic and American Narratives regarding the 
future of the American experiment (and, indeed, the future of all human endeavor) create 
spaces for rhetorical flexibility as well as contradiction; because the narratives contain 
positive and negative visions for the future of the human institutions of the nation, rhetors 
have the tools to suggest that the nation is constantly hanging on the precipice, with the 
decisions of the present moment representing a critical turning point not only for the 
present generation, but implicitly for the entire future of the cosmos. And by reading the 
symbols of Americanism as a coded language representing Christian domination and by 
demonizing the secular-humanist “other,” the Christian Right has been able to resolve 
issues of intramovement identity and circumference. The increasing use of the language 
of religious liberty has enabled Christian Right rhetors to expand the circumference of 
consubstantiation even further, by presenting Mormons and Catholics as similarly 
aggrieved and under threat from the increasing power of the enemy. 
It is noteworthy that in the 1999 Christianity Today column I highlighted earlier, 
Paul Weyrich characterized the victor of the culture wars, the antagonist of the Christian 
Right, as “the ideology of Political Correctness.”188 Negative rhetoric about “political 
correctness” abounded through the Christian Right literature of the 1990s and 2000s, as 
rhetors suggested that it represented the linguistic arm of the secular-humanist agenda. 
Political correctness, D. James Kennedy argued, was infiltrating the teaching of history, 
erasing “any good that America has done” and removing any hint of the influence of 
Christianity on the nation.189 Robertson argued that political correctness represented an 
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attack on the family by the “new world order,” and that it was normalizing sins like 
adultery, fornication, and homosexuality.190 Tim and Beverly LaHaye wrote that political 
correctness was leading people to disdain the “wholesome kind of lifestyle” of previous 
generations, and (Tim) LaHaye and Hindson argued that political correctness was 
destroying Western culture entirely by removing Christian morality from the culture's 
language.191 
In a rhetorical context such as that, the religious-liberty movement could easily be 
seen as the final battle against the forces of political correctness and their efforts to 
control not only the language people use, but also the way they behave; to a Christian 
Right adherent, laws requiring Christian bakers or florists to serve same-sex weddings, or 
laws requiring county clerks to sign off on same-sex civil marriages, represent yet 
another encroachment by the forces of “political correctness” into the lives of traditional 
Christians. 
Perhaps this explains evangelical Christians’ general support for Donald Trump in 
the 2016 presidential election—a relationship that will certainly be a major topic of 
discussion among future rhetorical scholars as they analyze the 2016 election. Though 
evangelicals’ relationship with Trump was not nearly as strong as the relationship they 
had with other 2016 contenders like Bobby Jindal or Mike Huckabee, he still garnered 
significant support among evangelical Christians, netting the endorsements of evangelical 
leaders like Jerry Falwell, Jr., and Tony Perkins, and enjoying slightly more evangelical 
support in the polls than Mitt Romney did at a similar point in his 2012 campaign.192 The 
depth of Trump’s evangelical support has mystified some political commentators, who 
see him as the candidate of the 2016 field who would have been least appealing to the 
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Christian Right in many ways. Trump has proudly engaged in numerous extramarital 
dalliances on his way to his third marriage (to a former model who is decades younger 
than he is), his culture-war bona-fides of opposition to abortion and LGBT marriage 
equality are shaky at best, he enjoys an ostentatious and luxurious lifestyle in New York 
City that seems completely at odds with the “wholesome kind of lifestyle” celebrated by 
Christian Right commentators of the past like the LaHayes, and where he has expressed 
his nominally-Christian beliefs, he has revealed an understanding of Christian theology 
that is flawed especially by evangelical standards. The perspective offered by this project 
might offer several potentially fruitful starting points for understanding this relationship. 
In justifying their support for Trump, several prominent evangelicals have 
engaged in typological arguments, reading history backward (as in the Cosmic Narrative) 
as well as forward. In his endorsement of Trump in March 2016, Jerry Falwell, Jr. drew a 
typological comparison between Trump and the biblical character of King David: a man 
who, despite his personal flaws, nevertheless earnestly sought after God and received 
God’s blessing as a result.193 Similarly, Lance Wallnau (originator of Seven Mountains 
Dominionism) suggested that Trump is a latter-day Cyrus, the biblical Persian king who 
allowed the exiled Israelites to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple; while Cyrus 
would remain a “heathen king” (in Wallnau’s words), he nevertheless served as God’s 
“anointed” to restore Israel, just as Trump, while not a Christian himself, represented a 
“direct promise to the church and restoration to society.”194 
Wallnau also explicitly alludes to the notion that Christians are “losing influence” 
in society, as a “powerful elite” in the “peak institutions of government, law, academia, 
journalism, banking, and entertainment” are holding the gates and keeping the Christian 
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majority out of those arenas, in part by demonizing conservative Christians using the 
terms of political correctness.195 One of the themes of Trump’s campaign has been his 
opposition to political correctness. The very first event of his campaign featured a tirade 
against Mexican immigrants that easily transgressed the boundaries of “politically 
correct” campaign rhetoric, and the pattern of his campaign ever since has been to find 
new and different ways to break the “rules” of ordinary political campaign rhetoric. He 
has ridiculed a physically-disabled reporter,196 engaged in sexist attacks against his 
female critics197, and railed against Muslims (and particularly the Muslim parents of a 
U.S. Soldier killed in Iraq, who spoke at the Democratic National Convention).198  
Could Trump’s ongoing quest to transgress the boundaries of acceptable discourse 
in the 2016 election be a major factor in his appeal to Christian Right rhetors, who see 
themselves as consubstantial with him as he is subjected to a chorus of critique from the 
national press, the “establishment” of both political parties, and other cultural elites? 
Could they see the hope that their beliefs, which they also characterize as “politically 
incorrect,” could be given more expression and space by his relentless attacks on the 
edifice of political correctness? As Trump promises his supporters that “we are going to 
say ‘Merry Christmas’ again,” (as opposed to “Happy Holidays”), do evangelical 
Christians see a promise that Christianity will be restored to its position at the top of the 
culture’s religious hierarchy, or that the “true” meaning of American civil-religious 
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